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ABSTRACT  
 
Offshore methane hydrates present a potentially abundant source of energy and 
fresh water and may open new pathways to green energy. However, there are 
certain novel harms and hazards present within the circumstances of developing 
and producing offshore methane hydrates. Both cataclysmic and non-cataclysmic 
hazards must be integrated into policy planning for the onset of this new energy 
resource. 
The study proceeds in four parts. The first part of the study provides an 
introduction to the scientific, engineering and commercial characteristics of offshore 
methane hydrate projects. It also provides reviews of both the potential benefits and 
the potential hazards of offshore methane hydrates.  
The second part of the study provides a review of the law and economics 
theory of accident law as applied to environmental accidents. Rules of civil liability 
are reviewed to determine when strict liability or negligence might be efficiently 
employed in risk governance. Further, similar reviews are developed for public and 
private regulation. A scientific review of the circumstances of offshore methane 
hydrates finds that the optimal set of rules is a combination of a strict liability 
paradigm in complementary implementation of public regulations.  
The third part examines existing laws and conventions to determine which 
might be applicable to offshore methane hydrates. The study also reviews if their 
risk governance strategies are in accordance with the recommendations from the 
second part of the study. It is found that most of the evaluated laws do follow a 
similar risk governance strategy of strict liability accompanied by public regulation, 
but that many of the current laws to address offshore oil and gas hazards would not 
interface with the particular circumstances of methane hydrates.  
In the fourth part of the study, a summary of the three previous parts is 
presented and recommendations are made as how to update the existing legal 
frameworks to accommodate the onset of offshore methane hydrate development 
and production. 
  
  
4_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
  
5_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
   
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
This dissertation benefitted from many helping hands, although many gave 
assistance years before it was begun. 
I am in profound thanks to the efforts of Professor Alessandra Arcuri, Professor 
Louis T. Visscher, and Professor Stefan Weishaar to read and review my 
dissertation. From their copious notes and comments, their depth of understanding 
and insight into my research efforts was a blessing to receive.  
But this dissertation would not have been possible without the kindness and 
invitation of Professor Michael Faure. His steadiness at the helm as I struggled to 
make progress and to keep up with his intellectual pace was always a relief to this 
student. His comments and suggested edits, which often sent me racing to the 
library, tended an education that had been left incomplete. It is due to the 
stewardship of Michael Faure, and to his family that supported his attentions on my 
studies, that this dissertation was possible. 
There are many more in mind and memory that could and should be thanked, I 
only draw short as to prevent my words from adding another 10,000 words to an 
already too long dissertation. 
  
6_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
 
  
7_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
   
 
DEDICATION  
This dissertation would not be possible, nor would it hold meaning, without the 
loving support of my Bokhee Kang and of my Benjamin Kang Partain.  
To the long nights while I typed and typed, to the long days when I had to retreat to 
read and learn, to those days when they saw me still up when they awoke, I thank 
them for every hug and kiss of support. Now that this project is drawing close, I 
hope we will now be able to take more bicycles rides together and laugh over 
adventures taken. 
I hope that this effort will make them proud, for I am so very proud of them. 
 
  
8_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
    
9_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R. A. Partain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mechanism Design for the Fiery Ice: 
 
Civil Liability and Regulations for the Efficient 
Governance of the Environmental Hazards from 
Offshore Methane Hydrate Operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
10_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Roy A. Partain, 2014  
11_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Dissertation Announcement iii 
Supervisors and Assessment Committee iv 
Abstract  v 
Acknowledgements vii 
Dedication  ix 
Table of Contents xi 
List of Laws, Conventions, and Regulations xxi 
List of Abbreviations xxv 
 
 
 
PART 1:  OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 
1. The dawn of methane hydrates as an energy source 1 
2. Major actors in offshore methane hydrates 4 
3. Goals of this Study 6 
4. Structure of study 7 
CHAPTER 2: PRIMER ON METHANE HYDRATES 9 
1. Non-technical introduction to methane hydrates 9 
2. Chemistry of methane hydrates 12 
3. Scale of the resource 15 
4. Geology of methane hydrates 19 
5. Location of methane hydrates 22 
6. Summary and conclusions 26 
CHAPTER 3: METHANE HYDRATES AS AN ENERGY RESOURCE 29 
1. Methane as a green energy source 29 
2. Economics of methane hydrates projects 31 
2.1. Economics of methane hydrates 31 
2.2. Discount rates and time sensitivity of costs 33 
3. Methane hydrate engineering 34 
3.1. Methods of extraction 35 
3.2. Example typical installation 37 
3.3. Recent production tests 38 
4. National Research Programs and Agendas 40 
4.1. Japan 42 
4.2. South Korea 44 
4.3. United States of America and Canada 45 
12_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
4.4. China 47 
4.5. India 48 
5. Other benefits of methane hydrates 49 
5.1. Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) 49 
5.2. Production of hydrogen fuel 50 
5.3. Co-production of fresh water 50 
5.4. Replacement of LNG with GTS shipping 51 
6. Summary and conclusions 52 
CHAPTER 4: HAZARDS OF OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES 57 
1. Impacted communities 58 
2. Life-cycle risk analysis 60 
2.1. Four discernible stages of risk 60 
2.1.1. Exploration 61 
2.1.2. Development 61 
2.1.3. Production 62 
2.1.4. Abandonment and sequestration 63 
2.2. Other risks and considerations 64 
2.2.1. Field choice 64 
2.2.2. High ambient risks 64 
2.2.3. Sovereign immune actors and de facto  
externalized costs 65 
3. Non-cataclysmic Hazards 65 
3.1. Venting of methane to the atmosphere 66 
3.2. Damages from methane seepage and ventings 69 
3.3. Acts that enable seeping and venting of methane 72 
3.3.1. Actions that make methane available 73 
3.3.2. Actions that provide a means of leakage 75 
4. Cataclysmic methane events 76 
4.1. Sudden massive venting 77 
4.2. Subsea landslides, tsunamis, and earthquakes 78 
5. Oil spills and deep ocean eruptions are distinguishable 81 
5.1. Marine oil spills 81 
5.2. Deep ocean eruptions 83 
6. Summary and conclusions 85 
 
 
 
PART 2:  GOVERNANCE OF ACCIDENTAL RISKS 91 
CHAPTER 5: RULES OF CIVIL LIABILITY 93 
1. Rules of civil liability to govern accidental harms 94 
1.1. Prioritizing accident reduction over compensation 95 
13_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
   
1.2. Choice of instrument: strict liability versus negligence 97 
2. When strict liability is preferable 98 
2.1. Unilateral accidents – strict liability efficiently sets both  
precaution and activity levels 99 
2.2. Abnormally hazardous activities 101 
2.2.1. Controlling tortfeasor with strict liability in bilateral  
accidents 102 
2.2.2. Landes Posner strict liability conditions 105 
2.2.3. Disproportionate risks to benefits 106 
2.3. Strict liability enables decentralization 107 
2.4. In the face of uncertainties 108 
2.4.1. Uncertain ex ante duty of care 108 
2.4.2. Incentives for safety innovation 108 
2.4.3. Complex interactions of precaution and activity levels 109 
2.5. When transaction costs of justice are critical 110 
3. When negligence is preferable 112 
3.1. Imperfect Tortfeasors 114 
3.1.1. Actors with risk aversion or incomplete insurance 114 
3.1.2. Insolvency 116 
3.1.3. Strategic avoidance plus precaution 117 
3.1.4. Defects of optimism and pessimism 117 
3.2. Imperfect or inaccurate damages 118 
3.2.1. Complexity and strict liability 119 
3.2.2. Complexity and negligence 120 
3.3. Need for data transparency 121 
3.4. Balancing of externalized costs and benefits 122 
4. Conclusion 124 
CHAPTER 6: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATION 127 
1. On regulations 128 
2. Benefits of positive regulations 130 
2.1. Information asymmetry 131 
2.2. Information revealing mechanisms 132 
2.3. Insolvency risk 135 
2.4. Underdeterrence: the effective absence of lawsuit threat 137 
2.5. Institutional Capacity 139 
3. Problems of Regulation 140 
3.1. Why efficiency may be lacking 140 
3.2. Regulatory compliance as a defense from liability 142 
4. Coordination of liability rules and regulations 143 
4.1. Civil liabilities defend against agency costs and lobby capture 145 
4.2. Revelation of hidden information 146 
4.3. Regulatory noncompliance as negligence per se 147 
4.4. Coordinated use of civil liability and regulations 147 
4.5. Grounds for deference to rules of civil liability 148 
4.6. Potential symmetries of policy effects 150 
14_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
5. Private regulation and market-based incentives 150 
5.1. Standard setting by private groups 150 
5.2. Nimbleness and flexibility of private regulation 152 
5.3. Informational advantages of private regulation 153 
5.4. Perceived caveats on private regulation 153 
6. Conclusion – Regulations in harmony with rules of civil liability 156 
CHAPTER 7: GOVERNING WITH STRICT LIABILITY  
AND REGULATIONS 159 
1. The character of offshore methane hydrate accidents 160 
2. Governing offshore methane hydrates with strict liability 161 
2.1. Arguments for applying strict liability to offshore  
methane hydrates 161 
2.1.1. The unilateral character of offshore methane  
hydrate projects 161 
2.1.2. Governing abnormally hazardous activities 161 
2.1.3. Achieving decentralization 164 
2.1.4. Handling uncertain ex ante duty of care 165 
2.1.5. Provide incentives for safety innovations 166 
2.1.6. Protecting victims facing uncertain harms 166 
2.1.7. Minimizing the costs of justice 166 
2.2. Arguments for Applying Negligence to Offshore Methane Hydrates 167 
2.2.1. Lack of risk averse actors in offshore  
methane hydrate development 167 
2.2.2. Insolvency of operators 168 
2.2.3. Strategic operators: avoidance and precaution 169 
2.2.4. Behavioral operators of offshore methane  
hydrate projects 169 
2.2.5. Insurance markets and the operators of offshore  
methane hydrate projects 170 
2.2.6. Addressing imperfect or inaccurate sanctions  
against methane hydrate accidents 171 
2.2.7. Need for data transparency 172 
2.2.8. Balancing of externalized benefits and risks 172 
2.3. Complexity in Implementation 173 
2.3.1. Joint and several liability 173 
2.3.2. Causality: threshold or proportionate 175 
2.3.3. Difficulties of long-term liability issues. 177 
2.3.4. Real world overlap in implementations of strict  
liability and negligence 180 
2.4. Conclusions – apply strict liability 181 
3. Governing offshore methane hydrates with regulations 182 
3.1. Regulations for offshore methane hydrates 182 
3.1.1. Information asymmetry 183 
3.1.2. Insolvency risk. 184 
3.1.3. Under-deterrence 185 
15_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
   
3.2. A role for private regulation or integrated regulatory design 187 
3.3. Complementing strict liability with regulations 188 
4. Conclusion – governing with regulations and strict liability 189 
 
 
 
PART 3:  REVIEW OF EXISTING LAWS 193 
CHAPTER 8: LAWS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 195 
1. Introduction 195 
2. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 196 
2.1. Rules on Mineral Exploitation 196 
2.2. Protection of the Environment 198 
2.3. Risk governance under UNCLOS 200 
3. Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 201 
3.1. Exclusion of certain hydrocarbon accidents 201 
3.2. Application to onshore facilities of offshore installations 202 
3.3. Risk governance under UNCTEIA 202 
4. Framework Convention on Climate Change 204 
4.1. Governance of anthropogenic climate change 204 
4.2. Governance of regulatory character 205 
4.3. Risk governance under the UNFCCC 207 
5. Espoo EIA Convention 208 
6. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 209 
6.1. Risk governance under Rio Declaration 211 
7. Conclusion 212 
CHAPTER 9: REGIONAL MARINE PACTS AND OIL SPILL PACTS 215 
1. Regional Marine Conventions 215 
1.1. OSPAR Convention (North East Atlantic Ocean) 216 
1.2. Bonn Agreement (North Sea) 218 
1.3. Barcelona Convention (Mediterranean Sea) 220 
1.4. Helsinki Convention (Baltic Sea) 223 
1.5. Risk governance under the regional marine conventions 224 
2. International Oil Spill Conventions 225 
2.1. A Brief History of Marine Oil Spill Laws 225 
2.2. Civil Liability Convention of 1992 227 
2.3. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution  
from Ships (MARPOL) 229 
2.4. International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness,  
Response, and Cooperation (OPRC) 231 
2.5. Risk governance under international oil spill conventions 232 
3. Summary and conclusions 232 
16_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
CHAPTER 10: LAWS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 237 
1. The EIA Directive 238 
1.1. Offshore methane hydrates qualified under Annex I 239 
1.2. Offshore methane hydrates qualified under Annex II 241 
1.3. Risk governance within the EIA Directive 243 
2. The SEA Directive 246 
3. Environmental Liability and Seveso III Directives 248 
3.1. Environmental Liability Directive 248 
3.1.1. Unsure applicability to methane hydrates 248 
3.1.1.1. Limited scope of environmental damages 248 
3.1.1.2. Lack of applicable Annex III activities 250 
3.1.1.3. Potential non-Annex III activities 250 
3.1.1.4. Exclusion of international conventions on  
civil liability 252 
3.1.2. Governance of risk within the ELD 252 
3.2. Seveso III Directive 253 
3.2.2. Inapplicability of Seveso III to offshore methane  
hydrates 254 
3.2.2. Risk Governance within Seveso III 254 
4. Offshore Oil and Gas Operations 255 
4.1. Applicability to offshore methane hydrates 256 
4.2. Risk governance within the Offshore Directive 257 
4.2.1. Call for a regulatory body 258 
4.2.2. Regulatory actions 259 
5. Carbon Capture and Sequestration 262 
5.1. Applicability to offshore methane hydrates 262 
5.2. Risk governance within the CCS Directive 263 
5.2.1. Assignments of liability 264 
5.2.2. Regulatory actions 264 
6. The Marine Framework 266 
6.1. Marine Strategy Framework Directive 266 
6.1.1. Applicability to offshore methane hydrates 267 
6.1.2 Risk governance within the MSF Directive 269 
6.2. Dangerous Substances Directive 270 
6.3. Water Framework Directive 271 
7. Greenhouse Gas Mechanism 272 
7.1. Applicability to offshore methane hydrates 272 
7.2. Governing risk within the Greenhouse gas mechanism 273 
8. Summary and conclusions 275 
CHAPTER 11: LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 279 
1. Introduction 279 
2. National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) 280 
3. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 281 
3.1. Applicability to offshore methane hydrates 282 
17_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
   
3.2. Risk governance within OSCLA 282 
4. Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 283 
4.1. Inapplicability to offshore methane hydrates 284 
4.2. Risk governance under OPA 285 
5. Clean Water Act (CWA) 286 
5.1. Inapplicability to offshore methane hydrates 286 
5.2. Risk governance within the CWA 287 
6. Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 288 
7. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 288 
8. Clean Air Act (CAA) 289 
9. Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act (MHRDA) 289 
9.1. Risk governance under the MHRDA 290 
10. Conclusion 291 
 
 
 
PART 4:  CONCLUSION AND APPENDICES 295 
CHAPTER 12: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 297 
1. The potential impact of offshore methane hydrates 297 
1.1. Benefits of offshore methane hydrates 297 
1.2. Hazards of offshore methane hydrates 298 
2. Model governance of the risks from offshore methane hydrates 300 
2.1. A rule of strict liability should apply. 301 
2.2. Public and private regulations should be engaged 302 
2.3. Application of civil liability, public regulations  
and private regulations 305 
3. State of existing governance for offshore methane hydrate risks 305 
3.1. Laws of the UN 305 
3.2. Regional marine and other oil spill conventions 306 
3.3. Laws of the EU 307 
3.4. Laws of the U.S. 309 
4. Recommendations 310 
4.1. Emergent need for standards 310 
4.2. General recommendations 311 
5. Final conclusions 315 
APPENDICES 319 
I. Appendix I - Maps 319 
A. Statoil’s map of methane hydrates near  
European waters 319 
18_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
B. Mother Jones/The Atlantic Global Map of Methane  
Hydrate Locations 321 
C. Der Spiegel’s Global Map of Methane Hydrates,  
based on Klauda Sandler Map 323 
D. Klauda & Sandler 2005 Global Map of Methane  
Hydrate Distribution 325 
E. Ramana 2006 Map of Likely Methane Hydrate  
Deposits Near India 327 
II. Appendix II – Mathematical Notes 329 
A. Notes on Shavell’s Models 329 
B. Notes on Schäfer’s, et al., Models 337 
C. Notes on Hylton’s Models 343 
D. Notes on Nussim and Tabbach’s Models 355 
E. Notes on Nell and Richter’s Models 363 
F. Notes on Glachant’s Models 371 
III. Appendix III – Offshore Methane Hydrates and Climate  
Change Hazards 377 
IV. Appendix IV – References 389 
IV. Appendix V – Curriculum Vitae of Roy Andrew Partain 403 
 
19_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
   
  
20_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
  
21_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
   
 
LIST OF LAWS, CONVENTIONS, AND REGULATIONS  
1. United Nations 
i. 1982 United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea  
ii. 2008 United Nations Convention On The Transboundary Effects Of 
Industrial Accidents  
iii. United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change  
iv. The Kyoto Protocol To The UNFCCC  
v. UNECE Convention On Access To Information, Public Participation In 
Decision-Making And Access To Justice In Environmental Matters  
vi. UNECE Convention On Environmental Impact Assessment In A 
Transboundary Context  
vii. Rio Declaration Of Principles  
2. Regional Maritime Conventions 
i. OSPAR Convention  
ii. Convention For The Protection Of The Marine Environment And The 
Coastal Region Of The Mediterranean And Its Protocols. (Barcelona 
Convention.)  
iii. Agreement For Cooperation In Dealing With Pollution Of The North Seas 
By Oil And Other Harmful Substances. (Bonn Agreement.)  
iv. Convention On The Protection Of The Marine Environment Of The Baltic 
Sea Area, 1992. (Helsinki Convention).  
3. International Oil Spill Conventions 
i. International Convention For The Establishment Of An International Fund 
For Compensation For Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels, December 18, 2012)  
ii. International Convention On Civil Liability For Oil Pollution Damage 
(Brussels, November 29, 1969). (CLC)  
iii. The Tanker Owners’ Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability For Oil 
Pollution, (TOVALOP)  
iv. The Contract Regarding An Interim Supplement To Tanker Liability For 
Oil Pollution, (CRISTAL)  
v. International Convention For The Prevention Of Pollution From Ships, 
(MARPOL)  
vi. 1990 International Convention On Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response 
And Co-Operation, (OPRC)  
22_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
4. European Union Directives 
i. Directive 2011/92/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Of 
13 December 2011 On The Assessment Of The Effects Of Certain Public 
And Private Projects On The Environment  
ii. Directive 2001/42/EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Of 
27 June 2001 On The Assessment Of The Effects Of Certain Plans And 
Programmes On The Environment.  
iii. Directive 2013/30/ EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council 
Of 12 June 2013 On Safety Of Offshore Oil And Gas Operations And 
Amending Directive 2004/35/Ec.  
iv. Directive 2009/31/ EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council 
Of 23 April 2009 On The Geological Storage Of Carbon Dioxide And 
Amending Council Directive 85/337/ EEC, European Parliament And 
Council Directives 2000/60/ EC, 2001/80/ EC, 2004/35/ EC, 2006/12/ EC, 
2008/1/ EC And Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006.  
v. Directive 2008/56/ EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council 
Of 17 June 2008 Establishing A Framework For Community Action In The 
Field Of Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive).  
vi. Directive 2006/11/ EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council 
Of 15 February 2006 On Pollution Caused By Certain Dangerous 
Substances Discharged Into The Aquatic Environment Of The Community.  
vii. Directive 2000/60/ EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council 
Of 23 October 2000 Establishing A Framework For Community Action In 
The Field Of Water Policy. (Water Framework Directive.)  
viii. Directive 2004/35/Ce Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Of 
21 April 2004 On Environmental Liability With Regard To The Prevention 
And Remedying Of Environmental Damage. (ELD).  
ix. Directive 2009/147/ EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council 
On The Conservation Of Wild Birds. (Birds Directive)  
x. Council Directive 92/43/EEC Of 21 May 1992 On The Conservation Of 
Natural Habitats And Of Wild Fauna And Flora (Habitats Directive)  
xi. Directive 2012/18/ EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council 
Of 4 July 2012 On The Control Of Major-Accident Hazards Involving 
Dangerous Substances, Amending And Subsequently Repealing Council 
Directive 96/82/ EC Text With EEA Relevance (Seveso Iii)  
xii. Directive 2000/60/ EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council 
Establishing A Framework For Community Action In The Field Of Water 
Policy.  
23_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
   
5. European Union Decisions 
i. 94/69/Ec: Council Decision Of 15 December 1993 Concerning The 
Conclusion Of The United Nations Framework Convention On Climate 
Change.  
ii. 2002/358/EC: Council Decision Of 25 April 2002 Concerning The 
Approval, On Behalf Of The European Community, Of The Kyoto Protocol 
To The United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change And 
The Joint Fulfilment Of Commitments Thereunder.  
6. United States 
i. National Environmental Protection Act (Nepa)  
ii. Oil Pollution Act (OPA)  
iii. National Oil And Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan  
iv. Clean Air Act (CAA)  
v. Clean Water Act (CWA)  
vi. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)  
vii. Methane Hydrate Research And Development Act (MHRDA)  
viii. International Convention Relating To Intervention On The High Seas In 
Cases Of Oil Pollution Casualties  
  
24_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
  
25_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
   
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
$ When otherwise not clarified, one U.S. dollar  
AIST  Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and 
Technology  
ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nations  
B.C.E.  Before common era; Before Christ  
BHP  Benthic Hazard Planning  
BP  formerly British Petroleum, now just BP  
btu  British Thermal Unit  
C  Celsius degrees, when not in the form Cn  
Cn  An alkane; e.gs. C1is methane and C4 is butane  
CAA  Clean Air Act  
CCS  Carbon capture systems/sequestration  
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism  
CH4  Methane  
CLC  Civil Liability Convention of 1992  
CO2  Carbon dioxide  
CLC  Civil Liability Convention of 1969  
CERCLA  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act  
CRISTAL  Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for 
Oil Pollution  
CWA  Clean Water Act  
DARPA  The U.S.’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency  
DOE  U.S. Department of Energy  
EC  European Community  
ECO2  A proper name for an EU project to study offshore CCS injection  
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone, from UNCLOS  
EHR  Enhanced Hydrocarbon Recovery  
EIA  Environmental Impact Assessment  
EIA  The DOE’s Energy Information Administration  
ELD  Environmental Liability Directive of the EU  
EMSA  European Maritime Safety Agency  
ENAA  Japan’s Engineering Advancement Association of Japan  
EU  European Union  
FID  Financial Investment Decision  
GHDO  Korea’s Gas Hydrate Research and Development Organization  
GHG  Greenhouse gas, as defined under the Kyoto Protocol  
GTL  Gas-to-Liquids technology  
GTS  Gas-to-Solids technology  
26_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
GWP  Global warming potential  
H2O  Water  
H2SO4  Hydrogen sulfide  
HSZ  Hydrate stability zone  
IRCGH  The Indo-Russian Center for Gas Hydrates  
ISA  International Seabed Authority  
JMHEP  Japan Methane Hydrate Exploitation Program  
JOGMEC  Japan’s Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation  
KIGAM  Korea Institute of Geosciences and Mineral Resources  
kJ  kilo-joule  
KNOC  Korea National Oil Company  
LNG  Liquified Natural Gas  
LSHP  Littoral Surface Hazard Planning  
m3 cubic meter, a volumetric reference  
MARPOL  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, from the concept of marine pollution  
Mcf  Million cubic feet  
MH21  Japanese Research Consortium for Methane Hydrate Resources in 
Japan  
MHHP  Methane Hydrate Hazard Planning  
MMBtu  Million British Thermal Units  
MOCIE  Korea’s Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy  
NEPA  The U.S.’s National Environmental Protection Act  
NGHP  India’s National Gas Hydrate Program  
NGL  Natural gas liquids, such as propane and butane  
OCSLA  Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act  
OPA  The U.S.’s Oil Pollution Act  
OPRC  1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation  
OSPAR  The Convention for the Protection of the marine Environment of 
the North-East Atlantic (the ‘OSPAR Convention’)  
psia  Pounds per square inch absolute  
RCRA  Resource Conservation and Recovery Act  
SEA  Strategic Environment Assessment  
sH  The most complex hydrate lattice  
sI  The simple form of a methane hydrate lattice  
sII  A methane hydrate lattice that can hold NGLs  
SLP model  Shavell Landes Posner economic model of Tort Law  
SUGAR  Submarine Gashydratlagerst_tten: Erkundung, Abbau und 
Transport  
Tcf  Trillion cubic feet  
Tcm  Trillion cubic meters  
TOVALOP  Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil 
Pollution  
UNCED  United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(1992)  
27_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
   
UNCLOS  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas  
UNFCCC  United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate Change  
U.K.  The United Kingdom  
U.S.A. United States of America  
USD  United States dollar  
USGS  United States Geological Service  
VAT  Value added tax  
WFD  Water Framework Directive of the EU 
28_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
29_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
   
Part I 
 
Offshore Methane Hydrates 
  
30_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  
 
31_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“the economically viable production of gas from hydrates is not a 
“gold-in-the-ocean” scenario – that is, the prospect of gas hydrates 
contributing to the world’s energy portfolio is not an unreasonable 
scenario.”1  
 
1. The dawn of methane hydrates as an energy source 
Methane hydrates are a potential source of large amounts of methane that have 
previously gone undeveloped primarily because of technological shortfalls. 
However, progress has been made in the last several decades; the successful testing 
of continuously producing offshore wells was first accomplished in 2013. Given that 
the basic extraction technologies are now in place, focus in research has shifted to 
cost reductions and commercial feasibility. Reasonable estimates suggest that 
offshore methane hydrate installations may be operational in some locations by the 
year 2020.2 The commercial development of methane hydrate extraction projects 
may soon begin.  
The benefits of methane hydrate development are particularly of interest to 
those countries without domestic energy supplies; the development of methane 
hydrates takes on a strategic role in those cases and might not be as dependent on 
cost reductions and market forces. The potential benefits of methane hydrates 
include:  
x Methane hydrates are estimated to present at least double the resource 
base of traditional hydrocarbons.3  
 
1  M. R. Walsh et al., Preliminary Report on the Commercial Viability of Gas Production from Natural 
Gas Hydrates, 31 Energy Econ. 815, 815-823 (2009). 
2  See discussions on the emerging engineering know-how and expected feasibility of offshore 
methane hydrates in ch. 3. 
3  See ch. 2, sec. 3. 
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x Methane hydrates are found in many geographical locations otherwise 
lacking substantial energy reserves.4  
x Methane hydrates produce methane, which is often targeted as bridge to 
more green energy technologies.5  
x Methane hydrates co-produce fresh water and methane, the two 
ingredients required for producing hydrogen fuel. 6  
x Fresh water is co-produced alongside the extracted methane; for many 
coastal communities that water is much needed.7  
x The extraction of methane hydrates enables the sequestration of carbon 
dioxide to replace the missing methane molecules; this process can be a 
form of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS).8 
Methane hydrates lay off of almost every coast in the world. Reservoirs of methane 
hydrates are located in many offshore locations around the world, more broadly 
than conventional oil and gas assets.9  
These locations represent the potential to reduce the geo-political stress on 
energy supplies, especially for those countries remote from local energy reserves 
such as those in East Asia. Stability and surety of delivery will affect the market to 
reduce energy prices for those countries. Even if methane hydrates are more 
expensive to develop than conventional natural gas,10 what might not be economic 
in the U.S.A. may well be commercially attractive in Japan.11  
Methane hydrates also present a ‘greener’ option for fuel; the combustion of 
methane emits less carbon dioxide than coal and crude oil, and it emits far fewer 
other hazardous or undesirable substances.12 Natural gas is a desirable fuel source 
to replace the dangers, both climatic and health, of coal and crude oil.  
 
4  See id., sec. 5.  
5  See id., sec. 2. See also the discussion on the role of methane hydrate production to impact on 
climate change risks, infra, at Appendix III. 
6  See id.. See also ch. 3, sec. 5.2. 
7  See id., sec. 5.3. 
8  See id., sec. 5.1.  
9  See ch. 2, sec. 5. 
10  Early estimates suggest that currently methane hydrates may be 15% to 20% more costly to 
produce than conventional natural gas fields, but those costs differentials are decreasing. See 
ch. 3, sec. 2.1. 
11  Thus, one must be considerate of more than one economic market when considering the 
potential development of offshore methane hydrates. The price of natural gas is not evenly 
distributed as a global commodity, unlike oil. E.g., in the last five years, the U.S. has faced 
domestic natural gas prices under $5 MMBtu, but Japan has faced LNG price floors of $8 
MMBtu since before 2007 and since 2011 that price floor has increased to $14 MMBtu. See the 
World LNG Report - 2013 Edition. International Gas Union. Office of the Secretary General. 
Fornebu, Norway. 2013, p. 14. Available at www.igu.org/gas-
knowhow/.../igu.../IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf . See also Global natural gas prices 
vary considerably. U.S. Energy Information Agency. Available at 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=3310 . 
12  See ch. 3, sec. 1. See also the discussion on the role of methane hydrate production to impact on 
climate change risks, infra, at Appendix III. 
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Thus it should come as no surprise that the governments of Japan, Korea, and 
China have targeted the commercial development of methane hydrates as national 
goals to help displace dirty coal and crude oil and to better secure domestic energy 
supplies; currently Japan and South Korea import over 98% of their energy 
supplies.13 These countries see the development of methane hydrates as solution 
sets to questions of energy supply, fiscal revenue sourcing, and means of air 
pollution abatement.  
For example, Japan relies heavily on natural gas imports. Japan consumes 
approximately 0.125 Tcm of natural gas annually; almost all of those natural gas 
volumes were delivered by importing LNG.14  Japan’s geophysical surveys forecast 
that Japan’s offshore Nankai Trough might contain 50.4 Tcm of methane.15 If Japan 
consumed that offshore supply of methane hydrates at its current rate of 1/8th Tcm 
per year, then Japan might possess a domestic multi-century supply of natural gas.16 
Thus, development of the methane hydrate reserves in the Nankai Trough could 
substantially improve Japan’s national energy security and potentially enable its 
economic expansion.   
So, one might reasonably ask, why are methane hydrate resources not already 
developed and integrated into the broader energy markets? While crude oil and 
conventional natural gas have been exploited since the 1800s, both the natural 
abundance of methane hydrates and their potential as an energy resource were only 
discovered in recent decades.17 Thus, the whole potential of methane hydrates is 
novel; but governments and industry are responding quickly. 18 Because the 
extraction of offshore methane hydrates is very different from methods used for 
traditional crude oil and natural gas, 19 there were technological challenges that 
needed to be overcome. However, as the offshore tests of 2013 indicated, these 
technological challenges are falling rapidly to the wayside.20 So, methane hydrates 
were undiscovered, then new but very challenging, and now are almost 
commercially viable as an energy resource. 
 
13  Y. F. Makogon, S. A. Holditch & T. Y.Makogon, Natural Gas-Hydrates—A Potential Energy 
Source for the 21st Century, 56 J. Petroleum Sci. & Engineering 14, 15 (2007).  
14  Original citation was to 4,387.5 billion cubic feet of natural gas. See Japan: Country Analysis. 
U.S. Energy Information Agency. Available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-
data.cfm?fips=JA||http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=JA . 
15  See ch. 2, sec. 5, see also ch. 3, sec. 4.1. 
16  J. Marcelle-De Silva & R. Dawe, Towards Commercial Gas Production from Hydrate 
Deposits, 4 Energies 215, 223 (2011). The original reference was to 1,800 Tcf, which equates to 
50.4 Tcm. That is the energy equivalent of 332.6 billion barrels of oil; contrast that with the 
estimated oil reserves of Saudi Arabia which are reported by the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration as 265 billion barrels of oil. See EIA Country Analysis Brief: Saudi Arabia. 
Available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=SA . 
17  See ch. 2, sec. 1. 
18  See ch. 3, sec. 4. 
19  See id., sec. 3. 
20  See id. 
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However, there are substantial environmental and safety risks associated with 
the development and extraction of offshore methane hydrates.21 In the less dramatic 
scenarios, seabed disruptions could result in persistent venting or seeping of 
methane into the ocean. Such leakages of methane from the hydrate deposit layers 
cold cause a variety of environmental damages and nuisance damages to both the 
marine biota and to human communities living nearby.  
In more dramatic scenarios, destabilized methane hydrate deposits could shear 
and cleave off in large cross sections, sending hydrates and sediments sliding across 
the ocean floor. This type of event could result in subsea landslides, earthquakes, or 
tsunamis. The damage and injuries from such events could be spread for hundreds 
of kilometers in radius. Also, should there be an energetic venting of methane, 
under either type of accident, the methane could reach the atmosphere and burn; 
one observed event saw flames hundreds of meters high jetting above the ocean’s 
surface.22 Thus, for all of the potential benefits of offshore methane hydrates, there 
are substantial risks and hazards to contemplate. For potential entrepreneurs and 
operators of offshore methane hydrates, there is a present lack of legal certainty to 
underlay their decision-making and investment decisions.23 
Ergo, there are legal challenges to address such as the proper provision of risk 
governance mechanisms for the novel risks and hazards poised by the operation of 
offshore methane hydrate projects. This study attempts to address some of these 
concerns. This study primarily focuses on the potential to develop optimal risk 
governance mechanisms for the risks and hazards from the development of offshore 
methane hydrate projects.  The instruments of civil liability rules, public regulation, 
and private regulations are examined for their capacity to efficiently set the optimal 
standards for the development of offshore methane hydrates. 
2. Major actors in offshore methane hydrates 
The major actors in the international development of methane hydrates are a 
mixture of technological innovators, resources owners and impacted communities. 
Additionally, due to the anthropogenic climate change risk posed by released 
methane and carbon dioxide, the broader global community is affected by the 
potential hazards.  
Most of the technology owners are centralized within a distinct group of 
nations with substantial national government commitments to the development of 
the commercial feasibility of methane hydrates. The leading national investors in 
 
21  See the discussion on the role of methane hydrate production to impact on climate change 
risks, infra, at Appendix III. 
22  See ch. 4, sec. 3.1.   
23  “Uncertainty is of course an inherent part of entrepreneurial activity and as such not a bad 
thing.” However, even risk takers have need of legal certainty and have the right to certainty 
as regards to the legal consequences of those risky activities. Similarly, such actors have 
expectations of non-retroactivity, the protection of acquired rights (such as licenses), and of 
legitimate expectations. M. Peeters, & S. Weishaar, Exploring Uncertainties in the EU ETS: 
Learning by Doing Continues beyond 2012, 3 Carbon & Climate L. Rev. 88, at Sec. 1.2. (2009). 
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methane hydrate technology, as far as can be determined with public documents, 
are eight countries: Canada, China, India, Japan, Norway, Russia, South Korea, and 
the United States. The United Kingdom does have some alignment through BP’s 
and Royal Dutch Shell’s research activities, but to a lesser extent than one might 
otherwise expect. Outside of the major Anglo-American oil companies, the overlap 
of national oil companies and national security interests often results in deeply 
coordinated behaviors; in the case of companies fully owned by their respective 
national governments the alignment is so seamless as to suggest that the corporate 
investment is more properly characterized as governmental investment. This is not 
to suggest that other countries do not have strategic interests and investments in 
methane hydrates, but in addition to pure national budgetary support, the publicly 
available data strongly suggest that the researchers from these countries both 
publish more often and appear to have more research missions and experimental 
projects to achieve those goals.  
The resource owner list is extensive, and perhaps best described with visual 
maps.24 Almost every coastal state and every single arctic state has methane hydrate 
assets. Practically every coastal member of the European Union is likely to have 
methane hydrates within their EEZ. Almost the whole eastern and western 
coastlines of North America have significant methane hydrate deposits. The 
Caribbean has multiple locations, as does the general Gulf of Mexico.  
The list of impacted countries is functionally the same list, plus the few 
neighboring coastal countries without hydrates. The impacted communities, on the 
other hand, will primarily be the coastal communities of those resource-owning 
countries. Those coastal communities will sometimes align with the financial and 
governmental centers of activities but sometimes they will be functionally distant 
from central decisions makers.  
Many of the categories can overlap, as in Japan. First, as a technology owner, 
the Japanese government has identified national and industrial security issues in 
sustainable and locally sourced energy supplies. Japanese corporations have joined 
with governmental and academic researchers to develop the technologies necessary 
for the onset of commercial methane hydrate operations.  
Second, as a resource owner, once the commercial operations begin, revenues 
from the sale of the methane will broadly impact both the corporate sector and 
governmental fiscal abilities. Japanese corporations will enjoy smoother and likely 
cheaper natural gas cost structures for their industrial needs. The Japanese 
government should expect to earn royalties and production/severance taxes from 
the operators; plus whatever income tax and VAT-type taxes may incrementally fall 
from the new industrial arrangements. Even local communities that provide 
infrastructural support to the new industrial operations stand to share in revenues, 
much as Houston or Aberdeen does today, even without revenue sharing 
arrangements.  
Third, as an impacted community, the coastal communities of Japan face 
potential direct impacts from the environmental hazards posed by commercial 
 
24  See detailed list, infra, at ch. 2, sec. 5, and see maps in the Appendix I. 
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methane hydrate operations. The rest of Japan could be indirectly impacted as 
marine food-stocks become impacted and if tsunami or earthquake events cause 
industrial slowdowns, as was seen in the Fukushima experience. An identical tale 
could be told of countries like the United States or Norway.  
3. Goals of this study and the research question 
The commercial development of offshore methane hydrates promises both great 
opportunities and dangerous challenges.  
This study proposes to focus on offshore methane hydrates because they are 
likely to come into production prior to onshore supplies, because the global 
availability of offshore methane hydrates is much greater than onshore, and 
ultimately, because the known risks of onshore methane hydrates are generally 
considered more safe than offshore development of methane hydrates.25  
The potential upside includes abundant energy supplies, a global 
diversification of energy sources, potential freshwater supplies, potential 
sequestration of greenhouse gases, and sustainable revenues for many developing 
nations. The risks include increased greenhouse gas emissions, large-scale 
combustion events, offshore landslides that could result in tsunamis or earthquakes, 
and general nuisance to coastal communities. The regulatory and societal challenge 
is to find an efficient means of balancing those risk and rewards so that 
communities can rationally chose optimal levels of commercial development of 
methane hydrates.  
The primary research question of this study is how to best facilitate optimal 
levels of safety in the operations of offshore methane hydrate installations or 
projects; which legal mechanisms would provide the optimal set of incentives: a 
civil liability rule of negligence, a civil liability rule of strict liability, public 
regulations, or private regulations? 26  Are there reasons that complementary 
implementations of more than one of the potential mechanisms could be preferable 
to the singular implementation of just one of the mechanisms? And finally, if a set of 
mechanisms could be chosen, how might the policy maker best develop the 
necessary mechanisms, given the existing state of laws and conventions? 
 
25  Onshore methane hydrates are found in Arctic permafrost locations. They provide no known 
risks of tsunamis or earthquakes. They might suffer from similar reservoir disturbances as 
offshore methane hydrates, see ch. 4, that could lead to venting or seepage of methane, but 
their onshore presence facilitates on-going surveillance and monitoring. Further, once 
discovered, onshore instability zones could be more readily assessed for damage and 
potentially remedied.  Onshore methane hydrates are also limited to a small number of Arctic 
countries, primarily Russia, Canada, and the U.S.  
26  Following Shavell description for unilateral accidents, optimal social welfare is the balancing 
of the various marginal costs and benefits to maximize social welfare.  “For social welfare to 
be maximized, an injurer must … choose a level of care that is commensurate with the effect 
of care in reducing accident losses and with its costs. … the injurer should also select his level 
of activity appropriately … at the level that appropriately balances the utility he obtains 
against the additional risks he creates and the costs of care.” S. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 194 (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004) 
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4. Structure of study 
This study will proceed in four stages.  
In Part I, the study will present an exploration of the science, benefits, and 
hazards of offshore methane hydrates. A thorough review of the chemistry and 
physics of methane hydrates is presented. The abundance of methane hydrates will 
also be discussed. Their abundance as a mineral will be explored as well as their 
geological and geographical distribution will be presented. Then, the art of 
extracting and producing offshore methane hydrates will be explored. Thereafter a 
presentation will be made on the potential harms and hazards that can result from 
the development of offshore methane hydrates. There are both cataclysmic hazards 
and non-cataclysmic hazards present with the operation of offshore methane 
hydrate projects; both types of risk are discussed in depth. 
In Part II, a review of theoretical models from Law & Economics is provided to 
demonstrate the progress made by researchers to broaden and strengthen the utility 
of their models of accident law and tort law. In particular, a review of the rules of 
civil liability is made in depth; under which circumstances would strict liability be 
efficient and under what circumstances would a rule of negligence be efficient. 
Thereafter, a study is made of public regulation and under what circumstances 
public regulations might be efficient. A second stage of that analysis examines when 
public regulations might be operated in complementary implementation to rules of 
civil liability. Finally, a study of which rules of governance might be best applied to 
the particular circumstances of offshore methane hydrates is developed. It is found 
that a rule of strict liability implemented complementarily with public regulations 
would provide the optimal mix of risk governance for offshore methane hydrates. 
In Part III, the study will review existing laws and conventions to determine (i) 
if those rules would be applicable to offshore methane hydrate project and (ii) if 
those rules apply the same types of risk governance as suggested in Part II. Four 
categories of laws and conventions will be examined: (i) UN conventions, (ii) 
international or regional conventions to protect marine environments, (iii) EU laws, 
and (iv) federal laws of the U.S.  
In Part IV the study will review the discoveries of the first three parts and 
provide analysis of how to potentially address the gaps between the theoretical 
models developed in the second part and the existing laws and conventions as 
discussed in the third part. It will be shown that generally speaking most of the 
examined existing laws and conventions would offer similar risk governance 
strategies to those recommended in this study but that those rules rarely match the 
particular circumstances of offshore methane hydrates. It will be suggested that the 
existing laws and conventions could be revised or extended to better support the 
optimal risk governance of offshore methane hydrates. Recommendations on how 
to best make those changes to the laws are presented in the final chapter. It is 
advised that the most efficient way to update the laws is to amend those laws 
already in place and in effect.  
A collection of appendices is also provided within the fourth part of the study. 
The appendices include detailed maps of offshore methane hydrates, notes on the 
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mathematics of the law and economics models presented, and a listing of the 
references utilized in assembling this study. 
The appendices also include an essay on the potential impact on 
anthropogenic climate change from the development of offshore methane hydrates. 
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PRIMER ON METHANE HYDRATES 
1. Non-technical introduction to methane hydrates 
Methane hydrates are a combination of fresh water and methane that form a solid in 
both seabeds and permafrost soils. Methane hydrates look like snow or ice, 
depending on one’s perspective. Methane hydrates can be dug up from their 
deposits with a shovel or extracted from a well if induced to melt and disassociate. 
The hydrates are an intriguing form of ice, in that they retain their frozen structure 
at temperatures substantially warmer than purely aqueous ice.  
Methane hydrates, as a chemical substance, have been a functional part of 
chemistry for over two centuries. Methane hydrates were first discovered by 
Humphrey Davies in 1810.1 The science of their internal composition was first 
reported by Michael Faraday in 1823. 2  But it was not until 1934 that 
Hammerschmidt identified hydrate as the clogging agent in natural gas pipelines 
that methane hydrates entered into broader research awareness. 3  For their 
discovery as an energy resource, it was not until 1964 that the first methane hydrate 
gas field was discovered at Messoyakha, in Siberia.4 The first initial offshore survey 
was undertaken in 1970 and the first recovery of offshore methane hydrates 
occurred in 1981.5  
 
1  J. F. Gabitto, & C. Tsouris, Physical Properties of Gas Hydrates: A Review, 2010 J. 
Thermodynamics 1, 1 (2010); C. A. Koh, Towards a Fundamental Understanding of Natural Gas 
Hydrates, 31 Chemical Soc’y Rev. 157, 157 (2002). However, it is suspected that Priestly was 
the first to observe hydrates. A. Demirbas, Methane Hydrates as Potential Energy Resource: Part 
1–Importance, Resource and Recovery Facilities, 51 Energy Conversion Mgmt. 1547, 1548 (2010). 
2  Koh, supra at note 1, at 157; P. Englezos & J. D. Lee, Gas Hydrates: A Cleaner Source of Energy 
and Opportunity for Innovative Technologies, 22 Korean J. Chemical Engineering 671, 672 (2005).  
3  Y. F. Makogon, S. A. Holditch & T. Y.Makogon, Natural Gas-Hydrates—A Potential Energy 
Source for the 21st Century, 56 J. Petroleum Sci. & Engineering 14, 16 (2007). 
4  Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1548. Makogon was present at Messoyakha and was rewarded 
for discovering the presence of methane hydrates at Messoyakha. See Makogon, Holditch, & 
Makogon, supra at note 3, en passim. Makogon was also one of the earliest to scientifically 
publish on the potential existence of offshore methane hydrates. See Makogon 1972. 
5  Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1548; Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, supra at note 3, at 16. 
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Table 1: Recognition of Energy Potential of Methane Hydrates, by first year 
of government sponsored research and development programs 
Year  Nation 
1982  U.S.A. 
1995  Japan 
1996  India 
1999  South Korea 
2004  China 
 
It was not until the 1990s that methane hydrates were broadly recognized as a 
potentially feasible energy source and respondent research and development 
programs initiated; the first international conference on methane hydrate extraction 
was held in 1991.6  
The first offshore methane hydrate well was drilled in 1999. 7  The first 
continuously flowing methane hydrate well was tested only in 2013.8 Thus, while 
hydrates are not recent discoveries, it is not until very recent times that their 
potential as an energy resource was identified.9  
The development of coal bed methane production technologies took 
approximately three decades to progress from discovery of potential to commercial 
feasibility and investment; it has been suggested that the arc of development for 
methane hydrate production technologies will follow a similar three decade 
progression.10 Similarly, due to the strategic needs of countries like Japan and South 
Korea to obtain local secure energy supplies, researchers in the Global Carbon 
Project forecast that commercial methane hydrate investments would begin by 2020 
and spread to fields globally by 2030.11 The head of methane hydrate research for 
the U.S. DOE stated that the production of methane from methane hydrate deposits 
was already technically feasible by 2005, and that the tailored application of existing 
off-the-shelf technologies could enable commercial feasibility in the very near 
term.12 
The vast majority of hydrates are found offshore coastal shelves around the 
world; almost every coastal country has methane hydrate assets. Methane hydrates 
accumulate under mud layers in the seabed; they do not accumulate deeper in the 
 
6  Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, supra at note 3, at 16-18; J. Marcelle-De Silva & R. Dawe, 
Towards Commercial Gas Production from Hydrate Deposits, 4 Energies 215, 216 (2011). See Table 
2.1. for data on when leading countries initiated their national research and development 
programs on the commercial feasibility of methane hydrates. 
7  Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1548; Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, supra at note 3, at 16. 
8  See discussion, infra, at ch. 3 on extraction technologies. 
9  Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1548. 
10  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 675 and 677. The time reference is stated as 3 decades at 675 
and as 20-25 years at 677. 
11  V. Krey et al., Gas Hydrates: Entrance to a Methane Age or Climate Threat?, 4 Environmental 
Research Letters 34007 (2009). 
12  R. Boswell, Resource Potential of Methane Hydrate Coming into Focus, 56 J. Petroleum Sci. 
Engineering 9 (2007). 
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earth under non-permeable rock formations. They can also be found under 
permafrost areas, wherein biogenic methane has combined with water to form 
hydrate deposits. Apart from permafrost, they are not generally found onshore but 
they can be found in certain talik lakes in Siberia.13 
Methane hydrates are dominantly water. The water forms a cage around a 
single molecule of methane. The cage fits methane just so; almost no other molecule 
will fit. There are other forms of aqueous hydrates that can hold larger molecules 
but they are fairly rare in nature. So most of the time, if you find methane hydrates, 
you have fresh water and sweet gas, no salt and no acids.  
This apparent simplicity makes methane hydrates attractive to investors for 
three simple reasons. Methane is an easy to use fuel that is cleaner than coal or 
crude oil and methane from hydrates requires almost no chemical treating due to 
the lack of contaminants; however, methane is commonly listed as a greenhouse 
gas.14  
Extraction of methane from hydrates produces a large volume of fresh water 
that is needed in many locations around the world. Also, the co-production of water 
and methane enables the production of hydrogen,15 which is a green fuel source as 
its combustion leaves only energy and water. There is an extra reason investors 
might like methane hydrates, it can be used to store other greenhouse gases such as 
carbon dioxide.16  
Methane hydrates will disassociate and dissolve in to water and methane 
under certain conditions: when pressure is reduced sufficiently, when temperatures 
are raised sufficiently, and when certain chemical means are used to dissolve the 
hydrates. These technologies can be used in tandem and they can be employed in 
tandem with carbon sequestration technologies.  
Early extraction and production testing is already underway. There are 
substantial reasons to believe that the technical issues of extraction and production 
may soon become commercially feasible.  
 
13  Talik are those unique spots of ground in permafrost regions that remain unfrozen. They are 
often accompanied by liquid water accumulations, which result in liquid water lakes year-
round.  
14  The UNFCCC refers repeatedly to “greenhouse gases” and “carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases” without explicit reference to methane. Methane is listed as one of the six 
enumerated greenhouse gas within Annex A of the UNFCCC's Kyoto Protocol. Decision No. 
280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 also lists 
methane as a greenhouse gas at Art. 3(1)(a). More details on these definitions, infra, at ch. 8 
and 10. 
15  Hydrogen can be produced by exposing methane to steam; methane hydrates would produce 
methane both as fuel and a feedstock as well as produce freshwater feedstocks. See the 
discussion on the potential to produce hydrogen from methane hydrate resources at ch. 3, 
sec. 5.2. 
16  The hydrate structures can be filled with gases other than methane; carbon dioxide can 
replace the extracted methane volumes for sequestration purposes. See the discussion on the 
potential to sequester greenhouse gases in methane hydrate deposits at ch. 3, sec. 5.1. 
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2. Chemistry of methane hydrates 
The literature refers to methane hydrates by several names, including natural gas 
hydrates, clathrates, and gas clathrates.17 The term clathrate is used for solids that 
contain one kind of molecule within a crystal lattice of a different molecule.18  
In the case of methane hydrates, the methane molecule is trapped within a 
water-ice framework. 19 The overall water-ice structure visually resembles white 
snow; the methane does not impact the overall appearance of the methane hydrate 
structure.20  
Methane hydrates are crystalline solids composed primarily of methane and 
water. 21  There is some debate if the methane hydrates should be considered 
crystalline or as a form of thermal glass.22  
They form as methane is emitted from within the earth but retarded in its 
seepage by overlaying mud layers in a watery environment. 23  This contact of 
methane to water under correct pressures and temperatures enables the formation 
of methane hydrates under that mud layer.24  
The primary hypothesis is that most of the methane was biogenically created 
before it accumulated in the methane hydrate deposits. 25  A process of 
methanogenesis is believed to have been utilized by anaerobic bacteria living below 
the mud line under the seawaters;26 the produced methane is a result of the bacterial 
methogens consuming decayed plant and animal matter in anaerobic conditions.27 
Other by-products of the methanogenesis are carbon dioxide, propane, ethane, and 
 
17  R. A. Dawe & S. Thomas, A Large Potential Methane Source—Natural Gas Hydrates, 29 Energy 
Sources 217, 218 (2007).; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1550; Z. G. Zhang, et al., Marine gas 
hydrates: Future Energy or Environmental Killer?, 16 Energy Procedia 933, 933 (2012).  Natural 
gas can sometimes include natural gas liquids, common understood to include ethane, 
propane, butane, pentane, and natural gasoline, so the term natural gas hydrates could 
suggest a variety of hydrates; for this study the term methane hydrate will be strictly used to 
indicate those hydrates rich in methane to the exclusion of other hydrocarbons. 
18  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17. Clathrate is derived from the Greek word khlatron, which 
means ‘barrier’. See I. Chatti et al., Benefits and Drawbacks of Clathrate Hydrates: A Review of Their 
Areas of Interest, 46 Energy Conversion Mgmt. 1333 (2005). 
19  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 218. Kurihara refers to hydrates as “in the solid state and 
hence does not have a flowability.” See M. Kurihara, M et al., Gas Production from Methane 
Hydrate Reservoirs, in: Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Gas Hydrates (2011). 
20  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 218; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1550. 
21  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 218; Koh, supra at note 1, at 157; G. J. Moridis et al., 
Toward Production from Gas Hydrates: Current Status, Assessment Of Resources, and Simulation-
Based Evaluation of Technology and Potential, 12 SPE Reservoir Evaluation & Engineering 745, 1 
(2009); Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1550. 
22  Gabitto & Tsouris, supra at note 1, at 4; A. I. Krivchikov et al., Thermal Conductivity of Methane-
Hydrate, 139 J. Low Temperature Physics 693, 6-7 (2005). 
23  Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, supra at note 3, at 19; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1548-1549. 
24  Id.; id. 
25  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 219; Koh, supra at note 1, at 160; Demirbas, supra at note 1, 
at 1548-49. 
26  Id., at 219; id., at 160; id., at 1548-49. 
27  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 219; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1548-49. 
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hydrogen sulfide.28 It is understood that even trace amounts of oxygen are sufficient 
to kill the methanogenic bacteria. 29  There is evidence of abiogenically sourced 
methane in some methane hydrate deposits.30 Thermogenic natural gas is the result 
of heavier kerogens and oils cooking deeper in the earth followed by the outward 
migration of the natural gas until it reaches the methane hydrate deposits.31  
Ice is constructed when water stabilizes into a framework. In the case of 
methane hydrates, the water forms polyhedral lattices that are stabilized by the 
inclusion of methane or other molecules.32 The hydrates do not need to be full in the 
sense that each cage needs to have a guest molecule; hydrates are stable with less 
than full cage occupancy.33  
Methane hydrates carry the general chemical form of Mn(H2O)p, wherein M 
represents the inner molecule around which the water lattice forms.34 The cages 
themselves can be characterized as Xn, e.g. Xn = 512 denotes a twelve-sided 
dodecahedral cage composed of 5-sided pentagons.35 The interaction between the 
methane (guest) and water (host) molecules is mediated by weak Van der Waals 
forces.36  
Methane hydrate deposits present a dense form of methane. In terms of energy 
content, methane hydrates as fully occupied hydrates contain 184,000 btu per cubic 
foot, in-between conventional natural gas at 1,150 btu per cubic foot and liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) at 430,000 btu per cubic foot.37 The disassociation of 1 m3 of 
methane hydrates produces 170 m3 of methane at standard temperature and 
pressure.38 In addition, 0.85 m3 of water is released from the same cubic meter.39 It 
has been suggested that methane hydrates present 2 to 5 times greater energy 
 
28  Id., at 219; id., at 1548-49. 
29  Id., at 219; id., at 1548-49. 
30  Id., at 219; id., at 1548-49. 
31  Id., at 219; id., at 1548-49. 
32  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 672; Koh, supra at note 1, at 157. 
33  Gabitto & Tsouris, supra at note 1, at 2. Laboratory-created hydrates have been stabilized at 
90% occupancy. Koh, supra at note 1, at 157. 
34  S. Y. Lee & G. D. Holder, Methane Hydrates Potential as a Future Energy Source, 71 Fuel 
Processing Technology 181, 181 (2001); Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 216-217. 
35  Koh, supra at note 1, at 157-158. 
36  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 672; Koh, supra at note 1, at 161. Van der Waal forces were 
defined more as a catch-all term to exclude certain other bonding interactions; Van der Waal 
forces are not covalent bonds, hydrogen bonds, nor electrostatic bonds between ions. Van der 
Waal forces are generally defined as a collection of positive and negative forces acting in-
between molecules, e.g., Keesom electrostatic forces are one such group of forces. Van der 
Waal forces are also anisotropic which means that the physical orientation of the molecules to 
each other affects the potential bonding results. 
37  Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 217. In more general terms, see Englezos & Lee 
2005, p. 673; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1548. 
38  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 673. See also Koh, supra at note 1, at 160, wherein Koh 
provides a slightly different presentation of similar data. She compares 90% occupied 
methane hydrates as equivalent to 156 m3 of methane under standard conditions. 
39  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 673; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1548. 
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density than traditional gas reservoirs and 10 times greater density than coal bed 
methane reservoirs.40  
The clathrate-nature of methane hydrates requires the inner-molecule to fit 
within the lattice structure, so hydrates can be formed with methane, ethane, 
propane, and i-butane but not with n-butane.41 This is important because it narrows 
what might be produced from those hydrates; the hydrate lattice acts as a sort of 
selective filter to prevent various impurities from contaminating the energy 
resources. 
The ice-water lattice itself is commonly found in three forms, called types sI, 
sII, and sIII or sH.42 These structures are differentiated by both the number of ice 
cages to hold trapped molecules and by the sizes of those cages.43 Types sI provides 
the smallest cages, capable of holding methane and little else, whereas Type sIII or 
sH offers the largest cages potentially capable of holding smaller hydrocarbon 
chains from crude oil. 44 There are other forms, e.g. sT, but they are laboratory 
discoveries not routinely seen in nature.45  
Types sI and sII were first identified by Von Stackelberg in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s.46 Type sH was discovered in the mid-1980s.47 Type sI and sII are cubic 
in shape, whereas sIII or H is hexagonal.48  
Type sI is the form most commonly referenced by the label ‘methane 
hydrate.’49 Type sI is the most prevalent form of methane hydrate found in nature; it 
is 99% of the methane hydrates detected offshore.50 Type sI is composed of 48 water 
molecules forming into 8 cavities that can each hold one guest gas molecule.51 Type 
sI can hold methane, ethane, or carbon dioxide as guest gases.52 The ratio of guest 
molecule size to host cell size needs to be precise, at approximately 90% of the cell 
size.53 This tight fit for sI and sII is why methane hydrates produce methane cleanly 
with so few by-products, other than water.54  
 
40  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 674; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1550; Zhang et al., supra at 
note 17, at 934. 
41  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 218; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1551. 
42  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 218; Koh, supra at note 1, at 157; Demirbas, supra at note 1, 
at 1551. 
43  Koh, supra at note 1, at 157; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1551. 
44  Koh, supra at note 1, at 157-159. With specific reference to iso-pentane, see Demirbas, supra at 
note 1, at 217. Pentane is larger than butane or propane. 
45  Koh, supra at note 1, at 159; Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 672. 
46  Gabitto & Tsouris, supra at note 1, at 2; Koh, supra at note 1, at 158-159. 
47  Id.; id., at 159. 
48  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 672; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1551. 
49  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 218; Koh, supra at note 1, at 159; Moridis et al., supra at 
note 21, at 1.  
50  Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 217. 
51  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 218; Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 672. 
52  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 672; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1551. 
53  Gabitto & Tsouris, supra at note 1, at 3; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1551. sI can accommodate 
molecules up to 5.8Å in diameter and sII can accommodate up to 6.9Å in diameter. 
54 Gabitto & Tsouris, supra at note 1, at 3; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1551; Zhang et al. , supra at 
note 17, at 934. 
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Type sII is composed of 136 water molecules forming into 24 cavities that can 
each hold one guest gas molecule.55 Type sII can contain larger gas molecules and is 
found to hold propane, argon, krypton, hydrogen sulfide (H2SO4), oxygen (O2), 
nitrogen (N2), and i-butane.56 Type sII is the form of hydrates commonly found in 
natural gas pipelines as a clogging agent.57 sII hydrates will form in pipelines when 
sufficient humidity is present in the pipe and the overall temperature falls within 
‘room temperature’ range.  
Type sH is composed of 34 water molecules forming into 3 small cavities, 2 
medium cavities, and 1 large cavity for a total of 6 cavities.58 Due to its large size, 
over 24 different guest molecules are known to fit in the large cavity.59.  
All three major types, sI, sII, and sH, if fully loaded with methane guest 
molecules will present their mass as 85% water and 15% methane.60 However, the 
overall density of methane hydrates of all three types is statistically the same as 
regular water ice.61  
3. Scale of the resource 
There are only two sure things known about the global volumes of methane 
hydrates: there are a lot of methane hydrates and there is a lot of uncertainty about 
exactly how much; most researchers simply state that the energy stored in methane 
hydrates is at least as much as double the world’s conventional fossil fuels. 62  
Estimates range tremendously, lower estimates are several magnitudes smaller than 
the larger estimates.  
There are substantial technical problems in determining the overall resource 
base. Similar problems exist within traditional oil and gas reservoir 
 
55  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 218. Also see Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 672. 
56  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 218; Koh, supra at note 1, at 159. 
57  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 218. 
58  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 672; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1551. 
59  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 672. 
60  Gabitto & Tsouris, supra at note 1, at 2. Makogon places the ratio as 80/20. See Makogon, 
Holditch, & Makogon, supra at note 3, at 18. 
61  Gabitto & Tsouris, supra at note 1, at 3; Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1550. 
62  See Gabitto & Tsouris, supra at note 1, at 1; Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 2; Zhang et al. , 
supra at note 17, at 934. 
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measurements, 63  but the science of methane hydrates is comparatively less 
developed and the resource itself presents itself less simply in its reservoirs.64  
The BP Statistical Review of World Energy estimates the current world supply 
of proved reserves of natural gas, i.e. traditionally supplied methane, at 187.3 Tcm, 
or 6614.1 Tcf, 65  by the end of 2012. 66  Another current estimate for global 
(conventional) natural gas supplies places their volumes at 150 Tcm.67 Englezos and 
Lee’s research suggests a comparable number for traditional natural gas reservoirs 
at 370 Tcm.68 At current levels of global production and consumption, this data 
forecasts 50 plus years of supply from traditional natural gas, ceteris paribus.69 These 
estimates of global supplies of traditional natural gas provide a baseline against 
which to measure methane hydrate estimates.  
 
63  While some standardization exists (generally listed as four tiers of reserve certainty, from 
least certain to most: undiscovered (prospective resources), discovered unrecoverable, 
discovered sub-commercial (contingent resources) and discovered commercial (reserves)), 
there remains tremendous variance in both linguistic terminology and terms of probabilistic 
certainty. Generally speaking, reserves-quality reservoirs are commercially feasible in the 
present whereas other certainty levels need improvements in technology or increases in 
market prices to become commercially producible. See J. ETHERINGTON, T. POLLEN & L. 
ZUCCOLO, MAPPING SUBCOMMITTEE, COMPARISON OF SELECTED RESERVES AND RESOURCE 
CLASSIFICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED DEFINITIONS, (Final Report. December, 2005); available 
athttp://www.spe.org/industry/docs/OGR_Mapping.pdf. 
64  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 221; Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 1-2. 
65  Much of the oil and gas industry utilizes Imperial Units instead of metric measures.  
1. 1 m3 of natural gas is generally deemed equivalent to 35 ft3 for commercial exchanges. 
See Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 221.  
2. The BP Statistical Reviews lists the exchange ratio as 1 m3:35.3 ft3. Appendices: 
Approximate Conversion Factors in: BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY JUNE 2013, 
44. Available at http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-
review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf. 
66  Natural Gas: Proved Reserves, in: BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY JUNE 2013,   22. 
Available at http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-
review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf. 
67  Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 3. 
68  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 674. 
69  Natural Gas: Proved Reserves, in: BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY JUNE 2013, supra at 
note 66, at 22. Note the reserves to production ratios. Also, these numbers can be contrasted 
against the annual energy demand budget for the U.S.A., which is 1 Tcm annually. See 
Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 3. 
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Table 2: Comparative Estimates for Global Methane Hydrates 
Scientist(s) Tcm  Energy Source 
BP Statistics 187  Natural Gas 
Englezos and Lee 370  Natural Gas 
Walsh - Low 2,800  Methane Hydrates 
Chatti - Low 3,100  Methane Hydrates 
Demirbas70 7,104  Methane Hydrates 
Collett71 9,000  Methane Hydrates 
Englezos and Lee - Low 10,000  Methane Hydrates 
Englezos and Lee 20,500  Methane Hydrates 
Kvenholden and MacDonald72 21,000  Methane Hydrates 
U.S. Methane Hydrate R&D Act73 24,000  Methane Hydrates 
Englezos and Lee - High 40,000  Methane Hydrates 
Klauda Sandler74 120,000  Methane Hydrates 
Walsh - High 2,800,000  Methane Hydrates 
Chatti - High 7,600,000  Methane Hydrates 
 
Walsh estimated the volume of global methane hydrates at between 100,000 Tcf and 
100,000,000 Tcf, or 2,800 Tcm to 2,800,000 Tcm.75 A consensus view reported by 
Englezos and Lee is that the global store of methane hydrates holds approximately 
20,500 Tcm of methane.76 They also state that any model that uses a range from 
10,000 Tcm to 40,000 Tcm should be considered reasonable.77  Zhang et al. presented 
an assertion that there is probably enough producible methane hydrate to provide 
the whole world with sufficient energy supplies to last a millennium.78 The U.S.’s 
Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act includes an estimate of the 
world’s methane hydrate reserves that would suggest that the world has over a 
hundred times more methane hydrates than currently booked natural gas 
reserves. 79  Englezos and Lee suggested a calculation that if the annual global 
 
70  Estimate was stated as 6.4 Trillion tons of methane. Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1551. 
71  Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 221. 
72  Referred to as the standard estimate, partially due to their age. MacDonald's numbers date 
from 1990. Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 219. 
73  This number is actually a statutory statement regarding the U.S.'s internal estimate of its own 
domestic supplies, which it estimates at a quarter of the world's supplies of methane 
hydrates. It provides an estimate of the domestic volumes at 200,000 Tcf. 800,000 Tcf converts 
to 24,000 Tcm. See 30 USC § 2001(2) and (3). 
74  Referred to as the most up-to-date model and likely the most accurate. Marcelle-De Silva & 
Dawe, supra at note 6, at 219. 
75  See M. R. Walsh et al., Preliminary Report on the Commercial Viability of Gas Production from 
Natural Gas Hydrates, 31 Energy Econ. 815, 815 (2009). 
76  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 673. 
77  Id. 
78  Zhang et al., supra at note 17, at 934; Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 2. 
79  See infra within this section. Compare the U.S. estimate for methane hydrates against the BP 
estimate for booked natural gas reserves. 
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consumption of methane is 2.4 Tcm, then the global inventory of methane hydrates 
could yield a millennium of methane as contrasted against the century’s worth of 
traditional natural gas – it is at least an order of magnitude of difference.80  
Methane hydrates are primarily an offshore energy strategy. Moridis et al. presented 
a survey of five leading studies on the geographical locations of methane hydrates; 
the articles consistently found that there was approximately one hundred times 
more methane hydrates offshore than onshore. 81 The World Wildlife Fund has 
presented an estimate of 400 gigaton of methane hydrates within Arctic permafrosts 
and over 10,000 gigaton of methanes hydrates in offshore shelves.82 Chatti reports 
that 1.4 Tcm to 34,000 Tcm of methane hydrates may be in found in permafrost 
areas, and 3,100 Tcm to 7,600,000 Tcm can be found offshore.83  
Given the abundance of offshore methane hydrates, versus onshore, it is 
probable that the offshore methane hydrates will be a primary target of both 
research and eventual commercial investment. 84  Chatti’s estimates match the 
expectations that offshore conditions better provide the phase envelope required for 
methane hydrate formation. 85  Additionally, the most recent model of methane 
hydrate depositions, from Klauda and Sandler, forecast 120, 000 Tcm of methane 
hydrates globally and over 80,000 Tcm of offshore methane hydrates.86 The Klauda 
Sandler model has become the standard model very quickly because of its ability to 
forecast both expected and unexpected real-world methane hydrate discoveries.87 
Partially because of this accuracy, their maps of methane hydrates are the maps 
most known from popular media on methane hydrate distributions; in particular, 
they are the basis of the well-known methane hydrate map published in Der 
Spiegel.88  
 
80  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 674. 
81  Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 3, also see Table 2 at 25. See also Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, 
supra at note 6, at 221. Combining this 100:1 ration of offshore to onshore, and the discussion, 
supra, of traditional natural gas to methane hydrates as a similar 100:1 ration, the secondary 
result is that onshore methane hydrates in permafrost areas likely equal the global inventory 
of traditional natural gas. While this present study is focused on offshore methane hydrate 
projects, the potential attraction for onshore methane hydrates would only increase once the 
commercial feasibility of offshore methane hydrates is developed. 
82  M. SOMMERKORN & S. J. HASSOL, ARCTIC CLIMATE FEEDBACKS: GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS, 86 
(World Wildlife Fund (WWF), 2009).  
83  Chatti et al., supra at note 18, at 1336. 
84  Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 2. 
85  Chatti et al., supra at note 18, at 1336. 
86  Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 3. See J. B. Klauda & S. I. Sandler, Global Distribution of 
Methane Hydrate in Ocean Sediment, 19 Energy & Fuels 459, en passim (2005). 
87  Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 3. See Klauda & Sandler, supra at note 86, en passim. 
88  See Appendices I.C. and I.D. 
49_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Chapter 2 
 19 
4. Geology of methane hydrates 
There is an effective envelop for offshore methane hydrates; low temperatures and 
high pressures favor their formation. 89  The top of offshore methane hydrate 
formations are commonly found at approximately 150m to 500m below the seabed, 
although in equatorial waters that depth has been found lower at 1000m.90. The 
hydrate stability zone (HSZ), i.e. the ‘sweet spot’ for temperature and pressure, is 
generally 500m to 1000m thick, vertically speaking.91 The HSZ is generally limited 
to no deeper than 1500m from the ocean’s surface, as ambient temperatures rise 
with depth.92  
 
Table 3: Simple Hydrocarbons by nomenclature 
N  Alkane  Formula 
C1  Methane  CH4 
C2  Ethane  C2H6 
C3  Propane  C3H8 
C4  Butane  C4H10 
C5  Pentane  C5H12 
 
Methane hydrates are found in pressures between 1 to 100 bars, wherein normal 
atmosphere pressure at sea level is deemed at 1 bar; alternatively, they present 
between 1500-15 psia.93 Despite their icy appearance, methane hydrates are present 
in ‘room temperature’ temperature ranges from -5 C to +34 C in Nature.94 Methane 
hydrate deposits can be characterized by their production profiles. Simple fields 
contain almost exclusively methane, with less than one percent of C2 and C3 and 
even more faint levels of C4 and C5.95 There are a few complex fields, so far only in 
the Gulf of Mexico, that display only about 70% methane, with large volumes of C2 
and C3, and presenting trace amounts of C4, C5, carbon dioxide and nitrogen.96 The 
 
89  Lee & Holder, supra at note 34, at 184; Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 1.  Demirbas 
referenced it the other way around, that heat and depressurization leads to hydrate reversion 
to water and methane. Demirbas, supra at note 1, at 1548. 
90  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 223; Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, supra at note 3, at 
19. 
91  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 222; Zhang et al., supra at note 17, at 933. 
92  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 222; Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, supra at note 3, at 
19. 
93  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 221. 
94  Id. Makogon provides laboratory ranges of -200 C to 75 C, with the correspondingly required 
extreme pressure ranges of 2 GPa to 20 nPa. See Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, supra at 
note 3, at 18. 
95  Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, supra at note 3, at 21; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at 
note 6, at 218. 
96  Id., at 21; id., at 218. 
50_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
Primer on Methane Hydrates 
20 
simple fields appear to be stable at 21 C, whereas the complex fields appear to be 
stable at a higher 28 C.97 
While the above description might suggest a smooth layer of methane 
hydrates in-between mud layers; that is not how methane hydrates are deposited 
within the HSZ. 98  Methane hydrates have complex geometries with major 
perturbances due to water flow, pressure and temperature changes, and other 
factors.99 In subsea deposits, the most stable methane hydrates are those highest in 
the reservoir with the most unstable, and gaseous, at the bottom of the reservoir.100  
It is possible for methane hydrates to form in the open ocean; however the 
resultant mass is buoyant and would float to the water’s surface.101 As the ocean 
temperatures rise as the hydrate floats upwards, and as the pressure levels decrease, 
the hydrate will disassociate. The resultant fizzy ocean waters, awash with gaseous 
methane, have been described in the literature as a ‘fluidized bed’ that does not 
support routine notions of naval buoyancy.102  
In contrast, in permafrost areas, with the ambient arctic temperatures, 
methane hydrates are often found near the surface, they can be found within 150m 
of the land surface; such depths might not require wells for recovery.103 The stability 
of methane hydrates in permafrost is less dependent on locational depth, as the low 
temperatures provide stabilization.104  
Methane hydrates can be detected by both seismic acoustic imaging, well logs, 
and via drilling tests.105 When the methane hydrates are located in not too deep 
conditions, the difference between the icy structures of the methane hydrates and 
the heavier viscosity of the collated muds provide strong acoustic signatures.106. 
Methane hydrates have been readily found with seismic detection methods, but 
they have also been found where no seismic indication suggested they be found, 
e.g. if no free gas is associated with the methane hydrate reservoir then it might not 
show in seismic scans, so drilling is often required.107 There are dangers to testing 
for methane hydrates by drilling and extraction, in that the methane hydrate can 
 
97  Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 218. 
98  Boswell, supra at note 12, at 11; Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, supra at note 3, at 19-21. 
99  Id., at 11; id., at 19-21. 
100  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at p. 223. 
101  Id. 
102  Id., citing R. Corfield, Close encounters with crystalline gas, 38(5) Chemistry in Britain 22 (2002). 
103  Id.; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 217. 
104  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 223; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 217. 
105  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 220; Gabitto & Tsouris, supra at note 1, at 4; Marcelle-De 
Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 224. 
106  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 220; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 225. 
Traditional oil and gas seismic techniques assume deeper assets and harder barriers, e.g. salt 
domes, than are generally present for methane hydrate deposits. Offshore methane hydrate 
deposits are shallow and covered with mud. 
107  Gabitto & Tsouris, supra at note 1, at 4; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 225. 
Because of such problems, the methane hydrate industry, as such exists, has increased 
reliance on ocean bottom cables (OBCs) and controlled source electromagnetism (CSEM) to 
provide more detailed images to identify methane hydrate deposits. 
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rapidly disassociate into water, sediment and gaseous methane.108 This potential 
disassociation both destroys the methane hydrate sample and presents dangers of 
combustion.  
There are several ways that the literature describes the in-situ arrangement of 
methane hydrates. One approach suggests four distinct morphologies of methane 
hydrates. 109  They are ‘disseminated’, ‘nodular’, ‘vein’, and ‘massive’. 110  
Disseminated means that the methane hydrates are formed within the mud matrix 
of loose coarse sand grains, whereas the other three categories are created by 
geological or other such disturbances that create trap-like structures to enable the 
growth of the lattices.111 Another perspective simplifies this taxonomy to only two 
morphologies, that of ‘pore filling’ and of ‘grain displacing’. 112  Pore filling is 
identical in lattice genesis as the previous disseminated morphology, but the idea of 
grain displacing is that the formation of the lattice itself affects the geological 
formation and moves it away so that more methane hydrates can be accumulated.113 
Ultimately, the argument over morphology is related to both how and where 
methane hydrates might have formed and how the methane hydrates might be 
structurally engaged in their local geology which could have substantial impact on 
structural stability during extraction and production. In laboratory tests, it appears 
that the two morphology hypothesis is more readily validated.114  
Methane hydrate deposits are classified into four different types of deposits 
based primarily on the complexity required to extract and produce from those 
deposits; a Class 1 reservoir of methane hydrates is easier to produce commercially 
whereas a Class 4 reservoir is more challenging to produce commercially.115  
A “Class 1” deposit occurs when a methane hydrate layer overrides a two-
phase water and a traditional natural gas reservoir.116 Class 1 deposits have been 
found to function best under depressurization techniques of extraction; 
depressurization might be the only technology that can produce Class 1 deposits 
over a long run.117 Recent Japanese offshore and American onshore research has 
focused on coarse grained Class 1 deposits.118  
A “Class 2” deposit is a Class 1 deposit without the traditional natural gas 
resource in place; a Class 2 deposit merely contains methane hydrates. 119  
Depressurization techniques of extraction work well for Class 2 deposits, once some 
 
108  See infra at ch. 4 for a more complete discussion. 
109  Gabitto & Tsouris, supra at note 1, at 5. 
110  Id., at 5. 
111  Id., at 5. 
112  Id., at 5-6. 
113  Id., at 6. 
114  Id., at 6. 
115  Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 12; Walsh et al., supra at note 75. There are additional 
classification issues, such as associated rock or mud layers, and potential mixing of classes 
within small terrains. 
116  Walsh et al., supra at note 75.; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 219. 
117  Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 13. 
118  Walsh et al., supra at note 75.. 
119  Id.; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 219. 
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volume of water is extracted, gaseous volumes of methane from the deposit fill the 
voids and effectively create Class 1 zones within the Class 2 deposit. 120  
Additionally, the water zone under a Class 2 deposit can be utilized to facilitate 
thermal stability or heating, as necessary; thermal techniques can assist in continuity 
of flow from the production zone at the bottom of the well.121  
A “Class 3” deposit is a simple methane hydrate deposit without any fluids, 
neither water nor gas, underneath it.122 Class 3 deposits lack the free space from 
which to begin depressurization, unlike Class 1 and Class 2 deposits.123  
“Class 4” deposits are scattered, as if littorally, on the seafloor in low density 
clusters. 124 Due to the complexity of both identifying those deposits and of the 
potential complexity of their development they are not currently seen as foreseeably 
commercial.125 Kurihara et al. described the Class 4 deposits as “hopeless.”126  
There is an additional potential source of methane hydrates. Chatti mentions 
that methane hydrates may form at certain depths in the ocean, without overlaying 
mud barriers.127 Chatti refers to carbon dioxide rich oceans wherein the hydrates 
form under pressure and temperature envelopes and then sink towards the sea 
bottom.128 It is generally assumed that methane hydrates would be buoyant, but it is 
possible that some sII or sH might contain both methane and other heavier guest 
molecules and sink to the ocean floor.  
5. Location of methane hydrates 
Almost every coastal state in the world is expected to have some amount of offshore 
methane hydrates. While traditional oil and gas reservoirs have been found in fairly 
limited areas, methane hydrates have been found on almost every coastline and in 
most arctic regions.129 As of 2009, methane hydrates had been drilled and recovered 
from upwards of two dozen countries in over 77 locations.130  
Methane hydrates primarily occur in two geological formations, in permafrost 
and under subsea mud near coastlines.131 When methane hydrates occur offshore, 
 
120  Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 14. 
121  Id. 
122  Walsh et al., supra at note 75.; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 219. 
123  Moridis et al., supra at note 21, at 16. 
124  Walsh et al., supra at note 75.; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 219. 
125  In the U.S government report produced at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Moridis 
carefully balanced the techniques and challenges presented to the first three classes of 
deposits. Class 4 deposits were not discussed at all, other than to dismiss them due to their 
low densities of methane, (less than 10%), and their lack of confining geologic strata; implying 
the complete lack of need given a broader awareness of their difficulties. See Moridis et al., 
supra at note 21, at 13-17. 
126  Kurihara et al., supra at note 19. See also Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 6, at 228. 
127  Chatti et al., supra at note 18, at 1337; Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 223. 
128  Chatti et al., supra at note 18, at 1337. 
129  See maps provided in Appendix I. See also Englezos & Lee, supra at note 2, at 674. 
130  Gabitto & Tsouris, supra at note 1, at 2. 
131  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 17, at 219. 
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they often form within 200 km of the coast,132 placing them generally outside of 
territorial waters (12 miles) 133 but well within general limits of exclusive economic 
zones. (200 miles). 134 Thus, the energy resources of offshore methane hydrates 
would be the exclusive resources of the coastal state but the impact of the 
development of those resources on living resources within the exclusive economic 
zone but without the territorial waters would impact upon the legal rights of all 
other signatory states, under the UNCLOS.135  
Without intending to overstate the point, the main geographic areas of impact 
are the following zones:  
x The western shelf of Europe, including the EEZs of Spain, Ireland, 
and the U.K.  
x The Mediterranean Ocean, except parts of the Adriatic, Tyrrhenian, 
and Aegean Seas as noted above. Practically every Mediterranean 
state is expected to contain methane hydrates within their EEZs.  
x The whole west coast of the Americas, from Alaska to Chile.  
x The eastern coast of North America. Including almost all of the 
Caribbean islands.  
x The coasts of Argentina, Uruguay and southeastern Brazil.  
x The whole coast of Africa in all direction, including the Red Sea and 
Madagascar.  
x Everywhere near the South Asian (India) peninsula, including large 
zones of the Arabian Sea and the Sea of Bengal.  
x Areas offshore of South Korea, Japan, and the Russian islands north of 
Japan including offshore Kamchatka.  
x Almost all of the ASEAN waters, ocean, and seas.  
x Offshore of Australia and New Zealand. 
When contrasted against the more limited locations of crude oil and traditional 
natural gas fields, the resource owners of methane hydrates form a much larger 
proportion of the global community.  
Broadly speaking, it is easier to speak of which countries will not likely share 
in methane hydrate production than to speak the other way around. Given that 
methane hydrates primarily form either offshore marine areas or in permafrost 
areas, if a country has neither then it is not likely to have methane hydrates. Almost 
every country with a coastline will have zones of potential methane hydrates; every 
area with permafrost is included in the set of countries with coasts.  
 
132  Id. 
133  The United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea. Sec. 2. Art. 3. Available at 
[http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm. 
134  The United Nation's Convention on the Law of the Sea. Part V. Art. 57. Available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm. 
135  In particular, see UNCLOS Art. 56 and see UNCLOS Arts. 69 and 70. Available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm. More 
generally, see the discussion on UNCLOS as it relates to the development of methane hydrates, 
infra, at ch. 8. 
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x Non-Arctic landlocked nations will not generally have gas hydrates.136 
x The Baltic Sea appears to be poor in methane hydrates; which is rare for 
coastal states anywhere.137 
x While the Mediterranean Sea appears to bear extensive methane hydrates 
deposits, the sub-regional Tyrrhenian Sea and the Adriatic Sea appear to 
lack substantial methane hydrate deposits. Similarly, much of the Aegean 
appears to lack methane hydrates.138 
x A few awkwardly located states, such as Honduras, will have difficulty to 
connect their EEZ to nearby methane hydrate fields.139 
Once the two lists are confronted, the resource owners and those not likely-to-be, 
several immediate observations can be deduced.  
The commercial development of methane hydrates will enable many more 
countries in the world to participate in hydrocarbon extraction and production. The 
production of methane will become feasible in many locations currently with no 
local energy supplies. Of the areas lacking methane hydrates, several of them are 
already in production of crude oil and natural gas, such as Kazakhstan. Many of the 
new resource owners are developing countries in need of fiscal revenues and 
affordable energy supplies.  
Certain countries are not expected to have any substantial methane hydrate 
deposits; the clustering is sobering. In South America, Bolivia and Paraguay will not 
have methane hydrates. In Africa, the states of Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Chad, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe will be left without methane hydrates. Chad and South Sudan are 
different from the other states on that list in that they have substantial crude oil 
reserves. In Asia, several Central Asian states and Mongolia will lack methane 
hydrates. These countries on the whole are some of the poorest in the world.  
This new energy resource might enable many areas to receive new streams of 
income, and thus affect global price levels on a wide front of commodities, but those 
countries sans hydrates will not be able to participate in the economy of methane 
hydrate development. Not only would those countries lack revenues from energy 
resources, but they would also lack the industrial capacities to benefit from 
industrial and service industry engagements with the emerging methane hydrate 
 
136  It is worth noting that certain Siberian lakes have had methane hydrates discovered at 
sufficient depths. It is possible that certain lakes elsewhere may contain the pressure and 
temperature envelopes required for methane formation. But lakes outside of the main 
research nations have not been explored, due to the ready abundance of methane hydrates in 
other locations. It may require local investment to further determine if non-oceanic water 
bodies contain methane hydrates. 
137  Finland does appear to have methane hydrates within its EEZ. Luckily for Denmark, it has 
extensive territorial waters northwest of its main peninsula wherein tremendous methane 
hydrates are suspected to exist. 
138  That said, Greece and Italy have other areas within their EEZs that do appear to contain 
methane hydrates, so perhaps it is only the former Yugoslavian areas of the Adriatic that 
would be substantially impacted by a lack of methane hydrates within their EEZs. 
139  Improved surveying will be necessary to help clarify what claims might be attempted. 
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economies. They are likely to be wholly excluded from the new methane hydrate 
paradigm without exogenous intervention.  
There are many countries within Europe that are not expected to possess any 
methane hydrate resources. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and 
Switzerland will probably not contain any methane hydrates within their main 
territories. But several of these states do produce methane from other natural gas 
deposits, such as Poland and the Netherlands. The Netherlands Caribbean 
territories are likely to hold methane hydrates offshore; France and the U.K. will 
similarly benefit from Caribbean holdings in addition to their western EEZ reserves. 
Many of these countries are substantially industrialized and will be able to 
participate indirectly in the commercialization of methane hydrate via industrial 
tool making and other services. In addition, many of the countries on this list are 
among the highest per capita income levels, in contrast to the situation of methane-
hydrate-poor states in Africa and South America. Thus, while methane hydrates are 
not evenly shared across all European countries, a substantial proportion of 
European countries do have methane hydrate resources, either close to Europe or 
within overseas territories. And among those European states that do not have 
methane hydrates, there are both wealthy and less wealthy states, so the impact is 
neither acute nor imbalanced, as contrasted against the distribution of methane 
hydrate lacking countries in Africa and South America.  
Certain observations are in order:  
x First, will the economic diversity of resource owners encourage a race to 
those with the least regulation?  
x Second, the strategic negotiating advantages of the technology owners 
could perversely incentivate the resource owners to reduce 
environmental regulatory costs. 
First, the diversity of resource owners is stunning. Some of the resource owners 
have advanced legal systems and stable institutions whereas many other do not. In 
an almost perfect inverse, the less legally developed locations are generally those 
with the lowest per capita incomes and thus those most likely to encourage the 
rapid deployment of methane hydrate production in order to obtain revenues 
therefrom. Thus, without broader regulatory efforts to divert initial investments 
into well regulated zones, there might be an initial surge of investment into those 
areas least capable of regulating for environmental safety.  
Second, the contrast of the small size of the methane hydrate technology 
owners versus the very large size of resource owners means that without regulation 
the technology owners have their pick of locations and resource owners. It would 
only be rational, ceteris paribus, for those technology owners to seek out the lowest 
costs locations. Less stringent regulations would generally be expected to be lower 
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cost, as costs of accidents and harms could be externalized from the technology 
owner.140 
Perhaps a broader agreement could be reached amongst the technology 
owners to self-monitor their environmental safety standards even when local 
conditions and regulation do not otherwise require such measures.  
6. Summary and conclusions 
Methane hydrates are a newly discovered source of energy supplies, but once 
extracted provides both water and natural gas. Methane hydrates are a novel 
energy resource, but the fuel it produces is the long-familiar natural gas methane. 
Methane hydrates are abundant, their potential supply dwarfs traditional crude oil 
and conventional natural gas supplies.  
The novelty of offshore methane hydrates is clear. Methane hydrates were not 
geo-physically surveyed until the 1970s and were not recovered in small samples 
from offshore locations until the 1980s. It wasn’t until the 1990s that offshore 
methane hydrates were identified as a potential energy resource. The first non-
continuous well was not drilled until 1999. Only in 2013 was the first successful 
continuous production well for methane hydrates drilled and operated offshore.  
Methane hydrates are a chemical combination of both fresh water and 
methane. Their combination enables the resulting hydrate to exist as a solid frozen 
mass at chilly but room temperatures. The hydrates usually form in the ocean under 
subsea mud layers but above harder ground surfaces. As such, the hydrates form an 
icy or slushy layer under the mud layers. While frozen and intact, the hydrate 
structures are very strong but if they are disturbed they can disassociate or cleave 
and enable massive displacement of the hydrates. 
While hydrates could contain other light hydrocarbons, the vast majority of 
hydrates contain only methane; in fact, the unique size of the hydrate cage structure 
effectively prevents contamination of the natural gas from many larger molecules so 
the produced methane is expected to be acid-free. However, carbon dioxide could 
be injected to replace the methane within the hydrate structures because it would fit 
within the cages. Thus, methane hydrate deposits could support carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS) technologies.141 
Methane hydrates are endothermic, meaning that it takes an injection of 
energy to enable the release of the methane from the hydrate. Left alone, methane 
hydrates are self-stabilizing. Methane hydrates store methane densely; methane 
hydrate deposits contain 170 cubic meters of conventional natural gas per each 
cubic meter of methane hydrate deposit. Thus, should energy be introduced into a 
 
140  Such a non-stringent regulation need not be per se predatory on the part of the technology 
owner. A nation state might offer nationwide indemnification for all methane hydrate 
liabilities to the technology owners, with counterbalancing promises to provide due process 
handling of victim claims and rights. The technology owner might then engage in a multi-
decade investment only to later discover that the bulk of the promised due process measures 
never manifested. 
141  See the discussion on carbon sequestration within methane hydrate deposits at ch. 3, sec. 5.1. 
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methane hydrate deposit, the potential volumes of emitted methane would be much 
larger than the volumes of affected hydrates.  
Globally, methane hydrates are expected to dwarf the global supplies of 
traditional crude oil and conventional natural gas. The standard estimate is that the 
global supply of methane hydrates is about 21,000 Tcm; this volume is three to four 
magnitudes larger than the global supplies of conventional natural gas. 99% of that 
global supply is expected to be stored in offshore methane hydrates. 
Those offshore volumes are located offshore almost every coastal state in the 
world. There are also volumes expected in areas of the world’s ocean beyond 
national exclusive economic zones, placing those volumes under the UN’s 
International Seabed Authority’s (ISA) control and management. This geographical 
diversity means that offshore methane hydrates will be located within a variety of 
legal settings, including both developed and developing countries. The potential of 
methane hydrates to enable many countries to obtain large supplies of domestic 
energy is clear; it is equally clear that the development of offshore methane hydrates 
would occur in a variety of legal settings.  
The potential for methane hydrates to provide the world with a large source of 
methane supplies is countered with the potential for those same volumes of 
methane to accidentally escape and cause harm and injury. 142  Additionally, 
methane hydrate deposits can serve as sinks to store carbon dioxide; but that too 
provides opportunity for risk and harm. As diversely located as offshore methane 
hydrates are, so too would be the potentially impacted communities around the 
globe. If methane hydrates were to be developed, the potential risks and hazards of 
that development would need strategies of risk governance to achieve optimal 
levels of methane hydrate extraction and of precautionary activities.  
  
 
142  The potential harms and injuries are discussed at ch. 4. 
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METHANE HYDRATES AS AN ENERGY RESOURCE 
1. Methane as a green energy source 
While the technologies of green and renewable energies develop, the production of 
methane hydrates could provide an earlier window of opportunity to eliminate coal 
and crude oil as fuel sources. Natural gas from methane hydrates provides very few 
pollutants and would yield less carbon emissions than coal or crude oil.  
While methane hydrates are not a form of renewable energy, they do open 
pathways to green energy. While methane is a carbon emitting fossil fuel, methane 
hydrates provide several methods to achieve near-term green energy supplies while 
other green and renewable energy supplies advance in technology and feasibility:  
x The methane and fresh water extracted from methane hydrates can be 
used to produce hydrogen fuel. What carbon dioxide is produced in 
the conversion process can be re-sequestered in the hydrate 
formation.1  
x They provide the potential to extract methane, combust that methane 
to electricity, and to re-sequester the produced carbon dioxide back 
into the hydrate formation.2  
x Methane itself provides approximately half the carbon emissions 
compared against coal for the same amount of produced energy. 
Methane also produces fewer carbon emissions than crude oil.3  
x Methane extracted from methane hydrates has practically zero co-
produced pollutants, other than carbon, and methane in general 
 
1  V. Krey et al., Gas Hydrates: Entrance to a Methane Age or Climate Threat?, 4 Environmental 
Research Letters 34007, 4 (2009). 
2  Id. 
3  P. Englezos & J. D. Lee, Gas Hydrates: A Cleaner Source of Energy and Opportunity for Innovative 
Technologies, 22 Korean J. Chemical Engineering 671, 671 (2005); S. Y. Lee & G. D. Holder, 
Methane Hydrates Potential as a Future Energy Source, 71 Fuel Processing Technology 181, 183 
(2001). 
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creates much less non-carbon pollution in contrast to the heavy 
pollutants emitted by coal and crude oil combustion. 
 
Table 1: Carbon Emissions from Energy Sources 
Fuel Source  Carbon Emissions4 
Coal  27 kg/GJ 
Crude Oil  21 kg/GJ 
Methane  15 kg/GJ 
 
Methane hydrates provide a “kind of clean energy” in that it contains sweet natural 
gas with no impurities.5 The overall environmental pollution from the combustion 
of methane is of a comparatively low degree when compared against the carbon 
dioxide and other harmful emissions from the combustion of coal, crude oil and less 
clean forms of natural gas.6  
Before 1800, plant-based sources, e.g. dried wood, provided in excess of 95% of 
the world’s fuel needs. They were essentially carbon neutral fuel sources. The early 
industrial era was based upon the heat energy from combusted coal; within decades 
coal had displaced wood as the globe’s primary energy resource.7 By the onset of 
World War I, coal had reached its peak as an energy resource, providing 
approximately 75% of the world’s energy needs.8 With the rise of the automobiles 
after World War I, crude oil and its distillates quickly replaced coal.9 Crude oil 
never reached the peaks of energy hegemony that coal had attained, but it reached 
close to 50% by the 1970s. Coal remained a strong competitor to crude oil, but both 
generated massive amounts of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide and other 
pollutants.  
The combustion of coal releases significant pollution beyond greenhouse gases 
that can cause substantial risk to human health. 10  Coal ash also contains 
 
4  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 3, at 671; Lee & Holder, supra at note 3, at 183. 
5  Z. G. Zhang, et al., Marine gas hydrates: Future Energy or Environmental Killer?, 16 Energy 
Procedia 933, 934 (2012); R. A. Dawe & S. Thomas, A Large Potential Methane Source—Natural 
Gas Hydrates, 29 Energy Sources 217, 217 (2007). See also discussion on methane hydrate 
chemistry, supra, at ch.  2, sec. 2. 
6  Zhang et al., supra at note 5, at 934. The combustion of coal and crude oil, especially as diesel 
fuel, are known to cause a variety of health and medical injuries to frequently exposed 
communities. The combustion of coal and crude oil provide the worst sources of fuel-based 
anthropogenic climate change. In Asia in particular, the health risks can be extreme. The 
delivery of a geographically diverse abundant supply of methane, or of hydrogen, is an 
opportunity to save lives and to save the climate. 
7  Y. F. Makogon, S. A. Holditch & T. Y.Makogon, Natural Gas-Hydrates—A Potential Energy 
Source for the 21st Century, 56 J. Petroleum Sci. & Engineering 14 (2007). 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  A typical 600 MWW coal plant might release 14,100 tons of sulfur dioxide (SO2), 10,300 tons of 
nitrous oxides (NOx), 500 tons of small airborne particles, 170 pounds of mercury, and 114 
Æ
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surprisingly substantial quantities of radioactive materials, which is carcinogenic.11 
Thus, countries that rely heavily on coal would find the combustion of methane a 
healthier option.12  
The alternatives to coal and crude oil, e.g., hydro-electric, geothermal, and 
nuclear, have never historically exceeded 10% of global demand; current forecasts 
suggest that they will likely remain under 20% of the world’s energy needs.13  
In the alternative, methane hydrates are forecasted to be able to supply energy 
volumes beyond the sum of the expected quantities to be provided by alternative 
forms of energy such as solar, nuclear and hydro-power. 14 
2. Economics of methane hydrates projects 
2.1. Economics of methane hydrates 
When methane hydrates were first discussed as a potential fuel source in the 1990s 
it was technologically infeasible to extract methane from methane hydrate 
deposits. 15  Since those years, the technology and scientific understandings of 
methane hydrates and their reservoir structures has rapidly developed; it is likely 
that early adopters will do so for national energy policy and strategic energy supply 
concerns followed by broader private investment as investment costs drop.16  
Much of the leading investment in methane hydrates research has been driven 
by nations with substantial concerns of energy supply security; the research 
programs have not been driven by private investors — however, the overall goal of 
 
pounds of lead annually. See Environmental impacts of coal power: air pollution. Union of 
Concerned Scientists. See at [http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/coalvswind/c02c.html] 
11  In a report from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, UT Battelle for the U.S. Department of 
Energy, it was estimated that American coal combustion emitted more uranium as ash than 
America used as nuclear fuel. “According to 1982 figures, 111 American nuclear plants 
consumed about 540 tons of nuclear fuel, generating almost 1.1 x 1012 kWh of electricity. 
During the same year, about 801 tons of uranium alone was released from American coal-
fired plants. Add 1971 tons of thorium, and the release of nuclear components from coal 
combustion far exceeds the entire U.S. consumption of nuclear fuels. ” See A. Gabbard, Coal 
Combustion, Nuclear Resource or Danger? (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, UT Battelle for the 
U.S. Department of Energy, 2008) Available at http://web.ornl.gov/info/ornlreview/rev26-
34/text/colmain.html. 
12  E.g., Greenpeace estimates that current air pollution in China, primarily sourced from coal 
combustion, may be responsible for a quarter million premature deaths. See Ottery, Christine. 
Interactive Map: Health impact of China's coal plants mapped. Greenpeace UK. Available at 
http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/newsdesk/energy/data/interactive-health-impact-chinas-
coal-plants-mapped. 
13  Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, supra at note 7. 
14  Id. 
15  As noted earlier, certain fields have been produced that contained both natural gas deposits 
and methane hydrate deposits; but no 'pure' methane hydrate fields has come online for 
continuous production as of December 2013. 
16  J. Marcelle-De Silva & R. Dawe, Towards Commercial Gas Production from Hydrate Deposits, 4 
Energies 215, 230 (2011). 
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these policies have been to provide beneficial economic support to national 
economies, thus project economics have been inclusive of the supported industrial 
sectors.17  
For early investors in methane hydrates projects, there are several concerns. 
First, the rapid development of methane hydrate technologies has been so fast that 
one hesitates to make a major investment in caution that better and cheaper 
technologies are imminent. For those planning eventual investments in methane 
hydrates, the benefits of waiting have been demonstrated in superior and safer 
technologies alongside drops in the overall costs of lifting production from the 
deposits.  
Second, the overall science of methane hydrates is stabilizing and coming 
together, but the transition from scientific laboratories to billion dollar investments 
will take time. Oil and gas fields have often taken a decade or more in basic 
exploration and economic modelling before approaching a FID. Methane hydrates 
will need to transition from scientific research accomplishment to industrial 
investment and then again from gaining boardroom recognition as a targetable 
investment to making specific FIDs on specific methane hydrate fields. While 
corporations can respond to change faster than bureaucracies, they too have 
paradigmatic drivers that take time to adjust and update.  
Third, while the costs of producing methane hydrates have been dropping as 
the scientific and engineering technologies advance, they remain more expensive to 
produce than traditional natural gas reservoirs. But how much more expensive is 
both unclear and subject to details of particular models. Some models compare the 
costs required to develop, other models compare the market prices required to 
ensure commercial feasibility. Optimistic estimates suggest that the cost of 
developing offshore methane hydrate projects should be 15% to 20% more costly 
than comparably situated conventional natural gas projects. 18  Another forecast 
stated, based on technologies and costs prior to 2008, the incremental costs of 
producing from an offshore Class 3 methane hydrate reservoir were $3/Mcf more 
expensive than production volumes from a conventional offshore natural gas well.19 
A meta-discussion on several economic models from 2005 observed that offshore 
methane hydrate projects were feasible when the price of natural gas exceeded $7 
USD. 20 Another model found that offshore methane hydrate projects would be 
commercially feasible if crude oil prices were to sustainably remain above $50 USD 
for the long run.21  
 
17  Krey et al., supra at note 1, at 4; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 16, at 230. 
18  Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, supra at note 7, at 30. In particular, the costs of well drilling 
are expected to be substantially lower due to the comparable shallowness of methane hydrate 
deposits and the lack of rock to drill through, as contrasted with conventional natural gas 
plays. The downside is that methane hydrate projects will likely need more wells to be drilled 
for comparable volumes to be produced. 
19  M. R. Walsh et al., Preliminary Report on the Commercial Viability of Gas Production from Natural 
Gas Hydrates, 31 Energy Econ. 815 (2009). 
20  Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 16, at 230. 
21  Krey et al., supra at note 1, at 3. 
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2.2. Discount rates and time sensitivity of costs 
Many investors in energy projects develop financial models against an assumed 
hurdle rate of 15% after a annual discount rate of 10% has been applied.22  
 These assumptions create strong economic incentives for operators to be very 
responsive to costs and revenues close in time to the FID and less responsive to 
costs further away from the moment of the FID. When costs and revenues are 
several decades beyond the FID, then those economic events will be effectively 
scaled down a magnitude or two in contrast to near term events.  
If one assumes the onset of cash costs from the abandoning and sequestration 
phase to begin three decades after the initial FID, the effect of 30 years of a 10% 
discount rate renders the effective costs very small in contrast to near term costs and 
revenues; against the FID date as year zero:  
 
Table 2: Effective Discounts at 10% for Post-FID Stages of  
Methane Hydrate Projects23 
Stage Years  Discount formula Simple 
Fraction 
Development 1  ܿ݋ݏݐݏ כ ൫1 െ 1 10ൗ ൯
ଵ
  9 10ൗ   
 5  ܿ݋ݏݐݏ כ ൫1 െ 1 10ൗ ൯
ହ
  3 5ൗ   
Production 5  ܿ݋ݏݐݏ כ ൫1 െ 1 10ൗ ൯
ହ
  3 5ൗ   
 10  ܿ݋ݏݐݏ כ ൫1 െ 1 10ൗ ൯
ଵ଴
  1 3ൗ   
 20  ܿ݋ݏݐݏ כ ൫1 െ 1 10ൗ ൯
ଶ଴
  1 8ൗ   
Abandonment 30  ܿ݋ݏݐݏ כ ൫1 െ 1 10ൗ ൯
ଷ଴
  1 25ൗ   
 40  ܿ݋ݏݐݏ כ ൫1 െ 1 10ൗ ൯
ସ଴
  1 70ൗ   
 50  ܿ݋ݏݐݏ כ ൫1 െ 1 10ൗ ൯
ହ଴
  1 200ൗ   
 
 
22  The discount rate for costs is often modeled as {costs × (1െ ݎ)௡} ; wherein r is the discount 
rate and n is the number of years from which to discount down. Author's personal industrial 
experience: When discounting a flow of costs from continuously successive time periods, the 
formula is usually given as: σ [ܿ݋ݏݐݏ௡ × (1െ ݎ)௡]௡଴  
23  This table is generated by simply completing the evaluations of specific notable time 
periods against a traditional compound interest rate calculation. The phrase “discount 
rate” is used in the oil and gas industry as a reflection of the decreased value of future 
money versus current money, future revenues need to be ‘discounted’ for correctly 
reflecting their current value to an investor. The Catch 22 for risk decision making is 
that discounted cash flows also apply to future costs, thus, their impact is less than 
current costs of the same numerical value. Future damages are less costly to a current 
investor than current damages, ceteris paribus. 
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Risk from the earlier years would be discounted by larger simple fractions, most of 
the cost impact of the future damages would be retained for the operator’s decision 
making process. But risks from further out would be severely discounted, 
potentially blunting the cost impact of those future damages in the tortfeasor’s 
decision making. For similar reasons, operators are more sensitive to earlier 
revenues than later revenues. 
The point to be made herein is that the economics of methane hydrate projects 
will be much more sensitive to early-in-time costs than late-in-time costs. In essence, 
discount rate analysis over-represents near-term costs and under-represents long-
term costs, resulting in a type of bias. Risks and revenues that feature in the first 
couple decades of project life will be accounted for within FID analysis and risk-
decision making while those events and accidents that happen futher out would be 
disproportionately represented due to the effects of discount rate analysis. The costs 
of events in the far future might be very large in their own time period but would 
be included at a substantially smaller size in the discount rate analysis employed to 
evaluate project risks and costs. 
3. Methane hydrate engineering 
That methane hydrates is presented as a solid in nature, that the extraction of 
methane from the hydrate is a resistant endothermic reaction, and that the 
production of methane hydrates in water actually cools the local environment 
fostering the reformation of hydrates all make the continuous extraction of methane 
hydrates much more difficult than the extraction of traditional natural gas.24  
The technology to produce offshore methane hydrates is advancing rapidly; 
Japan drilled the first offshore well in 1999 and recently sustained the first 
successful continuous flow testing from an offshore well in 2013.25 As of 2008, 
methane hydrates had been drilled and extracted from 23 locations, 3 in permafrost 
and 20 from offshore.26 In the offshore wells, experience has been accumulated in all 
phases of a methane project’s life cycle; wells have been drilled, cemented and made 
viable, methane has been produced, processed and combusted, and wells have been 
plugged and abandoned.27  
 
24  M. KURIHARA, M ET AL., Gas Production from Methane Hydrate Reservoirs, in: PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAS HYDRATES (2011) 
25  G. J. Moridis et al., Toward Production from Gas Hydrates: Current Status, Assessment Of 
Resources, and Simulation-Based Evaluation of Technology and Potential, 12 SPE Reservoir 
Evaluation & Engineering 745, 3 (2009). 
26  Id., at 23. Also see Koh & Sloan 2007. 
27  Moridis et al., supra at note 25. See also discussion on Japanese efforts in development in both 
the discussion on hazards from methane projects, infra at ch.  4.3, and on their investment in 
research, infra at sec. 4.1. 
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3.1. Methods of extraction 
There are three main methods in development to produce and extract methane 
hydrates. The first is depressurization, the second is thermal stimulation, and the 
third main method is inhibitor injection.28  
Depressurization extracts methane from hydrate formation by reducing the 
pressure level until the phase boundary of the hydrate is breached, causing 
disassociation of the hydrate.29 This method found practice at the Siberian field of 
Messoyhaka for several decades. Most current models assume that depressurization 
is the most energy efficient means of production because it can be applied using 
current technologies and be effective in long-run continuous operations; however 
most models assume a combination of techniques would be required in real-life.30  
Thermal stimulation directly confronts the endothermic reaction of hydrate 
decomposition be supplying energy to the hydrates.31 When the temperature is 
raised above the equilibrium, this increases the overall pressure within the hydrate; 
additional pressure returns the hydrate to a stability zone encouraging hydrate 
formation and thus yields some process control to the operator.32 Modelling and 
testing have shown that a 10% energy loss occurs in the overall extraction of 
methane calories; e.g., it takes 10 kJ of inputted energy to release the volume of 
methane that could release 100 kJ.33 On the other hand, the overall cooling of the 
methane hydrate reservoir system as methane is produced adds the challenge of 
adding additional energies to continue the extraction process. 34  Overall, the 
 
28  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 5, at 223; Moridis et al., supra at note 25, at 2 and 12-17; 
Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 16, at 227. 
29  Lee & Holder, supra at note 3, at 185; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 16, at 227. This 
method found practice at the Siberian field of Messoyhaka for several decades. 
30  Walsh et al. 2009; Moridis et al., supra at note 25, at 2 and 12-17; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, 
supra at note 16, at 227. 
31  Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 5, at 223; C. A. Koh, Towards a Fundamental Understanding of 
Natural Gas Hydrates, 31 Chemical Soc’y Rev. 157, 165-166 (2002); Walsh et al. 2009; M. J. 
Castaldi, Y. Zhou & T. M. Yegulalp, Down-Hole Combustion Method for Gas Production from 
Methane Hydrates, 56 J. Petroleum Sci. & Engineering 176 (2007); Englezos & Lee, supra at note 
3. Endothermic reactions require energy to be added for the reaction to occur. Exothermic 
reactions release energy as they occur. 50 kJ/mol of energy is required to separate methane 
from the hydrate formation. Larger molecules require more energy; e.g., propane requires 130 
kJ/mol. Lee & Holder, supra at note 3, at 185. 
32  KURIHARA ET AL., supra at note 24. Chatti et al. discuss the additional benefits of thermal 
pressure increases on carbon sequestration techniques. I. Chatti et al., Benefits and Drawbacks of 
Clathrate Hydrates: A Review of Their Areas of Interest, 46 Energy Conversion Mgmt. 1333, 1334  
(2005). 
33  Lee & Holder, supra at note 3, at 185; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 16, at 227. A 
constant concern in discussions on thermal injection systems is that they will need to 
consumer substantial portions of the methane produced to provide heat for the injection 
fluids. This is a costly issue that needs further development if it is to be widely adopted as a 
primary means of production. 
34  KURIHARA ET AL., supra at note 24. A variety of means to insert additional energy down-hole 
to enable the endothermic disassociation to begin have been developed; some of the explored 
options are heat injection via steam (known in the petroleum industry as “huff-n-puff”), 
Æ
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injection of hot water or steam into the reservoir is foreseen as causing methane 
hydrate formation near the well bore and frustrating extraction if there is not 
sufficient intra-granular room for flow; thus thermal stimulation is advised for 
secondary recovery after initial methane volumes have been recovered and thus 
providing circulatory room for hot water or stream fluids.35  
A supplementary technology for thermal injection technologies is to use 
horizontal wells, wells that lay parallel to the mineral within its deposit. 36  A 
dramatic improvement in overall performance has been reported for horizontal 
wells as compared against traditional vertical wells; Cranganu has suggested that 
certain combinations of horizontal wells plus injection of oxidized fuel gas into the 
hydrate layer may reduce overall inefficiencies to less than 2% of produced calories 
from the hydrate deposits, as compared with earlier models’ forecasts of 10% to 
20%.37  
Inhibitor injection disassociates methane gas from the methane hydrate by 
injecting chemicals known as inhibitors, e.g. methanol and glycol, which are known 
to prevent or inhibit the formation of the icy crystals around the methane.38 As a 
primary extraction technology, however, large volumes of injectants would be 
required which would be both costly to supply and create environmental concerns 
of such injected volumes; as such, the inhibitor injection method is not expected for 
Class 1, 2, and 3 deposits.39  
As hydrates are a common pipeline problem when transporting natural gas in 
the presence of sufficient water vapor, the extraction of methane from an aqueous 
environment will have similar challenges.40 From current experiences with pipeline 
hydrate solutions, there are four known thermodynamic solutions to that problem: 
maintaining the temperature of the extraction facility and pipelines at a warmer 
temperature outside of the phase boundary, down-hole dehydration of the 
extracted methane, rapid evacuation of the methane to maintain transport pressures 
below the phase boundary requirements, and to use hydrate inhibitors.41 Thus, even 
if inhibitor injection is not part of the disassociation technology strategy, chemical 
inhibitors may likely be employed to keep both the well and gathering systems 
 
thermal flooding, fire flooding, injection of non-hydrating gases (such as atmospheric 
volumes), electro-magnetic heating, and the sub-surface placement of nuclear materials. See 
Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 5, at 224. 
35  KURIHARA ET AL., supra at note 24; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 16, at 227. 
36  Moridis et al., supra at note 25, at 7-12. 
37  Id., at 7.; C. Cranganu, In-situ Thermal Stimulation of Gas Hydrates, 65 J. Petroleum Sci. & 
Engineering 76, 79 (2009). 
38  Castaldi, Zhou, & Yegulalp, supra at note 31; Englezos & Lee, supra at note 3; Walsh et al. 2009; 
KURIHARA ET AL., supra at note 24; Dawe & Thomas, supra at note 5, at 219-220. 
39  Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 16, at 227. 
40  Lee & Holder, supra at note 3, at 185; Koh, supra at note 31, at 159; Dawe & Thomas, supra at 
note 5, at 219-220. 
41  Lee & Holder, supra at note 3, at 185; KURIHARA ET AL., supra at note 24; Koh, supra at note 31, 
at 159. See a much more technical discussion of pipeline inhibition processes at id., at 164-165. 
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problem free. Additionally, the wells of a methane hydrate deposit will likely need 
to be heated to prevent accumulation of hydrates within the well structures.42  
Computer models of methane hydrate wells suggest that there may be long 
lag times from start-up at the well until full-volume production flow is achieved; 
unlike traditional methane wells, the methane hydrate wells will increase in 
produced volumes for a substantial portion of the production profile.43  
However, not all of the disassociated methane volumes are expected to enter 
into the well, accumulation would likely occur above the hydrate layer; as such, 
substantial hazards of venting and seeping would be present unless artificial 
barriers can be put in place.44  
3.2. Example typical installation 
Once an extraction technology choice is made, the onset of development will 
probably resemble traditional offshore gas production in many ways. In deep-water 
offshore production facilities, which 500m to 1000m waters would be, it is now 
common to rely on floating production platforms. It is common for economies of 
scale to be leveraged, so often a singular production platform will receive produced 
natural gas from multiple wells. Due to the depth of the seabeds and the placement 
of the wellhead structures at the seabed, often the whole christmas tree and 
associated equipment is placed at the seabed.45  
Several seabed wellsites may be connected by gathering lines to a single 
manifold station. Those gathering lines are often lain in the seabed or become 
settled therein by the movement of subsea currents. Such stations will provide a 
variety of remote services for the wellsites, including electrical supply and controls, 
hydraulic supply and control, or chemical injection facilities. The extraction of 
methane from the hydrate deposit may encourage the use of subsea facilities to 
separate the lifting of methane and water to the surface to prevent the reformation 
of hydrates in the gathering and transportation pipes. In that case, the manifolds for 
methane hydrate fields may also provide first stage separation and treatment 
facilities; these may include gas/liquid separators and tri-ethylene-glycol towers for 
dehydration and initial contaminant removal. The manifolds will then connect from 
the seabed to the production platform via vertically rising pipelines. The manifold 
would also need to support the recycle and support of its own chemicals and 
equipment.  
Once on the production platform, the extracted methane will be dehydrated 
and treated again; thereafter the methane is ready for transport, use, or conversion 
to hydrogen. The produced water will be collected and treated for purification 
purposes, usually treated with a biocide to prevent accidental contamination 
 
42  Moridis et al., supra at note 25, at 14. 
43  Id., at 15; Walsh et al., supra at note 19. Early models suggested that the lags could run up to 
eight years. 
44  Moridis et al., supra at note 25, at 15. 
45  A christmas tree is a multiple valve assembly routinely found immediately above the 
wellhead. A christmas tree is used to control the flow of production.  
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downstream, and then either transported away or re-injected into a disposal well. 
The production platform will carry a flare stack for the safe combustion of surplus 
methane volumes; regulations generally require a certain volume of methane to be 
continuously flared to ensure the function of the flare in emergency moments. 
Production platforms also generally have a range of support equipment and 
facilities, such as hydraulic systems, electrical power systems, crew support cabins 
and systems, and heli-pads and boat docks. Production platforms normally have 
export pipelines to transport the natural gas away from the platform and 
downstream to either marketing or additional processing facilities onshore.  
3.3. Recent production tests 
The engineering required to model and build safe and reliable methane hydrate 
extraction technologies has become quite advanced. 46  It is already possible to 
produce methane from some hydrate fields, the onset of profitable extraction may 
be soon. This places the timeline of development of methane hydrates between the 
current commercial development of the new technologies of shale oil and the on-
going research and development of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) 
technologies. While methane hydrates are not in commercial development, 
functional wells have been tested both onshore and offshore, one methane hydrate 
field in Soviet-era Russia was operated for decades. While technology 
improvements are expected, basic methane hydrate extraction technology is 
operational today. The commercial development of methane hydrates primarily 
awaits clarification of the legal environment and commercially feasible pricing 
structures.  
Soviet-era Russian scientists were the first to identify naturally formed 
methane hydrates in permafrost areas 47 and offshore subsea. 48  Due to those 
experiences, Class 1 fields are known to be capable of producing safely over long 
periods, if other conditions are in place. 49  In other words, Class 1 fields are 
technologically feasible today.  
 
46  Walsh et al., supra at note 19. 
47  A Class 1 field in Soviet-era Siberia called Messoyahka was the first known methane hydrate 
field to go into production. It was develop as a conventional natural gas field, and then began 
to display an unusual yet superior production curve; eventually it was determined that a 
methane hydrate resource overlay the known natural gas field and that production of the gas 
was causing the hydrates to disassociate yield methane alongside the conventional natural 
gas. The produced gas was used for industrial purposes for many years. See A. Demirbas, 
Methane Hydrates as Potential Energy Resource: Part 1–Importance, Resource and Recovery 
Facilities, 51 Energy Conversion Mgmt. 1547 (2010), and see Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, 
supra at note 7. 
48  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 3, at 672, citing to Y. F. Makogon, Natural Gases in the Ocean and 
the Problems of Their Hydrates, 11 Express-Information 1 (1972). 
49  Demirbas, supra at note 47. 
69_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Chapter 3 
 39 
The Japanese government has set a technological development goal to 
complete a Phase III of research and development by the close of 2017; 2018 is set to 
be the year of the onset of Japan’s commercial development of methane hydrates.50  
Early testing of methane hydrates has been underway since the late 1990s. 
There have been internationally coordinated extraction efforts in onshore Alaska 
and Canada and offshore Japan. The onshore testing at the Mallik Gas Hydrate 
Production Research Well in arctic Canada proved that methane hydrates could be 
reliably and sustainably extracted and produced. 51  Mallik additionally 
demonstrated that off-the-shelf technology could be employed to extract and 
produce certain classes of methane hydrates.52  
Japan’s Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation. (JOGMEC) reported its first 
successful continuous production from offshore reservoirs in March 2013.53 The 
researchers announced that they had successfully produced methane from a deep 
ocean Class 1 methane hydrates reservoir. The hydrate reservoir was located 300m 
below the mudline. The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
reported that the research vessel Chikyu had extracted methane from a reserve near 
the Daini Atsumi Knoll off the coasts of Atsumi and Shima peninsulas in the Nankai 
Trough, 80 kilometers south of central Honshu.54 
The method recently employed by the Japanese research team in its offshore 
continuous production testing employed depressurization to drop the pressure in 
the reservoir below the equilibrium value at the system temperature.55 The Japanese 
team installed a pump at the bottom of the well to remove initial methane volumes; 
this drop in gas pressure produced a suction that enabled additional the emission of 
additional methane volumes from the deposits.56 As methane is removed from the 
well and pressure continues to be reduced near the well bore, the lower pressure is 
propagated throughout the production zone. 57However, this pressure drop also 
coincides with a reduction in temperature, so not all of the methane will 
disassociate from the deposit systems.58 Thus, the operators retain an ability to cease 
 
50  See report from Methane Hydrates 21, available at 
http://www.mh21japan.gr.jp/english/wp/wp-
content/uploads/ca434ff85adf34a4022f54b2503d86e92.pdf. 
51  Mallik is an onshore permafrost testing location, located on Richards Island in the Mackenzie 
Delta of northern Canada. R. Boswell, Resource Potential of Methane Hydrate Coming into Focus, 
56 J. Petroleum Sci. Engineering 9, 12 (2007). 
52  Id. 
53  See Flow Test From Methane Hydrate Layers Ends, in: TECHNICAL REPORT (JOGMEC, March 
2013); available at 
http://www.jogmec.go.jp/english/news/release/news_01_000005.html?recommend=1 
54  Tabuchi 2013. See also Gas Production from Methane Hydrate Layers Confirmed, In: JOGMEC 
NEWS RELEASES (2013) Available at 
http://www.jogmec.go.jp/english/news/release/release0110.html?recommend=1.  
See also “Japan extracts gas from methane hydrate in world first.” BBC News, Business. March 
12, 2013. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21752441. 
55  Walsh et al. 2009; Castaldi, Zhou, & Yegulalp, supra at note 31; Englezos & Lee, supra at note 3. 
56  KURIHARA ET AL., supra at note 24. 
57  Id. 
58  Id.; Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 16, at 227. 
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down-hole disassociation processes by observing the ambient downhole 
temperatures.59  
This early success in extraction and production follows the investment of 
hundreds of millions of dollars by Japan into the eventual commercialization of 
methane hydrate extraction and production. 60  Japan expects to complete its 
extraction feasibility research and to be ready to begin commercial extraction 
activities by 2018.61  
While a variety of hydrocarbons could be found in hydrate formations, 
historical experience has found methane to by far the most prevalent hydrocarbon 
present in methane hydrate formations. Tests at Mallik found a range of C2 through 
C5 hydrocarbons, but methane predominated at 98% to 100% of all recovered 
hydrocarbons from the well over time.62 Propane and carbon dioxide were the main 
components of the remaining less-than 2% of the recovered gases. 63 
4. National research programs and agendas 
Methane hydrates are targeted by certain countries as both strategic energy policies 
and as industrial growth targets. Particularly those countries with both extensive 
methane hydrate resources and sophisticated oil and gas extraction technologies, 
such as Japan and the United States, are engaged in these methane hydrate 
feasibility studies. Moridis notes the strategic pattern of government-led investment 
in lieu of private-led investment; he suspects that this is due to the strategic need for 
energy supplies trumping profitability concerns.64 If he is correct, then the timing of 
technological activation may not wait for traditional notions of commercial 
feasibility but rather subsidized feasibility.  
An immediate observation is the shortness of the list of heavily invested 
countries. Partially, this is due to the overall centralization of the oil and gas 
industry.65 Most of the major oil and gas companies derive from Anglo-American 
 
59  KURIHARA ET AL., supra at note 24. The actual heat in a most simple case is from both the over- 
and under-burden of the deposit. That latent heat and initial gas removal triggers a certain 
amount of methane disassociation, but the disassociation process it self cools the deposit and 
returns it to within a stable zone for hydrate formation, ceasing the disassociation process. 
Additional efforts at pressure reduction is required to facilitate on-going production and 
extraction. 
60  Tabuchi. 2013. 
61  Gas Production from Methane Hydrate Layers Confirmed, in: JOGMEC NEWS RELEASES. March 12, 
2013. Available at  
http://www.jogmec.go.jp/english/news/release/release0110.html?recommend=1. 
62  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 3, at 672. 
63  Id. 
64  Moridis et al., supra at note 25, at 19. 
65  This is partially a result of the costs structures of modern oil and gas operations which require 
extremely large initial investments with relatively small marginal costs of operation. This is 
the definitional essence of a natural monopoly and it has led to decades of acquisitions, 
mergers and consolidations across the industry. There is also an interesting pricing dynamic 
wherein the upstream and downstream sectors of the industry tend to be counter-cyclical 
which encourages many companies to ensure a balanced portfolio of upstream and 
Æ
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roots, even when not derived from the Rockefeller/Standard Oil family of 
companies. The other major private oil companies, of which there are surprisingly 
few at any substantial scale of size, maintain their primary research and 
development center near the employable clusters of oil and gas scientists. The vast 
majority of these research and development centers are near a small number of 
cities around the world. Thus, while oil and gas operations may be scattered around 
the world, the technical elite of that industry are not and their research efforts 
remain clustered.  
Next, the technology of methane hydrates is dependent on a few critical 
bottlenecks. Methane hydrate surveying relies on massive computation capacity, so 
called “big data” machines. The ocean vessels used for methane hydrate surveying 
are in short supply. There are few trained scientists who have specialized in this so-
far niche of oil and gas research. These bottlenecks and others like them have 
reduced the opportunity for anyone but the major investors to have access to the 
necessary technology and researchers.  
This small set of knowledge-holders creates a fundamental problem of 
asymmetrical information, for both the commercial issues and on the environmental 
safety issues.  
Beyond the problem of their limited membership, those parties are 
additionally reluctant to share scientific data and technology due to both 
commercial and legal reasons. The first corporations to reduce the cost structures of 
methane hydrate production stand to earn a lot of revenue, even if they only license 
the technology to other parties or states. Also, for a variety of intellectual property 
rights and scientific validation needs, data and technology does not readily become 
available to non-investing countries and individuals.  
The major national investors are Japan, South Korea, the United States, China 
and India. Norway and Russia appear very motivated in methane hydrate research, 
but there is very little in public sources to provide financial estimates on their 
methane hydrate investments. 66  Australia, Canada and the U.K. have been 
historically engaged in methane hydrates, but their major oil corporations are 
indistinguishable from their American affiliations, so much of that research shows 
up hereunder as American research. Germany does have a research agenda into 
methane hydrates but its research program appears to be primarily focused on the 
potential to use methane hydrates for carbon sequestration.  
 
downstream assets. And finally, the emergence of the national oil corporations has provided 
competition for the private oil companies, driving them to gain scale to better match the 
investment capacity of the national oil companies. 
66  The evidence from Russia primarily exists in the form of scientific publications, which were 
often on co-sponsored cruises with American or Japanese researchers. The data from Norway 
appears primarily from PowerPoint presentations that have been placed on the internet, albeit 
apparently without first removing the private and proprietary labels. See T. Reichel & J. 
Husebø, Gas Hydrate as a Resource – Statoil’s Hydrate Initiative (Technical report, Statoil, 
Exploration Global New Ventures, 2011), as an example of such a report. 
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4.1. Japan 
Japan’s severe shortage of domestic energy supplies has driven it to pursue one of 
the most advanced methane hydrate research programs. 67  Japan’s reserves of 
methane hydrates have been estimated to be able to provide Japan with enough 
methane to power it for a century.68 While the United States may defer commercial 
investment in methane hydrates till the shale boom subsides, Japan does not have 
shale oil or gas to exploit – Japan will likely march on to commercial development 
before the United States. 69  Ray Boswell, the technology manager for methane 
hydrates at the U.S. Department of Energy, has said that he expects Japan to attempt 
to reach commercial feasibility by 2015.70  
There are seven major methane hydrates reservoir systems offshore of Japan.  
 
Offshore Shikoku and Honshu:  
x The Nankai Trough. 71 
x The Hyuga Nada. 72 
 
Offshore Hokkaido:  
x The Okushiri Basin. 73 
x Offshore of Tokachi-Hikada. 74 
x Offshore of Abashiri. 75 
x The West Tsuguru Basin. 76 
x Offshore, east of the Boso Penisula. 77 
 
In quest of this abundant and nearby energy supply, Japan began its Japan National 
Gas Hydrate Program in 1995. 78  Japan has remained committed to reaching 
 
67  J. F. Gabitto & M. Barrufet, Gas Hydrates Research Programs: An International Review (Technical 
report, Prairie View A&M University, 2009). 
68  Id. 
69  N. Jones, Gas Hydrate Tests to Begin in Alaska, 1038 Nature News 9758 (2013). 
70 Id. 
71  Gabitto & Barrufet, supra at note 67. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Makogon, Holditch, & Makogon, supra at note 7; COMMITTEE ON ASSESSMENT OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S METHANE HYDRATE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 
(NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (US)), EVALUATING METHANE HYDRATE AS A FUTURE ENERGY 
RESOURCE. REALIZING THE ENERGY POTENTIAL OF METHANE HYDRATE FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
(National Academies Press, 2010) (Hereinafter DOE Methane Hydrate Assessment). 
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feasibility of commercial methane hydrate extraction and methane production by 
2016.79  
As early as twenty years ago, the annual research budget for methane 
hydrates exceeded four million USD. 80 As part of the initial stages of their national 
methane hydrate research program, Japan had originally budgeted 10 million USD 
for a 5 year program; those budgets were soon expanded.81 In 2001, the annual 
budget was raised to 15 million USD. 82  To better facilitate methane hydrate 
research, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry created the Japan 
Methane Hydrate Exploitation Program (JMHEP) in 2004. 83  Semi-privately, the 
Japan Oil Gas & Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) has progressed an 
integrated methane hydrate research program.84 It was this same JOGMEC effort 
that achieved sustained offshore production of methane hydrates in 2013.  
Japan is committed to not only the break-throughs required for methane 
extraction but also the whole of support technologies that industry will need to be 
able to support in order to build the new methane hydrate production 
infrastructure. Japan currently coordinates its methane hydrate research through 
the Japanese Research Consortium for Methane Hydrate Resources in Japan, also 
known as the MH21 Research Consortium. 85  The MH21 Research Consortium 
provides private/public alignment on research by coordinating the efforts of 
JOGMEC, the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology 
(AIST) and the Engineering Advancement Association of Japan (ENAA).86  
Japan has been actively engaged in international methane hydrate research 
projects. With American researchers, Japanese scientists have coordinated research 
into combining Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) technologies with 
methane hydrate extraction. 87  Japan also coordinated with the U.S.’s National 
Science Foundation to research methane hydrate deposits in the Nankai Trough. 
JOGMEC has joined the U.S.’s Chevron-led Joint Industry Project, which focus on 
researching methane hydrates in the Gulf of Mexico.88 The ties between Japan’s and 
America’s research are coordinated at high levels of diplomacy; on June 6, 2008, U.S. 
Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and the Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry concluded a Statement of Intent for cooperation in methane research 
and development.89  
With Russian researchers, Japanese researchers explored for methane hydrates 
under the Okhotsk Sea near Sakhalin Island. Korean, German, and Belgian 
 
79  Englezos & Lee, supra at note 3; DOE Methane Hydrate Assessment, supra at note 78. 
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researchers were also present on that research mission.90  With French researchers, 
Japanese scientists worked to improve the seismic data from the Nankai Trough.91 
In Canada, Japan has played a leading financial role in supporting research at the 
Mallik research facility in northern Canada. JOGMEC has played a leadership role 
in the developing research at Canada’s Mallik Field.92  
4.2. South Korea 
Following Japan’s lead, in 2000, South Korea initiated the “Korean Gas Hydrate 
Research and Development Project.”93 South Korea announced a 10-year plan, to 
cover 2005-2015, to reach commercial feasibility of methane hydrate production. 
Matching Japan’s ambition, South Korea has announced its goals to reach 
commercial feasibility a year ahead of Japan, in 2015. 94 
Approximately 25M USD annually was budgeted for this research program.95 
That budget follows on the success of a 5-year program that prior to its onset. That 
previous program was funded at 5M USD annually.96 Given the contrast against 
Japan, it would appear that Korea has publicly committed to greater annual 
expenditures on methane hydrate research; indeed, contrasted with public U.S. 
data, Korea would appear to be supporting the largest methane hydrate research 
program in the world. However, the U.S. has much of its investment in alternative 
energy funnelled through DARPA, obscuring some of its funding, and Japan is not 
expected to be fully disclosing its private-side investments into methane hydrates.  
Estimates suggest that the Ulleung Basin contains over 30 years worth of 
methane at current Korean levels of consumption.97 Initial production is scheduled 
to begin after 2015.98  
The Gas Hydrate Research and Development Organization (GHDO) manages 
government coordinated research on methane hydrates; funding is provided by the 
Korean Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy (MOCIE). 99  The Korea 
National Oil Co. (KNOC), the Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) and the Korea 
Institute of Geosciences and Mineral Resources (KIGAM) are the leading 
institutions pursuing research into methane hydrate production. 100    
Early research in the Ulleung Basin was approximately 90 miles east of the 
coastal city of Pohang and 60 miles south of Ulleung Island. 101 One of the world’s 
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94  DOE Methane Hydrate Assessment, supra at note 78. 
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thickest methane hydrate deposit layer was found within the Ulleung Basin deposit, 
it measured 130m deep. 102 
In its annual report of 2009, KNOC announced its corporate target to become a 
top fifty oil corporation, with the goals of an annual production volume of 300K 
BOE/d reserves in excess of 2 billion BOE.103 ,104In order to accomplish those targets, 
KNOC has targeted three technology goals: oil sands, Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) 
technology and gas hydrates. 105 
Korea surely is matching its methane hydrate commercialization and 
technology goals against the goalposts of the Japanese government; it remains to be 
seen which country will succeed first. But it should not be underestimated how 
critical the development of methane hydrates is to both countries and that the 
ultimate manifestation of commercial development is likely not constrained by 
shale gas developments else. Both Japan and Korea need local gas supplies that are 
both stable in volumes and pricing to become more cost competitive in other 
industrial areas. Because of these unique factors, Japan and Korea may be the first 
nations to bring commercial methane hydrate developments forward.  
4.3. United States of America and Canada 
It is difficult to speak of separate research agendas between the United States and 
Canada; while the American side is clearly the dominant program they are so 
interwoven as to be inseparable. The United States possesses onshore permafrost 
methane hydrates deposits that are very similar to Canada’s permafrost deposits. 
Both countries also have similar Arctic offshore methane hydrate deposits. In these 
areas, Canada and the United States are closely engaged together.  
The United States has warm water hydrates offshore all three coasts, the 
Pacific, the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico. But the United States has primarily 
focused its extraction and production research on Arctic permafrost locations.  
Most of that research that has occurred in Canada has, in fact, been funded, or 
jointly funded, by U.S. and Japanese interests. 106  Methane hydrate research in 
Canada has centered on the gas hydrates found offshore Vancouver Island and in 
the permafrost of the Mackenzie Delta. 107 Because Canada has coordinated with the 
United States permafrost-based methane hydrate project at Mallik, in the Mackenzie 
Delta, the Mallik gas hydrates have become probably the most studied gas hydrate 
deposit in the world. 108 
The United States has several perspectives on methane hydrates. First, its has 
seen methane hydrates as an alternative source of methane for its military assets. 
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However, due to the lack of utility of methane for both road vehicles and aircraft, 
methane hydrates have not been a priority target for military fuels needs.  
Second, the United States has seen methane hydrates as an exploitable 
resource in alternative to expensive imports of LNG or crude oil. However, the 
development of shale oil, tight gas, and shale gas technologies has greatly relieved 
whatever tightness in energy supplies the United States had expected to encounter. 
For this reason, the commercialization of methane hydrates has dropped in priority; 
but research has neither ceased nor slowed down. It appears that the 
implementation of methane hydrate technologies is being keyed against certain cost 
structures that reveal that for the United States the commercialization of methane 
hydrates will need to be self-sustaining on a profitable basis. This is somewhat 
different from Japan and Korea, in that they face substantially higher LNG prices 
than domestic natural prices in the United States.  
The U.S. was probably the earliest non-Soviet nation to publicly support 
research into the extraction and production of methane hydrates. 109  While the 
United States is the oldest and perhaps largest methane hydrate research program, 
it is also the hardest on which to get solid details. One of the problems with 
collecting data is the lead role played by both private research interests such as 
Chevron and ExxonMobil and the role played in American research science of the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Both the corporate 
sponsors and DARPA have extensive reasons for keeping their research agendas 
and results discrete. So the publicly available data on methane research funding are 
generally seen as floors, not ceilings, of funding.  
As an example of the confusion in the funding of methane hydrate research in 
the United States, in 2000, Congress approved an annual budget of 33M USD to last 
five years until 2005.110 Congress eventually cut the annual budget allotment to just 
9M USD. 111  The funding gap was not to last long, by 2005, methane hydrate 
research was allocated 155M USD.112 The U.S. national research plan has expected 
35.3 Tcf of domestic methane to be commercially booked as reserves from methane 
hydrates before 2020.113 A decade plus ago, a lead researcher at the USGS, Timothy 
Collet, estimated that first commercialization could occur before 2015. 114 Those 
estimates now appear, with the benefit of time, to speak more to technological 
capacity than market driven demand.  
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4.4. China. 
China annually increases its energy consumption at a rate approximately equal to 
France’s national energy demand;115 it currently meets much of that demand with 
crude oil and coal. It has phenomenal air pollution problems to its reliance on coal 
for both electrical supplies and industrial heat. When China does import natural gas 
as LNG, it faces competitive pricing from Japan and South Korea; it often pays 
substantially higher net gas prices than either Europe or North America. China 
could address these challenges, in part, by developing its methane hydrate 
resources.  
It is difficult to find accurate numbers on the scale of China’s investment in 
methane hydrates. From the listings of published research articles viewable in 
online scholarly databases, it is clear that methane hydrate research is extensive 
within China.  
China appears to have begun methane hydrate research in the late 1990s.116 
China created the Guangzhou Center for Gas Hydrate Research in 2004.117 In 2007, 
the Guangzhou Center announced that its research mission entitled GMGS-1 had 
discovered substantial methane hydrate deposit areas in the South China Seas.118 
GMGS-1 was a drilling program, and at least eight sites were drilled, and three of 
the eight reported thick layers of methane hydrates.119 Methane hydrates deposits 
15m to 20m thick were located within seabed deposits of the South China Seas.120  
Overall, while the data is not necessarily robust, it appears that many 
observers suspect minimal annual research budgets of 10M USD for over two 
decades, demonstrating China’s sustained commitment to methane hydrate 
development. Records suggest that 60M USD was spent on research from 1999 till 
2007, averaging 10M USD a year. The Guangzhou Center manages China’s methane 
hydrate research programs. 121  At its establishment, China planned an initial 
investment of 50M USD.122 In 2006, China publicly announced that it would provide 
an annual research budget of 10M USD.123 These budgets appear to provide a stable 
research budget of approximately 10M USD per year.  
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4.5. India. 
India’s National Gas Hydrate Program (NGHP) is established under the Indian 
Directorate General of Hydrocarbons. 124  India has substantial methane hydrate 
deposits in four key areas.125  
West Coast - Arabian Sea  
x Konkan Basin offshore of Goa.126  
East Coast - Bay of Bengal  
x Krishna-Goad Ayari Basin offshore of Kakinada. 127 
x Mahanadi Basin offshore of Orissa. 128 
x Offshore the Andaman Islands. 129 
India’s research budget is very unclear, but the substantial spend is obvious. The 
NGHP recently commissioned the 104m long Sagar Nidhi, a special purpose 
methane hydrate research vessel. 130 The NGHP has also commissioned manned 
research submersibles that can dive to a depth of 6000m. 131 
India began drilling offshore exploratory wells in 2006. 132  The NGHP 
conducted those well tests with the assistance of the U.S.’s USGS.133 The NGHP 
drilled 39 holes at 21 test sites offshore India; methane hydrates were found at most 
of the test sites.134 The deposits are rich, e.g., a 128m thick gas hydrate layer was 
found in one of the test wells. 135 There are no known sustained production tests 
from those wells,136 but as Japan demonstrated in 2013, it could soon be feasible in 
India as well. India has collaborated with Russia on methane hydrate research for 
decades. 137 As a part of that relationship, India opened the the Indo-Russian Center 
for Gas Hydrates (IRCGH) in Chennai on March 12, 2004.138The IRCGH is a body of 
the National Institute of Ocean Technology, also located in Chennai. 139 
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5. Other benefits of methane hydrates 
5.1. Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS)  
The production of methane hydrates enables the potential sequestration of other 
GHG in the methane-depleted hydrates.140 Research and testing has begun on the 
potential to leverage industrial CO2 emissions in the production of methane 
hydrates, sequestering one fossil fuel in exchange for another.  
Ultimately, the production of methane hydrates could fit hand-in-glove with 
carbon capture systems/sequestration (CCS) technologies. 141  E.g., the German 
government’s SUGAR Projekt and its ECO2 project are designed with the goal of 
storing industrially produced carbon dioxide in methane hydrate deposits; the 
methane extraction is seen as a cost-recovery feature.142 In the case of methane 
reforming, it might be possible for the carbon dioxide by-products to be returned to 
the reservoir in lieu of the methane.143 
Research has been undertaken to find ways to optimize the CCS potential of 
offshore methane hydrates within other energy projects. Hydrogen fuel could be 
produced from the methane hydrates and the by-product carbon dioxide could be 
sequestered; methane hydrates would yield a fully green carbon-neutral energy 
supply. 144  Japanese researchers have investigated the potential to combust the 
methane from the offshore methane hydrates on site to generate electricity; again 
the by-product carbon dioxide could be sequestered and enable low-carbon 
electricity to arrive onshore by wire.145 
All of the main methods of extraction 146 can be combined with the 
sequestration of other gases into the hydrate lattice; research has focused on 
replacing methane with carbon dioxide to covert this fossil fuel extraction process 
into a carbon neutral or carbon negative activity with attendant benefits against 
anthropogenic climate change.147  
 
140  R. Kikuchi, Analysis of Availability and Accessibility of Hydrogen Production: An Approach to a 
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5.2. Production of hydrogen fuel 
Hydrogen has been widely advocated as one of the cleanest fuel sources because its 
combustion with oxygen yields simply energy and water. 148  Should hydrogen 
transportation be sufficiently advanced, methane hydrates are likely one of the main 
feedstock for that future.149  
Via methane reforming, methane hydrates are a major potential source of a 
global hydrogen fuel supply.150 Methane hydrates are unique in their coproduction 
of fresh water and methane enabling hydrogen to be produced at the point 
source.151 Methane reforming requires methane as a fuel and a feedstock along with 
steam.152 The chemical reaction is endothermic, requiring an energy input such as 
heat from combusted methane.153 The resultant carbon monoxide can be converted 
to carbon dioxide, suitable for re-injection into the hydrate deposit.154  
5.3. Co-production of fresh water 
Methane hydrates are composed primarily of water and methane.155. While the 
primary focus in methane production is the reduction of methane from the methane 
hydrates, there is a tremendous volume of water involved that can be captured as a 
by-product. The contrast between traditional gas wells, coal bed methane wells and 
methane hydrate production is essentially a sequence of magnitudal differences.  
 
Table 3: Comparison of Produced Water Volumes 
Type of Well Bbls per Million scf 
Conventional gas well156 10 
Coal Bed Methane157 100 
Methane Hydrates158 1,000 
 
Walsh presented models of economically viable development plans that required 2 
water disposal wells for 5 production wells. 159Walsh et al. also contrasted the 
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production of methane against the production of water; over time the water 
volumes rise with methane output and matches the production rate changes of the 
methane. 160 
To date, almost all of the models have associated the production of water as a 
disposal cost; increased volumes of water are seen as indicative of delayed payouts 
on the wells. 161 The voluminous production of water could be problematic, as it 
would require treating, processing and eventual disposal if handled as modelled.  
However, there are two alternative methods for addressing the water volumes 
without the costs of treating, processing and disposal. First, the water volumes 
could be treated and processed prior to marketing as fresh water volumes suitable 
for industrial or consumer uses.  
Second, there are technologies that would enable the sequestration of carbon 
dioxide within hydrates. The extraction of the methane could be coordinated with 
the injection of the carbon dioxide in such a manner that the methane hydrates are 
transformed into carbon dioxide hydrates. Those carbon dioxide hydrates could 
potentially enable cost efficient long-term sequestration of the problematic 
greenhouse gas. But the key to that accomplishment would be the locking of the 
carbon dioxide gas into the hydrate structures which would require the on-going 
presence of the water previously associated with the methane hydrates. Thus, a 
second usage of the water is to keep it in place to assist in the sequestration of 
carbon dioxide. As such, there would likely be economic benefits provided by those 
seeing the sequestration services.  
5.4. Replacement of LNG with GTS shipping 
Natural gas is a cleaner fuel than crude oil or coal, but its use has been limited by 
the difficulties and costs of its transportation. The technical understanding of 
methane hydrate formation and disassociation should enable a new and more 
energy efficient means of methane storage and transportation. This new form of 
methane transport has been called “Gas to Solids,” or more simply GTS;162 this is in 
analog to the name of the technology to convert natural gas to oil called “Gas to 
Liquids,” or GTL.  
Based on the emerging GTS technologies, methane hydrate transportation 
systems can be completely ship-based, requiring no local facilities other than 
methane feed-in pipes or offloading pipes.163 The lower investment required for 
methane off-loading should enable a broader and more efficient market in methane; 
once extracted from the seabed, methane could be economically transported by 
hydrate shipping in lieu of subsea pipelines.164  
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Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. built a pilot GTS plant to convert 
natural gas into hydrate pellets that can be stored at -15 degrees Centigrade and 
loaded on-board a ship for transport. 165 In addition to the minimal investment in 
hydrate storage equipment, it is also safer and easier to ship GTS, versus LNG, 
because they can be kept stable for several weeks at only -10 to -20 C at atmospheric 
pressures. 166 
A GTS technology was evaluated for shipments from Iran to various ports in 
East Asia.167 A cost estimate study found that the comparable costs of shipping by 
LNG were approximately a magnitude larger than the costs of shipping by GTS.168 
Based on this magnitude order reduction in costs, it was noted that many smaller 
isolated natural gas fields that not currently in development could be made 
commercially feasible with this mode of transport.169  
In August 25, 2010, the U.S. DOE announced a significant breakthrough in 
GTS technology.170 The new GTS technology replaces the previous multi-day batch 
manufacturing method with a rapid and continuous spray technology to produce 
transportable methane hydrates on board. This new technology would be quicker 
and cheaper, require less refrigeration and pressure maintenance, and this form of 
GTS would lose less methane in shipment than LNG.171 Similar technologies have 
been developed in South Korea, demonstrating the global interest in high-speed 
hydrate shipping technologies.172  
6. Summary and conclusions 
Methane hydrates could potentially serve as an abundant source of methane. As 
seen in Chapter 2, they are broadly distributed around the globe and would likely 
provide local energy supplies to many nations currently lacking such supplies.  
Methane hydrates provide both fresh water and methane when exploited. The 
extraction of methane hydrates can also be coordinated with carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS) in replacing the extracted methane with carbon dioxide.  
Methane from methane hydrates is potentially a source of green energy. 
Methane, when combusted, provides far less greenhouse gas emissions than either 
coal or crude oil, and clean methane as derived from methane hydrates lacks the 
uranium ash pollution of coal or the other hazardous substances that can be emitted 
by combusted coal and crude oil. Methane from methane hydrates can be reformed 
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with steam from the extracted freshwater to produce hydrogen fuel. The methane 
could be combusted on platform to generate electricity and the greenhouse gas 
emissions could be re-injected into the hydrate deposit via CCS technologies. All of 
these pathways enable a potentially greener and healthier alternative to the 
volumes of coal and crude oil combusted today. 
A key question must arise, if methane hydrates are so potentially useful, why 
aren’t they already more fully developed? As explored previously, the scientific 
knowledge and awareness of methane hydrates in natural settings is a fairly recent 
development. Since their discovery in the 1960s and 1970s, it has taken a couple of 
decades to develop sufficient scientific knowledge to begin engineering studies on 
offshore methane hydrates.  
Recently, the engineering potential to reliably extract offshore methane 
hydrates in continuous operations has been demonstrated. Field and laboratory 
experiences have now demonstrated a variety of potential means of extraction. 
What was once unfeasible has become feasible; engineers are now focused on 
improving safety and reliability of the extraction systems and on reducing the costs 
of extraction.  
Since the mid 2000s, the costs of producing offshore methane hydrates have 
been in potential range of commercial demands. While the U.S. benefits from 
abundant domestic natural gas supplies and sees natural gas prices in the 3 to 6 
USD range,173 Japan and other East Asia countries have paid high premiums for 
imported LNG, sometimes well over 15 USD for extended periods. As such, the 
concept of commercially feasible is dependent on the regional market conditions; 
natural gas does not have as global a price market as crude oil does. Financial 
studies have demonstrated that certain offshore methane hydrate extraction systems 
might be within several dollars per kcf of the costs to extract conventional natural 
gas from offshore locations. Other studies have found that the as of several years 
ago that the costs difference between producing conventional offshore natural gas 
and offshore methane hydrates was an increase of approximately 15% to 20%. If the 
variations in natural gas prices are more divergent than the divergence in the costs 
of production, then under some circumstances, the extraction of offshore methane 
hydrates might be already commercially feasible. Key scientists associated with the 
development of the engineering of such offshore methane hydrate extraction 
technologies expect the cost structures of offshore methane hydrates to continue 
dropping so that by the 2020s the costs structures should be competitive at a 
broader range of natural gas prices and at various offshore methane hydrate 
locations.  
Given the development of science and engineering, the falling costs of methane 
hydrate extraction, and the potential benefits of methane hydrates, it would appear 
reasonable that methane hydrate operations would be pursued by a variety of 
 
173  Since 1998, the price of natural gas at Henry Hub, a major selling point in the U.S., has 
hovered below 5 USD. There have been short periods above that barrier, e.g. in 2008, but not 
long-term. See the data both in chart and in graphics at the EIA. Available at 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm. See current spot prices at Bloomberg 
Energy. Available at  http://www.bloomberg.com/energy/. 
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actors, both public and private. Such is indeed the fact, as both private energy 
companies and national governments have coordinated in the development of 
offshore methane hydrate technologies. This development has not been limited to 
developed countries nor to traditional private oil corporations. Developing 
countries, such as China and India, and public/private investment co-operations 
such as the Korean Oil Company (KNOC) and Korea Gas (KoGas), have expanded 
the theatre of actors engaged in developing the nascent technology to extract and 
produce energy from offshore methane hydrates.  
So, if methane hydrates are so potentially useful, if they are becoming ever 
more feasible to commercial extract and produce, and if an array of public and 
private actors are engaged in those developments, then why aren’t there more fully 
developed commercial plans for the imminent investment in large scale offshore 
methane hydrate installations? 
One of the major reasons is the potential for offshore methane hydrates to 
present a unique set of risks of hazards that are quite distinct from traditional 
offshore oil and gas ventures. While the potential harms and damages from major 
oil spills are too well known, thanks to well-known events such as the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez and the 2010 BP Macondo incidents, the unique nature of methane hydrates 
will present novel forms of risk and hazards. Chapter 4 undertakes a review of 
these risks, but in preview it can be said that unlike in oil spills, methane hydrates 
will almost exclusively leak, vent or seep methane gas, not crude oil, tars, or other 
viscous liquids. Additionally, because of the softer structures that methane hydrates 
form within, the disturbance of those hydrate deposits can lead to sloughing or 
slippage of wide fields of earth, potentially enabling subsea landslides, earthquakes, 
and tsunamis. Such methane hydrate events have naturally occurred; subsea scars 
can be located on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean demonstrating that massive 
methane hydrate fields have collapsed in geological history. The potential exists for 
human interaction in offshore methane hydrate fields to unleash both cataclysmic 
and non-cataclysmic forms of damage. 
If the benefits of methane hydrates are to be obtained by both public and 
private parties, then some legal policy should be developed that can provide an 
optimal balancing of the obtainable benefits against the potential risks and hazards. 
The tools of rules of civil liability, public regulation and private regulation can all be 
explored as a means to set the optimal precautionary standards. By carefully 
choosing which of those tools to employ, liability or other enforcement 
consequences can be assigned to those parties best able to attain those optimal levels 
of methane hydrate operational activities and of precautionary efforts. By clarifying 
ex ante the standards and the actors held responsible, investment decisions can be 
more clearly and rationally undertaken in offshore methane hydrate installations. 
Additionally, such clarifications can also provide incentives to invest in the 
development of superior extraction technologies, precautionary technologies, and in 
monitoring and remediation technologies; as such capabilities might impact the 
overall level of expected risks and hazards.  
Further, by engaging in this standards setting process prior to the onset of the 
first offshore methane hydrate installation, there is an opportunity to set standards 
that can be replicated at subsequent fields around the globe. As many locations of 
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offshore methane hydrates are in areas either new to offshore energy resources or 
economically or legally developing, it would enable those jurisdictions to have a 
better chance at sustainably operating their own fields. 
Chapter 4 will explore those potential risks and hazards and attempt to 
provide characterization and categorization of those hazards and harms. Part II of 
this study will then undertake to examine what kind of legal mechanisms might 
provide the correct set of precautionary standards and economic incentives to align 
operators, and other parties if necessary, with those standards. Part III of this study 
will explore existing laws and conventions for their fit against the conclusions of 
Part II. Part IV of this study will provide a review of all of the above and suggest 
how the existing legal paradigms might be best adapted to the circumstances of 
offshore methane hydrates.  
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HAZARDS OF OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES 
The production of methane from methane hydrates will carry unique risks and 
hazards to the environment not present with the production of traditional natural 
gas. As seen in the Japanese environmental assessment, 1  the commercial 
development of methane hydrates contains a mixture of risks, those common to all 
offshore mining and those unique to methane hydrates.2  
What is unique to methane hydrates is the methane hydrate structure itself. 
The greatest unique environmental problem is the uncontrolled release of methane 
hydrates. 3 While the science is not yet comprehensive, it appears that from a 
planning perspective there are two basic scenarios: events that damage the methane 
hydrate stability so that it seeps methane on a continual but non-cataclysmic basis 
and those events that cause cataclysmic releases of large volumes of methane.  
It is also important to remember that the scientific consensus currently 
supports the idea that methane hydrate events are geologically current and active, 
that human interference is not beginning from a neutral position with regards to the 
hydrates. There is a baseline amount of risk with any in-place hydrates, human 
activity adds onto that baseline.4  
Secondary concerns include the risk of seabed subsidence. Methane hydrates 
lay under essentially plastic mud and sedimentary layers, so as the hydrates are 
moved and the structural support for the overlaying materials are removed, the 
seabed is likely to deform and sag. Subsidence can impact the subsea structural 
systems related to the methane extraction and it can impact the local eco-system. 
Perhaps the greatest concern on subsidence is that it can become a precursor for 
landslides, which in turn could result in massive amounts of uncontrolled methane 
eruptions.  
 
1  See Table 2 within sec. 3, infra. 
2  See discussion within sec. 3, infra. 
3  This would be in contrast to traditional oil spill events, wherein the main hazard source is the 
spilt crude oil and its associated tars. 
4  This makes it substantially different from oil and gas reserves trapped under relatively 
permanent formations. 
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1. Impacted communities 
Due to offshore location of methane hydrates and the broad continuity of methane 
hydrate distribution, the communities most likely to be impacted by the harms of 
methane hydrate development are the self-same states in possession of the methane 
hydrate reserves. 5 This is not to say that the beneficiaries of methane hydrate 
development are the same communities as those exposed to risks of harm within 
those states; in most cases they will be distinct and separate communities despite 
their common nationalities.  
The listing of countries and territories exposed to the risks of environmental 
harms posed by the commercial development of methane hydrates draws a line 
under the idea that addressing these environmental challenges is a common and 
global issue. 6 The variety of nations, the variety of economic development, the 
variety of legal institutions and institutional stability will all increase the regulatory 
challenges on balancing the interests of revenue seeking groups versus groups 
seeking sustainable environmental safety and comfort.  
First, there are differences in the economic and industrial capacities of the 
impacted areas. Many of the areas within East Asia, North America and Europe are 
technologically competent at advanced oil and gas extraction technologies and are 
well experienced with operational problems generally. These countries are likely to 
be able to manufacture their own methane hydrate infrastructure and maintain 
quality control processes in their implementation. Other areas will not be able to 
self-provide such manufacturing, servicing, and maintenance of methane hydrate 
facilities. The potential impact is that one side of the list can self-cure its technology 
concerns whereas the other side will need to seek external assistance or accept lower 
quality from local sources. Essentially, one group can see the improvement costs as 
a “multiplier” type benefit of methane hydrate investment but the other group faces 
pure economic costs.  
Second, there are differences in the stability and reliability of the legal 
institutions of the impacted areas. Some of the locations provide sound due process 
and broad protection of rights, other areas have less consistently applied legal 
institutions.7  
Third, based upon the variety of legal systems and the quality of their 
institutions, different forms of optimal regulation may be needed in different 
locations; the optimal solutions may be dependent on local conditions.  
 
 
5  The maps in the appendices provide similar information in a more graphical format. 
6  See Table 1, supra. 
7  For a more complete discussion on these concerns, see M. G. Faure, M. Goodwin & F. Weber, 
Bucking the Kuznets Curve: Designing Effective Environmental Regulation in Developing Countries, 
51 Va. J. Int’l L. 95 (2010). 
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Table 1: Countries with Immediate Exposure to Hazards and  
Harms from Offshore Methane Hydrate Installations 
Region Nations with Risk Exposure 
Africa Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, the 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Morocco (including Western Sahara), Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, and 
Tunisia. 
ASEAN Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and many of the smaller 
islands and nation states of Micronesia and Polynesia. 
South Asia Bangladesh, Burma, India, and Pakistan. 
East Asia China, Japan, North Korea, Russia,8 South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 
Europe Albania, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Montenegro, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the U.K. 
Middle East Cyprus, Israel, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and 
Yemen. 
North America Canada, Caribbean islands,9 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, and the United States. 
South America Argentina, 10  Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana, 
Peru, and Suriname. 
ANZAC Australia, including Tasmania, and New Zealand. 
 
Fourth, it is those communities living most closely to the offshore assets that will be 
affected,11 which may not well align with the vested power brokers within their 
countries; it may be useful to provide non-national forums to provide more 
balanced negotiations between the communities and the national power brokers. 
Because of the economics of the actors who can afford to invest in methane hydrate 
commercialization projects versus the economics of the communities likely to be 
invested in fishing and other forms of sea-born economies, a substantial inequality 
presents which could prevent serious or substantial efforts to respond to the 
concerns of the coastal communities. Additionally, if the nation is dependent on the 
revenues from methane hydrate development, then what political processes exist to 
address citizen concerns might be out-balanced by strategic and public policy 
arguments in otherwise democratic forums.  
Fifth, many methane hydrate deposits stretch across multiple national borders 
and EEZ borders. This will cause several problems. Primarily, it raises the general 
concerns of waste and unitization to provide for multi-party balanced production 
 
8  The eastern Pacific territories of Russia also have substantial methane hydrate reserves 
offshore including Sakhalin and Kamchatka around the Sea of Okhotsk. 
9  Assuming the Caribbean fits more into this area than other areas, practically every island is 
assumed to have methane hydrates offshore. 
10  The U.K.'s Falklands offshore of Argentina are forecasted to possess methane hydrates. 
11  The impact need not be immediate; as discussed, infra at sec. 3, such damage could of a 
persistent nuisance such as the loss of marine life from which incomes and food budgets were 
derived. 
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and common regard for environmental safety within the unit of production. E.g., 
North and South Korea’s methane hydrates lay contiguous to each other in the East 
Sea.12.  
Should North Korea decide to begin production of methane hydrates from 
near a bordering reservoir, then South Korea might fear accelerated depletion of its 
own adjacent resources and decide to try to match the extraction activity of the 
North Koreans. 13  While this type of problem exists in ordinary oil and gas 
production, in that case it merely leads to overproduction, pressure declines, and 
resource wastage. With methane hydrates, accelerated extraction and production 
could lead to structural failure of the methane deposit, resulting in cataclysmic 
methane venting and potential landslides. Environmental considerations to reduce 
and abate foreseeable hazards may require ex ante diplomatic efforts to result in 
coordinated extraction protocols if not outright unitizations. A coordinated 
extraction protocol might be created by regulating how closely methane hydrate 
wells might be located and how wells close to national territories accommodate 
revenue sharing or volume tracking and sharing.  
Sixth, as it is unlikely that most of the resource owners will become methane 
hydrate technology owners, and similarly that most of the impacted communities 
and their states will also likely not become methane hydrate technology owners, the 
ability to actually build, operate, and sustain commercial operations of methane 
hydrate fields will likely remain in the hands of a few nations without additional 
measures. This suggests a strong technological asymmetry of responsibility for the 
accidents from normal operations. There might be several solutions to this problem. 
One might be to find a way to enable the resource owners to become joint owners of 
the technology so that their profit seeking aligns with the operators for sustained 
safety under agreed to regulations. Another is to separately address some of the 
environmental safety concerns both within the technologically able parties and 
separately but in parallel discussions with those parties not able to participate 
technologically in safety management.  
2. Life-cycle risk analysis 
2.1. Four discernible stages of risk 
The commercial development of offshore methane hydrates will not occur in a legal 
and historical vacuum; it will inherit traditions and institutions from traditional oil 
and gas and from the more recently developed CCS technologies. Traditional oil 
and gas has a recognized life cycle of exploration, development, production and 
 
12  What the Koreas refer to as the East Sea, Japan refers to as the Sea of Japan. It is a matter of 
substantial diplomatic debate, but herein both names are used interchangeably. 
13  Similar problems of split jurisdictions over continuous and singular deposits can be found in 
many places, because the legal jurisdictions do not well correlate with the natural incidence of 
hydrate formation. Thus, the U.S. and Mexico might have such concerns, as might South 
Korea and Japan in the East Sea/Sea of Japan or Angola and Namibia in the South Atlantic 
Ocean. 
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marketing, and plugging and abandoning P&A). CCS has a similar multi-stage life 
cycle, albeit the post-injection and long-term storage period is longer than the P&A 
period of oil and gas projects because the project objective of storage remains active 
even though external activities may have greatly reduced. In some ways, the final 
stages of CCS resemble the late stages of CERCLA/RCRA projects requiring 
monitoring and surveillance for decades or longer. Many of those procedural stages 
will be similar to the life cycle of methane hydrate projects.  
The commercial development of methane hydrates will encounter basically 
four stages of activity: (i) exploration, (ii) development, (iii) production, and (iv) 
abandonment and sequestration. The risk profiles are different in all four stages and 
require different reviews.  
2.1.1. Exploration 
Exploration is the geophysical search to identify where methane hydrates lay in the 
seabed and the determination of the potential of production from those discovered 
reservoirs. The exploration stage for methane hydrates is practically identical for 
current oil and gas exploration efforts; methane hydrate exploration activities have 
been underway for several decades with no significant incidents of harm.  
Arguendo, exploration is not well framed temporally, in that it can continue 
indefinitely until a field begins development activities; some oil and gas fields were 
explored for decades prior to development activities began. Yet, exploration does 
not generally occur in a continuum, rather, it occurs on specific voyages and specific 
sounding missions, thus, the specific instances wherein the seabed would be 
scientifically or engineeringly engaged would be of fairly brief time periods. 
Routine exploratory seismic or surveillance missions take no more than weeks or a 
few months to complete, partially due to the costs involved.14 Thus the risks and 
hazards associated with exploration missions can be seen in small discrete temporal 
batches.  
2.1.2. Development 
Development focuses on activities undertaken in support of making an investment 
decision to construct and operate a methane hydrate field. Development is the stage 
associated with installation and construction of the infrastructure and wells needed 
to produce methane from the deposits; it is the stage within which EIAs will need to 
be developed and reviewed. Development includes initial well drilling and testing; 
production and early safety reports during the development phase are critical to 
decisions on how and if to go on to the production phase. It is during development 
that most of the actual hazardous activities will be initially undertaken in the 
specific field.  
Development of methane hydrates fields is novel; as of January 2014 there was 
not a single offshore methane hydrate field in development or in production. While 
 
14  Longer, more precise data are collected during the development stage. 
92_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
Hazards of Offshore Methane Hydrates 
62 
some data and experiences may be transferable from traditional offshore natural gas 
development, much of the technology and risk involved will be terra incognita 
(perhaps, mare incognitum?) for early developers. It will be difficult to forecast 
appropriate safety levels or insurance premiums; early developers may be faced 
with severe concerns about sufficient precaution. Early developers will be likewise 
hampered by their own lack of historical experience with the resource. Given this 
overall lack of knowledge and presumed novelty of technologies and risks, 
development may well be the riskiest stage of the four. However, development is 
usually the most well defined as to timeframe and duration. So while the risks 
might be high, at least the time frame of those risks will be bounded.  
2.1.3. Production 
Production is the stage wherein on-going methane extraction and production 
activities would be sustained for the commercial life of the methane hydrate field. 
The production period of oil and gas fields normally lasts decades; methane hydrate 
fields are similarly expected to potentially produce across multiple decades. While 
production is expected to last for several decades, it can be difficult to forecast field 
production life because of on-going improvements in production and extraction 
technologies.15  
Production will generally begin after initial safety testing and production flow 
tests are completed within the development stage. Production will focus on the 
severing, extraction, and lifting of the methane from the deposits. Once lifted, 
production will also handle the basic processing and treatment of the production 
stream and transportation of the production volumes to marketing lines or vessels. 
Production will generally continue to include new in-field drilling and extensions to 
the overall installed operational base.  
Whereas the hallmark of development is a cascade of activities with novel or 
initial character, production operates from a paradigm of sustained similar 
activities. Production operates to provide sustainable and predictable sales volumes 
of produced methane and other products. Thus, once the initial phase of production 
is underway, excepting new in-field drilling, one would expect that most risks will 
be of a similar type and quality for each day of operation. To the extent that seepage 
or venting could occur, that risk could be equally likely at any point during the time 
period of production.  
Likewise, except for when exogenous tropical storms or earthquakes add 
stress, there would likely be no reason to expect ex ante that such cataclysmic events 
would occur at any particular time point within the time frame of production. 
Constant monitoring or surveillance may yield awareness of looming hazardous 
events, but ex ante such events will be extremely difficult to forecast as to timing and 
extent. Other considerations for the production period will be engagement from 
 
15  There are fields that have operated decades beyond original forecasts. E.g., the Kern Front Oil, 
the Kern Oil, and the Midway-Sunset Oil fields of southern California have been in operation 
for over a hundred years. 
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exogenous sources, such as outside vessels traversing the production field, cable 
laying or other field disturbing activities, or private actors such as pirates.  
2.1.4. Abandonment and sequestration 
Abandonment and sequestration are begun only once the final production volumes 
are lifted and transported. There are essentially two sub-stages to abandonment and 
sequestration; an early active stage of closing and stabilizing of the field and a 
subsequent stage of waiting, securing, and monitoring of the field.  
Procedures are undertaken to stabilize the deposits and reserves. With 
methane hydrate deposits, there might also be collateral CCS-style sequestration of 
other greenhouse gases within the deposit.16 A variety of stabilizing chemicals may 
be injected into the deposit level. Thereafter, the wells are processed to plug them 
and ensure a minimum of communication between the well and wellbore and the 
surface above the production zones within the deposit. Various seabed recovery 
and reconstruction efforts might be made to better secure the stability of the 
remaining in-place hydrates. Subsea facilities such as gathering lines and subsea-
manifolds will likely be recovered or otherwise decommissioned as to limit their 
potential to disturb the seabed. This collection of activities could create risks to the 
seabed and the deposits, despite their function to prevent long-term risks to the 
same.  
This initial stage of abandonment and sequestration is similar to development 
in reverse, in that much of the activity is intense and of an initial character for the 
field. And again similar to development, this early stage of abandonment and 
sequestration faces a well-defined time frame, in that it would be expected to follow 
a defined plan of limited years. It is also possible that various wells and sub-sections 
of the field might have already undergone abandonment and sequestration 
providing guidance on the closure for the whole field. For this reason, while the 
risks might be present, the overall risks are confined to a certain time period.  
The latter stage of abandonment and sequestration could potentially last 
decades or centuries; it is yet unclear when it would be possible to declare a 
depleted hydrate field sufficiently stable and safe as to not require additional care 
versus those hydrates otherwise present in nature. To the extent that carbon dioxide 
or other greenhouse gases are stored within the hydrates, as studied under the 
German Submarine Gas Hydrate Reservoirs project (SUGAR),17 then the relevant 
rules on CCS would be invoked and affect the monitoring period of the deposits.  
These activities would generally be expected to onset at least several decades 
after the initial investment decision reached during the development period; the 
latter stage of abandoning and sequestration could continue for decades or longer 
 
16  See discussion at ch. 3, sec. 5.1. 
17  As explained on the GEOMAR website, “The German gas hydrate initiative “SUGAR – 
Submarine Gas Hydrate Reservoirs” is a collaborative R&D project with 20 partners from 
SMEs, industry and research institutions. The project is coordinated by the Helmholtz Centre 
for Ocean Research Kiel (GEOMAR).” Available at 
http://www.geomar.de/en/research/fb2/fb2-mg/projects/sugar-2-phase/. 
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depending on bed stability and if CCS was a co-incidental activity of the methane 
extraction. Given the role of “time value of money” or discounted cash flow metrics 
in financial decisions, and the potential decades involved before the actual 
commencement of the abandoning and sequestration phase, plus the extended 
period within which those activities would occur, the overall economic impact of 
these hazards might be expected to be minimized by decision makers at the time of 
the initial financial investment decision.  
2.2. Other risks and considerations 
2.2.1. Field choice 
There is also a matter of field choice, to choose methane hydrate fields that are likely 
to be stable and safely producible versus choosing those fields more prone to 
venting, seeping, and landslides. There are several technical means to characterize 
fields and to differentiate them; the thickness and quality of the mud overlay, the 
depth and pressures of the deposit, and the general angle of the deposit can all be 
factors for safety assessments. The choice of field deposit can be applied to each 
stage of the project’s life, as it will separately impact the exploration, development, 
production and abandonment phases. But generally speaking, one assumes that 
those fields with more readily foreseeable harms and hazards should come under 
greater oversight, via liability or regulation, than safer locations.  
2.2.2. High ambient risks 
A sincere problem could be presented by many of the developing countries that 
contain methane hydrates within their waters. It is foreseeable that certain countries 
and resource owners might find that their ambient level of risk and harms exceeds 
those posed by the development of methane hydrates. E.g., Namibia has faced 
severe droughts and severe economic underdevelopment; methane hydrates could 
provide both methane as a revenue and fuel source and volumes of fresh water.18  
There could be reasonable judgements made that the risks of hydrates for their 
nation and citizen were less than the risks of not obtaining the revenues and 
resources obtainable therefrom. Ergo, rational actors might opt for greater risk in the 
future to better provide for those presently suffering; especially those political 
actors who might not remain in power if short-term problems are not resolved prior 
to near-term elections.19  
 
18  See Susan Beukes, “Namibian villagers grapple with the worst drought in three decades”, 
August 7, 2013. In: NEWSLINE (UNICEF, 2013) available at 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/namibia_70107.html. 
19  In such cases, the traditional notions of liability and regulation might be insufficient to 
provide optimal development of methane hydrate resources.  See the discussion on optimal 
strategies, infra, within ch. 7 and 12. For a broader discussion on the potential coordination 
problems of transboundary governance of offshore methane hydrates, see R. Partain, Avoiding 
Epimetheus: Planning Ahead for the Commercial Development of Offshore Methane Hydrates, 14:2 
Æ
95_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Chapter 4 
 65 
2.2.3. Sovereign immune actors and de facto externalized costs 
An important exception to the risk analysis of operators and sovereigns is when the 
two parties are in fact a singular body, when the operator benefits from sovereign 
immunity. The case can be extended to those cases where a sovereign resource 
owner might extend its immunity to private actors performing at its behest, or when 
that sovereign resource owner might offer indemnity or provide minimal safety 
regulations or liability rules to ensure faster development of its resources.  
Such actors may face perverse incentives to produce at risky levels as they 
may perceive all or some portion of the eventual costs of the hazards as 
externalities; they would be likely to choose activity levels higher than merited if 
those external costs were more correctly included in development decisions.  
3. Non-cataclysmic hazards 
As part of the Japanese team operating offshore production tests from methane 
hydrate deposits, Yabe et al. provided a table of seventeen identified risk factors and 
likely impacts.20  
Yabe’s chart provides sixteen basic events that could give rise to 
environmental hazards, but only six basic hazards.21 The key hazards identified by 
the Japanese team are impacts to marine life, to fisheries, to aviary ecologies, to 
benthic ecologies, and the broader scale items of tsunamis 22and anthropogenic 
climate change. A few of these items are unique to the production of methane from 
methane hydrates: seafloor subsidence, submarine landslides, and the combined 
risks from a cracked methane hydrate deposit bed.  
 
 
Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y (forthcoming December 2014). One of the proposals in that article 
is the opportunity to provide for methane banking to provide alignment incentives for such 
resources owners by creating revenue sharing opportunities from fields that could be 
properly governed in return for forbearance or deferment of production from their own 
fields. 
20  I. Yabe et al., Environmental Risk Analysis of Methane Hydrate Development, in: 7th International 
Conference on Gas Hydrates, 4 (2011). 
21  The present hazards are somewhat vague and high-level, so it may not be sufficient for more 
careful enumerations of potential harms. 
22  The chart provided by also listed the impact upon telecommunication cables and production 
pipelines at the bottom of the seabed. In short, subsidence could be the beginning of a very 
bad sequence of events. They also explain that the landslide case is a more severe case of 
subsidence. Subsidence might damage seabed gathering systems, but the landslide would 
obliterate them. Yabe et al., supra at note 20. 
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Table 2: Chart of Risk Factors and Impacts for Offshore  
Methane Hydrate Development. 
Item # Risk Factor Impact 
1 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Global Warming 
2 Water Quality Change Impact on Marine Life 
3 Lightening Impact on Marine Life and Birds 
4 Interference in Fishery Impact on Fishery 
5 Seafloor Disturbance Impact on Benthic Community 
6 Underwater Noise Impact on Marine Life 
7 [Sediment] Resuspension Impact on Benthic Community 
8 Increase in Turbidity Impact on Benthic Community 
9 Marine Sediment Change Impact on Benthic Community 
10 Seafloor Occupation Impact on Fishery 
11 Seafloor Subsidence Tsunami 
12 Submarine Landsides Tsunami 
13 Cracks in Deposit - Disrupt 
Methane Entry to Sediment 
Impact on Benthic Community 
14 Cracks in Deposit - Methane 
Leakage from Sediment 
Global Warming 
15 Flaring - Lightening Impact on Marine Life and Birds 
16 Flaring - Greenhouse Gas 
Discharge 
Global Warming 
 
The routine set of subsea mining risks are primarily related to the building and 
operating of seabed infrastructure. The Yabe et al. list of environmental impacts 
comes from a variety of exploration, development and early production activities.23 
Surface ships will have a variety of emissions and discharges. Mooring lines will 
need to be installed. Submersible drilling equipment could disrupt the seabeds. 
Noise and vibration will be frequent and pervasive. Drilling mud and cementing 
may reach the environment. Gathering lines and their connecting manifolds need to 
be laid and installed. Drilling operations will require flaring as a safety system, but 
that implies potentially large flares and venting will be needed on occasion. All of 
these activities can impact the turbidity of the waters, cause re-suspension of 
sediments, and create a variety of seabed disturbances. Depending on the depth of 
the seabed, a variety of eco-systems can be disrupted.  
3.1. Venting of methane to the atmosphere 
Any discussion on the risks of developing methane hydrates must include a 
discussion on the role of methane and climate change. 24  Methane is a known 
 
23  Yabe et al., supra at note 20, at 4. 
24  Sec. 4, infra, examines certain cataclysmic accidents that might occur from methane hydrate 
extraction. A separate and reasonable concern is whether such events might impact the 
thermohaline circulations of deep ocean waters and what might result from such situations? 
Æ
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greenhouse gas.25 Methane has a global warming potential index (GWP) 3.7 times 
stronger than carbon dioxide by mole number and 20 times stronger than carbon 
dioxide by mass weight. 26 Thus, emissions of methane are generally seen as worse 
for accelerating anthropogenic climate change than emissions of carbon dioxide. 
The massive scale of methane hydrate fields and their general presence in almost 
every coastal country presents a hazard unlike traditional natural gas wells, in that 
certain accidents in the development of methane hydrates could have global 
warming impacts far beyond any previous oil or gas disaster.  
While some scientists have modelled methane bubble transport and found in 
simple one-dimensional systems that very little methane should be able to vent 
from the sub-sea hydrate deposit to the atmosphere,27 other scientists have made 
field observations that do document substantial transportation of methane bubbles, 
and thus gaseous methane, from the seabed to the atmosphere.28  
When methane is present in free water at low ocean depths, and when there is 
not a separate mechanism for quick venting, methane can take 100 to 1,000 years to 
reach the surface.29 Given that long duration of transit and of the ocean’s oxidation 
 
First, it would much depend on where the accident occurred; thermohaline flows engage in 
both transporting heat to and away from locations thus an accident could shift waters in 
either direction. Also, if sufficient methane were to reach the atmosphere, then the clathrates 
gun hypothesis might become central to the question. Yet, the physical models remain 
substantially in development. Thus it is difficult to venture what impact a major hydrate 
venting might have; e.g., even if the thermohaline flows were altered, it is unclear without 
more detail if that would increase or decrease global climate heat and if it might increase risk 
of a clathrates gun result. For additional background on thermohaline circulation, see S. 
RAHMSTORF, Thermohaline Ocean Circulation. In: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUATERNARY SCIENCES 
(Elsevier, Amsterdam 2006). Clearly risks would exist; the question that remains to be 
answered is how much and of what extremity. At this point in time, given the current state of 
knowledge, those answers remain unknown. Should that lack of knowledge engage the 
precautionary principle, should development be prevented until greater certainty of safety 
can be accrued? Alas, that is probably not an outcome that anyone controls. The existence of 
those risks and general awareness of them might not be sufficient to prevent the onset of the 
commercial extraction of offshore methane hydrates as not all technology owners or resource 
owners would agree on which risks and harms were more relevant. E.g., certain states might 
be in urgent need of public revenues, energy supplies, and of freshwater to an extent that the 
other risks of methane hydrate development are seen as relevant only after the first set of 
worries are addressed. Fear of famine, poverty, and civil disruption might outweigh other 
risks from their perspective. There thus exists a need to establish governance mechanisms, 
preferably internationally, prior to the onset of commercial extraction to ensure that all 
parties are aligned with regards to the goal of setting optimal levels of care and of activity. 
25  Z. G. Zhang, et al., Marine gas hydrates: Future Energy or Environmental Killer?, 16 Energy 
Procedia 933, 935 (2012).  
26  Id. 
27  A. Yamamoto, Y. Yamanaka & E. Tajika, Modeling of Methane Bubbles Released from Large Sea-
Floor Area: Condition Required for Methane Emission to the Atmosphere, 284 Earth & Planetary Sci. 
Letters 590 (2009). 
28  N. Shakhova & I. Semiletov, Methane Release and Coastal Environment in the East Siberian Arctic 
Shelf, 66 J. Marine Systems 227, 235-236 (2007).  
29  V. Krey et al., Gas Hydrates: Entrance to a Methane Age or Climate Threat?, 4 Environmental 
Research Letters 34007, 4 (2009). 
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of the methane while in transit, it is forecast that most methane is converted to 
carbon dioxide before venting out of the ocean. 30 On the other hand, it has been 
verified that methane bubbles do not need to exceed a certain saturation level to be 
able to reach the ocean surface.31 Ebullition can, and does, transport methane from 
the seabed to the ocean surface, especially when the depth of the waters does not 
exceed several hundred meters.  
Generally, it is agreed that the amount of methane that will reach the 
atmosphere from a seabed seepage is dependent upon three factors:32 
i. the quantity and transfer rate of methane from the sediments to the 
water column,  
ii. the volume of methane which dissolves in the water column, and  
iii. the volume of methane which eventually escapes to the atmosphere. 
 
The transfer rate of the methane from the methane hydrate deposit has been 
identified as the key variable; slow releases appear to be absorbed into the ocean but 
fast releases do not.33  
Nature provides ready examples that methane can erupt from ocean depths 
and reach the atmosphere chemically intact; sometimes methane plumes can make 
it to the surface and ignite. Offshore Vancouver Island in Canada, it has been 
discovered that methane hydrates do have localized eruptions that result in gas 
chimneys to transport the methane to the atmosphere directly.34 After the eruptions 
are completed, there are permanent structures left within the hydrate deposit.35 
Similarly, mud volcanoes are often formed with gas hydrates as the methane 
source. 36  A mud volcano was witnessed in 1958 to suddenly erupt. From 
approximately 150m below the Caspian Sea’s surface, the methane vented out at 
extremely high speeds and the resulting flame was estimated at a height of 500m.37 
Whether or not the methane erupted from methane hydrates or other sources, as it 
remains unclear for the Caspian event, it is clear that high speed methane can and 
does vent to the atmosphere; sometimes dramatically so.  
The legacy of ancient chimney structures has been detected in a variety of 
locations.38 What were once believed to be smooth surfaces between the mud layers 
and the methane hydrate deposits are now identified as ’roughness’, and are seen as 
a sign that methane hydrates deposits are not as stable as once thought. 39 Due to 
this discovery, it is now thought that methane hydrate fields are indeed posed on a 
 
30  Id. 
31  Shakhova and Semiletov, supra at note 28, at 236. 
32  J. Marcelle-De Silva & R. Dawe, Towards Commercial Gas Production from Hydrate Deposits, 4 
Energies 215, 230 (2011).  
33  N. L. Bangs et al., Massive Methane Release Triggered by Seafloor Erosion Offshore Southwestern 
Japan, 38 Geology 1019, 1019 (2010).  
34  M. HOVLAND, Gas hydrates, in: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEOLOGY, 261, 266 (Elsevier, Oxford, 2005). 
35  Id. 
36  Id., at 267. 
37  Id. 
38  I. A. Pecher, Oceanography: Gas hydrates on the Brink, 420 Nature 622, 622  (2002). 
39  Id. 
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careful balance within the gas hydrate stability zone of certain pressures and 
temperatures.40 Moreover, these legacy structures might act to collate and collect 
loose methane within the deposit field.41 If a commercial operator were to tap into 
that kind of structure, it could enable a sudden venting of methane.  
Without reference to commercial extraction of methane hydrates, there are 
locations in the world today that cause methane hydrates to disassociate and 
produce methane flows from the sea bed. West of the island of Spitbergen, in the 
Svalbard archipelago northwest of Norway, over 250 continuous bubble plumes 
have been discovered. 42  Observation of the plumes reveal that the methane 
transports from 200m to 400m below the sea surface to approximately 50m below 
the surface, by which point the plumes are fully absorbed in the water and no 
longer traceable. 43. It is believed that the methane venting has been caused by the 
increase in local water temperatures by 1 degree centigrade. 44 While the changes in 
ocean temperature might be anthropogenic, based in carbon emissions from 
industrial civilization, it remains unclear if that is the case and to which nation or 
actors blame might be ascribed, so these types of ambient methane hydrate 
emissions remain beyond the purview of the United Nation’s Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its corresponding Kyoto Accords.45  
3.2. Damages from methane seepage and ventings 
In the minimal case, the disruption of otherwise intact methane hydrates reserves 
could cause similar effects seen elsewhere in the world today.  
“Swamp gas’ is the nickname for the biogenic methane created by the 
anaerobic decay of organic materials underwater.46 Bubbling and burping up in 
swamps; it is considered a nuisance due to its distasteful aroma and potential for 
nuisance flames.  
In the African nations of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, there 
are lakes that emit noxious but odourless volumes of methane and carbon dioxide.47 
This type of emission is called mazuku; etymologically mazuku means “evil winds 
that travel and kill in the night,” in Kiswahili.48 The emissions come from dissolved 
 
40  Id., at 623. 
41  Id. 
42  M. A. K. Muir, Challenges and Opportunities for Marine Deposits of Methane Hydrate in the 
Circumpolar Arctic Polar Region, 32 Retfaerd Aergang 61, 63 (2009). 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Id., at 65. See discussion on UNFCCC, infra, at ch. 8. 
46  A. A. Raghoebarsing et al., Methanotrophic symbionts provide carbon for photosynthesis in peat 
bogs, 436 Nature 1153 (2005). 
47  D. Tedesco et al., January 2002 Volcano-Tectonic Eruption of Nyiragongo Volcano, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 112 J. Geophysical Research B09202, at 5 of 12 (2007).  See also B. Smets et al., 
Dry Gas Vents Mazuku in Goma Region (North-Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo): Formation and 
Risk Assessment, 58 J. Afr. Earth Sci. 787, 788 (2010). 
48  Smets et al., supra at note 47, at 788. 
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gases with in the lakes; the deep lakes stratify into three or more levels.49 In Lake 
Kivu, e.g., the hypo-limnion or upper-level of the lake waters contains 265 km3 of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and 54 km3 of methane (CH4).50 That is the equivalent of 54 
billion cubic meters of methane or approximately 2 Tcf of methane. The methane is 
biogenic, sourced from bacterial metabolisms, and the carbon dioxide primarily 
results from additional bacterial metabolism of the methane and oxidation of the 
methane.51 The dissolved gases can be released and then emitted by a variety of 
mechanisms such as seismic activity or down-swelling cold waters from rain run-
offs.52  
The ambient methane levels have been detected within the necessary 
concentrations to enable air-borne combustion.53 These mazuku emissions have been 
known to kill both livestock and humans.54 Even marine life has been impacted; at 
the time of the emission from the lakes crawfish and crabs were observed struggling 
to exit the lake and many fish were found dead soon after.55 Observational histories 
detail that the lakes emit these gases with little warning and the mazuku fills the 
valleys that the lakes are situated within.56 There is essentially no escape for all 
respirant life forms close to the lakes. 57  Due to these hazards, engineers have 
installed gas evacuation systems to pump out excessive emissions before they build 
to dangerous levels; the methane is used to power an electrical plant.58  
Additionally, there are concerns that a field of leaking methane could cause 
buoyancy problems for waterborne craft. 59  Indeed, it has been modelled and 
discussed that certain conditions could lead to a field of methane hydrates 
disassociating in such a manner that a ship could lose its buoyancy and sink.60 Non-
buoyancy examples also exist. Offshore oil rigs and boats have been lost when 
methane suddenly erupted from below; the boats became upended by the displaced 
water pushed by the emerging methane.61  
 
49  Wafula et al. 2007, at 1. 
50  Id. 
51  Id., at 25. 
52  Tedesco et al., supra at note 47, en passim. See also Wafula et al. 2007, at 26. 
53  Tedesco et al., supra at note 47, at 5 of 12. 
54  Smets et al., supra at note 47, at 787. 
55  Tedesco et al., supra at note 47, at 6 of 12. 
56  Smets et al., supra at note 47, at 789. 
57  Id., at 794. 
58  See the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment summary generated by the African 
Development Bank for the KivuWatt project. Available at  
 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Environmental-and-Social-
Assessments/EX%20summary%20ESIA%20KIVUWATT%20may%2026th%202010%20Englis
h.pdf. 
59  I. S. Leifer et al., Engineered and Natural Marine Seep, Bubble-Driven Buoyancy Flows, 39 J. 
Physical Oceanography 3071 (2009).. See also E. A. Keller et al., Tectonic Geomorphology and 
Hydrocarbon Induced Topography of the Mid-Channel Anticline, Santa Barbara Basin, California, 89 
Geomorphology 274 (2007) 
60  D. Adam, Methane Hydrates: Fire From Ice, 418 Nature 913, 914 (2002). 
61  Id. 
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Ambient methane is not toxic per se, but it is a simple asphyxiant.62 Methane 
has no noticeable smell to humans; the smell associated with natural gas in home 
cooking fuel has a second chemical added, mercaptans,63 that provide that off-
smelling stink to alert home owners to gas leaks. In an industrial accident of 
unmodified methane, the workers will be challenged to evade an airborne poison 
that they cannot detect.  
Large amounts of methane could become dissolved into the benthic waters 
and substantially impact sea life.64 While the resource assets at that depth are well 
studied, the ecologies of those depths are not.65 Due to the location of methane 
hydrates, shallow within the seabed itself, it is expected that the development of 
methane hydrates will cause “significant impacts on the sediment dwelling 
fauna.”66 Additionally, the energy levels of the benthic oceans are generally much 
lower than upper levels of the ocean, preventing effective removal of polluting 
debris.67  
When methane seeps are located at 300m below the water’s surface, and 
unless high velocities and large volumes are involved, models suggest that 98% of 
the seeped methane could be absorbed by bacteria prior to reaching the water’s 
surface, metabolized into carbon dioxide.68 Glasby provides a broad review of the 
recent literature and finds that both modellers and field researchers agree that when 
methane needs to transport through 300m or more of water then the probability of 
any methane reaching the ocean’s surface is very minimal.69  
When carbon dioxide increases its presence within the water column, several 
problems are found. First, the acidity of the water column is increased, causing 
stress to sea fauna. 70 . Second, there is a risk of an affected area becoming a 
“mortality sink,” wherein predators begin to prey off of the dead and dying fauna, 
further decreasing population sustainability within the zone.71  
A main exception found in the meta-study is the potential for high speed 
methane to reach the surface.72 A second, but perhaps more rare exception, are 
when the width of the seeps are greater than the depth of the waters; in that case the 
methane can reach the surface intact. 73 Should a large field under commercial 
 
62  Available at http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/eh/chemfs/fs/Methane.htm. 
63  Available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/mhmi/mmg139.pdf . 
64  G. P. Glasby, Potential Impact on Climate of the Exploitation Of Methane Hydrate Deposits Offshore, 
20 Marine and Petroleum Geology 163, 169 (2003). 
65  A. G. Glover et al., The Deep-Sea Floor Ecosystem: Current Status And Prospects Of Anthropogenic 
Change By The Year 2025, 30 Envtl. Conservation 219, 220 (2003). 
66  Id., at 232. 
67  Id., at 220. 
68  Glasby, supra at note 64; K. A. Kvenvolden, Potential Effects of Gas Hydrate on Human Welfare, 
96 Proceedings Nat’l Acad. Sci. 3420 (1999). 
69  Glasby, supra at note 64, at 170. 
70  Glover et al., supra at note 65, at 225. 
71  Id. 
72  Glasby, supra at note 64, at 170. 
73  There is an example given of a Gulf of Mexico seep. The seep was over 600m wide and the 
methane had been seen at the surface 540m above. See id. 
102_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
Hazards of Offshore Methane Hydrates 
72 
operation lose some structural integrity and begin to bubble across the field, not 
collapse but merely simmer as it were, then a large volume of methane might vent 
to the atmosphere on an on-going basis. Worse, it might become impossible to 
repair once started.74  
A separate harm or damage can result from the extraction technologies. When 
chemicals are injected into the deposit to effect the dissolution of the hydrates, those 
chemicals are often toxic to those lifeforms living near the hydrates.75 Not only do 
micro-fauna such as zooplanktons and micronektons live near methane hydrates, 
but also macro-fauna such as tubeworms and mussels.76  
Deepwater organisms already test positive for sea-borne chemical pollutants.77 
The types of chemicals used to aid in hydrate dissolution are generally solvents and 
not water-soluble. As such, they are the types of chemicals known to significantly 
affect the zooplanktons and micronektons at the bottom of the food chain. 78 Such 
chemicals often accumulate; they can become concentrated at magnitudes higher 
levels within the micro-fauna compared against the ambient water column within 
which they reside. 79The problems of toxicity are not limited to the micro-fauna, the 
food-chain presents toxicity in birds and fish eaten by humans. 80 Those animals can 
carry toxicity levels higher than health limits for human consumption, making them 
effective poisonous to human diets. 81 
3.3. Acts that enable seeping and venting of methane 
The mechanisms of seeping methane are better understood than cataclysmic 
releases.  
Methane seeps do occur in nature and can be routinely studied. The methane 
can be absorbed into the water column and begin a process of metabolism that will 
eventually result in the transmission of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. The 
methane can persist as bubbles and present plumes from the seabed to the 
atmosphere, enabling the venting of slow moving volumes of methane to the 
atmosphere. Occasionally, even chunks of methane hydrates can break off and rise 
to the ocean’s surface. The impacts of such seepage can be monitored, measured, 
and studied. Policy makers have the scientific data to estimate the potential impact 
to marine ecologies and nearby communities caused by artificially created seeps 
and vents.  
 
74  If repairs were to be made to the field at large, it would likely consist of some sort of 
entrapment and layering in mud, restoring the pressures necessary for stability. 
75  C. R. Smith et al., The Near Future of Deep Seafloor Ecosystems, in: Aquatic Ecosystems: Trends 
and global prospects, 334, at 22 (2008).  
76  E. ALLISON & R. BOSWELL, DEPT. ENERGY, METHANE HYDRATE, FUTURE ENERGY WITHIN OUR 
GRASP, AN OVERVIEW, 9 (2007). See also Smith et al., supra at note 75, at 22. 
77  Id., at 22. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id., at 23. 
81  Id. 
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The incidence of seeping and venting needs two events. Methane needs to 
become free from the hydrate structure and a means of transport from the hydrate 
deposit bed is needed. Policy needs to address both events to be effective.  
Experiences in traditional offshore oil and gas well drilling, the testing at 
Mallik and in the Nankai Trough, and laboratory modeling do provide some insight 
into the risky behaviors that could artificially cause the methane hydrates to begin 
seeping methane. It is likely that a methane hydrate field could experience a variety 
of impacts that could lead to methane seepage and venting without necessarily 
leading to cataclysmic results. Policy needs to discern what actions could enable 
methane to become free and available for seeping and what actions could provide 
the means for the methane to leak out.  
3.3.1. Actions that make methane available 
Depressurization of the hydrate deposit, increases in the hydrate deposit’s 
temperature, and off-target chemical inhibitors could all artificially cause methane 
to become free in the methane hydrate deposits.  
The production of natural gas from conventional wells and conventional 
reservoirs has its own risks and hazards; the production of methane from methane 
hydrate deposits will also include most of those hazards. Drilling and installation of 
wells is complicated and hazardous. Wells are complicated mechanical systems and 
can fail. Christmas trees, gathering lines, and other elements of the production 
system can suffer from ruptures or other break-downs. But the production of 
methane hydrate will invoke a variety of novel problems and hazards. 
Depressurization can occur while drilling into a hydrate layer. 
Depressurization can occur while extracting methane from a hydrate layer; the 
removal itself provides empty space in the reservoir and the extraction process 
likely also effects a hydraulic-type effect on the fluids remaining in the hydrate level 
and thus decreases the pressure in the area of the evacuation. 82  As seen at 
Messoyakha, 83 the depressurization of a hydrate deposit can induce additional 
disassociation of methane from the hydrate layers. But at Messoyakha, the hydrates 
were under a solid formation unlike the hydrates in most offshore locations.  
Depressurization can also occur from accidental evacuation of the hydrates; 
structural damage to the field could deform the hydrate layer and result in 
depressurization. E.g., field subsidence might result in deformed hydrate layers that 
might then disassociated into methane. Cracks in the methane hydrate deposits 
 
82  This particular argument is made without reference to the specific technology used to actively 
produce the methane from the hydrates; once the methane is intentionally disassociated from 
the hydrate structure by in-situ heating, chemical agents, or by depressurization systems, the 
methane needs to be removed. Potentially a lot of the water will also need to be removed. The 
argument herein is that during these processes additional depressurization can occur from the 
physical removal of these matters from the production zone. 
83  Messoyakha was the first gas hydrate field to be operationally produced. It is located in 
Siberia. See Y. F. Makogon, S. A. Holditch & T. Y.Makogon, Natural Gas-Hydrates—A Potential 
Energy Source for the 21st Century, 56 J. Petroleum Sci. & Engineering 14, en passim (2007). 
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could enable depressurization due to the pressure differential above and below the 
mud-line.84  
Increases of the ambient temperatures in the gas hydrate deposit could lead to 
methane disassociating from the hydrate structure. There are a variety of human 
activities that could cause those increases to occur.  
First, the technology of methane extraction could rely on heat transfer into the 
methane hydrate deposit.85 Current models of heat transfer include steam and in 
situ combustion. 86  These activities may enable some methane to become free 
without production to the surface. Indeed, Moridis discusses the technical problem 
of preventing secondary hydrate formation at the well-bore; free methanes are 
likely to remain in contact with water until the well-bore and the reformation of 
hydrates at the well will clog the well and prevent removal of the produced and 
freed methane volumes.87  
Second, after extraction from the production zone, if the produced methane or 
water flow through seabed gathering lines, then the warmth of the pipes may 
provide a local heat source against the mud. With sufficient mud depth, this ought 
not be a problem, but subsurface currents might raise and relocate the mud at times 
and gathering lines may become embedded within the mud and become closer to 
the hydrate deposits. This has been a realistic concern in permafrost areas. The Point 
Thompson Unit in Alaska, although built onshore, was constructed akin to offshore 
methods due to concerns that the underlying permafrost would not support the 
warmth from the field operations.88  
Chemical stability is primarily a problem resulting from the leakage of injected 
chemicals into unintended injection zones. Chemical inhibitors are one of the main 
technologies in testing for the extraction of methane from hydrate deposits. Their 
original development was for the unclogging of pipelines blocked by methane 
hydrates formations; they chemically interfere in the lattice structure and enable the 
escape of methane from the cage structures. The extraction technology assumes that 
chemical inhibitors can be injected with control of where the inhibitors interact with 
the methane hydrate. But that will not always be the case. various cracks or fissures 
within the hydrates could combine with various hydraulic-types forces to transport 
the inhibitors away from their targeted work site.  
 
84  Cracks could also provide a means of leakage, see infra at sec. 3.3.2 for a more complete 
discussion. 
85  Current modeling for these types of technologies assume that as much as 10% of the energy 
extracted would be needed to heat the hydrate formations. See Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, 
supra at note 32. 
86  Overall, the technologies are very similar to the technologies employed in heavy oil and 
bitumen fields. The petroleum is heated in the reservoir, reducing the viscosity of the bitumen 
or pitch until it can flow into the well-bore. 
87  G. J. Moridis et al., Toward Production from Gas Hydrates: Current Status, Assessment Of 
Resources, and Simulation-Based Evaluation of Technology and Potential, 12 SPE Reservoir 
Evaluation & Engineering 745, at 14 (2009).  
88  Author's personal observations from experience with the Unit. 
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3.3.2. Actions that provide a means of leakage 
Seepage and venting require an opening from the methane gas deposit to the 
benthic waters. From that opening the methane can transport into the water 
column. The overall tendency of methane to become free during production 
processes and to accumulate in sub-mud bubbles has led one researcher to 
emphasize the need to prioritize hydrate assets with impermeable upper 
boundaries to prevent accidents.89  
Three structural problems were identified by Moridis with regards to field 
stability, all of them derive from problems with field porosity and permeability.90 
The three problems are field subsidence, formation yielding or failure, well-bore 
stability in the mud and hydrate zone. 91.  
Koh explained another critical problem, that the hydrate inhibitors used for 
extraction work by causing a change in lattice formation, they adsorb onto the 
surface of the lattice.92 Once injected, the inhibitors shift the lattice from octahedral 
crystals to two-dimensional plates or from rhombic dodecahedral crystals to highly 
branched crystals. 93  In essence, the structural frameworks of the hydrates are 
disassembled and flattened; they then lose their ability to hold together in all three 
dimensions, enabling slippage across planar sections of the hydrate fields.94 
Under both circumstances, the deposit fields could lose substantial structural 
cohesion. When combined with the porosity and permeability problems of Moridis, 
wherein the chemicals could use capillary action to flow far beyond the well-bore, 
the effects could be unpredictable.  
Cracks could emerge from faulty construction methods when developing the 
seabed. The construction activities of well drilling, dredging, and cementing could 
all provide mechanical energies that might cause fissures or cracks in the mud 
layers above the hydrates that could enable methane transport. Beyond the 
development phase of the field, the production period could offer a variety of 
events that could cause cracks. Cracks could emerge from uneven extraction of 
methane from the hydrate deposit. Cracks could emerge from uneven in situ burns, 
excess methane might try exit outside of the control of the well bottom. Evidence 
has been observed in production testing in Alaska of capillary motives of fluids near 
the production zone of the well-bore causing “honeycombs of wormhole like 
disassociation patterns.”95 The creation of such porous pathways could easy lead to 
cracks either within or above the deposit layers.  
 
89  Id., at 13. 
90  Id., at 17. 
91  Id. 
92  C. A. Koh, Towards a Fundamental Understanding of Natural Gas Hydrates, 31 Chemical Soc’y 
Rev. 157, 165-166 (2002). 
93  Id. 
94  Perhaps a suitable, but less technical, analogy would be to begin with a cake that could 
maintain its vertical integrity and then convert that cake in a stack of pancakes that could slip 
and slide apart. 
95  Moridis et al., supra at note 87, at 13. 
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As a methane hydrate field moves into operational production, there are 
hazards of methane accumulation away from the well bores. The pressures of built-
up methane can provide the means of transport for methane to exit from the 
hydrate deposit zone; the methane might build up enough force to remove the 
overlaying mud.96 Thus, unmonitored methane accumulations might provide their 
own means of transport out of the deposition zone.  
One suspects that mitigating against cataclysmic methane events could 
support the routine search for such methane accumulations, and if not producible 
by well, enabling the venting of that methane into the ocean in a safer manner. 
Seeping and venting may come to be seen as pressure valves against larger risks.97 
Of course, if one wanted to create seepage or venting, there are direct 
methods. Once the presence of gas hydrate fields are made public and their 
potential dangers are more publicized, there are likely some parties who might in 
certain conditions seek to exploit those hazards.  
Given the historical acts of Iraq in Kuwait to destroy the Kuwaiti oil fields in 
1990 and 1991, it is not unimaginable that adverse state actors might employ similar 
military strategies that could result in some actors seeking to intentionally initiate 
methane transport from the deposits. Additionally, both anti-government terrorists 
and certain environmentally-focused terrorist groups might seek to intentionally 
open methane hydrates to transport in the water column.98 
4. Cataclysmic methane events 
There are two basic areas of concern for cataclysmic methane events, the accidental 
and the strategic. The accidental catastrophe is when routine operations of methane 
hydrates fields lead to a cataclysmic release of methane. The strategic catastrophe is 
when an actor decides to intentionally initiate a cataclysmic methane event. One 
event can be characterized as tortious, but the other might need characterization as 
criminal or even belligerent under international law.  
A cataclysmic event could see a large section of a hydrate field lose its internal 
structure and shear off, causing the overlying mud layers to fall deep into the ocean. 
Such an event might be correlated with earthquake-like impacts such as tsunamis. 
The physical energy of the shear-off would likely enable massive sudden venting of 
much of the reservoir’s methane directly to the atmosphere. That methaneous 
eruption would also likely induce surface combustion to a broad area so long as the 
 
96  Such events are in the geologic record. See supra, sec. 3.1. 
97  Perhaps seepage might eventually be sought as a stability maintenance method versus 
accumulated methane volumes. Such venting is routine at post-clean up industrial dumps. 
But such ’safety measures’ do not eliminate the hazards posed by that calmer transmission of 
methane into the environment. 
98  Given current activities against oil and gas assets, these kind of events are reasonable to 
occur. The sabotage of Kuwait’s oilfields during the Gulf War of George H. W. Bush 
presidency, the on-going pipeline sabotage in many developing countries, and the 
Greenpeace boarding of Gazprom’s Prirazlomnaya Arctic oil platform are all examples that 
developers and regulators of methane gas hydrates fields will need to take into consideration. 
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methane continued to vent from the shaken depths. The impacts to any local 
community of a tsunami that coincides with ambient combustion would be horrific.  
4.1. Sudden massive venting 
Methane hydrates are poorly trapped and deposited in great contiguous bulks, 
these are the key dangerous differences between traditional natural gas and 
methane hydrates. The gas hydrate stability zones, wherein the deposits 
accumulate, are fragile on both pressure and temperature vectors, “[a]ny change in 
temperature and pressure will cause it to decompose ...”. 99 A rapid release of 
substantially large amounts of methane could result in short-scale climate 
change. 100 This perspective, when combined with an awareness that the expected 
extraction techniques will focus on warming the hydrates, on depressurizing the 
hydrates, and injecting chemicals which stimulate the disassociation of the hydrates, 
leads to the conclusion that the extraction technologies must effect a delicate 
balancing act to avoid triggering what could become a deposit wide disassociation 
event and a massive release of methane and freshwater from the hydrate deposits. 
The extraction of methane from methane hydrate deposits might always remain an 
extremely hazardous activity even if otherwise desirable.  
Methane can vent from the ocean floor and create a column of methane rich 
gas, analogized to a “super bubble” by Leifer.101 Such super bubbles have likely 
occurred in the recent geological past.102 Alternatively, large chunks of methane 
hydrates might rise to the surface and sublimate or combust at the ocean’s surface. 
Such an event has been witnessed offshore Vancouver Island at the Hydrate Ridge 
near the Cascadia Margin.103 Chunks of methane hydrate, measuring over a cubic 
meter each, were observed floating in the ocean. 104 Should a methane hydrate 
become disturbed during commercial operations, and if the field lost stability 
quickly, then it would be possible for either methane gas to vent directly to the 
atmosphere or for large chunks of hydrates to break off and float to the surface 
where they would be potentially explosive.  
The resulting behavior of the venting methane is to create a chimney-like 
structure that connects the hydrate bed to the atmosphere above the ocean water, 
enabling a direct pipeline of methane ventilation.105 So long as the buoyancy of the 
methane bubbles and the pressure from the emitted methane can be maintained, the 
chimney will be sustained. Thus, once in place, a chimney could provide a manner 
for a massive methane emission event to occur. All of that methane is potentially 
combustible at atmospheric conditions, but incomplete combustion is likely to 
result. Thus some of the methane will be directly absorbed by the atmosphere and 
 
99  Zhang et al., supra at note 25, at 935. 
100  Id. 
101  Leifer et al., supra at note 59. 
102  Keller et al., supra at note 59. 
103  Glasby, supra at note 64, at 170. 
104  Id. 
105  See supra, at sec. 3.1. 
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act as a greenhouse gas while a separate portion of the methane is likely to combust 
and explode above the ocean’s surface.  
Additionally, the destabilization of one location is likely to affect the pressure 
and temperature of nearby deposits, especially if they are in communication.106 
Therefore, the establishment of one chimney would result in substantial 
depressurization of nearby deposit and potentially enable other chimneys of 
emission.  
Such accidental events have already been witnessed. An accidental chimney 
was formed on the Pechora shelf; a drilling attempt through a subsea permafrost 
encountered a hydrate layer.107 The resulting surge of free methane created a gas-
water fountain that rose over a 100m through the waters and shot into the air 10m 
above the drilling ship. 108 
While the probabilities of sudden massive venting events are difficult to gauge 
given a lack of historical data, the geological record strongly suggests that 
cataclysmic venting has occurred in pre-history and earlier periods, there are subsea 
craters that reflect massive sudden blow-outs of methane.109 Up to 1 to 5 gigaton of 
carbon were released in those events, mostly in the form of methane. 110  
Additionally, it is believed that massive venting of methane hydrate deposits were 
instrumental in causing the sudden global warming seen approximately 55.6 
millions years ago at the Latest Paleocene Thermal Maximum.111 During that event, 
the temperature of the northern hemisphere increased 6 to 12 C.112  
4.2. Subsea landslides, tsunamis, and earthquakes 
Methane hydrate deposits often occur on gentling sloping continental shelf areas; if 
disassociation occurs and methane and water are released from the deposits, then 
the overlaying mud and sediments may lose stability and collapse, causing a 
landslide.113 This is not an easy condition to induce, because the disassociation of 
water and methane requires an energy source.114 The beginning of a disassociation 
in one location increases the pressure and thus improves the stability of hydrates 
near the disassociation event. 115 
 
106  “Communication” occurs when gases, liquids, and kinetic energy are shared or transmitted 
through the deposit system. The motives can be capillary action, Boyle's Law or Charles's 
Law. For examples of means in hydrates, see supra, at sec. 3.3.2. 
107  Shakhova and Semiletov, supra at note 28, at 240. 
108  Id. 
109  Krey et al., supra at note 29, at 4. 
110  Id. 
111  Zhang et al., supra at note 25, at 935. 
112  Id., at 935-936. 
113  M. F. Nixon & J. L. H. Grozic, Submarine Slope Failure Due to Gas Hydrate Dissociation: A 
Preliminary Quantification, 44 Can. Geotechnical J. 314, 314-315 (2007). 
114  Id., at 315. 
115  Id. 
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It takes an unusual amount of energy or a unique displacement of the methane 
hydrate bed to cause landslides; 116 but they do occur. Once they begin to occur, 
then they can enable positive feed-back loops that enable more methane to be 
released and more landslides to occur.117  
There are two known natural triggers, lowering sea levels, which reduce 
pressure on the hydrates field-wide, and warmer oceans, which heat up the 
hydrates field-wide. Commercial hydrate development, with field-wide on-going 
extraction, would potentially offer the types of trigger events necessary for deposit-
wide disassociation followed by a landslide. 118 . This is doubly so for those 
techniques that combine volume extraction with in-situ heating to spur 
disassociation; 119  a combination of field wide depressurization and field-wide 
warming.  
Methane hydrates often form intermixed with sand and sediment, forming a 
type of icy cement.120 Zhang has shown that gas hydrates, in situ, can display 10 
times greater shear strength than water ice.121 Studies suggest that the mud or 
permafrost might actually be structurally dependent on the underlying methane 
hydrates.122 If so, then the removal of the methane hydrates could cause the collapse 
and relocation of the overlaying materials and result in a landslide. Offshore, such a 
geological event could cause an earthquake or a tsunami.123  
Generally speaking, offshore methane hydrate deposits lay on inclined slopes, 
which are overlaid with mud.124 A positive feedback loop could manifest, wherein 
one stage of methane and water releases enable others. If the hydrates start to 
disassociate and the methane is emitted, then there will also be a great release of the 
previously integrated waters.125 As the hydrate structures continue to disappear, the 
shear strength of the deposit will decline, and the structural integrity of the 
overlaying mud will be lost.126 Additionally, the released water volumes will both 
physically lift and assist in the dissolution of the mud bed.127 The result is that all of 
the mud and other overlaying materials will begin to fall downwards under the tug 
of gravity, causing a sub-sea landslide.128 
 
116  Id. 
117  Bangs et al., supra at note 33. 
118  When oil is raised from the reservoir to the production platform, it is often quite a bit warmer 
than the adjacent seabed. There are known instances wherein oil platforms ran their 
production lines through hydrate deposits, which then destabilized as the production line 
warmed the seabed. Nixon and Grozic, supra at note 113, at 315. 
119  See supra, at ch. 3. 
120  Nixon and Grozic, supra at note 113, at 316. 
121  Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 32, at 231. 
122  Zhang et al., supra at note 25, at 935. 
123  I. Chatti et al., Benefits and Drawbacks of Clathrate Hydrates: A Review of Their Areas of Interest, 46 
Energy Conversion Mgmt. 1333, 1336 (2005), citing Glasby, supra at note 64, at 163-175. 
124  Zhang et al., supra at note 25, at 936. 
125  Nixon and Grozic, supra at note 113, at 315. 
126  Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 32, at 231. 
127  Zhang et al., supra at note 25, at 936. 
128  Id. 
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There are certain limiting parameters for operational safety. Early modelling 
suggests that shallow water hydrates, in waters shallower than 300m, the hydrates 
will generally lack the conditions to enable a landslide result.129 Additionally, there 
is certain depth, below 700m, wherein both temperature and pressure are likely to 
be safely stable despite changes in ocean temperature or changes of ocean depth. 130. 
The deeper the mud layer over the hydrates, the safer the deposit; but the 
relationship is not linear. A slow improvement in safety is seen as the mud 
approaches from no mud to 400m in thickness, but then at approximately 400m the 
safety certainty make a dramatic jump, after which only marginal gains to safety are 
made.131  
Thus, there are envelopes of safety, albeit fuzzily described, wherein hydrates 
could be extracted with high certainty of triggering no landslide events. Some 
geologies are safer than others; the Beaufort Sea is seen as more likely to offer future 
landslide under commercial development, whereas the hydrates in the Gulf of 
Mexico may be more resilient to landslide events.132 However, even the safest areas 
were seen as capable of landslides under sufficient conditions.133  
There are numerous geological signs of earlier events that began as methane 
hydrate deposit destabilizations that led to landslides, tsunamis and earthquakes. 
On the United States’ Atlantic shelf, over 200 slump scars have been discovered; 
these are all believed to be methane hydrate events.134 Additional slump scars have 
been identified off the west coasts of Africa, in the fjords of British Columbia, and in 
the Beaufort Sea offshore of Alaska’s northern coastline.135  
The prehistoric landslide of Storegga, offshore Norway, is perhaps one of the 
best known examples of a landslide caused by a methane hydrate event. It has been 
measured at over 800km long.136 The landslide is believed to have carried over 5,500 
km3 of earthen material. The tidal waves and tsunamis that resulted are blamed in 
large part for the submergence of Doggerland. Another similar event occurred in 
the Kumano Basin, offshore Japan, about 50,000 years ago.137 While the evidence for 
events such as Storegga and Kumano are ancient by human standards, geologically 
they are recent events and the geophysical data suggests that similar processes can 
occur today.138 Of particular concern is that the gas hydrates fields offshore Japan 
routinely experience earthquakes which could trigger or assist in triggering 
landslides in gas hydrate fields.139 The Nankai Trough routinely experiences Richter 
8 plus scale earthquakes. 140  If a field is already weakened by commercial 
 
129  Nixon and Grozic, supra at note 113, at 317. 
130  Id. 
131  Id., at 317 and 319. 
132  Id., at 321-322. 
133  Nixon and Grozic, supra at note 113, at 323-324. 
134  Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 32, at 231. 
135  Nixon and Grozic, supra at note 113, at 315. 
136  Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra at note 32, at 232. 
137  Bangs et al., supra at note 33, at 1021. 
138  Id. 
139  Id., at 1022. 
140  Id. 
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development, an earthquake that might not have originally triggered a landslide 
might find the depleted field more readily susceptible to collapse.  
5. Oil spills and deep ocean eruptions are distinguishable 
This section of the study attempts to highlight the differences between traditional 
oil and gas injuries and the injuries likely to occur from the development of 
methane hydrates.  
The hazards of methane hydrates are different from those of traditional gas 
wells. In some ways, methane from methane hydrates appears simpler. Methane 
from methane hydrates is sweet, not sour. It requires less post-production 
processing and treatment, so it lacks the hazards associated with those activities. 
Were methane hydrates from a more secure structure, perhaps it would be a simply 
safer form of natural gas. But it is not from a traditional trap, instead offshore 
hydrates are under a mud layer and much more dangerous.  
But other risks, while present in traditional offshore gas well development, are 
of a more substantial threat and greater harm when associated with methane 
hydrates. The potential for methane emissions to accelerate global climate change 
are much more pronounced with methane hydrates. The potential of a subsea flood 
of disassociated fresh water to disrupt the eco-system of the benthic communities is 
again a much greater danger with methane hydrates. The potential to permanently 
disrupt or lose a local marine eco-system is much more likely with a collapse of a 
methane hydrate deposit than it would be with a leaking natural gas well.  
5.1. Marine oil spills 
There is a traditional model for oil spills and it dates back to a period when most 
spills of concern came from ship-loaded crude oil.141 The traditional paradigm for 
oil spills is the “shore-bound surface spill.” 142 To better capture the legislative 
norms associated with “shore bound surface spill” model, this study will refer to 
these types of harms and hazards as marine oil events.  
Although there are a variety of legal institutions available to handle oil spill in 
the marine oil model, few of them apply to methane hydrates. Even if they did, is 
doubtful that they would be able to handle the scale and range of the types of 
hazards brought by the development of methane hydrates. Ultimately, marine oil 
spills are different events with distinguishable harms and hazards from those 
presented by methane hydrate projects.  
In the United States, there are a variety of laws that address marine oil spills 
and the laws’ domains depend on the method of emission or spill. E.g., the Oil 
Pollution Act covers tanker spills and oil well spills, but the Clean Water Act 
governs emissions from run-off waters and from some pipeline spills. The American 
 
141  E. E. Adams et al., A Tale of Two Spills: Novel Science and Policy Implications of an Emerging New 
Oil Spill Model, 62 BioScience 461, 461 (2012). 
142  Id. 
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legal institutions are not aligned on the incident of harm but are aligned on the 
means of the harm and the location of the tortfeasor. This is in part due to the 
complexity, especially in earlier decades, of sourcing the oil spills to establish legal 
authority and jurisdiction.143 Recent advancements in technology, especially remote 
sensing, have reduced the difficulty in tracking and measuring oil spills at the 
surface of the ocean and above.144  
Annually, 1,300,000 tons of crude oil enters the ocean; tanker vessel spills 
account for less than 8% of the volumes and pipeline spills account for less than 
1%.145 Rain-driven run-off from roads and other surfaces provide approximately 
11% of the volumes.146 Natural seepage is estimated to provide 45% of the total 
volumes. 147 That leaves a large portion not well accounted for, although intentional 
ocean vessel discharges are thought to make up a large part of the missing 
numbers. 148 There are many natural processes that disperse oil and enable other 
organic processes to break it down; 149 crude oil does not persist naturally if mobile 
and in an aerobic environment.  
The marine oil spill model presumes a spill on the ocean surface as the 
primary accident; that the oil spill begins at the ocean’s surface or quickly rises to it 
from a shallow depth.150 Whatever methane is present in the transported crude is 
quickly evaporated little combustion or interaction with marine waters and marine 
ecologies. 151 The crude oil and tars then drift from the ocean towards land, coating a 
variety of marine and estuarial habitats. 152 The life-forms at the ocean surface that 
bear the brunt of harm; that harm is primarily resultant from the crude oil and tars 
at the surface. 153  When buried in anoxic sands or embankments, the crude oils can 
persist for decades without oleophagic bacteria-enabled decomposition. 154 It is to 
these hazards and harms that marine oil regulation was traditionally targeted.  
The marine oil paradigm assumes that the primary hazards result for 
contamination and inundation from tar and crude oils in the littoral zones of 
shorelines, marshes, and coastal communities. The crude oil is assumed to degrade 
 
143  Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has raised similar concerns with regards to connecting 
tortfeasors to resultant climate change events. For a more complete discussion on the Court's 
concerns from Massachusetts and Kivalina, see Partain & Lee 2013. 
144  See I. S. Leifer et al., State of the Art Satellite and Airborne Marine Oil Spill Remote Sensing: 
Application to the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 124 Remote Sensing of Environment 185 
(2012), wherein a discussion of U-2 mounted avionics is presented. When engaged in such 
research purposes, the planes might be designated as ER-SODQHV(DUWK5HVRXUFHVï 
145  Id., at 187. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Adams et al., supra at note 141, at 461. The key difference was that spilt oil will float and 
persist in the environment until cleaned-up whereas spilt methane leaves little physical mass 
after its evaporation or combustion. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. 
154  Id. 
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into thick tars as it is exposed to salt water, solar radiation, and air. Flora and fauna 
can become entangled and contaminated by the crude oil and tars. This contact can 
be lethal due to either contact with hydrocarbon solvents or from the tars and oils 
preventing normal survival behaviours such as flying, hunting and eating. The 
deteriorating crude and tars accumulate on the shores and sands; where they are 
likely to remain for decades or more without artificial removal. To the extent that 
the crude oil and tars float in the ocean, they can come into contact and damage a 
variety of marine life. Ocean-borne crude oils and tars present an immediate 
nuisance to fishermen and others dependent on the quality of the epipelagic 155 
waters for occupational and recreational purposes. The regulatory goals of planning 
for marine oil are the prevention of leakage and the provisioning for expedited 
clean-up and restoration once a leakage event does occur; compensation for what 
cannot be remedied is often made available as well.  
While the crude oil and tars are toxic, they are not likely to add to 
anthropogenic climate change. Methane gases and other greenhouse gases might be 
emitted in the course of an oil spill,156 However, the marine oil paradigm does not 
generally perceive anthropogenic climate change as a major component of the spill 
event. The majority of the spilt volumes are viscous in nature and not readily 
capable of evaporating under normal atmospheric conditions. Thus, the regulatory 
paradigm for marine oil has not included direct regulation on climate change 
matters.  
In general, boat-based crude oil spills provide no geological concerns. There 
are no records of tsunamis, earthquakes, nor landslides resulting from boat-based 
oil spills. Even in the face of marine oil from shallow water oil wells, there are 
generally no concerns for geologic stability. Indeed, it might be the reverse case, it is 
the multi-decade operated oil fields that demonstrate subsidence. Louisiana’s lower 
Cajun territory has experienced broad areas of subsidence since the onset of oil 
production.  
5.2. Deep ocean eruptions 
There is a developing alternative in the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon incident, 
the “deep ocean persistent presence” model. 157  It is important to identify this 
 
155  Epipelagic waters are generally defined as reaching from the ocean’s surface down to about 
200m. Crude oil does not normally float at depth, rather it tends to float with a meters of the 
surface. Such assumptions were eliminated at the Deepwater Horizon event, because 
chemicals were injected into the oil stream at the wellhead which substantially changed the 
buoyancy of the resultant hydrocarbon blobs. 
156  Assuming that the spill is not co-incidental with production from a gas well, the main source 
of greenhouse gases would be either the evaporation of volatile hydrocarbons, such as 
butane, as the crude is exposed to solar heat and the atmosphere. Ocean-spilled crude oil is 
often combusted as a means of abatement and that in turn can release a variety of emittants 
such as carbon dioxide. While noxious, the overall volumes of emissions from both the 
sublimated/evaporated natural gas liquids and the emitted combustants are globally 
insignificant in contrast to daily traffic-based combustion. 
157  Adams et al., supra at note 141, at 461. 
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alternative deep ocean hazard paradigm as distinguishable from both the 
traditional oil spill paradigm and the paradigm of harms from methane hydrates. It 
is an important area for future legal research but it is outside the scope of this 
current study.  
The Deepwater Horizon event is the paradigmatic deep ocean persistent 
presence scenario. The spill was not really a spill in as much as it was an eruption of 
crude oil and natural gas from an out-of-control artificial well-bore into the 
reservoir.158 The leak is not at the ocean surface but perhaps a kilometer below at 
great benthic depths.159  
The ocean is regarded as having multiple levels; they range from near the sea-
surface wherein much light and biotic material exist to deeper levels with little 
illumination and a scarcity of biotic material. While benthic levels of the ocean are 
less active, they are critical areas of the ocean from an ecological perspective. The 
ecology of those depths is especially fragile in contrast with waters closer to the 
surface.  
The crude oils and natural gases emerge at great heat into a cold aqueous 
environment with great turgidity; the physical energies whirling near the point of 
eruption also cause great disruption to the general seabed. 160 Odd combinations 
emerge from this kinetic and thermo-dynamic chaos, chunks of methane hydrates 
form near the eruption and float off, oil-gas-water emulsions are formed and flow 
into the turbulence, and sediments mix with all of it to create a variety of substances 
of varying buoyancy and toxicities. 161 
In contrast to the rapid buoyancy of crude oil spills from the MOP model, the 
products of the deep ocean eruption do not necessarily move quickly to the 
surface.162  A great proportion of the crude oil volume will drift laterally deep 
within the ocean, as it may lack much buoyancy and be carried away by deep seas 
currents. 163 Another portion of the erupted hydrocarbons may remain submerged 
indefinitely, either flotsam or as seabed encrusting. 164 There is evidence that a lot of 
the post-turbulence sub-sea hydrocarbons can enter marine food chains at the 
lowest levels; 165 the harms and hazards of the hydrocarbons are passed up the food 
chain. As with all toxicities in a food chain, the higher in the food chain the greater 
the resulting accumulated toxicity; deep ocean spill events will reach the human 
food supplies and cause great risks to human health if not prevented. The damages 
from a benthic event may not be fully obvious for decades.  
There are few, if any, laws properly squared on the “deep ocean persistent 
presence” model. 166  The majority of existing oil spill laws and regimes are 
 
158  Id., at 462. 
159  Id., at 461. 
160  Id., at 462. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. 
163  Id. 
164  Id. 
165  Id. 
166  See discussion on EU Offshore Directive, infra, at ch. 10. 
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predicated on the “shore-bound surface spill” model, such as the Oil Pollution Act 
of the United States. It was drafted in response to the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska.  
There are certain general anti-pollution regulations and ecological 
preservation regulations that can be brought to bear on deep ocean spills, but again, 
the events of the BP Deepwater Horizon demonstrated that the ex ante protections 
for the specific benthic harms were insufficient.167 
This kind of accident can and needs to be distinguished from the potential 
harms and hazards of offshore methane hydrate projects. 168  The activities of 
methane hydrate projects will occur offshore, sometimes hundreds of kilometers 
offshore. But unlike deep ocean type events, methane hydrate projects will engage 
in comparatively shallow wells. Methane hydrate projects will obtain resources 
from below a mud layer unlike the marine oil or deep ocean wells that recover from 
below a solid rock or salt interface. And the potential injuries from methane hydrate 
projects will be very distinguishable from MOP or BHP events in that the primary 
chemical emissions will be gaseous methane and carbon dioxide and not 
hydrocarbaceous oils and tars. 
Thus, while methane hydrate events will clearly not belong within the marine 
oil paradigm of hazards, it will also not belong to the emerging deep ocean 
paradigm of hazards, and thus the planning for harms and hazards of methane 
hydrate projects will need to be included in liability and regulatory frameworks as a 
novel matter.  
6. Summary and conclusions 
While the previous chapter established the potential benefits of developing offshore 
methane hydrate resources, this chapter has established that there is a range of risks 
and hazards that would accompany that development. Some of the risks might be of 
a pervasive or non-cataclysmic character while other risks and hazards would be 
cataclysmic in character.  
Non-cataclysmic harms might include continuous or frequent venting or 
seeping of methane from the deposit beds into the ocean, disruption of the flora and 
fauna adjacent to the deposit fields, and potential nuisance disruptions to the 
human communities that routinely interact with the water environments near the 
deposit fields.169 These harms would primarily affect those that interact routinely in 
 
167  It is an interesting observation that in the years since the Deepwater Horizon event, the 
United States has adopted little in new regulation to address these types of problems. An 
argument can be made that BP’s swift offer to create a large compensation fund, in fear of the 
American tort system, plus a perception that “the system worked, the problem was fixed,” 
has removed a sense of urgency for reform. It may take a number of years of scientific 
observation to more firmly determine what damage occurred at benthic depths and what 
legal remedies may be added before the United States takes more decisive action. 
168  Those harms are detailed, supra, at 4.2 et seq. 
169  Following Arcuri’s use of Knightian terms, the non-catalcysmic risks hazards posed by 
offshore methane hydrates are predominately of the risk classification, although one would 
reasonably assume some levels of uncertain hazards would remain. See A. Arcuri, The Case for 
Æ
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the water immediately adjacent to the hydrate deposit area. In general these 
localized types of harms would not likely generate transboundary events; although 
they could become transboundary in character if the zone of the incident were to be 
sufficiently adjacent to a border. 
Cataclysmic harms primarily result from sudden massive methane-release 
events. 170  As the methane hydrates lay in sheets under mud layers, certain 
disruptions could cause whole field sections to slough and slide; potentially leading 
to landslides, earthquakes, and tsunamis. On-going extraction activities could also 
produce accumulations of free methane under the mud layers that could erupt 
violently through the mud layers; once initiated, that methane evacuation could 
cause additional methane volumes to become disassociated and released. If the 
emissions are released with sufficient energy and volumes, it is feasible that the 
methane volumes could reach the atmosphere intact and erupt in flame. These 
harms could result in damages far afield from immediate surroundings of the 
offshore methane hydrate installation. It is reasonable to believe that such harms 
might be hundreds of miles or further afield based on evidence from geological 
records of historical events. Given the far range of cataclysmic injuries, it is very 
likely that the accident and its harms would be transboundary in character. 
Both categories of harms release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, 
facilitating anthropogenic climate change. Methane and carbon dioxide are listed as 
greenhouse gases under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol.171 Methane can be 
released from the seabed via cracks in the mud layers, via persistent venting or 
seeping, or by massive emission events. Carbon dioxide can result from the 
methane being metabolized by sea-borne biota. When methane is vented at low 
energy levels and at sufficient depths in the ocean then it has been modelled that 
almost all of the emitted methane would be converted to carbon dioxide prior to the 
gases reaching the ocean’s surface. Either way, the emissions of methane from 
methane hydrate deposits would result in the eventual transfer of greenhouse gases 
to the atmosphere, increasing the risks and likelihood of anthropogenic climate 
change. That is a harm presented to current and future generations, globally. 
These events, cataclysmic harms, non-cataclysmic harms, and climate change 
harms, do happen in nature. The geological evidence is clear that both massive 
sloughing and landslides have occurred around the world; there are tsunami run-
up scars in the soil beds of Scotland and Norway from the Storegga events of 8,000 
years ago. At the non-cataclysmic level, methane hydrate chunks routinely dislodge 
and float to the surface of the sea. Ocean warming events such as hurricanes can 
 
a Procedural Version of the Precautionary Principle Erring on the Side of Environmental Preservation, 
11-12 (Global Law Working Paper No. 09/04, 2007). 
170  For the cataclysmic hazards, the potential outcomes are known and the probabilities are 
coming into focus. But perhaps it is yet premature to suggest that the risks are Knightian risks. 
They will likely remain in the range of uncertainty for near-term policy makers. See id. Due to 
the undesirability of learning from historical accidents or large-scale experiments, the 
advancement of computer simulations will likely be at the forefront of that shift from 
uncertainty to risk.  
171  See discussion on UNFCCC, infra, at ch. 8, sec. 4. 
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warm seabed deposits of methane hydrates and induce temporary seeping from the 
sea beds. In some parts of the world, venting methane, called mazuku, has flowed 
out of lakes and asphyxiated villages. The nuisance odour of swamp gas is a smell 
familiar to many people who live close to swamps. It is expected that with offshore 
methane hydrates, anthropogenic disturbances to the methane hydrate beds will be 
additive to the pre-existing natural risks. 
The affected communities from offshore methane hydrate development are 
potentially of a very wide character. Because almost every single coastal country in 
the world is expected to either possess its own offshore methane hydrates or be 
adjacent to such deposits, the whole range of developing and developed economies 
could be impacted. Similarly divergent, some methane hydrates sit offshore high-
density urban areas while other deposits lay offshore of uninhabited areas.  
Adjacency is not the only vector of concern. Some hydrates lay on fairly flat 
fields while other lay on steep slopes; the greater the incline the higher the risks of 
landslide or tsunami. Some hydrates lay in cold waters, others in warmer waters; 
the warmer the waters the greater the ambient chances of disassociation. There is 
also great diversity in the way that methane beds can be formed with regards to 
forming cements with gravels and grains of sand; firmer hydrate deposits would be 
safer than others.  
But that said, most readers would have been largely unaware of the risks 
posed by offshore methane hydrates. That is because methane hydrates are 
endothermic; it takes something ‘extra’ to get an accident from methane hydrates. 
Once hydrates are formed, it takes energy from outside to raise the potential for the 
hydrates to disassociate. Thus, when hydrates are under pressure and within cool 
temperatures, they are very unlikely to destabilize and vent or seep. The harms 
from methane hydrates in nature are usually predicated by exogenous sources of 
energy, e.g., such as earthquakes or warm ocean currents. Sometimes, slow 
processes accumulate for a suddenly appearing emission; but again the energy 
source was usually found to be exogenous. Thus, offshore methane hydrates are 
inherently stable once formed and lying in deposits, but they can be disturbed.  
The development, production, and even certain stages of the abandonment 
and sequestration phases of an offshore hydrate installation all offer potential 
sources of exogenous energy that could induce hydrate structures to disassociate 
and enable various harms to result. The various risk explored by Yabe et al. detailed 
the many standard operation activities that could lead to energy-adding 
disturbances that could lead to increased levels of methane hydrate accidents. 
Because methane hydrates do not readily disassociate, the very act of producing 
methane hydrates would require the introduction of exogenous energy into the 
deposit bed to enable the disassociation that could then lead to the extraction of the 
disassociated methane volumes; the very act of production requires the 
destabilization of the hydrate. The range of extraction technologies reviewed in 
Chapter 3 were effective techniques because of their means of adding energy to the 
deposit beds; depressurization, thermal stimulation, and inhibitor injection all serve 
to destabilize the hydrate beds. The enterprise of extracting methane from methane 
hydrate beds is a balancing act of sufficient energy injection to loosen and remove 
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methane gases without injecting so much energy as to destabilize the bed and result 
in harms.  
Safe offshore extraction of methane hydrates, even continuous and flowing 
extraction, has been achieved in practice; it is possible to extract safely. The risks can 
be managed, so long as reasonably stable methane hydrate beds are chosen at the 
beginning. The ability to categorize the risks of disassociation and their vectors of 
causation gives rise to hope, in that hydrate risks are characterizable and hydrate 
disturbances can be measured, thus the sources of the risks, hazards, and harms can 
be assayed and monitored for potential impact on the deposits of offshore methane 
hydrates.  
This is where standards of safety and precaution become necessary to ensure 
that the whole collection of operators and investors, of local citizens living within 
the zones of potential harm, and of nations further afield concerned with 
anthropogenic climate change can all become assured that optimal levels of offshore 
methane hydrate development and precautions are met.  
The key to that management of risks from offshore methane hydrate 
development and production is the subject of the next section of this study, Part II. 
Therein the study of rules of civil liability, public regulation and private regulation 
will be explored to determine the optimal means of standards settings and of 
efficient achievement of those standards. Optimal governance mechanisms for 
offshore methane hydrates will be identified. Part III will follow to compare existing 
laws and conventions for their match and fit against the recommendations 
presented in Chapter 7 or Part II. Part IV will provide a summary of the whole 
study and present final conclusions. 
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Part II 
 
Governance of Accidental Risk 
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RULES OF CIVIL LIABILITY 
This Part II of the study provides three chapters. The overall focus of these three 
chapters is to identify which means of risk governance might optimally provide for 
the efficient governance of the risks and potential harms from the development of 
offshore methane hydrates. This effort in Part II is theoretical in character, 
comparing the unique circumstances of offshore methane hydrates to the rules of 
civil liability and to both public and private regulation.  
Chapter 5 reviews the civil liability rules of strict liability and negligence. It 
attempts to provide a survey of when each rule might be optimally or efficiently 
employed; introductory comments on the potential application of each rule to 
offshore methane hydrates are provided.  
Chapter 6 addresses the theory of regulation and when regulations might be 
optimally or efficiently employed. Additionally, that chapter addresses the potential 
for regulations and rules of civil liability to be complementarily engaged to 
efficiently govern.  
Finally, Chapter 7 will provide an integration of the first two chapters and 
apply them to the question of what mix of civil liability rules and regulations might 
optimally govern the risks and hazards from offshore methane hydrate installations. 
It is within Chapter 7 that the theoretical recommendations for a mechanism of risk 
governance will be presented.  
Part III of this study will provide a comparison of the results of this Part II, the 
risk governance mechanism presented in Chapter 7, with the existing laws and 
conventions that might be applicable to the development of offshore methane 
hydrates. Part III will examine the conventions of the UN, international maritime 
and oil spill conventions, laws of the EU, and the federal laws of the U.S. Particular 
attention will be paid to both the general applicability of the various laws and 
conventions to offshore methane hydrates and to the general fit and match of the 
existing laws to the recommendations from Chapter 7. 
Part IV of this study presents a summary and final conclusions for the whole 
of the study. Part IV also includes various appendices, including maps, 
mathematical notes, and a reference section. 
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1. Rules of civil liability to govern accidental harms 
Liability rules stem from the legal traditions first enunciated under the Roman lex 
Aquilia,1 that tortfeasors2 should be held responsible for the damages they cause to 
another person’s property. Traditionally, liability arose from an idea of social 
obligations; it is the flip-side of contractual or volitional obligations, in that liability 
arises from non-consensually derived damages.3  
Law and Economics provides a framework for evaluating the strategic 
consequences of incentives from public actors onto the decisions and economic 
activities of private actors. Rational actors are assumed to exist, the actors face 
choices and prices, and can make optimizing decisions.4 When the markets provide 
actors with a complete data set, i.e. when the costs faced by the actor include all of 
the potential costs derived from the consumption of a given product, then the actor 
could make efficient decisions. But what if informational problems arise, e.g., what 
if a product’s costs to the actor did not include the costs of damage to others beyond 
the actor cum consumer, would efficient consumption decisions still be attained? 
Externalities are the economic phenomena that are transferred from a first actor to a 
second actor without economic consideration; the recipient is thus unable to 
provide cost or pricing information data back to the first actor.5  
Pigou suggested that negative externalities could be efficiently addressed by 
taxing an economic activity that creates externalities within the jurisdictional zone 
of a sovereign; thus economic information could be provided to the first actor.6 
 
1  G. D. DARI MATTIACCI, Economic Analysis of Law: A European Perspective, in: TORT LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, 2 2006.  
2  A note on the vocabulary choices of this chapter. This chapter will primarily employ the 
Anglo-American common law term tortfeasor as indicative of the lead actor in an activity that 
gives rise to a tortious injury to a second or third party person. Much of the economic 
literature employs the word injurer, certain quotes herein retain that original word choice. 
There is not an effective difference in meaning. Etymologically in English, tortfeasor derives 
from the Anglo-Norman legal term tort fasieur, the tort-doer; and tort itself derives from Latin 
tortus, to twist and thus to hurt, e.g., see torture. This phrasing is perhaps more active in voice 
than the term delict, which derives from the Latin de linquo, to depart from or to be missing, 
i.e., to evade one’s duties. Injurer derives from the Anglo-Norman borrowing from Latin of 
iniuria, or the lack of a legal right. Both injurer and tortfeasor indicate an actor who violates 
another’s lawful rights or who invades another’s legally protected interests. Interestingly, the 
etymology of the word victim derives from the Latin word for a sacrificial animal, implying 
that the victim played a passive role in their resultant injury. If so, then perhaps there is a 
linguistic bias to be careful to take note of, that victim in the law and economics literature 
does not suggest unilateral nor bilateral nature of an accident but merely the party 
counterpart to the tortfeasor. 
3  Mattiacci, supra at note 1, at 2. 
4  See A. PACCES & L. T. VISSCHER, Methodology of Law and Economics, in: LAW AND METHOD: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH INTO LAW, 85, #-# (Tübingen: Möhr Siebeck, 2011). 
5  See id. See also R. Van den Bergh & L. T. Visscher, Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law, in: 
MITIGATING RISK IN THE CONTEXT OF SAFETY AND SECURITY. HOW RELEVANT IS A RATIONAL 
APPROACH?, 29 (R.V. de Mulder, ed., Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam 2008), for an 
applied discussion on optimal enforcement policies to address existing externalities. 
6  A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1924). 
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Pigou suggested that by setting the marginal additional tax rate for an externality 
equal to the marginal costs caused by the same externality, the economic producer 
of the externality would be driven to efficiently balance the utility of the externality 
against its welfare costs to the broader community.7  
Coase established his revolution on the idea that in the absence of transaction 
costs, such an effort would be unneeded because the parties on both sides of the 
externality would be able to efficiently negotiate the conflict to resolution.8 Coase 
demonstrated that externalities are essentially a conflict of overlapping property 
rights. 9  Coase used the existence of the conflicts, and their demonstrable 
inefficiency, to demonstrate both that transaction costs were important 
considerations and of how those costs impacted the need for legal rules to assign 
certain initial conditions to better improve market efficiencies. 10 
 
1.1. Prioritizing accident reduction over compensation 
Lawyers, both Civil and Common, have seen liability rules as a system that 
provides compensation for victim of tortious acts.11 There are valid critiques of this 
perspective, that using liability as a source of compensation is substantially less 
efficient that other means such as insurance. 12  The polluter pays principle is a 
principle of environmental tort law that reflects the fundamental paradigmatic 
focus, who pays what to the victim as a means of justice and compensation.13  
In the last fifty years, a new school of thought has developed on the proper 
role of liability rules. 14  Economists began to see liability rules as a system of 
incentives to prevent unwanted behaviors and outcomes. 15  Whereas the older 
notion was that tort law serves to administer justice to those injured, the newer 
model evidenced that tort law could serve to guide tortfeasors to optimal levels of 
risky behavior. The contrast of these two paradigms can be suggested as the ex post 
compensation for damages versus the ex ante prevention of harm. 16 These two 
ideas, although espousing different teleological ends, can be broadly compatible 
with each other.17 Micro-economic analyses suggest that incentives can be created or 
 
7  Id. 
8  R. H. Coase, Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1  (1960). 
9  Id. 
10  Id. 
11  Mattiacci, supra at note 1, at 3; M. G. Faure, Environmental liability, in Tort Law And 
Economics, 247, 249 (Edward Elgar, 2009). 
12  Id., at 3; Also see S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, 263 (Harvard University 
Press, 1987). 
13  Faure, supra at note 11, at 249. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  M. G. Faure, Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from CO2 Storage Sites, 26 (2013) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
17  Policy makers should be advised that if the liability rules are tasked with both creating 
incentives to avoid inefficient levels of accidents and providing the means to compensate 
Æ
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utilized that will push the actors to reach efficient levels of activity and risk; and 
thus minimize accident costs.18  
In an economic view of liability rules, liability rules provide incentives to the 
decision maker in current time to consider the potential costs of future harms and 
hazards.19 Taking those costs into account, the actor can then optimally choose the 
efficient level of care for a given activity. “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound 
of cure,”20 could be an apt summation of the theoretical perspective.  
Calabresi stated that the objective of tort law is to minimize the social costs of 
a tort defined as the sum of the of total accident costs, administrative costs, costs of 
properly allocating accident losses by means of insurance, and accident prevention 
costs of both the tortfeasor and the victim.21 Finsinger and Pauly have added that 
normatively, the net social welfare of any risky activity should be positive in 
value.22  
“The main goal of tort law is to internalise the externalities in order to 
enhance optimal decisions on the level of precaution.”23  
The goals of liability rules are to induce the involved parties to attain efficient levels 
of activity and efficient levels of care or precaution.24 Liability rules can be used to 
control the behavior of one or of both parties.25 Liability rules can also directly 
 
accident victims, then the overall effectiveness to accomplish either goal could be 
substantially diminished. Faure, supra at note 16, at 32. See also Faure, supra at note 11, at 249, 
citing G. T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 
75 Tex. L. Rev. 1801 (1997). 
18  M. GLACHANT, The Use of Regulatory Mechanism Design in Environmental Policy: A Theoretical 
Critique, in:  SUSTAINABILITY AND FIRMS: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE CHANGING 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT, 179, 181 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1998). 
19  The concern is that certain events create costs or impacts that are not recognized by the actor; 
economists call these costs “externalities”. By using liability rules, the legal system is able to 
redirect the costs of torts back to those who society has decided should bear those external 
costs, usually the original tortfeasor. For those individuals who are profit-seeking, such as 
corporations or investors in energy projects, the legal assignment for ex post costs of damages 
can thus become expected costs of operational hazards and become included in ex ante 
decision making on the project. Since the costs of the damages can be reduced by 
expenditures for safety and caution, the operator/investor is able to efficiently gauge the 
correct duty of care and ensure an efficient use of economic resources. 
20  Benjamin Franklin. February 4, 1735 issue of The Pennsylvania Gazette; as paraphrased by 
Faure, supra at note 16, at 27. 
21  H. B. SCHÄFER & A. SCHÖNENBERGER, Strict Liability versus Negligence, in: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS, 598 (Edward Elgar, 2000). They cite to G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF 
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 
1970). 
22  Id., at 602. They cite to J. Finsinger, & M. Pauly, The Double Liability Rule, 15 Geneva Papers on 
Risk Ins. 159 (1990). 
23  G. D. DARI MATTIACCI, Economic Analysis of Law: A European Perspective, in: TORT LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, 4 (2006). 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
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impact or ignore activity levels. 26 Liability rules are generally employed where 
transaction costs appear to be barriers to Coasean negotiations to clarify contrasting 
assertions of rights.27  
Liability rules are effective because they force actors to consider ex post 
requirements to pay damages and compensation in ex ante decisions.28 Including 
those impacts in the ex ante decisions processes should affect both care level and 
overall activity level decisions. 29 This mixed paradigm has been in place for a 
longtime, and as such is generally seen as uncontroversial.30  
1.2. Choice of instrument: strict liability versus negligence 
Shavell was one of the first economists to develop models of liability rules that 
enabled policy makers to evaluate the efficiency of a particular liability rule to 
achieve the optimal level of accident avoidance.31 Given the intent of his models, it 
is clear that Shavell examined liability rules from the perspective that liability rules 
are tools to provide ex ante incentives to avoid accidents. 32 He demonstrated that 
both strict liability and negligence could, under the right circumstances, provide 
efficient results to optimally manage the potential harms and hazards from 
accidents.33  
A standard economic model of tort law emerged several decades ago and has 
been considerably refined.34 The standard model broadly supports the finding that a 
rule of strict liability would be preferable, or more efficient, to a negligence rule in 
most situations. There are several theoretical models that extend support to the 
 
26  Id., at 4-5. See also, S. Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980), en 
passim. 
27  See infra at ch. 6. 
28  Mattiacci, supra at note 23, at 3.  
29  Id.; Faure, supra at note 11, at 251. 
30  Glachant, supra at note 18, at 181. See also G. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and 
the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L. J. 499 (1961); R. A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1(1) J. Legal Stud. 
29 (1972); Shavell, supra at note 26; and H. B. SCHÄFER & F. MÜLLER-LANGER, ‘Strict liability 
versus negligence’ in: TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS (2009). 
31  See S. Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. Econ. 541 (1979); Shavell, supra at note 
30; and Shavell, supra at note 12. 
32  In this, Shavell set the theoretical stage to focus on how to efficiently reduce the incidence of 
accidents and away from the question of how efficiently or justly those rules might provide 
compensation to victims. “The aim of this article is to compare strict liability and negligence 
rules on the basis of the incentives they provide to “appropriately” reduce accident losses. ... 
In particular, there will be no concern ... with distributional equity—for the welfare criterion 
will be taken to be the following aggregate: the benefits derived by parties from engaging in 
activities less total accident losses less total accident prevention costs.” Shavell, supra at note 
26, at 1. 
33  Id. 
34  J. Nussim & A. D. Tabbach, A Revised Model of Unilateral Accidents, 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 169, 
169 (2009). See also at footnote 2, same page. See also Calabresi, supra at note 21; Shavell, supra 
at note 26; W. M. Landes & R. A. Posner, The positive economic theory of tort law, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 
851 (1980); Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 21; Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 
30. 
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application of negligence rules under certain circumstances. 35  The theoretical 
impacts of ex post avoidance strategies,36 of risk allocation,37 of the (a)symmetries of 
externalized costs and benefits,38 and of general informational shortages39 all lead to 
specific logics for the use of negligence rules.  
The choice of strict liability versus negligence comes down to two main tests; 
(i) which system provides more efficient incentives for people to undertake safer 
activities and (ii) which system provides more efficient incentives for people to 
make given activities safer? 40 Thus the policy maker is faced with determining 
which rule set is more likely to be efficient in light of the circumstances surrounding 
the activity to be regulated or influenced. 
It will be central to this study to determine if the operations and the risks of 
offshore methane hydrate installations fit within the standard model or whether 
they merit the rule of negligence from other specific needs. First a review of the 
arguments for when strict liability could be efficiently implemented is provided. 
Second, a similar review of like arguments for when a rule of negligence might be 
efficient applied is developed. A discussion of certain concerns regarding the 
application of both rules is presented thereafter. Following those reviews, a 
summation of the potential arguments for the application of the arguments to the 
conditions and circumstances of offshore methane hydrates is presented. A 
conclusion is reached that strict liability would be more efficient than a rule of 
negligence for the nascent offshore methane hydrate industry.  
2. When strict liability is preferable 
There are several types of activities wherein strict liability has been modeled to be 
more efficient at determining the optimal levels of activity and precaution.  
First, when the underlying harms and hazards are best described as unilateral 
in nature, that the majority of the information needed to determine the 
probability and severity of the accident is determined by the injurer, then strict 
liability has been found to be optimal over negligence.41 
 
35  See K. N. Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict Liability. 4(1) Review of Law & Economics 153 
(2008) (Due to licensing limits where the present study was undertaken, its research relied on 
the working paper version of Hylton’s article; as such, all point citations are to that source 
material. See K. N. Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict Liability. (Boston University School of 
Law Working Paper No. 06-35, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=932600); Nussim 
& Tabbach, supra at note 34; See also T. Friehe, Precaution v. Avoidance: A Comparison of Liability 
Rules, 105 Econ. Letters 214 (2009). 
36  Friehe, supra at note 35. 
37  M. Nell & A. Richter, The Design of Liability Rules for Highly Risky Activities - Is Strict Liability 
Superior When Risk Allocation Matters?, 23 Int’l Rev. 31 (2003).  
38  Hylton, supra at note 35. 
39  Nussim & Tabbach, supra at note 34. 
40  Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 21, at 598. 
41  See discussion, infra, at 2.1 Unilateral accidents ̽ strict liability efficiently sets both precaution 
and activity levels 
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Second, when activities are described as abnormally hazardous activities, or 
activities wherein the externalized costs far outweigh the externalized benefits 
to society, then strict liability has been found to be optimal over negligence.42   
Third, when decentralization is a policy goal, strict liability is preferable.43 
Fourth, when the activities themselves are innovative and present novel and 
uncertain risks and hazards, then strict liability has been found to be optimal 
over negligence.44 
Fifth, when the transaction costs presented to the judicial systems are matters 
of concern for the policy makers, then strict liability has been found to be 
optimal over negligence.45 
The commercial development of offshore methane hydrates is well characterized by 
these five scenarios. The commercial development of offshore methane hydrates 
will primarily present risks and hazards best characterized as unilateral in nature. 
Due to the severity of the potential harms and hazards from cataclysmic methane 
hydrate events, the operation of offshore methane hydrate projects could be 
characterized as abnormally dangerous.46 As no offshore methane hydrate projects 
have ever been commercially developed, and as offshore methane hydrate deposits 
have never been produced for yearlong periods, the activities of such offshore 
projects could be characterized as innovative and presenting novel and uncertain 
risks and hazards.  Finally, as the geography of the known offshore methane 
deposits lay offshore of jurisdictions with limited judicial resources, it is likely for 
many of those jurisdictions that transaction cost management will be of importance 
to their policy makers. For these reasons, strict liability is likely to be more efficient 
for the management of the harms and hazards from offshore methane hydrate 
projects. 47 
2.1. Unilateral accidents – strict liability efficiently sets both precaution and 
activity levels 
Broadly speaking, the rule of strict liability has been found to be efficient more often 
than the rule of negligence in unilateral situations. Both strict liability and 
negligence achieve efficiency with regards to preventative measures within 
unilateral accident models. 48 Strict liability is superior to negligence in that strict 
 
42  See discussion, infra, at 2.2 Abnormally hazardous activities 
43  See discussion, infra, at 2.3 Strict liability enables decentralization 
44  See discussion, infra, at 2.4 In the face of uncertainties 
45  See discussion, infra, at 2.5 When transaction costs of justice are critical 
46  See the discussion and definitions of ‘abnormally dangerous’, infra, at sec. 2.2. 
47  See discussion, infra, at Ch. 7. 
48  While Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, offer perhaps the most recent demonstration 
of this result, their paper follows a history of similar findings, including the seminal models 
of Shavell and the Landes-Posner systems; likewise, Schäfer has published similar 
demonstrations with other authors. See Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 25. 
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liability efficiently obtains optimal levels of tortfeasor activity but negligence often 
cannot.49 
Shavell proposed that accidents could be categorized into two sets of models, 
unilateral accidents and bilateral accidents. Unilateral accidents are those in which 
only the tortfeasor’s actions affect the probability and severity of the accident.50 
Bilateral accidents are those accidents that enable the actions of both the tortfeasor 
and the victim to affect the probability and severity of the accident.  
Under a rule of strict liability,51 the tortfeasor is able to optimize his utility as 
impacted by the costs he would bear in accidents. The tortfeasor’s optimand is the 
same as the social welfare function, thus strict liability is efficient.52 Shavell found 
that in the stranger-stranger unilateral tort, that strict liability achieved efficiency by 
requiring the tortfeasor to include the full costs of the accident in his overall welfare 
function.53 Schäfer and Müller-Langer also demonstrated that only strict liability 
provides for both efficient setting of precaution and activity levels. Strict liability 
enables control of activity levels and correctly sets an efficient level of activity.54  
Under a negligence rule, the assumption is that a rational tortfeasor would 
choose a level of care equal to the duty of care, i.e., that the care level selected is the 
efficient care level. 55 Then the tortfeasor under a negligence rule is tasked with 
optimizing its utility function given the tortfeasor’s choice of activity level and the 
assumed duty of care.56 The tortfeasor will select a higher level of activity than the 
welfare efficient level of activity, given the due care level; because the tortfeasor 
does not bear the costs of injuries incurred whilst operating at due care levels. 57  
Thus in stranger-stranger unilateral contexts, the negligence rule would yield 
results of due care but at excessive levels of activity, resulting in higher than 
efficient levels of accidents with the victims being required to bear the costs of those 
accidents. 58 This results in the tortfeasor engaging in an excess of activity, excessive 
accidents result, and negligence is seen as inefficient. 59  Negligence does not require 
the tortfeasor to consider certain costs so long as the prescribed duty of care is met, 
thus the tortfeasor’s activity level is too high and thus inefficient.60  
Under a ‘no liability’ rule, the tortfeasor exercises no duty of care and bears no 
costs of the accidents so the activity level of the tortfeasor is guided solely by his 
 
49  Id. 
50  Unilateral accident models are those models that investigate the consequences of a single 
actor’s decisions on activity choice, activity level, and precaution level. 
51  In Shavell’s unilateral formulation, the tortfeasor has a care or precaution level and an 
activity level. Social welfare was defined as the sum of income equivalent of the utility of the 
tortfeasor, less the costs of the activity at activity level. 
52  Shavell, supra at note 26, at 11. 
53  Id.at 11-12. See Equation (2). 
54  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 25. 
55  Shavell, supra at note 26, at 11. 
56  Id., at 12. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 25. 
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personal utility, as affected by his selections of precaution and activity levels, 61 and 
again the tortfeasor would over-engage in tortious conduct. Shavell ranks the 
cumulative results as Proposition 1:  
 “PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that injurers and victims are strangers. Then 
strict liability is efficient and is superior to the negligence rule, which is 
superior to having no liability at all.” 62 
In effect, strict liability forced the tortfeasor to internalize and adopt Kaldor-Hicks-
type welfare efficiency.63 The same scenario under negligence requires only that the 
tortfeasor maintains a duty of care but no additional costs from whatever accidents 
occur, so long as the duty was met.64 Thus, when activities can be described as 
unilateral in character, the common consensus is that a rule of strict liability is 
strongly preferable to the rule of negligence. 65 
2.2. Abnormally hazardous activities 
Usually the first introduction a young law student has to strict liability is in relation 
to ‘abnormally hazardous activities;’66 as such, abnormally hazardous activities are 
often the paradigmatic example of when the rule strict liability should be employed.  
The main logic is that when certain actors choose to engage in abnormally 
dangerous activities that other actors, not conjoining or consenting to such 
adventurism, should not be expected to suffer for resulting harms of those 
dangerous activities. 67  
 
61  Shavell, supra at note 26, at 11. 
62  Id., at 12. Note that Hylton’s Positive Theory of Strict Liability model can be shown to 
replicate the basic tenet of the Shavell-Landes-Posner model, that under unilateral accidents 
both strict liability and negligence are efficient. See Hylton, supra at note 35, at 6. An identical 
result is reached for Shavell’s seller-stranger scenario. See Shavell, supra at note 26, at 14. 
63  Id., at 11-12. See Equation (2). 
64  Id., at 11-12. 
65  Hylton provided a caveat to this result. Despite the potential equality of the efficiencies 
offered under strict liability and negligence under certain conditions, when the potential 
harms and benefits are small, actors might be more sensitive to their own harms than other 
due to the differences in transaction costs to identify both sets of data; in such environments, 
Hylton found that negligence might be more robust than strict liability. See Hylton, supra at 
note 35, at 23. 
66  See United States’ Restatement (2nd) Tort §520. Hylton listed the definitional elements, “In 
determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be 
considered:  
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;  
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;  
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;  
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;  
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on and;  
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.”  
 Id., at 18-19.  
67  Expressed another way, strict liability operates similar to a finding of a breach of duty of care, 
regardless of whatever precautionary efforts were taken, whenever a tortfeasor caused injury 
Æ
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2.2.1. Controlling tortfeasor with strict liability in bilateral accidents 
When Shavell examines bilateral accidents, those accidents wherein both parties 
have control over actions that lead to accidents, he finds that the critical issue is 
“which party do we want to control, the tortfeasor or the victim?” The focus of 
control was on the activity levels of the parties. This is an extension of Calabresi’s 
earlier cheapest cost avoider rule, that the person who could have prevented the 
accident with the least cost of taking care should be the person held liable for the 
accident.68  
Shavell suggested that ultra-hazardous activities have two characteristics 
which especially merit the application of strict liability rules.69   
First, the activities are  
(i) uniquely identifiable and  
(ii) impose non-negligible risks on non-participant victims which 
“make[s] the activity worthwhile controlling.”70  
Second, the victim’s engagement with the risky activity is entirely routine in 
normal life, thus “activity that cannot and ought not be controlled.”71 
Shavell’s definition focuses on the rights of the non-participant victims to remain 
undisturbed in their routine activities; this has ready application to industrial 
activities that could be characterized as ultra-hazardous but occurring near 
populated areas. 72 
Shavell then stated that given those descriptions of ultra-hazardous activities 
that the application of strict liability to such dangerous activities falls within his 
Propositions 4 and 6 from his model of bilateral accidents between strangers.73  
 “PROPOSITION 4. Suppose that the tortfeasor and victim are strangers. 
Then none of the normal liability rules is efficient. Strict liability with a 
defense of contributory negligence is superior to the negligence rule if it is 
sufficiently important to lower tortfeasor activity levels. Strict liability 
 
via an abnormally dangerous activity. See “Concluding Comments. #4. Shavell, supra at note 
26, at 24. 
68  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 10. See Calabresi, supra at note 21. 
69  Shavell examines the ultra-hazardous from a bilateral perspective in part because a unilateral 
accident was already established to be more efficiently addressed with strict liability, even 
those ultra-hazardous in nature. 
70  See “Concluding Comments. #4. Shavell, supra at note 26, at 24. 
71  Id. 
72  Shavell’s definition did not require much more than the imposition of “non-neglible” costs of 
harm onto the victims so what might reasonably be characterized as ultra-hazardous 
remained open ended. See id. 
73  In so doing, he implicitly assumes that the ultra-hazardous scenarios involve victims cum 
strangers, and that a rule of contributory negligence is in effect. Id. 
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without the defense and no liability are each inferior to whichever rule is 
better: either strict liability with the defense or the negligence rule.”74  
 “PROPOSITION 6. Suppose that injurers are sellers and that victims are 
strangers. Then the results are as given in Propositions 4 and 5.”75  
As such, the goal becomes to efficiently incentivize the tortfeasor to control his 
activity level and leave the victim unaffected in his activity level; 76 this is best 
achieved by the rule of strict liability with defense of contributory negligence.  
In the stranger-stranger scenario, he found that strict liability with a defense of 
contributory negligence, efficiency could not be achieved because the victims would 
bear no costs for accidents and would have no incentive to reduce their activity 
levels.77 The negligence rule in this scenario reflects the reverse, that the tortfeasor 
will face no costs to reduce activity levels and thus the negligence rule is 
inefficient. 78  Further, no liability rule and strict liability without contributory 
negligence are rated as inferior to either of the two previous results. 79 Thus, in 
bilateral stranger encounters, the policy choice is inefficient but does enable the 
policy maker to reduce either tortfeasor activity levels under strict liability with 
contributory negligence or to reduce victim’s activity levels with the negligence 
rules.80  
Indeed, Shavell proves that in stranger-stranger encounters, no simple liability 
rule can be efficient.81 Table 1, infra, provides the results of Shavell research; that 
while other bilateral situations could be efficiently governed b rules of civil liability 
that no cases involving strangers were found to be so. These results are identical 
when the seller-stranger scenario is modelled; it is more efficient to use strict 
liability if the target is to reduce tortfeasor activity levels and more efficient to use 
negligence if the target is to reduce victim activity levels.82  
 
 
74  Shavell, supra at note 26, at 19. Hylton found that that the private liability rules provide 
different controls and that they do not necessarily provide the same result as the social 
welfare optimand. Under strict liability, the actor responds to the cost consequences of his 
own acts; under negligence the actor responds to the cost consequences of the acts of other 
actors. This finding aligns well with Shavell's bilateral accident model, but Hylton’s model 
herein is a unilateral accident model. See Hylton, supra at note 35, at 7 and 10. See also Shavell, 
supra at note 26, en passim. 
75  Id., at 20. 
76  See “Concluding Comments. #4. Id., at 24. 
77  Id., at 19. Specifically, Shavell targets the condition of s = ݏҧ = ݏכ as the cause. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Id., at 19-20. See Proposition 5. While not exclusively for this finding, but inclusive thereof, see 
the discussion, infra, on the complementary implementation of public and private regulations 
with rules of civil liability in Ch. 6, Sec. 4, and see Ch. 7, Sec. 3.3, and also see Ch. 12, Sec. 2.3. 
82  Shavell, supra at note 26, at 20. See Proposition 6. 
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Table 1: Shavell’s Bilateral Accidents: Are Liability Rules Efficient? 
Encounter Strict83 Strict84 Negligence No Liability 
Stranger-Stranger No*85 No***86 No**87 No*** 
Seller-Stranger No* No*** No** No*** 
Seller-Customer88 No No Yes Yes 
Durable Goods No No Yes No 
 No No No No 
Seller-Customer89 Yes No Yes Yes 
Non-Durable Goods Yes No Yes No 
 Yes No No No 
 
Shavell’s conclusions on bilateral accidents are much more complex than for the 
unilateral accidents. Because the results are substantially different, it highlights the 
importance of correctly identifying events as unilateral or bilateral events. Unlike 
the unilateral results, no rule was found to be consistently efficient.90 But, if the least 
cost avoider can be identified ex ante,91 then the application of that principle to 
determine which actor should be governed can be combined with the appropriate 
choice of regime to obtain first best results.92 If the tortfeasor were the least cost 
avoider, e.g., an offshore methane hydrate installation operator, then the rule of 
strict liability would be the robust choice. 
Schäfer, et al., extended Shavell’s unilateral accident model to establish an 
additional argument for the application of strict liability to abnormally hazardous 
activities. They demonstrated that under a negligence rule, the actor will over-
engage in risky activity, whereas under a strict liability rule the actor might under-
engage in a risky but socially beneficial activity.93  
 
83  Strict Liability with Defense of Contributory Negligence. 
84  Strict Liability without Defense of Contributory Negligence. 
85  One asterisk, *, indicates that the rule limits the tortfeasor’s behavior. 
86  Three asterisks, ***, indicates inferiority to other inefficient results. 
87  Two asterisks, **, indicates that the rule limits the victim’s behavior. 
88  Entries to the right reflect three orders of knowledge. Top row, the customer knows the risk 
of each seller. Middle row, the sellers' average risk. The bottom row, uncertain knowledge or 
misperception. 
89  Entries to the right reflect three orders of knowledge. Top row, the customer knows the risk 
of each seller. Middle row, the sellers' average risk. The bottom row, uncertain knowledge or 
misperception. 
90  However, there may be theoretical reasons to find negligence to be more robust than strict 
liability when this model's assumptions are relaxed. That was the result when Schäfer, et al., 
extended this section of Shavell's research. They found that when the identity of the lowest 
costs avoider was determined ex post, and not ex ante, then both parties face a probabilistic 
distribution as to potential judgment and damages. See Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at 
note 30, at 11. 
91  And might not the operator of the offshore methane hydrate project be that foreseeable least 
cost avoider of most if not all of the harms and hazards from its own operations? 
92  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 11. 
93  Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 21, at 606. For the case of: 
Æ
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As such, strict liability tends to require net positive social welfare results 
whereas negligence rules tend to enable net negative social welfare results.94 If an 
activity is abnormally hazardous and has the potential to expose victims to very 
expensive injuries, then strict liability provides a mechanism that can ensure that 
such activities are undertaken only when the net costs and benefits of that activity 
are net positive for both the tortfeasor and society at large. The negligence rule 
would enable excessive amounts of that abnormally hazardous activity. Thus, 
under Schäfer’s, et al., arguments strict liability is a superior rule to ensure net 
positive results for the broader community from the abnormally hazardous activity. 
2.2.2. Landes Posner strict liability conditions 
Landes and Posner provided an approach was similar to Shavell’s analysis of 
stranger-stranger bilateral accidents. 95  Their approach also reflects Shavell’s 
observation that while strict liability or negligence may fail to be fully efficient 
under bilateral conditions, that strict liability would be more effective at altering 
tortfeasor behavior.96 
Landes and Posner’s conditions of strict liability provided guidance as to both 
the character of abnormally hazardous activities and the tortfeasor’s behaviors. 97 
They state that an abnormally hazardous activity poses high expected costs in injury 
and that additional levels of care will be ineffective in reducing the probability of 
risk. They also focus the effort to alter the tortfeasor’s behaviors while assuming 
that the potential victims’ activities either cannot be changed or should not be 
changed.   
Landes and Posner advised the rule of strict liability in scenarios that 
presented the combination of expensive injuries, inability to reduce risk through 
additional care, the impossibility to control the activities of potential victims and the 
primary goal to limit dangers by efficiently controlling the overall level of the 
tortfeasor’s engagement in the abnormally hazardous activity. 98   
 
i. Over-engagement under a negligence rule, they cite to A. M. Polinsky, Strict liability 
versus negligence in a market setting (National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., No. 
0420, 1980) 
ii. Under-engagement under a strict liability rule, they cite to Shavell, supra at note 26. 
94  Strict liability requires the tortfeasor to bear all of the costs, so tortfeasors have stronger 
incentives to ensure the net positive worth of their activities. Under negligence, the tortfeasor 
will escape some of the consequences and costs of his actions so long as he meets his duty of 
care. Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 21, at 606. 
95  Shavell, supra at note 26, at 18 
96  See Proposition 4, that “strict liability is superior to the negligence rule if it is sufficiently 
important to lower tortfeasor activity levels.” Shavell, supra at note 26, at 19. 
97  Faure, supra at note 16, at 37, citing to Landes and Posner, supra at note 34. 
98  Id., citing to Landes and Posner, supra at note 34.The listed items were: 
i. high expected accident costs,  
ii. the impossibility that more care by the tortfeasor would reduce accident risk,  
iii. the impracticability to constrain the victim’s activity in flavor of the tortfeasor, and  
iv. the desirability to reduce the risk by an activity level change of the tortfeasor. 
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2.2.3. Disproportionate risks to benefits 
Expanding upon the ratio of externalized costs and benefits to the victims, Hylton’s 
model provided a strong basis for the application of strict liability if the underlying 
activity displayed disproportionate externalized risks of harm without counter-
balancing externalized benefits to the community. 99  Abnormally hazardous 
activities, by their very definition, are likely to qualify to be governed by strict 
liability. 
Hylton took his observations on the cross effects of externalized costs and 
benefits to provide a comparative risk analysis that forecasts when which civil 
liability rules would be efficiently applied or at least more robust.100 Noting that 
more risk reduces the optimal levels of an activity but that the reverse is true for 
externalized benefits, Hylton observed the rule paradigms of strict liability and 
negligence provided offsetting and balancing results.101  
Under strict liability, the more externalized risk there is, the more damages 
will be assigned to the actor based upon his own activity level. 102 But under 
negligence, the actor will have an incentive to reduce his activity in response to the 
risks externalized by other actors. 103  
This led Hylton to propose the following two propositions: 104 
Proposition 1:  
“If ݍ஺ > ݍ஻, holding ܣU strictly liable is preferable to using the negligence rule 
in regulating the activity level of ܣ. If, however, ݍ஺ ൑ ݍ஻, strict liability is 
not preferable to negligence. In simpler terms, if ܣ externalizes more risk to 
others than they externalize to him, strict liability is preferable to negligence. 
However, if there is a reciprocal exchange of risk between ܣ and ܤ, or if ܤ 
externalizes more risk than does ܣ, holding ܣ strictly liable is not preferable, 
as a method of regulating ܣ’s activity level choice, to the negligence rule.”105 
(Underscoring added.)  
Proposition 2:  
 
99  Hylton differed from the above analysis in the case where external benefits from the 
abnormally hazardous activity coincided with abnormally large benefits to the potential 
victims; in that case he suggested that application of a negligence rule might be more efficient. 
See Hylton, supra at note 35, at 18-20.  
100  See footnote, supra at sec. 2.2.1., in discussion on Shavell’s fourth proposition. 
101  Id., at 10. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Hylton did not thusly label the propositions, so this labeling follows the sequence in which 
they were presented in the article. Also, for a more complete presentation of the models 
referred to in the quote from Hylton, see the discussion summarizing Hylton’s models, infra, 
at Appendix II.C. 
105  Id., at 11.  
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“If there is reciprocal exchange of risk between ܣ  and  (ݍ஺ = ݍ஻) , strict 
liability and negligence provide the same incentives for care and for activity 
level choices.” 106 
These results provide simple guidance, that strict liability should be used when the 
risk asymmetry is substantial; otherwise the negligence rule is at least equally 
efficient and potentially preferable. 107 Hylton summarized these results:  
“Where there is asymmetry in risk externalization, negligence causes 
high risk-externalizers to increase their activity levels while low risk-
externalizers decrease their activity levels.” 108 
A negligence rule faced with asymmetrical externalization of risks results in more 
extreme behavior from the actors than comparatively under a rule of strict liability. 
The risky actors engage in higher levels of activity, the less risky actors engage in 
lower levels of activity.  
2.3. Strict liability enables decentralization 
Decentralization occurs when each tortfeasor can determine his level of 
preventative activities based on his unique costs; tortfeasors are not identical in that 
they might face different technology and cost choices.109 Decentralization enables 
each tortfeasor to separately and uniquely optimize their due care and activity level 
decisions based on their own unique circumstances, thus this enables each 
tortfeasor to set their own standards to achieve the optimal levels of precaution and 
activity level.  
The availability of decentralization is certain under strict liability but under 
negligence decentralization only becomes available under certain additional rules. 
Strict liability places the full risk of the precautionary level decision with the 
tortfeasor with no outside determined imposition of precaution costs. Thus, the 
tortfeasor can coordinate his costs to his precautionary activities and thus achieve 
decentralization.110  
Negligence requires the tortfeasor to meet a certain minimal level of care, the 
reasonable man standard, regardless of a tortfeasor’s unique costs to achieve that 
 
106  Id. 
107  When the tortfeasor is singular but the victims many, the choice of civil liability rule may 
have a second criteria of risk-neutrality versus risk aversion. Nell and Richter provided a 
demonstration that risk neutrality provides equivalent choice-of-rule results for both abstract 
singular victim and multiple-count victims but models with risk aversion have 
distinguishable results for singular victim versus multiple-count victims. They provided a 
proof that the optimal level of care increases, in risk aversion models, as the number of 
potential victims is increased in total head-count. See Nell & Richter, supra at note 37, at 35. 
108  Hylton, supra at note 35, at 12.  
109  Tortfeasors likely face different costs of care; decentralization is the policy goal to enable each 
actor to set their own individualized efficient levels of activity and precaution versus 
requiring them to meet community-wide standardized levels. 
110  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 18. 
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level of care. 111  Variations to the standard negligence rule can provide for 
decentralization.112 The application of both partial liability and a “highest degree of 
care” standard can effectively provide full self-selection of tortfeasors to enable 
decentralization.113 Kahan demonstrated that partial liability or use of the difference 
principle can provide decentralization under negligence; especially when the 
tortfeasor faces high per unit costs of care.114 In response to Kahan, Miceli proposed 
to establish due care levels at the efficient due care level of the least cost of care 
tortfeasor, holding each tortfeasor to the “highest degree of vigilance, care and 
precaution.”115  
2.4. In the face of uncertainties 
2.4.1. Uncertain ex ante duty of care 
When certain activities are new and they present novel risks, it can be difficult to 
ascertain the potential harms and hazards and to accurately determine ex ante the 
efficient duty of care or means of precautions. In that uncertainty, Schäfer, et al., 
stated that strict liability would remain as efficient as it was with well-established 
activities, as the rule of strict liability never required a duty of care for its efficient 
operation. 116   
Schäfer, et al., contrasted the efficiency of strict liability under uncertainty 
against the difficulty faced by the rule of negligence in similar circumstances. 
Negligence, in requiring a probabilistic interpretation of the duty of care, could 
drive tortfeasors to inefficiently over- or under-comply against the unknown duty 
of care.117 
2.4.2. Incentives for safety innovation 
Additionally, with novel activities and uncertain risks, policy makers might want to 
consider which rule better provides incentives to reduce the likelihood of future 
 
111  Negligence posits a reasonable man standard, but the results of that standard need be 
identical for all potential tortfeasors. Thus, negligence inherently makes it more difficult to 
obtain decentralization. 
112  See D. L. Rubinfeld, The Efficiency of Comparative Negligence, 16 J. Legal Stud. 375 (1987); O. 
Bar-Gill & O. Ben-Shahar, The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence, 5 Am. L & Econ. Rev. 
433 (2005); and T. J. Miceli, On Negligence Rules and Self-Selection, 2 Rev. L. & Econ. 349 (2006). 
113  See Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 17-18; and see R. COOTER  & T. ULEN, LAW 
AND ECONOMICS, 388 (Pearson Addison Wesley, 2004). 
114  See Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 17. 
115  See id., at 18. Citing to Miceli, supra at note 112, who in turn was citing to M. Kahan, Causation 
and Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence Rule, J. of Legal Stud. 427 (1989). 
116  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 26. 
117  That said, Schäfer, et al., did caveat that efficiency might be obtained under a negligence rule, 
just unreliably so. See id. 
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injuries. Under a rule of strict liability, because the tortfeasor has to bear all of the 
costs of harm, the search costs for safer alternatives fall to the tortfeasor.118  
The rule of negligence is less effective in providing incentives for safety 
innovation as the tortfeasor is only incentivized to reduce the costs of reaching the 
established due care levels.119 Negligence provides a safety net for the tortfeasor, in 
that as long as certain established historical norms are met,120 then no additional 
damages from harms can be assessed against the tortfeasor. 
2.4.3. Complex interactions of precaution and activity levels 
Nussim and Tabbach noted that the activity level might affect marginal expected 
harm in non-linear ways; the marginal expected harm could be either increased or 
decreased with additional levels of activity. 121 A rule of strict liability places the 
calculus of trade-offs solely with the tortfeasor but a negligence rule requires a 
public manifestation of a duty of care, which might be complicated and 
prohibitively costly for legislators and judges. Nussim and Tabbach provided an 
analysis that suggested that application of a negligence rule would result in a duty 
of care in excess of the actually optimal duty of care, creating inefficient results. 
In their model, the social objective is the sum of the utility less the costs of 
precaution and less the costs of harms and injuries to victims. The model posits a 
condition that marginal investment in precaution is met by the marginal reduction 
in accident costs. Also, the marginal costs of increasing the activity level equal the 
marginal social costs of additional activity. These are impacted by their 
interdependency.122 
Certain behavioral options can be identified within this framework. First, 
consider the case of specialization, wherein exposure to a risky activity decreases 
the marginal costs of precaution.123 The result is that precaution and activity are 
 
118  Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 21, at 605. Especially relevant for the case of 
complicated or exotic industrial technologies, strict liability imposes the research costs upon 
the party mostly likely to find the answer, and to find that answer at the lowest costs. 
119  Coasian transaction costs have been noted as blocking negligence from operating better with 
this particular problem. See J. R. Chelius, Liability for industrial accidents: a comparison of 
negligence and strict liability systems, 5 J. Legal Stud. 293, 296-297 (1976). 
120  The very employment of historical norms has also been cited as one of the downfalls of the 
negligence rule in its underperformance to provide proper incentives for innovations. See G. 
Parchomovsky & A. Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 Michigan Law Review 285, 303-306 (2008). 
121  Nussim & Tabbach, supra at note 34, at 170. 
122  In their model, the cross effects are described as:  
డమ௃(௫,௭)
డ௫డ௭ = െܿ௫௭(ݔ, ݖ) െ ݄௫௭(ݔ, ݖ). This relationship can be contrasted with the Shavell and 
Landes Posner models’ assumption that ഃమ಻(ೣ,೥)ഃೣഃ೥ = 0 . See Nussim & Tabbach, supra at note 34, 
at 171. 
123  As formulated: ܿ௫௭(ݔ, ݖ) < 0. Id. See also the discussion on “fatigue or wear and tear” in 
Appendix II.D. It appears that Nussim and Tabbach examine the concept that higher levels of 
activity could fatigue either the humans or the machinery involved in the higher activity level 
and thus the costs of care might increase along with the increased level of activity. It is also 
important to note the tentative ‘could’ in the phrase, as they state in their conclusion; “The 
Æ
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complements. Second, fatigue could cause the costs of precaution to increase with 
activity levels; thus increases in either activity level or in precaution increase the 
costs of precaution. 124 When the fatigue effect is strong, then precaution and activity 
levels become substitutes. 125  
Nussim and Tabbach found that for the negligence rule, this complexity 
provides an unexpected result; when faced with high costs of ascertaining the 
effects of interdependency on resultant activity level and undertaken precautions, 
legislators and judges should set the value of due care higher than the otherwise 
established efficient level of care.126 Legislators and judges cannot simply determine 
the activity level by setting a simple due care level, in that interdependency effects 
will require a simultaneous solution to both activity level and level of care.127  
In some sense, this is captured by the idea of jointly permitting certain activity 
levels and safety standards within an environmental regulatory setting; as such, to 
the extent that regulatory means can better combine these two targets than civil 
liability might, regulatory means would be preferable. But much of the information 
needed to make such determinations is hidden or costly. 
2.5. When transaction costs of justice are critical 
In an extension of the logic but not the result of Shavell’s earlier arguments, Schäfer 
et al. demonstrated that strict liability would likely present fewer cases to the courts 
than negligence would. Further, once in court, the costs of litigating under a rule of 
strict liability are expected to be less than the costs of litigating under a rule of 
negligence. Thus, when the transaction costs of preserving rights afforded under the 
rules of civil liability are of concern, the rule of strict liability is preferable to a rule 
of negligence. 
Shavell had argued that under a rule of negligence, the tortfeasor would be 
likely to meet his duty of care and thus not be held liable and ergo no suits would be 
brought by the victim; also, because it was less costly to litigate under strict liability 
more claims would be brought forward; that negligence increased the transaction 
costs of litigating and thus provided an incentive to avoid litigation, whereas strict 
liability with its lack of a duty of care rule would be less costly and provide an 
incentive to litigate anytime the expected payoff from litigation was higher than the 
costs of filing. 128  Additionally, strict liability requires less information to be 
 
costs of care are not necessarily proportionate to the activity level; it may be increasing with 
increasing or decreasing rates or be independent. “ Underscoring added. 
124  As formulated: ܿ௫௭(ݔ, ݖ) > 0. Id. 
125  The input of either reduces the other, ceteris paribus: ഃమ಻(ೣ,೥)ഃೣഃ೥ < 0 
126  At some ݔ > ݔכ. Id., at 173. 
127  Id., at 172. In some sense, this is captured by the idea of jointly permitting certain activity 
levels and safety standards within an environmental regulatory setting; as such, to the extent 
that regulatory means can better combine these two targets than civil liability might, 
regulatory means would be preferable. 
128  S. Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 Rand J. Econ. 271 
(1984). Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 21, at 604; wherein they cite to Shavell, supra at 
note 12, at 264. 
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presented to the court than a rule of negligence would require, because strict 
liability does not require a finding of both the existence or setting level of a 
prescribed duty of care and whether that duty was in fact met by the tortfeasor.129  
Schäfer et al. suggested that the overall simplicity of the strict liability rule, 
which drove the lower costs identified by Shavell, should actually encourage 
tortfeasors to settle out of court if the facts of harm are readily apparent. 130  
Additionally, when litigation costs are considered, because errant courts will bear 
substantial transaction costs, the optimal rule may not necessarily be foreseeable ex 
ante but a strict liability rule is expected to be less costly.131  
There are three impact factors. First, because victims bear more costs to litigate 
under a negligence rule, as they have more to establish in court, they will initiate 
less litigation that those victims facing a strict liability rule. 132 Second, because the 
law of strict liability is both simpler, in that no causation need be developed nor any 
level of care be established, the legal consequences are more readily foreseeable. 133 
Third, this foreseeability will lead to more pre-trial settlements, enabling low cost 
transference of wealth from tortfeasor to victim. 134 
If lawsuits based in rules of civil liability were to reach adjudication, the costs 
presented by litigation under a rule of strict liability will be less than those costs 
posed by litigation under a rule of negligence. Courts will have fewer tasks to 
accomplish in adjudication under strict liability because they will only need to 
determine the scale of the harms. 135  Under negligence, courts need to prove 
negligence by establishing both a duty of care rule and then an evidentiary hearing 
on whether that duty was met, such a process can face high transaction costs.136 
Thus, the overall costs of resolving conflicts under a negligence rule would be 
expected to run higher than under a strict liability system.137  
 
129  See M. G. FAURE, ‘Regulatory Strategies in Environmental Liability’, in THE REGULATORY 
FUNCTION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, 129, 137 (F. Cafaggi, F., Watt, H. Muir, eds., 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011). See also M. G. Faure, Designing Incentives Regulation for the 
Environment, 17 (Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2008-7, 2008). 
130  I.e., if it is cheaper because it is obvious, then rational litigators would also expect the courts 
to render foreseeable judgments and thus preempt the need for actual litigation, leading to 
pre-trial settlements. As a result, those cases brought to court under strict liability are most 
likely to be cases wherein the parties has divergent views as to the extent or scale of the 
harms received by the victim. See Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 21, at 604. 
131  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 16. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. 
135  Clearly both forms of adjudication would also require several findings, such as causation, but 
as those matters would be common to both they would not provide for substantial cost 
differences, even if the nuances of the issues were distinguishable between the two rules. E.g., 
establishment of causation might be somewhat different under strict liability and under 
negligence, but the similarity of the task overweighs the potential differences. 
136  Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 21, at 604. 
137  Id. 
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3. When negligence is preferable 
As noted in the first section of this chapter, there are a large number of arguments 
in favor of the application of strict liability. As stated by Schäfer and Müller-Langer, 
“the strict liability rule, therefore, seems to dominate the negligence rule in terms of 
giving the right incentives.” 138  
Yet, Schäfer and Müller-Langer also noted that most of the legal traditions in 
the world display a preference for negligence rules over strict liability.139 Civil law 
nations have negligence as the general rule and common law countries assume a 
default of negligence for any risky activities unless previously assigned to strict 
liability or other specific torts. 140 Civil law nations provide specific enactments for 
when strict liability is to be applied and common law countries generally reserve 
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. 141   
This divergence between theoretical expectations of strict liability and real-
world application of negligence rules has led researchers to find rational models of 
when negligence would be rationally preferable. Many of these results are obtained 
by the weakening of the simplifications of the standard models. It broadly appears 
that judicial error, transactions costs, information searches, and ultimately the desire 
to not prevent those risky activities with broad welfare benefits from over-
deterrence lead policy makers to apply negligence rules.  
First, the standard model follows the normal economic assumptions of 
rationality and financial capacity to respond to economic events. Once the problems 
of risk aversion, risk allocation or incomplete insurance are added to the standard 
model, the negligence rule becomes more robust than strict liability. Similar results 
avail if the tortfeasor would be unable to pay or unwilling to pay the due damages 
by means of insolvency or avoidance strategies.142 
Second, the standard model assumed that the courts were able, under both 
strict liability and negligence rules, to return accurate judgments and damages. 
When that assumption is relaxed, that judgments and damages might be errant, 
then negligence has been found to be more robust than strict liability.143 
Third, both the actors to the risky activity and the courts called to judge on the 
resultant harms need access to complete and accurate information. The standard 
model assumes as much. When critical information is missing, negligence has been 
suggested as more fit to provide that data than strict liability.144 
Fourth, even though an activity might display high risks and costly 
externalized hazards, if those risks and hazards are symmetrical to their 
 
138  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 18. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. See also the United States Restatement (2nd) on Torts for a demonstration of the limited 
historical application of strict liability. The Restatement is currently in process to the 3rd 
edition.  
142  See discussion, infra, at 3.1 Imperfect tortfeasors.   
143  See discussion, infra, at 3.2 Imperfect or inaccurate damages.   
144  See discussion, infra, at 3.3 Need for data transparency.   
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externalized benefits to public welfare, then it might be in the interest of the 
community to support a higher level of activity to obtain those externalized 
benefits. As seen in earlier discussions of bilateral accidents, a negligence rule 
would better enable higher levels of activity at a due level of care than a rule of 
strict liability would enable.145 
While the character of offshore methane hydrate operations might include 
certain aspects of these conditions, it is not clear that these circumstances would 
make a compelling argument to reverse the strength of the previous arguments for 
the application of strict liability for that industry. While more complete arguments 
are to be found, infra,146 a short discussion is presented here. Risk aversion is not the 
same behavior as risk recognition; while longtime operators in oil and gas ventures 
surely have recognized the potential hazards of their industries they do for the most 
part remain engaged in those hazardous activities.147 Thus, it would be difficult to 
make a prima facie case that the likely operators of offshore methane hydrate 
installations would be rationally hindered by risk aversion or like concerns.  
The chance of court error is more likely than the previous concern. The 
potential harms and hazards of offshore methane hydrate accidents would likely be 
both complicated and widespread; the technological issues would also be plentiful. 
However, courts have responded reasonably to other large environmental 
accidents; if there were to be unique problems due to the character of cataclysmic 
methane hydrate accidents those problems might in turn be more properly 
addressed by regulation than civil liability.148  
Would there be sufficient information on the risks, precaution costs, and 
potential hazards both ex ante to make correct decisions and ex post to sustain 
accurate judgments; one assumes that there could always be more information. 
However, much of the evolving science and engineering preceding the commercial 
development of offshore methane hydrates has in fact been conducted conjointly 
with multiple national governmental agencies or otherwise published through peer-
reviewed scientific and engineering journals. While surely some amount of private 
in-house technology and operation procedures could be reasonably assumed, there 
is little or no reason to expect a significant enough data failure to prevent civil rules 
from functioning properly, for either negligence or strict liability.  
Finally, the onset of commercial development of offshore methane hydrates 
will surely externalize accidental risks, but will it externalize potential public 
welfare benefits? While the benefits of offshore methane hydrates were enumerated 
in Chapter 3, one would likely assume that those benefits would not be received 
without some form of economic payment. E.g., it unlikely that one might obtain 
 
145  See discussion, infra, at 3.4 Balancing of externalized costs and benefits.   
146  See discussion, infra, in ch. 7. 
147  Indeed, a res ipsa loquitur argument might well be made that if those oil and gas operators are 
aware of the hazards and have remained engaged, then likely they have found solutions to 
those risks such as insurance, self-insurance, safety planning and a variety of other means. 
Indeed, one of the earliest messages sent by BP in the wake of the Macondo incident was to 
reassure their investors of their intent to recover and continue in the industry. 
148  This avenue of accident governance is directly addressed in the next chapter, see ch. 6. 
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electrical power or methane fuel without paying for it. Likewise, while CCS storage 
within the hydrate deposit might not have a direct billing to the local community, it 
is likely that either their taxes or their electrical bills might contain the costs of that 
service. Thus, it is not clear that these types of benefits would qualify as formal 
externalities.149 A demonstrated lack of externalized benefits but a clear presence of 
risks is traditional grounds for a rule of strict liability; all of the major models 
reviewed in this study would concur. Thus, if a rule of negligence were to be 
applied, it would be in want of proof of externalized public benefits. 
But even if such externalized public benefits were to be established, a strong 
argument can be made that the accidents likely to result from methane hydrate 
operations are more properly characterized as unilateral and thus better governed 
with strict liability. And in the alternative, while the commercial and energy supply 
benefits might be readily demonstrated, just as surely some members of the public 
might be concerned about potential climate change impacts or cataclysmic accidents 
to an extent that they would advocate that the potential externalized risks might 
outweigh the externalized benefits, and thus deem the ratio of risks to benefits more 
in line with the application of a rule of strict liability.  
3.1. Imperfect tortfeasors 
3.1.1. Actors with risk aversion or incomplete insurance 
The standard models of accident risk governance assumed risk neutrality; this 
assumption is critical to the efficiency of strict liability within the standard 
models.150 Risk aversion was not generally included in earlier accident models, such 
as in Shavell’s unilateral and bilateral models. 151  
Nell and Richter suggested that risk aversion could be added to the standard 
models.152 They provided a demonstration that the application of risk aversion to 
unilateral accident models would break the standard symmetry of both strict 
 
149  I. Gilead, Tort Law and Internalization: The Gap Between Private Loss and Social Cost, 17 Int’l Rev. 
L. & Econ. 589 (1997). 
150  For a discussion on the connection between risk neutrality and the standard models, see Faure 
2001. See also Endres & Schwarze 1992. 
151  Nell & Richter, supra at note 37, at 33. 
152  Nell and Richter provide a list of reasons that corporate entities might be risk averse: (i) 
corporate notions of risk aversion operate only for well-financed diversified portfolio holders 
which is contrary to many investors both private and public, (ii) even for such parties as 
qualify as well-diversified portfolio holders, they can only achieve genuine risk neutrality if 
there is no system risk component which might not be true for certain highly risky 
(investment) activities, (iii) there is much evidence of structural imperfections in the capital 
market which could frustrate efforts to diversify risk, (iv) transaction costs tend to prevent 
portfolios from being sufficiently diversified, (v) entrepreneurial decisions within firms are 
made by risk averse humans who are guided by careful strategies to remain in employment 
and are often rewarded for conservative stewardship of capital, and (vi) those same human 
managers will have the potential to display risk aversion or pessimism against the risk of 
large losses. Id. 
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liability rules and negligence rules to efficiently set precaution levels. 153  They 
provided two levels of analysis, the first focused immediately on the risk adverse 
parties and second on the role insurance might play in such settings. 
Nell and Richter found that for risk adverse actors, negligence was more 
robust than strict liability. 154  In a simple model, the results were completely 
divergent, with negligence being increasingly preferred as the number of potential 
victims increases.  
In contrast, strict liability was found to be preferable only when parties are 
risk neutral or when insurance is readily available, which in turn appears to require 
risk neutral insurance providers. 155 When the ideal terms for strict liability are not 
present, then strict liability leads to insufficient activity levels. 156 They found that 
when the number of victims is sufficiently large, risk aversion can drive strict 
liability to prevent otherwise socially beneficial activity from occurring.157  
They then modelled how the provision and impact of insurance affected the 
parties risk allocation strategies. If insurance markets were perfect, then tortfeasors 
and victims could both eliminate their risks in exchange for purchasing insurance 
policies; but in the real world liability insurance limits coverage to leave some risks 
with the purchasers.158 The optimal amount of liability for the tortfeasor increases as 
the amount of insurance becomes available; the intuition herein is that if the 
tortfeasor can purchase insurance efficiently then it is more efficient for social 
welfare for the risk to be moved from victim to tortfeasor and onto the insurer, i.e. 
from the most risk averse towards less risk averse parties. 159 But there is a limit, in 
that tortfeasors would not purchase a full amount of insurance so long as the costs 
of the insurance include non-trivial loading fees, so coverage will remain shy of the 
total exposure and the tortfeasor will continue to bear less than full risk.160 
The efficiency of loading is critical; as the loading fee becomes trivial in cost, 
strict liability becomes more robust and as the loading fee become more expensive 
then negligence becomes more robust. 161 Ergo, the more costly it is to provide 
insurance, the more negligence is preferable and the less costly insurance is the 
more strict liability is preferable.  
Given the result that insurance companies will charge for claims and for 
loading fees, and that customer cum tortfeasors would not pay for full coverage, 
 
153  Id. 
154  Id., at 31. 
155  Id., at 42. 
156  Id. 
157  Id., at 43. 
158  Id., at 40. 
159  Id., at 41. 
160  In the modelling terms presented by Nell and Richter: But there is a limit, in that tortfeasors 
won’t buy full insurance so long as there is a positive loading fee, ݉ > 0, so the level of 
coverage, ݀, will remain ݀ < 1, and the of risk allocated to the tortfeasor, ݍכ, will not reach 1. 
161  In the modelling terms presented by Nell and Richter: The efficiency of loading is critical, as 
݉ ՜ 0, strict liability becomes more robust and as m, diverges from zero negligence becomes 
more robust. Id., at 42. 
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neither strict liability nor negligence approximate the optimal solution. 162 However, 
there is simply no convergence to the negligence rule as was seen above. 163 Yet, at 
sufficiently high levels of victims, the maximum level of care becomes optimal. 164 
Thus, negligence was found to be more robust than strict liability for risk averse 
tortfeasors with incomplete insurance options when the number of victims is large 
or when the insurers themselves are risk averse.165  
Nell and Richter found that when insurance is imperfectly provided then 
negligence is a superior rule.166  When insurance is costly to purchase, as compared 
to expected pay-outs in claims, then negligence is more robust. This is especially 
true when the cost of the insurance is driven by the risk aversion of the insurer.167  
Friehe found a similar result when the number of potential victims is large and 
insurance is provided.168  
3.1.2. Insolvency 
Shavell demonstrated that under insolvency constraints, strict liability was likely to 
provide incentives to the tortfeasor to undertake insufficient precaution and over-
engage in activity; thus, negligence would be preferable.169  
When Nussim and Tabbach’s ‘durable precaution’ model is extended to the 
insolvency problem, it develops a three-tier analysis, (i) when the assets exceed the 
expected costs of damages, (ii) when they equal them, and (iii) when the assets are 
less than the expected costs of damages.  
When the assets exceed the expected costs of damages, then there are no 
effective constraints preventing the tortfeasor from choosing optimal levels of 
activity and precaution. 170 However, if the marginal utility to the tortfeasor of 
additional activity does not decline, as in diminishing returns, then the tortfeasor is 
likely to pursue maximum activity levels. 171  
When the assets are less than or equal to the expected costs of damages,172 then 
the tortfeasor would face declining marginal costs of damages as the activity level 
increases; those costs are said to “plummet to zero.” 173  This drop in costs 
encourages the tortfeasor to engage in the maximum level of activity. This has a 
 
162  Id. 
163  Id., at 41. 
164  Id., at 42. 
165  Id. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. 
168  Id. 
169  Nussim & Tabbach, supra at note 34, at 175; citing to S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 
Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 43 (1986). 
170  “Assets exceed the expected costs of damages.” Id., at 176. 
171  Id. 
172  “Assets are less than or equal to the expected costs of damages,172” as formulated: ܣ ൑ ݖכ݄. Id., 
at 175. 
173  Id. 
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secondary effect on the precautionary level, which drops below the prescriptive 
level of care, ݔ෤ ൑ ݔכ.174  
These results are roughly in alignment with Shavell’s analysis on insolvency, 
but they diverge from the incorrect estimation analyses and thus clarify that the 
choice of civil liability rules need to take these matters into separate account.  
3.1.3. Strategic avoidance plus precaution 
When tortfeasors can invest in both precaution and avoidance, negligence will 
outperform strict liability in unilateral accidents. 175  Once tortfeasors exercise 
avoidance strategies, strict liability becomes notably weaker than negligence.  
When avoidance is highly effective, both strict liability and negligence yield 
similar results, which is that both rules produce precaution levels less than the 
socially optimal level.176 Negligence achieves first-best performance in all ranges of 
the avoidance parameters, but strict liability can only do so in limited settings.177 As 
negligence is socially less costly than strict liability, it is preferable when avoidance 
is exercised.178  
If the courts were to set their prescriptive due care level to the levels that the 
avoidance-seeking tortfeasors self-selected, per the argument above, then the 
resultant overall social costs would become lower than if the courts had pursued the 
naive179 notion of optimal due care.180 This is a complex result that would require 
the summation of the additional risks, and thus social costs, undertaken by the 
avoidance-seeking tortfeasors and the social cost reductions enabled by the lowered 
prescriptive duty of care; the net impact may be unforeseeable. 
3.1.4. Defects of optimism and pessimism 
Behavioral economics affects the results of the liability rule models; negligence 
provides a more robust response in achieving efficiency under these changes to the 
basic models.181  Negligence appears to be preferable primarily because it separates 
the decision processes of the tortfeasor from the determination of the appropriate 
 
174  Id. 
175  Friehe, supra at note 35, at 216. Avoidance is defined as the efforts made to reduce the 
likelihood of being held responsible, not the avoidance of an accident itself. E.g., when a 
tortfeasor seeks legal advice to minimize consequences after the accident occurs, that is an 
instance of avoidance. It is a wholly separate notion from precaution, which is the avoidance 
of liability before the occurrence of an accident. 
176  Id., at 215. At Lemmas 1 and 2. 
177  Id., at 215. 
178  Id.. At Proposition 1. 
179  Here naive refers to the model's level of due care as if no avoidance were undertaken by the 
tortfeasors. 
180  Id.. At Proposition 2. 
181  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 24. Behavioral economics posits, among other 
issues, that humans tend to deviate from rationality in predictable ways, thus rational models 
can be built from non-rational logic systems. 
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level of precaution whereas strict liability would leave that determination with the 
tortfeasor who would be suffering from certain cognitive biases.182 
Schäfer et al. posited that once certain emotional ambiguities of optimism and 
pessimism are introduced that negligence leads to better results than a rule of strict 
liability.183  Humans tend to be overly optimistic about avoiding accidents or about 
environmental risks. 184  In such optimism, the tortfeasor underestimates their 
expected harms to victims and thus enacts a lower level of precaution.185 Under a 
strict liability rule, this would see the tortfeasor misestimate the potential impacts 
on victims and thus set a level of care below the efficient level; on the other hand, a 
negligence rule would remain unaffected and remain efficient as the standard of 
care is not set by the tortfeasor’s estimate of harms and damages and the tortfeasor’s 
behavior is unchanged by the optimism.186  
Humans tend to be excessively pessimistic about catastrophic accidents such as 
earthquakes; 187  excessive care will result. Excessive care will result in certain 
inefficiency under strict liability,188 whereas negligence might be efficient in this 
setting.189 Again, the negligence rule might be preferable because the determination 
of precaution is set exogenous to the tortfeasor by the prescribed duty of care. 
3.2. Imperfect or inaccurate damages 
When inaccuracy of judgments in producing accurate sanctions is introduced to the 
costs to be borne by the tortfeasor, the results on efficiency are markedly impacted. 
Negligence will not need the sanction to equal the harms caused, 190 but strict 
liability will need the sanctions to equal the harms imposed in order to yield an 
 
182  Arguendo, it appears to be presumed that the court retains a higher level of freedom from the 
affects of behavioral economics in this understanding. Clearly, that assumption might be 
poorly grounded. 
183  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 25. They cite to J. C. Teitelbaum, A Unilateral 
Accident Model Under Ambiguity, 36 J. Legal Stud. 431 (2007), with special reference for 
pessimism models. 
184  Id., at 24., citing to A. Guppy, Subjective Probability of Accident and Apprehension in Relation to 
Self-Other Bias, Age, and Reported Behaviour, 25 Accident Analysis Prevention 375 (1993); C. R. 
Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1998); and N. D. Weinstein, 
Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 Science 1232 (1989). 
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
187  Id. , citing to G. GIGERENZER, The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior,  in: IS THE MIND 
IRRATIONAL OR ECOLOGICALLY RATIONAL? 37 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005) and 
C. Jolls, , C. Sunstein & R. Thaler, A Behavioural Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1471 (1998). 
188  Id. 
189  Negligence has been observed to be inefficient, in the general case, because the tortfeasor 
does not take into account the costs of damages when he meets the prescribed duty of care. 
By setting his standard of care higher than the prescribed rule, he might actually achieve an 
efficient result. See similar modeling effects within Nussim and Tabbach’s analysis of costly 
legislation, infra, at Appendix II.D.. 
190  Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 21, at 605. 
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optimal result. 191  Strict liability loses its efficiency in the face of inaccurate 
damages.192 
Court errors are likely to frustrate efficient governance of accident risks.193 The 
incorrect estimation of damages affects both the strict liability rule set and the 
negligence rule set. The incorrect estimation of damages is believed to be a wide 
spread problem in the real world.194  A variety of transaction costs problems could 
frustrate efforts to set correct damages.195 Punitive damages attempt to correct for 
some of those issues, but they are likewise frustrated by transaction costs 
problems. 196  
E.g., in the case of a tortfeasor choosing to increase their care level and to thus 
over-comply,197 the mechanical results are that the costs of care are increased, the 
expected damages are decreased, and the probability of being held liable for 
negligence also decreases. 198 Given this mix of directions in costs changes, it is 
difficult to forecast what the tortfeasor would choose to do without the specific costs 
being detailed; but it is most likely that either way the tortfeasor is not likely to land 
on an efficient result. 199 
3.2.1. Complexity and strict liability 
Strict liability did not provide sufficient incentives under imperfect damages. Strict 
liability was found to be frustrated by interdependencies between the activity level 
and the level of precaution undertaken; only under certain rare conditions did the 
 
191  Id. 
192  R. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523 (1984).. See also L. T. VISSCHER, Tort 
Damages, in: TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 153, en 
passim (Vol. 1, 2nd Ed., M. G. Faure ed., Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2009). 
193  Court errors do occur and must be taken into account. There are three primary listed sources 
for court errors: (i) error in determinations in the level of efficient care, (ii) error in the 
assessments of an tortfeasor’s actual rendered level of care, and (iii) the parties own 
inabilities to monitor and render specific levels of care continuously. Schäfer & Müller- 
Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 8. 
194  Nussim & Tabbach, supra at note 34, at 173. 
195  Id. 
196  Id., at 174. 
197  The three sources of court errors have two effects on the efficiency of liability rules; to over-
comply or to under-comply. Over-compliance better ensures that whatever the actually 
imposed level of care turns out to be that the tortfeasor met that hurdle and will not bear the 
potentially larger costs of the harms rendered. Under-compliance results from an awareness 
that errant courts might sometimes render no judgment for damages despite the tortfeasor 
failing to meet the sanctioned level of due care, thus it becomes irrational to always pay the 
costs for meeting the sanctioned level of due care. Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, 
at 8. 
198  The mechanics of the decision process are determined by three factors; (i) the impact on the 
costs of care, (ii) the expected damages, and (iii) the resultant impact on being held liable for 
negligence. Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 9. 
199  Id. 
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rule provide any certainty as to effect and under no certain case was efficiency 
found by Nussim and Tabbach.200  
When the judgment damages are expected to be too high, the tortfeasor would 
enact over-precaution and become inefficient. Symmetrically, when the expected 
judgment damages are too low, the tortfeasor will behave with under-precaution 
and cause excessive accidents and harms.201  
A rule of strict liability is not very robust when presented with incorrectly 
estimated damages and interdependent activity and precaution decisions. Within 
these requirements, stable forecasts of policy setting for tortfeasors under rules of 
strict liability can be achieved only within two narrow results. 202  Due to the 
complicated interdependency effects, the remaining situations had mixed results. 
Thus, the direct and indirect results of a specific policy may well be in conflict with 
each other, creating a lack of clear effect.  
There is no efficient outcome under a strict liability rule, only inefficient over- 
or under-compliance.203 This is a rational, albeit inefficient, result of responding to 
errant court judgments. 
3.2.2. Complexity and negligence 
When the potential of the court system to render errant damages is considered, the 
negligence rule can be more robust and retain its efficiency in contrast to a less 
reliable strict liability rule. 204  
Multiple studies found that for a tortfeasor under a negligence rule, there are 
several foreseeable results. 205 Under systematic overestimation of damages, the 
tortfeasors would operate at the prescribed duty of care level and at their maximum 
levels of activity.206 Under systematic underestimation of damages, the tortfeasors 
would face strategic choices.207 If the estimate error is small, then the tortfeasor will 
exercise due care, x*, and operate at maximum levels of activity. 208 The major 
exception to that finding was when extreme underestimation of damages set the 
 
200  Nussim & Tabbach, supra at note 34, at 174-175. 
201  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 26. 
202  If damages are overestimated, then both care and activity level will be increased if and only if 
the elasticity of the probability of accidents given a level of precaution exceeds the elasticity 
of the first derivative of the same. On the other hand, overestimated damages will decrease 
both activity and precautions if and only if the elasticity of the first derivative of the utility 
function is less than unity. Nussim & Tabbach, supra at note 34, at 174. See also the 
mathematical discussion at Appendix II-D. 
203  ݉ > 1 always leads to over-deterrence and ݉ < 1 always leads to under-deterrence. Schäfer 
& Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 9. 
204  Id. 
205  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 26. See also mathematical discussion at Appendix 
II-B. See also Nussim & Tabbach, supra at note 34, at 174-175. See also mathematical discussion 
at Appendix II-D. 
206  Id., at 174. An overestimate of damages costs reinforces the calculus to avoid damages by 
operating at the due care level. 
207  Id. 
208  Id., at 174-175. 
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costs of liability below the costs of due care, wherein the tortfeasor was expected to 
operate at below the level of due care and at levels of activity lower than the 
maximum – in effect, the tortfeasor would operate under a de facto rule of strict 
liability as they would always be found liable because their duty of care was 
unmet.209 
But even a negligence rule can become sufficiently complex as to match strict 
liability’s loss of efficiency. Schäfer and Müller-Langer found that a negligence rule 
would function inefficiently when the error rate becomes extreme; either at very 
low or very high error rates.210 Similarly, Nussim and Tabbach found that if the 
error were significant enough, then the tortfeasor would exercise a lesser level of 
care, i.e., below the prescribed duty of care, and operate below maximum levels of 
activity.211  
3.3. Need for data transparency 
Negligence bears higher transaction costs, but those costs may come with 
informational benefits. The Janus-nature of the aforementioned transaction costs of 
negligence is that those transactions provide information to the public to better 
inform them and the courts on the efficient, and hence appropriate, duty of care.212  
Strict liability enables a tortfeasor to make a private decision with regards to 
precautionary efforts. 213 The event of harm does not require any disclosure of 
information other than the detailing of the harms rendered to the victim and a 
sufficient argument that it was the tortfeasor’s activity that resulted in the harm. 
Thus the findings of a strict liability process will provide little information to the 
public with regards to potential precautionary efforts or to missed opportunities for 
more clear standards.  
Negligence requires the detailing of causation and of the precautionary options 
and actions of the tortfeasor, in addition to the evidences of harms to the victim.214 
Additionally, this information will be made public in court, both in testimony and 
in rendered decisions, so that the general public can be engaged in the decision 
processes to establish appropriate activity levels and precautionary efforts. 215  
Furthermore, this information can be transmitted to other potential tortfeasors to 
 
209  Id. 
210  The error rate is defined as ms{0 < ݉ < ߱}; wherein “zero error” would be m = 1 and Ȱ  is a 
very large positive real number. See Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 9. 
211  Nussim & Tabbach, supra at note 34, at 174-175. 
212  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 18. 
213  Id. 
214  Id. 
215  The argument here is not that strict liability cases do not result in lawsuits with publicly 
available information; rather, that strict liability likely leads to a higher percentage of pre-
court settlements that would remain private if not also privileged and thus result in fewer 
cases making it to court. Additionally, those cases that did reach court would provide less 
information than analogous negligence cases. See discussion, supra, at 2.5 When transaction 
costs of justice are critical. See also Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 18. 
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both improve the costs efficiency of precautionary measures and to measure their 
own levels of care vis-à-vis the now-effective ex ante prescribed duty of care.216.   
Nussim and Tabbach have provided an argument that a negligence rule could 
provide a means of efficiently bootstrapping the appropriate prescription of the 
optimal duty of care. 217 When legislators and judiciary officials would face high 
transaction costs in determining the correct level of due care, it would be more 
robust if they were to choose a negligence rule and preemptively set the level of due 
care higher than the otherwise efficient level might have been; future discovery in 
future trials could then enable a lowering of the duty of care to optimal levels.218 
3.4. Balancing of externalized costs and benefits 
Hylton demonstrated that strict liability could be overburdening and threatening to 
important positive externalities; he argued for the restriction of strict liability to 
those cases of substantially asymmetrical risk externalization not offset by 
counterbalancing externalized benefits.219  
Given the interconnections of externalized costs and benefits, he found that 
negligence, strict liability, and no liability rules all have their respective zones of 
efficiency. 220  Negligence was robust when the externalized risks and the 
externalized benefits were well paired.221 Strict liability won out as more robust 
when risk asymmetry, i.e., that the tortfeasor externalizes more risks than the 
collective community of victims, is present and the risks increase in relative scale to 
the wealth of the victims. 222  
Hylton provided a review of four cases; the results are thus ambiguous at first 
glance, but they do clearly emerge from an analysis of two relationships;223 (i) the 
ratios of externalized probabilistic risks between tortfeasor and victim(s), (ݍ஺:ݍ஻), 
and (ii) the ratios of externalized probabilistic benefits between tortfeasor and 
victim(s), (ݓ஺:ݓ஻).224  
 
 
216  Id., at 19. 
217  Nussim & Tabbach, supra at note 34, at 173. Similarly, if the legal institutions or if the 
technical complexity of the risky behavior create conditions that prevent clear ex ante 
determinations of judgment damages, then negligence may provide a more robust means of 
achieving socially efficient outcomes. Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 30, at 9. 
218  Nussim & Tabbach, supra at note 34, at 173. See the mathematical discussion at Appendix II-
D. 
219  See the mathematical discussion at Appendix II-C. 
220  Hylton, supra at note 35, at 15. For no liability rules, Hylton supported the idea of 
subsidization when the net welfare results were positive. See Quadrant III in Table 2, infra. 
221  Id., at 15, 22.  
222  Id., at 23.  
223  In Hylton’s model, there are two parties, tortfeasor A and victim(s) B.  
224  Id., at 14.  
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Table 2: Liability Rule Expectations based on Externalized Benefits and Risks 
  Externalized Benefits 
Ex
te
rn
al
iz
ed
 
R
is
ks
 
 ࢝࡭ > ࢝࡮  ࢝࡭ ൑ ࢝࡮  
ࢗ࡭ > ࢗ࡮  I. Negligence (probably)  II. Strict Liability  
   
ࢗ࡭ ൑ ࢗ࡮  III. Subsidy (no liability)  IV. Negligence  
   
 
He developed a quadrant mapping of the results, supra at Table 2: 
I. (ݍ஺ > ݍ஻) and (ݓ஺ > ݓ஻ ). ܣ provides exceptional externalized risks 
and benefits. ܣ externalizes both more risks, ݍ஺, and more benefits, 
ݓ஺, than his average community of actors externalize to the commu-
nity.225 
II. ( ݍ஺ > ݍ஻ ) and ( ݓ஺ ൑ ݓ஻ ). ܣ  is risky but of average benefits.  
ܣ  externalizes more risks, ݍ஺ , than the norm, but ܣ  provides the 
same or fewer externalized benefits, ݓ஺, compared to the norm in his 
community of actors. 226   
III. (ݍ஺ ൑ ݍ஻) and (ݓ஺ > ݓ஻). ܣ provides exceptional benefits at normal 
risks. ܣ provides the same or fewer externalized risks, ݍ஺, than the 
norm, but externalizes more externalized benefits, ݓ஺ , against the 
norm in his community of actors. 227   
IV. (ݍ஺ ൑ ݍ஻) and (ݓ஺ ൑ ݓ஻). ܣ is normal in externalized risk and bene-
fits. ܣ provides the same or fewer externalized risks and benefits as 
compared against the norms in his community. 228   
 
Hylton proposed that negligence is likely to be most effective or efficient when the 
risks ratios are symmetrical or when the externalized risks and benefits are well-
balanced with each other because “communities are likely to form around activities 
that cross-externalize similar risks.”229  As a result, negligence was recommend in 
two out of four scenarios, making it Hylton’s preferred result. 
Strict liability is most likely to be of benefit to policy makers when (ݍ஺ > ݍ஻) 
and (ݓ஺ ൑ ݓ஻), i.e., when A displays extraordinary risks without sufficient offsetting 
benefits to the community. Negligence would see A undertake excessive activity, 
 
225  Id. 
226  Id. 
227  Id. 
228  Id. 
229  See Quadrant I and IV of Table 9.5. Quadrant I is the high risk/high benefit case that probably 
merits negligence to ensure sufficient production of externalized benefits. Quadrant IV is the 
routine case wherein most ordinary activities with balanced risks and benefits fit. See id., at 
15.  
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causing inefficiently high numbers of accidents to B, who would reduce his own 
activity to minimize his damages.230  
In the opposite direction is when A displays extra-ordinary benefits to the 
community with average risk; such a situation might be given a no liability rule or a 
subsidy, effectively the same, to encourage A to undertake more of this beneficial 
activity.231  
Similarly, Nell and Richter found that as the number of potential victims 
increases, and the tortfeasor is exercising a maximum feasible level of due care,232 
the correct assignment of risk allocation should shift from the tortfeasor to the 
victims at large.233 Negligence with a due care level set at the maximum level of care 
is the optimal rule, whereas strict liability is equally not optimal. 234 
4. Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the rules of civil liability, strict liability and negligence. 
Both rules of civil liability, strict liability and negligence, can be efficient within their 
own clusters of fitting circumstances. When determining which rule would be more 
effective, it is to the circumstances of the activity that we should look. 
Strict liability is more robust than negligence in unilateral accidents or for 
bilateral accidents wherein the tortfeasor controls most of the incidents of risk. The 
operators and owners of offshore methane hydrates development projects would 
likely be such potential tortfeasors. Strict liability is also preferable when addressing 
the risks of abnormally hazardous activities; public welfare might benefit from the 
activity itself but the management of the risk is difficult or perhaps infeasible by any 
party other that the undertaker, i.e., the potential tortfeasor. It has been well 
established in Chapter 4 that the extraction of offshore methane hydrates may well 
be considered as abnormally hazardous, especially in certain locations. Strict 
liability enables the complete set of costs and benefits, including those externalized, 
to be addressed by a single decision maker; that focus of information and control 
enables the efficiency of strict liability for the above situations. Also, because the 
determinations on optimal precaution and activity levels are made by the tortfeasor, 
 
230  See Quadrant II of Table 9.5. See id. 
231  See Quadrant III of Table 9.5. See id. 
232  Maximal level of due care as ݔ௠௔௫. Nell & Richter, supra at note 37, at 37. 
233  The risk aversions coefficients for the tortfeasor and the victim are denoted as ߙ and ߚ , 
respectively; where Ș > 0 and ș > 0. Id. The tortfeasor’s share of liability is ݍ א (0 ൑ ݍ ൑ 1); 
the victim’s share of risk is similarly (1െ ݍ).  Id., at 39. The optimal liability for the tortfeasor, 
meeting due care ݔ௠௔௫ , is found to be: 
ݍכ = ࢼ݊ߙ + ߚ 
234  This matches the results of the negligence rule; the negligence rule emerges from this 
argument as ݍכ ՜ 0 as ݊ ՜҄. Strict liability provides the opposite result, inݍכ ՜ 1 as ݊ ՜҄, 
and assigns all of the risk to the tortfeasor. However, one ponders if this result is real-world 
applicable when the victims face a unilateral model wherein they can take no or few steps to 
avoid harm but the tortfeasor has readily avoidable means to avoid risk, as in an offshore 
methane hydrate project accident. 
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they can correctly integrate local marginal costs and benefits and thus gain access to 
decentralization. It appears that for a variety of uncertainties, strict liability can be 
more robust than negligence. 235   
The rule of negligence has its own domains of efficiency. The more likely it 
becomes that victims have a role to play in averting harm, the more likely 
negligence is efficient to govern the combined risks of the tortfeasor and the victim. 
But with methane hydrates, neither the inhabitants of the eco-system nor the 
impacted coastal communities would be expected to have such roles. The more 
likely that the tortfeasor’s risk neutrality is replaced with risk aversion, the more 
likely negligence will be more robust.236 But the development of offshore methane 
hydrates is expected to be primarily carried out by corporations or other 
institutional arrangements with limited senses of risk aversion. Similarly, the 
presence of insolvency, strategies of liability avoidance, incorrectly estimated 
judicial damages, or the effects of behavioral economics can all present 
circumstances to support negligence as a more robust rule than strict liability. Again, 
depending on the circumstances of the accident, a rule of negligence might be 
efficient to govern the risks and hazards of that activity. However, as will be 
explored in Chapter 6, such problems might be also addressed, perhaps more 
efficiently, by regulation. 
This chapter has provided an initial foray into when either rule might be 
optimal for offshore methane hydrates. The more complete resolution of that 
research is to be found in Chapter 7, wherein a joint discussion of the rules of civil 
liability and of regulations as applied to offshore methane hydrates operations will 
be entertained. But it beckons from the exploratory comments made within this 
chapter to reveal that Chapter 7 will support the application of strict liability to 
govern the risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates.  
  
 
235  See a similar conclusion on the potentially more robust application of strict liability to 
environmental pollution, M. G. FAURE, AND S. E. WEISHAAR, The Role of Environmental Taxation: 
Economics and the Law, In: HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, 399, 403 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012). 
236  See the discussion on Nell & Richter’s risk allocation models, infra, at Appendix II.E. 
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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATION 
This chapter examines the potential role of public and private regulation to govern 
the risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates. It could be said that the 
primary goal of both civil liability rules and both types of regulations is to set 
standards to enable the attainment of optimal activity and due care levels.  
The previous chapter, the first of Part II, explored the various circumstances 
that private parties could efficiently set those standards and ensure the attainment 
of those standards under rules of civil liability. It explored the circumstances 
wherein a rule of strict liability might be efficient and those circumstances wherein a 
rule of negligence might be efficient. It previewed a preliminary finding that a rule 
of strict liability might be more robust for the circumstances of offshore methane 
hydrates. 
In this present chapter, the second of Part II, a discussion is presented on the 
role of public and private regulations, how standards might be set through the tool 
set of regulations. Second, the reasons for and advantages of public regulation to 
govern the risks of accidents are presented. Third, a discussion reviews the potential 
interactions of public regulation and private rules of civil liability. Fourth, the 
potential for private parties to advance private regulation to set standards and 
provide self-governance is examined. Finally, a discussion on the potential 
application of both public and private regulation to offshore methane hydrates is 
presented. A preliminary finding is presented that the circumstances of offshore 
methane hydrates would benefit from both public and private regulation. 
The following chapter, the third within Part II, will integrate the conclusions of 
the chapter on civil liability rules and this chapter on public and private regulation 
with the unique circumstances of offshore methane hydrates as developed within 
Part I of this study. Specific recommendations are made in that chapter as to the 
optimal portfolio selection of civil liability rules, public regulation and private 
regulation. In brief preview, the third chapter of Part II will present an argument for 
the complementary implementation of public regulations alongside a rule of strict 
liability; it also presents an argument that private regulation could be additionally 
integrated alongside these two previous recommended mechanisms. 
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1. On regulation 
Regulations, both public and private, formulate and set standards so that actors can 
avail themselves of these standards ex ante to their decisions to undertake certain 
activities.  
Both public and private regulations can enable incentives to affect the actor’s 
conduct prior to incident of accident or injury.1 Regulations can define and include 
behavioral norms as part of their ex ante standard setting process. While rules of 
civil liability respond to injury and damages, regulations can respond to both injury 
and to risky behaviors without resultant injury. For those activities wherein 
potential hazards might be extreme or irreversible, regulations can respond to 
faulty behaviors prior to the incidence of an accident whereas rules of civil liability 
would be limited to injunction-type remedies.2 Because regulations can be applied 
where civil liability rules might fail to be applicable or functional, some scholars 
have labeled “the public law approach as ‘the preferred approach.’” 3 Yet, the 
general approach developed by Shavell provides an analytic structure to evaluate 
when public regulations might be more robust than rules of civil liability.4 
Regulations generally offer a degree of due and deliberative processes that are 
placed before the public ex ante, not only before the engagement in a potentially 
risky act but also potentially before the standards themselves are determined.5 Civil 
liability offers, in contrast, rulemaking of an ex post type and generally by a small 
sub-section of the populace; to the general public the decisions of a court may 
appear deus ex machina.  
Public regulations are argued to be effective because the standards can be 
based upon more information than might have been available to only the tortfeasor, 
victims, or courts; that the central regulatory body would have the resources and 
purview to make a more complete gathering of information.  
 
1  See R. Van den Bergh & L. T. Visscher, Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law, in: MITIGATING RISK 
IN THE CONTEXT OF SAFETY AND SECURITY. HOW RELEVANT IS A RATIONAL APPROACH?, 29 (R.V. 
de Mulder, ed., Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam 2008). “ … fines can be attached to 
norm breaking behaviour, irrespective of whether losses have occurred, and/or harmful 
behaviour.” Id. 
2  Van den Bergh & Visscher set out a temporally framed set of enforcement measures; (i) 
preclusionary measures, (ii) act-based sanctions, and (iii) harm-based sanctions. They 
demonstrated that regulations could provide policy tools at each temporal stage while rules 
of civil liability would be primarily limited to harm-based sanctions with some access to 
preclusionary measures via inunction type petitions. Van den Bergh & Visscher, supra at note 
1. 
3  M. G. FAURE, AND S. E. WEISHAAR, The Role of Environmental Taxation: Economics and the Law, In: 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, 399, 404 (Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2012), citing to L. BERGKAMP, LIABILITY AND ENVIRONMENT (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague, Netherlands, 2001). 
4  Id., at 404-406.  
5  Generally, most modern public states develop regulations within democratic or at least 
publicly deliberative processes, so that the nature and character of the regulations is 
coordinated with social awareness. 
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Private regulations are argued to be effective due to the specialized knowledge 
that certain actors might have with regards to a certain activity; private regulations 
might arise from a group of actors directly engaged in undertaking the regulated 
activity or they could arise from other private groups engaged in observing and 
monitoring the regulated activity.6 
Historically, another aspect that influenced the general adoption of regulations 
by governments is the capacity to enforce the regulations. Most modern states 
contain the means of enforcement, at least the means to find culpability, to extract 
fees or taxes from those who fail to abide by the regulations, and potentially to 
incarcerate those offenders.  
The set of reasons generally provided from a theoretical perspective on why 
regulations should be employed by a society are predicated in terms of the 
alternatives; “public enforcement appears attractive whenever the probability of 
punishment under a private regime appears to be low,”7 particularly if one allows 
the notion of ‘punishment’ to mean enforcement of damages to provide ex ante 
incentives.  
The overall body of literature on environmental torts, or more broadly stated 
industrial torts that have broad and diffuse impacts on nature and social settings, 
supports the role of ex ante regulations to determine standards and to provide 
incentives to operators to efficiently balance risk and welfare by relying on those 
standards. Liability rules do offer one means of clarifying initial conditions for 
improvement of Coasian negotiations. However, regulations have long provided an 
alternative to liability in that they provide specific and more comprehensive 
allocations of rights and of duties than liability rules could offer.  
Regulatory standards are also developed within the public sphere in a manner 
that is more subject to public review than the judicial decisions of appointed judges 
or the thought processes of tortfeasors under strict liability. Statutes enacted by 
legislatures are explicitly under the operation of electoral representation and thus 
democratic in function. By extension, when legislative bodies appoint regulatory 
authorities to provide more detailed review and persistent oversight of the enacted 
legislation and detailed regulations, those activities remain within the governance 
of democratic organs. Much existing legislation contains explicit requirements of 
public participation of various forms in the drafting of legislation, plans, and 
proposals. Some environmental rules provide for public engagement in the 
regulatory review of private projects. Thus regulations provide an alternative 
mechanism for collecting information across otherwise asymmetrical sources and 
 
6  See N. Gunningham, M. Phillipson & P. Grabosky, Harnessing Third Parties as Surrogate 
Regulators, Achieving Environmental Outcomes by Alternative Means, 8 Bus. Strategy 
Environment 211, en passim (Australian Centre for Environmental Law, 1999). 
7  K. N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?, 41 Washburn L.J. 
515 (2001). (Due to licensing limits where the present study was undertaken, its research 
relied on the working paper version of Hylton’s article; as such, all point citations are to that 
source material. See K. N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental 
Regulation?, 4 (Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 01-11, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=285264). 
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enabling a democratic process to evaluate and value the various positive and 
negative externalities in setting standards for optimal behavior with regards for the 
regulated activity.8 
2. Benefits of positive regulations 
Civil liability rule systems are at their root merely systems and all systems have 
weaknesses and dependencies. Liability rules are no exception and require systemic 
stress analyses to understand where they may encounter difficulties in operation.  
It has been argued that there is a fundamental shift in focus between the rules 
of civil liability and regulations.9 Under the rules of civil liability, the tortfeasor 
retains the privilege to make an independent assessment of how to optimally 
prevent harm.10 Strict liability rules provide incentives to avoid the incidence of 
harm; negligence rules provide incentives to optimize the amount of damages to be 
paid to the victims of the tortfeasor’s risky activity. 11  In a sense the rules of civil 
liability motivate the tortfeasor to consider ex ante the future ex post costs of their 
activity decisions, but those costs are predicated on ex post determinations of 
causation and for negligence rules of preventative due care efforts. On the other 
hand, regulation appears to enable a regulatory body to determine ex ante specific 
standards of behavior for particular risky activities.12  
Shavell found three criteria that suggested when liability rules might not be 
effective despite otherwise sound reasons for employing rules of civil liability.13 The 
three reasons were:  
i. Information asymmetry: Parties lack sufficient knowledge,  
ii. Insolvency risk, and  
iii. Effective Absence of Lawsuit Threat. 
 
8  No argument is made herein that such regulatory drafting processes are theoretically 
efficient, e.g. Kenneth Arrow demonstrated the difficulties of assembling a public utility 
function from diverse individual utility functions, nor is there any argument presented that 
such processes are free of lobbying and other regulatory capture strategies. The argument is 
simple put that at least more voices might be heard and that some form of public audit of the 
regulations can occur prior to their adoption, unlike the tort liability rules developed by 
judicial decisions. It is an argument to distinguish procedural aspects, not quality nor 
efficiency. 
9  M. G. FAURE, ‘Regulatory Strategies in Environmental Liability’, in THE REGULATORY 
FUNCTION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, 129 (F. Cafaggi, F., Watt, H. Muir, eds., Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar, 2011). See also M. G. Faure, Designing Incentives Regulation for the Environment, 
(Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2008-7, 2008). 
10  Id., at 140. See also id., at 20-21. 
11  Id., id. 
12  Id., id. 
13  See S. Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984). See also 
S. Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 Rand J. Econ. 271 
(1984), and see S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (Harvard University Press, 
1987). 
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Additionally, there are concerns on the institutional capacity of certain jurisdictions 
to efficiently and effectively govern via rules of civil liability.  
Effective enforcement of civil liability is predicated on three issues: 14  (i) the 
probability of the violation’s detection, (ii) once detected, the probability of 
prosecution, and (iii) the probability of punishment once prosecuted.15 Problems at 
any one of more of these stages can cause civil liability regimes to be frustrated; 
public regulations are seen as potentially able to address those problems.16  
2.1. Information asymmetry 
The concept of information asymmetry is that liability rules work as designed when 
the affected actors have sufficient knowledge to make accurate and rational 
decisions to achieve efficient levels of accidents. However, there are situations that 
lack that characteristic; the tortfeasor might not be informed of the existence of his 
victims or lack awareness of the extent of the damages caused by his accidents. The 
standard model suggested a two-step problem:17 
i. A market failure results from incomplete supply of information. 
ii. A market failure could be corrected by regulation based upon a more 
complete set of information not present in the marketplace. 
There are multiple ways in which externalities could cause informational 
asymmetry. Transaction costs to resolve the externalities may be too large. In such 
cases, liability rule are likely to falter and may need the reinforcement of regulation 
by an agency that can better integrate the disparate sources of information and 
integrate them for socially efficient policy decisions. The public burse is assumed, in 
general theoretical models, to be sufficiently larger than most private budgets that it 
can afford to gather a larger amount of relevant information to facilitate proper 
enforcement of a legal norm.18 Such a result might occur due to dispersed victims or 
due to each victim’s injury being too marginal to justify investigatory costs. 19 Also, 
the central sovereign is generally seen as having better and more complete access to 
the whole set of related parties and the relevant data that they might bring to the 
administration of the legal norm. 20 
Shavell proposed a rule to determine when a regulatory framework would be 
more efficient than rules of civil liability. 21  Rules of civil liability should be 
 
14  Hylton, supra at note 7, at 12. 
15  Id., at 4. 
16  Id. 
17  See G. J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961). See also A. Schwartz & 
L. L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal And Economic 
Analysis, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1978). And see also E. Mackaay, Economics of Information And 
Law, (Groupe de recherche en consommation, 1980). 
18  Hylton, supra at note 7, at 3. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  Shavell, supra at note 13; with reference to 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984). See Faure, supra at note 
9, at 140. See also See Faure, supra at note 9, at 21. 
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employed when the pairing of tortfeasor and victim have more information on the 
impacts of the risky activity, but regulation should be employed when a regulatory 
body might have a more complete set of information about those impacts.22  
This regulatory body need not be a governmental agency, a private agency 
might be able to collect the complete data set and share the data as needed, but the 
functional role of government does provide it access to a broader set of data and 
participants than most other potential agencies.  
2.2. Information revealing mechanisms 
There is a developing area of mechanism design, that of truth revealing 
mechanisms.23 Truth revealing mechanisms are designed to create incentives that 
encourage the revelation of information between the regulator and the regulated 
actor.24  
Glachant offers a critical appraisal of the Shavell analysis; informational 
asymmetry may present an intractable problem for policy makers in the choice of 
civil liability, regulation, or nothing at all.25  
At the root of Glachant’s concerns is that Coase may have suggested a deeper 
paradigmatic shift than accounted for by Shavell. Glachant’s concern is that the 
costs of information searches are themselves a form of transaction costs and if they 
are included in the overall cost analysis then the informational clarity to pursue 
regulatory guidance in the face of informational uncertainty or asymmetry might be 
incomplete.26 In fact, Glachant argued, it may be impossible to discern when civil 
rules, regulations or no policy at all might be preferable if the sum of the overall set 
of transaction costs is not readily resolvable.27  
In such models, it is assumed that the regulator is less informed than the actor; 
the actor is closer to the facts or technologies that affect the safety levels.28 But in 
turn, the actor is less informed about the potential harms and hazards, particularly 
as they impact third parties beyond the actor. 29 Due to the state of incomplete or 
imperfect data, economic tools are employed instead of direct quota systems, to 
 
22  Shavell, supra at note 13; with reference to 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984). See also Van den Bergh 
& Visscher, supra at note 1, wherein an argument is further developed that even when private 
parties might have informational advantages, if the private parties’ private interests and 
broader social interests were to not align, then private parties might lack incentives to take 
advantage of the civil liability mechanisms to recover damages. Thus, the informational 
concerns need to consider not merely the sum of data but also the strategic outcomes of the 
data possessed by a party; public actors might act where private actors might fail to act. 
23  M. GLACHANT, The Use of Regulatory Mechanism Design in Environmental Policy: A Theoretical 
Critique, in:  SUSTAINABILITY AND FIRMS: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE CHANGING 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT, 179, 2 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1998). 
24  Id., at 3. 
25  Id. 
26  Id., at 9-10. 
27  Id. 
28  Id., at 3. 
29  Id. 
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enable the actor to integrate sufficient data to determine an efficient level of activity 
and of care. 30 A tax may be used to transfer information to the actor. 31 
If the regulator were to ask the actor for his estimated impact costs of pollution 
abatement, the actor would be tempted to over-report his costs in order to minimize 
the policy decision’s impact on his operations. 32 As Glachant stated the problem:  
ę[C]ommunication between agents is subject to strategic manipulation 
if (i) the objectives sought by the emitter and the receptor differ and 
(ii) the receptor’s decision influence emitter’s gains.” 33 
The regulator searches for a collection of methods, ܨ, to transform the receipt of the 
messages into a functional policy ܣ that holds true for two conditions: 
i. that the regulator’s method can yield a specific policy for each unique 
set of messages:,34 and  
ii. that for all combinations of private pollution abatement costs there 
will exist some set of messages from the ݊ actors that will establish an 
equilibrium of the game. 35   
Glachant states that indeed there is a menu of such methods to transform the 
messages from the actors into specific policies that will reveal the necessary 
information to the regulator.36  
It is the dynamic of the messages on the likely policy results that drive this 
potential to reveal information and balance the earlier recognized asymmetry. 37 
However, there are several concerns that this analysis reveals.  
First, an assumption of budgetary neutrality cannot be maintained, i.e., there 
will always be an effective capital flow from the regulator to the actors; subsidies 
will be provided for the information received. 38 
Second, because of the aforementioned capital leakage, the system is second 
best optimal. The results can be improved, but examples in the literature suggest 
that the mapping of the administrative communications with emitters that can 
result in actionable policies might actually require drafting of unique policy 
instruments for each actor. 39 
As such, Glachant projects, in a Coasean manner, that the overall problem 
with routine mechanism design is that it assumes too readily zero-cost transaction 
 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Id., at 5. 
35  Id. 
36  Id., at 5-6. 
37  Id., at 6. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
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costs to obtain information relevant for policy design. 40 As he states, “we are 
especially suspicious towards the zero administrative costs assumption.” 41 
He documents several problematic areas that are likely to not be zero-costs in 
the collecting or processing of information:  
 
i. The design of the menu options by the regulator. This is an exercise in 
scientific, engineering, and economic analysis of (݊ + 1) 
participants.42  
ii. The means of communicating the menu to the ݊ actors. 43 
iii. The strategic calculations undertaken by each actor to determine their 
message ݉௜  back to the regulator. 44 . Frankly, the interlinearity of 
actors responding to each other’s anticipatory strategies could be 
computationally vexing in a way that would require next-best 
approximations.  
iv. The messages need to be correctly and timely collected and sorted by 
the regulator. 45 
v. The mapping of the received messages into a coherent and workable 
policy, especially if the policies need to be actor-specific, could be 
especially cost intensive. 46 
 
The results of Glachant’s study are that informational strategies do exist to rectify 
the observed informational asymmetries, but they will likely be costly. Thus, 
regulations might not be appropriately seen as more efficient than lawsuits in civil 
liability when informational asymmetry is too costly.  
This is not to suggest that no form of rules or regulations could ever be 
efficient, not at all. But it does highlight the centrality of obtaining sufficiently 
accurate information for the regulatory body to be able to efficiently set optimal 
standards. And underlying that challenge is the quest to obtain that information in 
the closest verisimilitude to perfect cost-less information as possible. 
When certain assumptions of perfect information are met, indeed one can 
forecast which rules or regulations might efficiently set optimal standards. But 
when faced with uncertainty it becomes more complex to ensure those efficient 
results. When information needs to be obtained from private actors, transaction 
costs will be incurred; these costs could affect which sets of standards are optimal 
given the inclusion of the costs of this information against the ceteris paribus of zero-
cost information. Second, regulators seeking to improve the mapping of policy to 
individual information sets on cost would likely need to produce a result that 
 
40  Id., at 7. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. And here is a latent assumption of a singular policy challenge; imagine the complexity 
facing real administrators facing numerous industrial settings. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
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appears rather similar to the idea of decentralization. But the tailoring of policy to 
each actor would likely bear its own set of transaction costs. In summary, if 
regulatory bodies face costly information acquisition problems, the results of which 
could be differing sets of standards shy of the optimal standards that might have 
been obtained if information had been cost-less.  
Thus, regulatory bodies are in need of cost-efficient means of obtaining critical 
information for standard setting. As a consequence, Glachant’s model establishes a 
predicate for arguments raised in Section 4, infra, that public regulations can be 
complementary to the function of rules of civil liability. As such, the application of a 
regulatory process can suss out information that once acquired might aid either 
regulators or petitioners in addressing their Coasean negotiations or lawsuits. 
Additionally, Glachant’s concerns could be addressed by the development of 
standards by private regulation. While the public regulations and private 
regulations might not result in identical standards, the development of private 
regulations and the promulgation thereof does reveal information that might 
otherwise by difficult for the regulatory body to efficiently obtain. 
2.3. Insolvency risk 
Liability rules depend on the consequences of being financially responsible for the 
damages caused by an accident being included in rational decision making 
procedures. To the extent that a party is unable or unwilling to be financially 
responsible,47 liability rules will not work as designed. Shavell demonstrated that 
the rule of strict liability loses its efficiency in the face of insolvency whereas a rule 
of negligence more robustly retained its functionality.48 Shavell also proposed that 
regulations would be more efficient than rules of civil liability when the expected 
costs from judgment damages were expected to exceed the wealth or capitalization 
of the tortfeasor.49  
Insolvency is the problem that even if the tortfeasors could be detected, 
prosecuted and punishments levied, the tortfeasor would still avoid consequences 
simply because they have insufficient capital to bear the fines imposed; it is a legal 
 
47  Such cases could be insolvency from routine bad luck or poor financial planning to 
strategically undercapitalized corporations. 
48  See S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 43 (1986). 
49  On the contrary, when the tortfeasor’s wealth or capitalization is expected to be in excess of 
the expected damages, then rules of civil liability would retain their efficiency; of course this 
is a statement that civil liability works efficiently when no insolvency is present. See Shavell, 
supra at note 13; with reference to 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984). 
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null.50 As such, those insolvent tortfeasors have no economic incentives to avoid the 
accidents, or, to achieve reasonable or efficient levels of precaution.51  
There are several conditions to consider:  
 
i. when the actor has no funds, when they are insolvent,  
ii. when the actor has some funds, but some of his liabilities would 
exceed that amount of funding, and  
iii. when the actor takes legal steps to avoid liability judgments.  
 
To the extent that an actor is genuinely insolvent or unfunded, case (i), they will 
rationally not include the consequences of financial liabilities, as those liabilities will 
be undeliverable. The actor would behave as if the liability rule were not in place.  
To the extent that the actor is incompletely funded vis-a-vis his potential 
liabilities, case (ii), he will only respond to liability rules as far as his funding 
supports. Once the potential liability extends beyond that budgetary boundary, the 
liability rule will cease to be effective. This could occur either by a limit on funds on 
hand, or in the case of a corporation be limited to the capital reserves prior to a 
bankruptcy or act of dissolution.  
The third issue is raised when actors take on legal forms of organization to 
limit their exposure to liability risks; this is part of the avoidance strategy concept 
discussed in Chapter 5.52 Limited liability for certain forms of business associations 
can frustrate the functional purposes of liability rules. 53 One of the defining aspects 
of legal incorporation is to provide limited liability; in essence, all corporations pose 
a type of insolvency risk.  
 
50  Hylton, supra at note 7, at 12. While one might argue that tortfeasors might be provided 
incentives by addressing their future post-insolvency incomes, the operators of large resource 
projects would likely be legal personages, such as corporations, that might not have future 
income pending a major accident. The elimination of such entities is often even tax rewarded, 
as in the American tax code’s deduction allowance for “worthless stocks, “ under 26 U.S.C. 
165 and 26 C.F.R. 1.165-1. Thus, strategic avoidance remains a substantial concern. 
51  Id., at 12. 
52  A famous example is the structures that O.J. Simpson had in place prior to the litigation for 
his civil lawsuit on the murder of his wife and Ron Goldman. While Mr. Simpson lost the 
case and was found civilly liable for their murders, he has transferred his assets out of his 
personal accounts to trust funds and similar vehicles. He has paid only a portion of the 
financial judgments entered against him, although he was able to sustain a comfortable 
lifestyle post-judgment. 
53  E.g., Many oil and gas operators specifically provide that each well is included within its own 
corporation to both limit liability from the holding company and also to enable certain 
financial and tax planning measures called “worthless stock deductions” in the case of a bad 
well or early life accident. Thus, otherwise well-funded operators might employ corporate 
entities to limit and de-aggregate risks in a common production project. In such cases were 
legal structure can be used to prevent or limit assessments of financial liabilities, liability 
rules will not function as designed. 
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Given that insolvency is a problem of insufficient capital for economic 
incentives to be effective,54 it is important to recognize that the regulatory body 
would need enforcement measures beyond cost-driven measures. 55  Laws that 
operate to reduce avoidance capacity, laws that criminalize or otherwise penalize 
the tortfeasors, or laws that remove access to the underlying activity itself might be 
instances of such measures. 
2.4. Underdeterrence: the effective absence of lawsuit threat 
Rules of civil liability function to set standards of optimal behavior. Those standards 
will work effectively as incentives ex ante if there is an expectation on the part of the 
tortfeasor that some real and expectable ex post damages will be assessed when 
harm or injury results from the tortfeasor’s activity. When the fundamental element 
of the lawsuit to obtain those damages fails to be pursued, then a core mechanism of 
civil liability fails to operate. Regulations can address these problems by (i) directly 
providing standards ex ante to potentially tortious activities, and (ii) provide 
information to the public to better facilitate the implementation of civil liability 
rules. 
The effective absence of lawsuits seeking redress for injuries prevents the 
mechanism that transits ex post damages into ex ante incentives. That lack of ex ante 
incentives frustrates the efficient avoidance of accidents; an alternative mechanism 
is needed to provide the incentives to obtain the standards. In such events wherein 
lawsuits fail to be filed, Shavell demonstrated that regulations could be more 
efficient than rules of civil liability.56 Regulations can directly provide the necessary 
standards; this setting of standards can be done ex ante to the onset of activity and 
thus provide the necessary ex ante incentives for the tortfeasor’s decision making 
process. 
While it might seem odd that regulations could function to facilitate the 
implementation of civil liability rules, an argument could be made that sometimes 
transaction costs could prevent or frustrate the proper litigation that would enable 
civil liability rules to function as designed; the activity of creating standards via a 
regulatory process and the gathering of necessary information by the regulatory 
body could alleviate the problems frustrating the implementation of civil liability 
rules.57 The missing information could be made public and therefore reduce the 
transaction costs of litigation for rules of civil liability. By facilitating the transaction 
costs or by fixing missing markets, regulations can either provide for the 
 
54  Every corporation has a limited account of capital against which its liabilities are limited. 
Considering that most of the operators that would eventually develop offshore methane 
hydrates would likely be incorporated, this concern of insolvency is relevant to the choice of 
governing mechanism. 
55  S. Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J. L. & Econ. 587 
(1985). 
56  Shavell, supra at note 13; with reference to 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984). 
57  Hylton, supra at note 7, at 3. 
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subsequent prosecution of private litigation or provide public enforcement to the 
same ends.58  
The central notion to liability rules is that they provide a plea for bringing an 
injury to court for resolution; if that process is unlikely to occur then the 
effectiveness of the liability rule is much diminished.59 To the extent that such a 
problem is foreseeable, the liability rule will provide little to no incentive to achieve 
an efficient level of accidents. If the liability rule is inefficient, then regulations or 
other means may be called for to ensure a socially optimal level of safety and 
accidents is ensured.  
Shavell identified three major sources of underdeterrence:60 
i. Disparate Plaintiffs: When injuries are spread across too many 
plaintiffs, then their individual injuries and expected awarded 
judgments might be too small to justify the individual transaction 
costs of litigation. 61 This ‘rational apathy’ result is adverse to the 
community, wherein the sum of the injuries would have justified the 
transaction costs of litigation as a single case. 
ii. Lack of Evidence: The passage of time can enable the loss or lack of 
evidence to prevent bringing a case to trial. 
iii. Missing Parties: The passage of time can enable the loss or lack of 
either the tortfeasor or the victim; this could be by death, 
disappearance, or dissolution in the case of a corporate tortfeasor. 
Another well documented economic logic, examined by both Landes and Posner 
and then by Kunreuther and Freeman,62 for why cases might fail to be brought 
forward was that the establishment of a causal linkage between risky activity, 
tortfeasor and victim, and the specific injury suffered may well be difficult to 
establish, especially for many environmental injuries. 
Injuries might be related to chemicals dispersed into the environment, such as 
toxins or greenhouse gases. The potential role for the chemicals to have a direct 
effect and cause specific harm may also be well understood by science, but the 
evidentiary demonstration that a particular source of the chemical emission was 
 
58  Id. 
59  See Shavell, supra at note 13; at 363; and see W. M. Landes & R. A. Posner, Tort Law as a 
Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. Legal Stud. 417, 417 (1984). 
60  Shavell, supra at note 13; with reference to 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984). 
61  Environmental and industrial injuries to individuals are often spread across a wide area and 
may only provide marginal injuries to the individual but cause community level harms. After 
the victims realize that they are injured, it might not be readily apparent that other parties are 
also similarly injured. Assuming that any litigation would bear at least a de minimis cost 
burden, many potential plaintiffs might evaluate their particular injury in isolation and 
decide to forego litigation due to the expected benefits of litigation being less than the costs. 
In that case, they might also decide to forego additional search costs to identify other co-
victims who might could have shared the costs of litigation. 
62  See Landes & Posner, supra at note 59. See also H. C. KUNREUTHER & P. K. FREEMAN, 
Insurability, Environmental Risks and the Law, in: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT, 302 (2001). 
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causally connected to a specific injury may be difficult to establish.63 E.g., a chemical 
factory might release a known toxin that can cause cancer, and it might be clearly 
documented that said factory did indeed emit such a toxin, but it may be difficult to 
clearly demonstrate that a specific instance of cancer was specifically caused by the 
emitted volumes of that toxin as the cancer may have arisen from exposure to other 
toxins or dangers in the victim’s environment. Additionally, injuries may require 
time to develop or may not be noticed until a time later than the act causing the 
injury to result. In such a case, the tortfeasor might no longer be present either in the 
jurisdiction or more seriously might no longer exist either by death, insolvency, or 
dissolution. Such issues could both raise standing problems and transaction costs 
problems for bringing forth liability litigation.  
Schäfer and Schönenberger observe that not all parties will bring litigation 
when standing would otherwise exist.64 In that event, the tortfeasors under both 
rules, negligence and strict liability, would not expect to pay for all of the damages 
that their rules expect them to suffer. 65 Thus, the tortfeasors could adopt a higher 
risk profile with the assumption that only a percentage of the harms would translate 
to actual judgments against them. In such a case, they argue that punitive damages 
can serve to “fill the gap” of missing litigation and ensure that tortfeasors regain the 
full extent of the tort rules damages. 66 
A potential reason for certain plaintiffs to bring suits for judgment to recover 
damages is that their injuries might be non-pecuniary in character. Non-pecuniary 
injuries are those injuries that do not have immediate market valuations from which 
to give rise to pleadings; this clearly leads to difficulties in utilizing economic 
incentives as predicated within the standard civil liability models. One can lose a 
car or economic usages and provide specific damages in the plaint, yet one may 
have difficulty pleading the value of an injury based in loss of companionship or 
enjoyment of undisturbed nature. Some non-pecuniary injuries may even be 
difficult to articulate or to render into specific grounds that are supported in the 
law. These difficulties increase the transaction costs of litigation for all parties, as the 
plaintiff needs to expend more to discover a proper avenue of pleading, the 
respondent needs to find a way to address such a plaint, and then the court would 
need engage in a search for a proper means of compensation or remedy for the non-
pecuniary injury which may well be novel. (Non-novel non-pecuniary injuries may 
have precedential models to rely on.)  
 
63  E.g., the U.S. Supreme Court has decided to avoid all climate change related tort cases on 
precisely such grounds, see Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 133 S. Ct. 2390, 
185 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (2013). See also the lower appellate decision that was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court’s decision to deny writ of certiorari, at Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). See a discussion of these cases at R. A. Partain & S. H. Lee, 
Article 20 Obligations Under the KORUS FTA: The Deteriorating Environment for Climate Change 
Legislation in the U.S., 24 Stud. Am. Const. 439 (2013). 
64  H. B. SCHÄFER & A. SCHÖNENBERGER, Strict Liability versus Negligence, in: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS, 605 (Edward Elgar, 2000). 
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
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2.5. Institutional capacity 
Improved capacity to detect, prosecute, and provide for the punishment of 
tortfeasors are seen as key advantages of the regulatory rules over the civil liability 
rules.67 The overall liability system needs to accurately be able to both identify the 
externalities and determine their quantitative impacts prior to being able to assign 
damage to a party. The public government is generally assumed, in theoretical 
discussions, to be financially and human-resources-wise capable in contrast to 
situations wherein private actors might not be sufficiently capitalized or otherwise 
supported.68  
The underlying damages need to be addressable in pecuniary or similar metric 
terms to function within both overt social reassignment and enable replacement or 
compensation in proportion to the damages.  
The concept of a judicially determined liability system requires the judges to 
have access to adequate levels of information as to the costs and benefits of the 
event and its externalities. If that information is not delivered to the judges, then 
several problems can result. First, if the tortfeasor is expected to take into account 
the actual costs of damages when liable under either strict liability or a negligence 
rule, then inaccurate damage judgments from judges will, to the extent that problem 
is foreseeable by the tortfeasor, cause the tortfeasor to make a rational decision to 
choose an inefficient level of activity or of caution. In a strict liability framework, 
underestimation of the costs of damages will result in excessive engagement in the 
hazardous activity or an insufficient level of caution.69  
3. Problems of regulation 
While regulations can provide many solutions and can work in complementarity 
with rules of civil liability, they also contain problems of their own. First, a short 
review of the basic functional problems of regulations is provided. Next, the 
problems of utilizing the defense of regulatory compliance within a rule of civil 
liability setting are discussed.  
None of these problems are “show stoppers,” rather they are concerns that 
suggest that the use of regulation must be tempered with realistic expectations of 
their performance and they also reinforce the need for complementary 
implementation with civil liability regulation. 
3.1. Why efficiency may be lacking 
There are several scenarios when the efficiency of regulation is lacking.  
 
67  Hylton, supra at note 7, at 12. 
68  Id., at 4. 
69  R. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523 (1984). See also M. G. FAURE, 
Environmental liability, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS, 247, 252 (Edward Elgar, 2009).  
171_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Chapter 6 
 141 
First, regulations have historically tended to over focus on the prevention of 
‘bad acts’ instead of focusing on the attainment of targeted conditions.70 This is 
somewhat to be expected, in that it was often the problem of emissions or spilling 
by the tortfeasor that would have gotten regulatory notice, not the idea of a more 
perfect environment; especially if the regulatory design was to improve on the 
function of a tort system whose underlying roles included both compensation for 
damages and punishment for tortious acts.71  
Second, the actual operations of regulations, when applied to large 
populations, requires major capital expenditures;72 funds must be spent to gather 
reconnaissance on activities, to monitor potential tortious conduct, to evaluate 
potential injuries, to integrate that collection of data into enforcement decisions, and 
the costs of that enforcement. Tietenberg and Lewis presented a balancing problem; 
policy effectiveness must be counterbalanced against the costs of the policy.73 If the 
regulatory goals were too tightly defined, then the social costs of enforcement 
would run too costly; but, if the regulatory goals were too loosely defined, then the 
social costs of the damage from failed policies would be too costly.74 It is implied 
that the social planner needs to minimize the combination of the costs to establish 
efficient regulations; but that in itself recognizes that regulations are not likely to 
ever become completely successful, in that they would face ever higher costs as the 
policy goals grew stricter. 
Third, for a variety of reasons from agency capture to the Tietenberg and 
Lewis costs balancing, regulatory standards often fall short of the level of rigor 
needed to provide the full set of corrective incentives that could optimally reduce 
accident risk and hazards.75 In such cases, full regulatory compliance would still 
leave an excess of risk in the community, reducing net welfare. 
Fourth, regulations provide a jurisdiction-wide standard. That standardization 
is part and parcel of their appeal. However, that same standard setting prevents the 
attainment of decentralization and thus prevents the individual tortfeasor from 
efficiently reacting to their own/private marginal costs of precaution.76 
Fifth, following the third argument from above, regulations set low standards; 
enabling innovation to become static. Regulations work by requiring parties to 
comply with the standards, but rarely are there incentives to perform higher than 
mere compliance. To profit-maximizers, such as corporations, over-compliance with 
a regulatory framework would be costly and wasteful. Thus, a condition results 
wherein insufficient incentives fail to motivate tortfeasors to modify their activities 
 
70  See M. G. Faure, & S. Ubachs, Comparative Benefits and Optimal Use of Environmental Taxes, 1 
Critical Issues in Envtl. Taxation 29, (2003). 
71  Also, this follows a pattern from criminal law, in that the regulatory body focused on the 
prevention of acts that hurt the public welfare instead of focusing on how to improve it. 
72  T. H. TIETENBERG & L. LEWIS, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2000). 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  See Faure, supra at note 9, at 26-27. 
76  Id., at 27. 
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to optimal precaution and activity levels.77 Thus, an excess of accidents would be 
likely to result. 
Finally, the drafting and creation of regulations is burdened with complex 
transaction costs. The problems-to-be-regulated must be identified, they must be 
studied, and various interest groups must be brought together in order to result in a 
final set of regulations. Once that investment is made, it is not likely to be repeated. 
Thus, regulations become sticky, 78  drafted infrequently and long-lasting. But 
underlying technological development might continue and the problems facing the 
victims might be changing. Rules of civil liability, and the rule of strict liability in 
particular, are more efficient at adjusting to ‘state of the art’ preventative means and 
of efficient activity level determinations. Further, there does appear to be a risk of 
path-dependence,79 that once a regulation sets a certain form of precaution as a 
standard, that what innovation does thereafter would occur from around this 
accepted standard, whereas rules of civil liability might better retain the possibility 
of more diverse pathways of innovation. 
3.2. Regulatory compliance as a defense from liability 
There is no fundamental requirement that the duty of care from a negligence rule is 
in any way connected to compliance with a regulatory regime; a court could simply 
find two disjoint systems. Some courts have found that the failure to comply with 
regulatory norms becomes a form of per se negligence; that the regulatory rules 
support some de minimis norm of duty, of a necessary but perhaps insufficient level 
of care. On the other hand, some courts have found regulatory compliance to 
function as sufficient indicia of a met duty of care; this is called a “defense of 
regulatory compliance.”80 
The concept of regulatory compliance as a defense to liability is less positively 
viewed by the literature. It has been rejected by many legal systems.81 There are 
several reasons. Regulatory standards are often set as minima, neither as ideal levels 
 
77  Id. 
78  Shavell addressed the theoretical origins of stickiness in a discussion on insurance contracts 
over long time periods, see Shavell 1976. Stickiness is related to a variety of phenomena, 
primarily the complex interactions of various transaction costs that prevent more continuous 
adjustments to pricing/cost data over time. In this study, regulations are discussed as a form 
of technology and the choice to adopt up-to-date technologies is affected so that the choice of 
technology becomes sticky, the regulations are not frequently updated. 
79  For a seminal paper on path dependency on effects of technological choice, see W. B. Arthur, 
Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 Econ. J. 116 
(1989). 
80  Shavell, supra at note 13, at 365; M. G. Faure & R. Van den Bergh, Negligence, Strict Liability 
and Regulation of Safety Under Belgian Law: An Introductory Economic Analysis, 12:43 Geneva 
papers on Risk and Insurance 95, 110 (1987); C. D. Kolstad, T. S. Ulen & G. V. Johnson, Ex Post 
Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 
888, 888-901 (1990); and P. Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of 
External Costs, 19(2) Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 227 (1999)  
81  See Faure & Ruegg 1994, at 55-56. 
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nor as targeted levels of activity; therefore the enabling of a regulatory compliance 
defense resets the liability rule from strict liability to a negligence rule with a 
regulatorily defined level of care.82  
Effective removal of incentives to achieve more efficient levels of activity and 
care eliminates the effectiveness of both strict liability rules and negligence rules, as 
the regulatorily defined level of care is likely to omit many potential events which 
an otherwise undefined duty of care standard could have been taken into account at 
trial.83  
It has been formally proven that rational actors should respond to regulatory 
compliance defense rules by limiting their precautions to those required by the 
regulations even if more efficient levels of accidents lay beyond those 
requirements.84 If such actors did receive benefit of a regulatory compliance defense 
and if their legal environment were to lack counterbalancing rules of civil liability, 
then inefficient decisions on preventative care levels would likely result.  
The regulatory compliance defense rule also presents a hazard of regulatory 
capture wherein the operator has an incentive to limit both the completeness of the 
regulations and the enforcement levels of those regulations.85 This in turn presents a 
quis custodiet ipsos custodes concern, in that additional measures might be required to 
monitor the civil servants impacted by such efforts.  
Tort law, especially as developed under the common law system, acted as a 
gap-filler for the limitations of regulatory efforts.86 No regulatory system is ever 
complete or perfect, and some device is needed to maintain both adaption to change 
and justice under new circumstances. The application of a regulatory compliance 
defense rule would eliminate that role for tort law and leave the overall system 
more friable. 
4. Coordination of liability rules and regulations 
The interactions of regulatory guidelines on the interpretation of tort law 
responsibilities have long been recognized as non-simple. But there are many 
reasons to suspect that the two systems of accident management could be used in a 
complementary manner. 87  Indeed, Gunningham and Sinclair have stated that 
 
82  Shavell, supra at note 13, at 365. See also Faure & Van den Bergh, supra at note 80, at 110; 
FAURE, supra at note 69, at 254. 
83  Burrows, supra at note 80. 
84  Kolstad, Ulen & Johnson, supra at note 80, at 888-901; Burrows, supra at note 80. 
85  M. G. Faure, I. M. Koopmans & J. C. Oudijk, Imposing Criminal Liability on Government Officials 
under Environmental Law: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 18 Loy. LA Int'l & Comp. LJ 529 
(1995). 
86  S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, Environmental Liability Law, in: INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, 
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 
AND LIABILITY, 223, 123 (1992).  
87  See Kolstad, Ulen & Johnson, supra at note 80. See also ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra at note 86, and 
see S. Rose-Ackerman, Public Law versus Private Law in Environmental Regulation: European 
Union Proposals in the Light of United States Experience, 4(4) Rev. Eur. Commun. & Int’l Envtl L. 
312 (1995). See also Faure & Ruegg 1994. And see also Burrows, supra at note 80. And see A. 
Æ
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“’single instrument’ or ‘single strategy’ approaches are misguided,” but that “in the 
large majority of circumstances (though certainly not all), a mix of instruments is 
required, tailored to specific policy goals”88 There is a broad understanding within 
the literature that for environmental hazards, the coordinated implementation of 
civil liability rules and regulations could be more robust than the singular 
application of either.89 
Several main arguments have been raised.  
The effectiveness of the regulations depends greatly upon the underlying 
effectiveness of the regulatory body to enforce the regulations. In certain situations, 
it might be desirable to “belt and suspenders” by using the complementary private 
aspect of civil liability rules to ensure that risky activities remained monitored when 
regulatory bodies face enforcement challenges.90 
Regulatory bodies, and the regulators inside them, face targeted efforts to 
lobby them and capture their agenda; this effort to refocus regulatory control is 
known as agency capture. Employment of civil liability rules reduces the 
effectiveness of agency capture. 91 
There are other logical reasons for a complementary implementation of both 
civil liabilities and regulations. A regulatory body can work to collect and then 
publicize the missing information that prevented civil liability rules from being 
effective; i.e., the regulatory body can assist in fixing Shavell’s missing market or 
market failure. Or, rules of civil liability might be useful in mitigating the Nyborg & 
Telle problem of ‘regulatory loss of control’; the parallel existence of private 
enforcement from civil liability claims could reduce the tortfeasor’s expectation of 
evasion.92  
The development of regulations can also be used as a sort of de minimis duty of 
care; the ability to spot the tortfeasor’s failure to attain the regulatory-set minimums 
could provide courts with a lower cost method to identify when negligence occurs. 
This use of regulations is referred to as negligence per se. The reverse of this logic 
would be to suggest that attainment of regulatory standards could act as a proof 
that the prescriptive duty of care was met; this argument has not found broad 
support among economists. 
Regulations, especially those traditionally labeled ‘command and control,’ are 
systems that contain both benefits and flaws. The singular application of a public 
regulatory framework has been modeled as potentially adverse to the morale of the 
public.93 This is in part because the uniformity of the adopted regulations removes 
 
Arcuri, Controlling Environmental Risk in Europe: the Complementary Role of an EC Environmental 
Liability Regime, 15(2) Tijdschrift voor Milieuaansprakelijkheid 39 (2001). See also Faure, supra 
at note 9, at 143 and see Faure, supra at note 9, at 24. 
88  N. Gunningham & D. Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental 
Protection, 21 L & Pol’y 49, 50 (1999). 
89  Faure & Weishaar, supra at note 3, at 405-406. 
90  Faure, supra at note 9, at 143. See also See Faure, supra at note 9, at 24. 
91  Id.; id. 
92  See Van den Bergh & Visscher, supra at note 1, for a discussion of the Nyborg & Telle problem 
within their discussion of compliance strategies as an alternative to deterrence strategies. 
93  B. S. Frey, Morality and Rationality in Environmental Policy, 22(4) J. Consumer Pol’y 395 (1999). 
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the choice making from the tortfeasor and victim and places it elsewhere; 94 the 
active ‘decider’ has become the process that drafts and enacts regulations.95 
Regulations may be expensive to operate,96 may be poorly focused on activity 
instead of results, may be insufficiently written to achieve optimal targets, may 
prevent decentralization, and they may effectively reduce incentives for tortfeasors 
to achieve optimal levels of precaution and activity level setting.97 Many of these 
flaws are inherent in the benefits; e.g., the expenses of operating a regulatory 
framework are often due to the costs of collecting information about the various 
tortfeasors and the character of their activities – this is the very collection of data 
that was valued as a reason to implement regulations.  
As such, where regulations are weak is often well aligned with where civil 
liability rules are efficient; thus the argument for the complementary 
implementation of civil liability rules and regulations is well founded.  
4.1. Civil Liabilities defend against agency costs and lobby capture 
A central problem to the effective exercise of positive regulation is that it needs to 
be administered by human agents who may not always be properly aligned with 
the aims of the regulation itself; “public enforcement agents do not always have the 
right incentives.” 98 Actors within the regulatory body may thus set regulatory 
standards that deviate from the optimal set of standards, vis-à-vis what they would 
have done unimpeded. 
First, there are a couple of reasons for that problem that regulatory bodies can 
become inefficient without external distractions. Internal bureaucratic processes, 
such as who gets promoted, may be at odds (perhaps innocently due to simple 
complexity) with the broader regulatory targets. 99 Also, there are substantial agency 
costs in the administration of public regulations. 100  Agency costs are a term 
developed to describe the various transaction costs of administering public 
regulations, but the term is primarily focused on the concept of lobby capture and 
other means in which the regulator receives incentives contrary to original design of 
the regulations.101  
 
94  Id. 
95  As Frey stated, even the movement towards market based incentives to reinforce regulatory 
frameworks is very much akin to selling indulgences, it provides the wrong message that 
environmental error can be washed clean with cash when in fact much of that damage 
cannot. Id. 
96  Rules of civil liability are generally seen as a “relatively cheap instrument” in contrast to the 
“higher system costs” of regulation. The formulation of detailed ex ante norms, the 
coordination costs of aligning inconsistent policies across divergent bureaucracies, and the 
costs of monitoring can all lead to regulations being more costly than rules of civil liability. 
See Van den Bergh & Visscher, supra at note 1.  
97  See Faure, supra at note 9, at 26. 
98  Hylton, supra at note 7, at 5. 
99  Id. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
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Second, Hylton proposed that the specificity of regulations themselves 
encourages the tortfeasor to lobby to engage in the drafting and determination of 
those rules in ways that are unavailable within the framework of private 
litigation. 102 He added that concentrated interest groups would be able to bring 
such lobbying efforts forwards, whereas private citizens would be blocked by the 
transaction costs of integration and representation. 103. Hylton argued that such 
resultant regulations might look harsh at first glance but would actually be friendly 
(i.e. sub-optimal from a general welfare perspective) to the industry that brought the 
lobbying effort to the regulatory body.104  
By the provision of a rule of civil liability alongside standards set by 
regulation, it becomes less cost-effective for industry groups to lobby solely 
regulatory bodies as those bodies no longer offer “one-stop shopping” for 
regulatory relief. Especially as regulatory compliance is generally not accepted as a 
defense in most jurisdictions, see supra Section 3.2, those actors who would have 
sought to gain regulatory shielding would find themselves still exposed where rules 
of civil liability enabled victims to pursue damages in court.  
4.2. Revelation of hidden information 
Private litigation, especially negligence lawsuits, produces ex post information to the 
public.105 This production of ex post information can be transformed into informed 
ex ante rules.  
The victim is an expert on injuries suffered, the tortfeasor is an expert on the 
activity and precaution options, the attorneys can bring forth various other experts 
into the courtroom; all of these testimonies are further focused by the actual 
incident of a specific and historical harming.106 This is advantageous, cost-wise, over 
the ex ante parliamentary or administrative discussions prior to the drafting of 
regulations which need address a wider range of potential harms and hazards over 
a wider range of potential parties. The benefits of litigating ripe cases with present 
injuries provides a much richer data set than otherwise obtainable:  
ȾA public regulatory scheme could not hope to match the negligence system 
in terms of its scope, detail, and encapsulation of private information. To do so 
would require public agents to discover ex ante how much a potential victim would 
be hurt by a specific injury, and how much it would cost a potential injurer to avoid 
the injury.” 107 
 
102  Id., at 7. 
103  Id., at 7-8. But see also M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups (Harvard Economic Studies, 1971). 
104  Hylton, supra at note 7, at 7-8. Given the modern development of private interest lobbying 
groups from all sectors of life, perhaps this argument is not as strong as it might once have 
been. 
105  Id., at 8. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
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As tort cases are resolved, conduct norms emerge, predicated on real-life 
events and data.108 As additional courts continue to process the conduct norms in 
civil liability litigation, there is the potential for stable expectations to develop on 
likely outcomes; these expectations form the basis of ex ante rules for all future 
accidents and risk planning. 109 
4.3. Regulatory noncompliance as negligence per se 
While the idea of negligence per se is not a necessary logical result, it does provide 
the benefit of reinforcing the regulatory regime with the power of the tort system if 
the regulatory system itself lacks the ability to ensure compliance or effective 
policing. Additionally, the idea of per se negligence also reduces certain transaction 
costs for courts attempting to find clear means of defining a minimal duty level of 
care as the regulations can provide clear structure where the common law may yet 
be vague and undefined.  
The drafting of regulations also usually provides a certain due process and 
openness to community voices so that the regulations may suggest and include 
concerns that might not otherwise be readily apparent in an adversarial courtroom 
setting. The engagement of the concept of per se negligence does provide a certain 
marriage of tort liability and regulatory command and control; the use of tort law to 
reinforce a regulatory system and the use of a regulation to assist the process of tort 
law liability would appear to provide some resilience to both sides.110.  
Yet, Shavell demonstrated that negligence per se might lead certain actors to 
become overcautious because their efficient care level would have been the level set 
by the regulations. 111 
4.4. Coordinated use of civil liability and regulations 
On the other hand, there can be useful applications of regulatory frameworks to 
liability rule systems. While most papers debate the comparative efficiencies, as if 
only one could be applied to the exclusion of the other, a growing trend of research 
in law and economics’ suggests that the joint-implementation of civil liabilities and 
regulations may be incrementally beneficial beyond the singular implementation of 
either.112 
 
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra at note 86. See also FAURE, supra at note 69. 
111  Shavell, supra at note 13; with reference to 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984). See also FAURE, supra at 
note 69. 
112  Schmitz listed Kolstad, Ulen & Johnson, supra at note 80, and Shavell, supra at note 13; with 
reference to 15 Rand J. Econ. 271 (1984), as the only two such articles that pre-dated his article 
from 2000. P. W. Schmitz, On The Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 20 Int’l Rev. L. 
Econ. 371, 2 (2000). Since then, there have been many more such studies. E.g., these are some 
of the most cited such articles, according to Google Scholar: 
i. M. Boyer & D. Porrini, Modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of 
social welfare, 37(3) Can. J. Econ. /Revue Canadienne d'économique 590 (2004).  
Æ
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As was shown by Shavell, the application of civil liability rules are frustrated 
by informational uncertainty. 113  More recently, Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson 
demonstrated that regulatory frameworks, with their ex ante clarifications on 
appropriate levels of care, can be implemented to correct the inefficiencies of 
negligence rules facing informational uncertainties.114  
Schmitz extended the same family of Shavell-Landes-Posner models in the 
development of his system.115 Schmitz finds that when tortfeasors face different 
budgetary assumptions, then civil liabilities and regulations can be complementary 
and optimal.116 The Schmitz model relies on a strict liability rule as its modeled civil 
liability rule within an unilateral accident model from Shavell.117  
When the regulatory optimand is developed without reliance on a civil 
liability rule, and if injurers are heterogeneous with regards to wealth, then the 
complementary use of regulations and civil liability rules may lead to reduced 
social cost; this is contract to when only regulatory rules or only civil liability rules 
would be enforced exclusively.118 That scenario has two extreme forms.  
i. When the population of tortfeasors is poor then regulations would be 
more socially cost efficient. 119   
ii. When all of the tortfeasors are wealthy, then civil liability is more 
efficient.120  
It is demonstrated by the model that when civil liability is employed alongside of 
regulatory frameworks, that the regulatory standard should be set lower than it 
would have been if the regulatory framework was designed without a 
corresponding civil liability rule.121  
 
ii. P. Calcott & S. Hutton, The choice of a liability regime when there is a regulatory 
gatekeeper, 51(2) J. Envtl. Econ. Mgmt. 153 (2006). 
iii. G. De Geest & G. Dari-Mattiacci, Soft Regulators, Tough Judges, 15(1) Supreme Ct. 
Econ. Rev. 119 (2007). 
iv. R. Innes, Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and 
ex-ante regulation, 24(1) Int’l Rev. L. Econ. 29 (2004). 
v. J. G. Zivin, R. E. Just, & D. Zilberman, Risk Aversion, Liability Rules, and Safety. 25(4) 
Int’l Rev. L. Econ. 604 (2005). 
113  Shavell 1980. 
114  Kolstad, Ulen & Johnson, supra at note 80. 
115  Schmitz, supra at note 112, at 3. He also makes reference to an earlier survey by Schäfer & Ott, 
which is in turn coordinated with the more recent Schäfer models presented in Chapter 5, 
supra. C. Ott & H. B. Schäfer, Negligence as Untaken Precaution, Limited Information, and Efficient 
Standard Formation in The Civil Liability System, 17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 15 (1997). 
116  Schmitz, supra at note 112, at 3. 
117  Id., at 11. 
118  Id., at 9. 
119  Id. 
120  Id., at 10. 
121  Id., at 3-4, and at 10. 
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4.5. Grounds for deference to rules of civil liability 
Private tort litigation, relying on rules of civil liability, enables private actors to 
bypass those problems by simply eliminating the middle-man problem. 122  As 
described, supra in Chapter 5, the economic models of civil liability demonstrate 
that private litigation can bring damages to the tortfeasor sufficient to provide 
incentives to the tortfeasor to alter his behavior to achieve reasonably efficient care. 
Private actors can achieve efficient behaviors from tortfeasors without the agency 
costs of the central bureaucrats, at least theoretically.123  
There is also an institutional arrangements argument to be made, that common 
law civil liability rules, and to a certain extent civil law’s judicial mandates within 
civil liability as well, provide a “flexible, undefined structure” with which to solve 
tortious disputes. 124  Tort law provides that injuries can be redressed in court 
without too much in the way of specifics delineating which injuries are permitted 
redress or not. 125 The regulatory structure is the opposite, it “has more structure 
and definition” and offers detailed rules. 126   
It can be argued that private litigation provides a better defense to over-
zealous use of resources to achieve enforcement of the legal norms, in contrast to the 
risks posed by the central bureaucrats.127. Private litigators need produce their own 
capital resources for litigation and thus must limit their activity to the expected 
outcomes of the litigation; this is a key concept within the theoretical models of civil 
liability. 128  Research literature has demonstrated that government agencies can 
become trapped in political rhetoric or in zealous pursuit of compliance and expend 
disproportionate sums on lesser problems, economically speaking.129  
While not explicitly stated in Hylton’s argument, it appears in contrast to his 
argument on private litigators that he finds regulators bound by neither capital 
budgets of enforcement nor by the effective costs of their imposed sanctions; the 
regulators are argued to operate beyond economic feedbacks to match the sanctions 
to the harm in proper alignment as suggested by theoretical economic models of 
 
122  Hylton, supra at note 7, at 6. 
123  Id. See also Hylton's model to see his argument on the resilience of various civil liability rules 
to achieve those ends. Infra, at Appendix II C. 
124  Id., at 7. 
125  Id. Hylton remains squarely within reference to common law, but there does not appear to be 
any substantial contrast with the civil code notions of routine tort and their support of 
redress by civil liability. Perhaps his argument could have been made more broadly. 
126  Id. 
127  Id., at 6. 
128  Id. 
129  Hylton refers to the research of Viscusi and Hamilton, which has revealed economic 
problems with the execution of various hazardous waste clean-up sites in the United States. 
They demonstrated that regulators often required million dollar solutions to problems posing 
harms of magnitudes less. See id., citing to W. K. Viscusi & J. T. Hamilton, Are Risk Regulators 
Rational? Evidence from Hazardous Waste Cleanup Decisions, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. 1010, (1999). 
180_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
Public and Private Regulation 
150 
civil liability. 130  Essentially, the private litigation system presents an effective 
equivalent to the “public with prices” model of public regulations.131  
4.6. Potential symmetries of policy effects 
Hylton provided a taxonomy of public and private civil liability and regulations.132 
The means of law enforcement are bifurcated into two major camps, that of public 
law and that of private law.133 Then public law is divided into rule compliance or 
sanctions-driven law and into taxes and fees or prices-driven law. The first 
grouping is labeled public law with controls and the latter grouping as public law 
with prices.134 Private law is divided into private with strict liability and private 
with conduct norms, negligence and nuisance fall into the latter category.135 The 
environmental regulatory structure in the U.S. is described as public law with 
controls system; the U.S. is described as very short on implementations of public 
laws with prices. 136 
Hylton stated that the public law with prices system should be equal in 
function and efficiency to private law with a strict liability system. 137  
But traditional common law in the U.S. has not had such a pure system of 
private with strict liability, so that abstract system of economically driven 
mechanisms remains largely untested within the U.S. for environmental torts. 138 
What the U.S. has traditionally had is a large system of private with conduct 
norms. 139 A list of such rules is given: (i) trespass, (ii) nuisance, (iii) Ryland-based 
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities.140  
 
130  A “Bleak House” argument is made therein that bureaucracies are likely to see the 
enforcement of regulations as a “full employment program” that has little regard for the 
actual regulatory ends. It is unclear to the present author that American rules on financing 
tort trials are any less subject to abuse and thus limits this argument from Hylton as 
potentially rhetorical and not scientific. See Hylton, supra at note 7, at 6. Dicken's arguments 
were indeed against private litigators. See Charles Dickens, Bleak House, 1853. 
131  Hylton, supra at note 7, at 7. 
132  Id., at 1-2. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. 
135  Id. 
136  Id., at 2. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. 
140  Hylton states that while the Ryland standard is a form of strict liability, it is quite distinct 
from the standard form developed with law and economics literature. The common law 
version under Ryland requires an analysis of the defendant’s conduct, his state of mind about 
the activity and ultimately the general activities of the local community. These are all 
softeners that cause Ryland liability to approach the functional description of negligence with 
a very high duty of care. Id., at 2. 
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5. Private regulations  
5.1. Standard setting by private groups 
A key difference between rules of civil liability and public regulations is who sets 
the standards; in private regulations, a set of private actors who are expected to be 
uniquely well-informed as to the technologies, benefits, and potential injuries of a 
specific activity are the standard setters. These standards might arise as industrial 
norms, 141  as official rules of professional associations, 142  or as standards of 
recommended practices from industrial associations.143 Such standards reflect the 
expertise of the practitioners within their relevant industries or technological 
specialties.  
When it comes to regulating risks and hazards from industrial activities, a 
reasonable question to ask is who might have the best information on the actual 
risks and potential acts of precautions; one might expect that those most engaged in 
the activity would be well versed in such knowledge.144 Private regulation works on 
the assumption that the collective group of actors engaged in those types of 
activities would be well informed to determine best available practices and be able 
to respond to the most recent of innovations. Private regulation also relies on the 
idea that the collective group of actors is self-interested to optimize the balance of 
their private profits and their duties to pay damages – but by combining knowledge 
sets beyond the individual tortfeasor the collective group might be able to discover 
more optimal solutions.145  
However, private regulations need not be a collection of the tortfeasors, it 
could be based on another group of parties similar deeply engaged in the issues of 
the activity but a group distinct from the tortfeasors.146 Such groups have been 
referred to as surrogate regulators.147 They could be drawn from public interest 
 
141  E.g., the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) 
provides a wide variety of industrial standards across many sections of the economy. 
Available at http://standards.ieee.org . 
142  E.g., see the ethical rules adopted by the American Medical Association. Available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics.page . 
143  E.g., the American Petroleum Institute (API) maintains an “inventory of over 600 standards 
and recommended practices.” See ‘Publications, Standards, and Statistics Overview’, at API. 
Available at  http://www.api.org/publications-standards-and-statistics . 
144  The argument is not made here that such parties would be the best informed, but rather, only 
that such parties ought to reasonably knowledgeable about such concerns. Due to the 
potential advancement of technology and related matters, and their likely involved role in 
that development, they might also be in possession of relevant information in advance of 
other parties such as regulators. 
145  In this sense, it is not unlike the logic of strict liability, but it does impose the consensus result 
of the private regulation; that requirement to meet such a regulatory obligation could undo 
several advantages of strict liability such as decentralization.  
146  Gunningham, Phillipson, & Grabosky, supra at note 6. 
147  Id., at 212. 
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groups, 148 from commercial third parties such as green consumers or financial 
investors, 149insurance institutions, 150 or environmental consultants. 151 When this 
form of private regulation is co-integrated with public regulatory efforts then the 
approach has been called “integrated regulatory design.”152 
Private regulation might be effective for methane hydrate projects and 
operators. The operator would face a private need to address its investors and 
shareholders to validate that it responsibly engaged in methane hydrate operations 
as a capital project to earn revenues and profits with an appropriate level of risk.153 
Currently in offshore oil and gas operations, it is common for a group of energy 
companies to invest together in a common project and have one of those companies 
act as operator. The joint-venturers retain rights to inspect and audit the 
management and oversight of the offshore projects. As such, it is efficient for the 
energy companies to have common standards across similar projects to enable both 
consistent training for attaining those standards and to facilitate audits as standards 
would be consistent at each project.154 Or, perhaps private regulation arises in an 
integrated regulatory design, wherein a collection of private but engaged groups 
could assist in the development and oversight of private regulations for offshore 
methane hydrates operations. 
5.2. Nimbleness and flexibility of private regulation 
Miller stated that private enterprise is more flexible than bureaucratic organs at 
adapting to change. 155  This would be critical in an industry undergoing rapid 
technological innovation and development, especially if the expertise to follow such 
advancements required years of study and experience that would be difficult for 
new entrants to achieve. Bureaucratic organs are also challenged by requirements of 
due process and public deliberation to which private enterprises are not subjected, 
thus private enterprises can process new information and reach decisions quicker.  
One of the problems to be faced in any nascent industry with innovative 
technologies is the speed at which lessons learned can be transformed into guidance 
 
148  Id. 
149  Id., at 214 and 216. 
150  Id., at 217. 
151  Id., at 218. 
152  Id., at 220. 
153  It would be reasonable to assume that the operator and its board would have created internal 
incentives to better obtain such results. As such, it is reasonable to work with a rational 
model of a profit-seeking operator that would be responsive to economic incentives provided 
by the rules of civil liability or by either public or private regulations. 
154  Therein lies the basis of the 600-odd “standards and recommended practices” maintained by 
the API. See the prior footnote, supra. Offshore contracts are thus able to refer to standards by 
their serial numbers enabling the ready inclusion of the standards without new negotiations 
at each project. 
155  J. C. Miller III, The FTC and Voluntary Standards: Maximizing the Net Benefits of Self-Regulation, 4 
Cato J. 897 (1984); and see A. I. Ogus, Rethinking Self-Regulation, 15 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 97, 98 
(1995). 
183_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Chapter 6 
 153 
and normative rule setting. Bureaucracies might be poorly staffed to respond to 
rapidly advancing technologies or they may lack funding or opportunities to 
investigate rapidly advancing technologies. Even executive branches of government 
that are more responsive to daily and short-term needs experience difficulty 
obtaining sufficient information to develop regulations without extensive support 
from those parties actively engaged in the development of the new technologies and 
their industrial uses. One should expect no difference with regards to methane 
hydrate projects. 
5.3. Informational advantages of private regulation 
The operator should already be aware of the costs and technologies involved in 
achieving the efficient level of accidents and could therefore develop the new 
necessary standards more cheaply than bureaucrats due to that informational 
advantage. 156  Additionally, the operator would need to bear its own costs of 
operations and maintain a profit-seeking optimand from its investors and 
shareholders, so the operator will be bound to achieve both an efficient level of 
accidents and safety and an efficient usage of its capital resources.  
It is likely that the operators will have better information than governmental 
actors on the technologies and best practices for efficiently operating methane 
hydrate projects.157 In that case, it would be simpler, cheaper and more efficient for 
the operator to develop the necessary guidance to achieve the efficient level of 
accidents, once that level is determined.  
Additionally, to the extent that a grouping of operators could develop the 
procedures, some form of industry organization, there would be potential for 
private standards to evolve and become privately enforced. E.g., many oil and gas 
projects are joint venture projects with joint investment by several operators but 
managed and operated by a single specific operator. In an example wherein the 
operators ex ante agreed to certain standards and norms of operational procedures 
for a methane hydrate project, then those other non-operating investors would want 
the rights and permissions to audit that the operator was indeed enforcing the 
agreed to standards and norms and that their investments were soundly within 
planning guidelines. So long as the private regulations were acceptable to both 
governmental and other agencies, the costs of enforcement and policing would be 
born by those profiting from the on-going operations of the methane hydrate 
project. This method of private regulation could be a potentially large welfare effect 
for the operator/investors, the government cum regulator, and the public-at-large.  
 
156  Id.; and id. 
157  See A. I. Ogus, Rethinking Self-Regulation, 15 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 97 (1995); and see A. I. OGUS, 
Self-Regulation in: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2000) 
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5.4. Perceived caveats on private regulation 
There are concerns on the capability of private regulation to provide fair and 
efficient regulation of risky activities:158  
i. Industry needs to earn public trust,  
ii. Danger of weak enforcement,  
iii. Self-serving regulation, not necessarily in public interest,  
iv. Creation of barriers to entry,  
v. Uncertain legitimacy within democratic and open societies, and  
vi. Governmental limits and “conditional self-regulation.” 
It has been often held that industry, and the rise of the industrial revolution, was 
responsible for the need for stronger tort law systems.159 However, what may have 
been more central to the rise of tort law in the 1800s may have been the increasing 
cases of stranger to stranger encounters which were facilitated by the changes in 
industry, transportation, and urban living that were contemporaneous to the 
industrial era.160 
When industries are allowed to provide private regulation for themselves, they 
need to be able to provide strict compliance and enforcement of those regulations. 
When the structure of joint ventures is taken into account, that common groups of 
investing corporations divide operational roles across different projects but that all 
of the corporations are on both sides of the fence, it becomes clear that perverse 
incentives could arise to allow slack enforcement at one location to receive 
counterbalancing slack enforcement at another location. Without a party external to 
this daisy-chain of enforcement, the “buck is passed” along the chain without 
certainty of enforcement. When combined with the dangers of weak enforcement, 
private regulation can become ineffective. 
Additionally, traditional joint venturers rely heavily on contractors and other 
parties to provide critical services and support roles; yet, those contractors are in 
need of good relationships with their clients to ensure and secure access to future 
work assignments. This tension between operational roles and service relationships 
creates an atmosphere wherein the contractors are potentially reluctant to speak out 
although they might actually be the actor best able to confirm or audit the 
maintenance of the agreed to private regulations.  
Private regulation has been doubted to take into account as many voices as 
might be heard by a bureaucratic organ more concerned with due process and 
transparency; the source of the efficiency of the private regulation is ultimately also 
a problem spot for private regulation. What the industrial groups decide to target as 
 
158  A. J. Campbell, Self-regulation and the Media, 51 Fed. Comm. L. J. 711, 717 (1998); T. W. Reader, 
Is Self-Regulation the Best Option for the Advertising Industry in the European Union--An 
Argument for the Harmonization of Advertising Laws through the Continued Use of Directives, 16(1) 
U. Penn. J. Int’l L., 181 (1995), at 182 and 210. 
159  G. W. White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History, 16 (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2003) 
160  Id. 
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efficient levels of accidents may not align with other parties exposed to the risk. E.g., 
an operator of a methane hydrate project might have lower regards or lower levels 
of knowledge for benthic micro-fauna than other interested individuals. Or, e.g., an 
operator might have a high regard for the integrity of its well field but low regards 
for the pre-existing recreational utility of that sea surface that long time community 
members may have previously enjoyed. As such, private regulation could 
potentially emerge as incomplete and in need of public adjustment or correction. 
For methane hydrate projects, there will likely be many voices and many concerns 
that would need to be integrated into a broader more cohesive set of standards and 
regulations in order to garner broad public support prior to the early onset of 
development and production activities. Private industry could muster an effort to 
coordinate such an engagement, but it is probably more efficient for all parties to 
rely on those political processes already present within open democracies to handle 
the development of new regulations.161 
There is a concern that private regulation could be used by those already in the 
industry to prevent the entry of additional market participants. The industrial 
insiders, as it were, could conspire to set standards too high or in a manner too 
difficult to comply with for those new to the industry. Also, to the extent that the 
enforcement was left in the hands of the same private actors, there could be 
concerns that the overall enforcement could be applied unevenly to benefit the 
original members of the collective. It is unclear just how many “new entrants” there 
might be to the methane hydrate industry as it does not yet even exist.162 This 
particular problem is probably not sufficiently ripe for consideration in the 
regulation over methane hydrate projects.  
Democracies promote the ideal that laws are publicly drafted through 
transparent procedures, vetted by the public via various forms of openness 
including privately held media, and ultimately approved of and legislated into law 
or regulation by democratic elected proxies or representatives. Even those systems 
that provide broad powers to judges to enact effective legislation provide ample 
recourse to judicial reversal and constitutional cassation of those decisions. The 
development of private regulation, putatively behind closed doors by private 
interests, could readily appear to be the opposite of a democratic process. To the 
effect that the private regulations are developed in lieu of public regulations, it 
could further appear that the process could potentially be a by-pass of the role of 
the democratic government to determine public policy and to provide for the public 
welfare. Arguments could also clearly be made that even public laws are often 
drafted in rooms with few attendants and that private regulations can be drafted 
 
161  Once those regulations are settled and agreed upon, perhaps those regulations could be 
implemented privately. In that sense, this discussion anticipates the issues of conditional self-
regulation, discussed infra. 
162  Silicon Valley provides many ready examples of well-entrenched firms that suddenly found 
themselves sharing their market space with new and very competitive entrants; e.g. Boeing 
and Elon Musks’s SpaceX. While barriers might be created that required previous experience 
with oil or gas, it might be equally reasonable that whoever met survive vetting at the public 
licensing stage might well be able to address such private regulatory barriers as well.  
186_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
Public and Private Regulation 
156 
with inputs from multiple community voices. Nevertheless, it would appear that 
private regulation does bear the burden of demonstrating the resultant regulations 
and guidelines are at least as good and as balanced as what might have emerged 
from a more democratic process if the private regulations are to gather public 
support for their usage in lieu of those public regulations.  
All in all, the above conclusions lead to the development of conditional private 
regulation, that private regulation works best if coordinated and monitored to some 
extent by public authorities. Governments can limit the application of private 
regulation to certain aspects of operations or require the inclusion of a wider range 
of voices in the development of the regulations. The government can impact either 
the development of the regulations, the means of enforcing the regulations, or both. 
In this manner, it is hoped that some of the efficiencies of the private enterprise can 
be dove-tailed with the open transparency and inclusive character of public 
legislation. Certainly, for novel industries such as methane hydrate production it 
will be important to get as broad a consensus as possible in the development and 
acceptance of any form of private regulation.  
6. Conclusion – Regulations in harmony with rules of civil liability  
“Given the fact that (for a variety of reasons) all policy instruments 
seem to have particular advantages, but also suffer from particular 
weaknesses, it may be optimal to use the strengths of particular policy 
instruments in an optimal way in combination with other 
instruments.”163 
 
This chapter has established the place of public and private regulations to set 
standards for optimal levels of activity and precaution. It has found that public 
regulations can function alongside private regulation in integrated regulatory 
mechanisms.  
It has also found that rules of civil liability, and strict liability in particular, and 
regulations could be complementarily implemented. In the next chapter, where the 
circumstances of offshore methane hydrates are reviewed in light of the findings of 
this and the previous chapter, the recommendation will be made that a rule of strict 
liability should be implemented alongside an integrated regulatory mechanism with 
both public and private regulations.  
Several reasons to adopt and employ regulations were presented in this 
chapter. Regulations can rebalance information asymmetries and restore full 
function to weak instances for rules of civil liability. Regulations can pursue 
tortfeasors where civil liability rules falter, such as when avoidance schemes or 
insolvency are present in tortfeasors. Regulation can assist when lawsuits are 
unlikely to be filed; regulatory bodies can unify disparate victims, can persist over 
time, and could have the capital, human, and technological resources that many 
victims might not. Additionally, regulatory bodies might be able to process claims 
 
163  See Faure, supra at note 9, at 40. 
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in their own manners, e.g. administrative courts, to provide a sense of due process 
that might otherwise be missing institutionally in some locales. 
It appears that often where one paradigm is weak, the other is more robust. In 
that sense, there is an opportunity to apply regulations in complementary fashion 
alongside of civil liability rules; it need not be an exclusive choice. To provide the 
tortfeasors with incentives from both the regulatory paradigm and the civil liability 
paradigm would provide the tortfeasors with a more complete portfolio of 
incentives to better ascertain efficient management of accidental risks in contrast to 
the limited basket of incentives provided by mere regulatory guidance.164 
But it is really in the complementary aspect that regulations gain their best 
effect. The power of the regulatory body to correct the market will attract those to 
‘correct’ the regulatory body; the coordinated implementation of civil liability rules 
would limit the potential distortion and recursively make the original attack on the 
regulatory body less attractive in the first place. Regulations help civil liabilities to 
function better, civil liabilities help the regulatory body to function better. 
In closing, neither paradigm is perfect, but in complementary implementation 
regulations and rules of civil liabilities can function closer to optimal than either 
would alone. Thus, it would be preferable to see joint implementation of regulations 
alongside a rule of civil liability for the governance of methane hydrates. 
  
 
164  See id., at 41. 
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GOVERNING WITH STRICT LIABILITY AND REGULATIONS 
The commercial development of offshore methane hydrates will necessitate 
planning for accidental risk. Due to the unique risks and hazards associated with 
the development of offshore methane hydrates, it is unlikely that their development 
would be capable of beginning without some form of ex ante risk governance 
mechanism such as civil liability or regulations. 
The commercial development of offshore methane hydrates will potentially 
provide both benefits and risks to the general public. If they are to be sustainably 
and safely developed, then the correct legal policy choices will need to be made. 
Should the risks and hazards be governed by rules of civil liability or by regulations; 
and if by civil liability, by strict liability or negligence? 
The present chapter is the third chapter within Part II, it serves to integrate the 
civil liability and regulation analysis of the previous two chapters with the unique 
circumstances of offshore methane hydrates as developed in Part I.  
The previous two chapters provided a review of under which circumstances a 
rule of strict liability might be efficiently employed and when a rule of negligence 
might be efficiently employed. They discussed the role of regulations, both public 
and private, to set standards. The previous chapter explored the potential for 
complementary implementation of multiple mechanisms to more completely 
address the risks and hazards of a targeted activity.  
The present chapter provides a review of the unique and distinguishing 
circumstances of offshore methane hydrates. It reviews the fundamental science of 
offshore methane hydrates. It provides a review of the benefits that the 
development of offshore methane hydrates might afford. It also discusses the risks 
and hazards posed by that same development. The present chapter then goes to 
demonstrate that a strict liability rule would be more robust than a rule of 
negligence for the unique circumstances of offshore methane hydrates. Then the 
chapter discusses the potential benefits of implementing both a rule of strict liability 
and public regulations. This present chapter will argue that the combination of strict 
liability and regulations, when implemented in a complementary fashion, would 
provide for optimal governance of the risks and hazards from offshore methane 
hydrate installations. The potential to complement both of those systems with 
private regulations is also addressed. 
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Following this present chapter is Part III, which will provide a review of 
existing laws and conventions for their match and fit with the recommendations of 
this present chapter.  Chapters in sequence will review conventions of the UN, 
international maritime and oil spill conventions, EU laws, and the federal laws of 
the U.S. Thereafter, Part IV will provide a summary and exposition of conclusions. 
Part IV also contains appendices of maps, mathematical notes, and reference listings. 
1. The character of offshore methane hydrate accidents 
The accidental risks of offshore methane hydrate projects are novel, as of 2014 no 
such fields were yet in commercial or even in sustained noncommercial 
development. There are engineering models from previous decades of experience in 
developing and producing offshore natural gas and crude oil reservoir systems, but 
there will remain much novelty to be integrated into the knowledge bases that will 
provide for the decision processes in implementing both strict liability-based and 
negligence-based safety planning. 
The risks of cataclysmic accidents are unique to the specific operations of 
offshore methane hydrate fields; routine and ordinary human activities at sea are 
not known to have ever triggered these events. Sudden massive venting of methane, 
subsea landslides, tsunamis and earthquakes do not traditionally result from the 
types of activities undertaken by the communities located adjacent to the methane 
hydrate deposits. As far as knowledge exists, while cataclysmic methane hydrate 
events have occurred in the geological past, they have never been triggered by any 
human activities prior to the onset of methane hydrate exploitation.  
The major harms and hazards of methane hydrate projects are reasonably 
described as unilateral in nature. The harms would result from activities primarily 
occurring in or near the production zone from which the methane hydrates are 
extracted. It is unlikely that anyone other than the operators and its affiliates and 
contractors would have access or normal reasons to be in adjacency to those areas of 
risk; thus, it is unlikely for bilateral accidents to occur. It is not impossible for 
bilateral accidents to occur,1 but the types of events would require such clearly 
unique actions that they are probably not justifiable as reasons to characterize 
methane hydrate risks as bilateral.2  
 
1  To the extent that third party causation needs to be considered, they do not necessarily 
require the use of bilateral accident models. E.gs:  
 (a) Commercial fishermen or mineral prospectors might engage in dangerous dredging or 
seismic operations that could trigger harms; but one assumes that basic permitting and 
responsibility for protecting the methane hydrate deposits properly belongs with the 
operator, thus even these intrusions are in some sense due to the failure of the operator and 
thus the accidents fit the unilateral characterization.  
 (b) Energy pirates attempting to steal access to hydrates or terrorists simply intent on havoc 
are another potential source of harm, and such risks exist today in the energy industry, but 
are generally seen as intervening sources of causation and thus outside of the realm of civil 
liability and more in the domain of criminal law and its enforcement. 
2  Arguendo, in a sense, it takes two for a house to fall, the homeowner with a house unprepared 
for tsunamis and an actor that sets off tsunamis. However, it is unclear if a house can truly be 
Æ
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2. Governing offshore methane hydrates with strict liability 
2.1. Arguments for applying strict liability to offshore methane hydrates 
2.1.1. The unilateral character of offshore methane hydrate projects 
As stated in section 4.1, immediately supra, the major harms and hazards of 
methane hydrate projects are reasonably described as unilateral in nature.  
Offshore methane hydrates would be generally located at sea removed from 
direct or normal interactions with onshore communities. The few potential 
interactions for potential victims to interact with the operational or hazardous areas 
of the hydrate fields would primarily be limited to surface craft crossing the field at 
water level. The vast majority of offshore methane hydrate fields lay beyond routine 
shoreline tourist activities and deep below routine skin or scuba diving activities. 
The main opportunity for accidental overlap and contributory risky acts from 
victims might be either commercial fishing that dredges nets too close to the mud 
layers or interferes with gathering lines or subsea mining operations; but those risks 
are routinely addressed within existing offshore installations and are not known to 
have created any major accidental events.3  
The primary risks are technologically, geologically, and operationally under 
the primary and likely sole control of the operator and its joint venturers and 
subcontractors; the opportunity for bilateral accidents is fairly limited.4 As such, the 
commercial development of offshore methane hydrate primarily presents accidents 
and hazards of a unilateral character. The rule of strict liability has repeatedly been 
found to be superior to the rule of negligence in governing unilateral accidents, thus 
strict liability should be applied to the governance of offshore methane hydrate 
installations and operations. 
2.1.2. Governing abnormally hazardous activities 
There are reasonable arguments that the development and operation of methane 
hydrate extraction installations could be seen as abnormally hazardous activities. 
 
prepared for the tsunamis it might face, at least within the routine budgets of ordinary 
homeowners. If homeowners cannot afford sufficient protection, ceteris paribus, it would 
appear that they are essentially unable to avoid damage and thus the accident would remain 
primarily unilateral in character. 
3  But both of those activities can be reasonably engaged with by the operator to alert those 
actors to the potential risks that they would be entering into should they draw too near. 
Indeed, one might readily assume that the operator would bear a certain responsibility under 
either rule of civil liability to ensure that trespassers are safely intercepted prior to any 
potential to disrupt safe operations. 
4  This particular analysis excludes events such as warfare or terrorism wherein the act against 
the safety and stability of the hydrate field is intentional and deliberate. 
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First, a review of Shavell’s Ultra-Hazardous Strict Liability Rule is developed, 5 
followed by a review of the Landes-Posner conditions for strict liability.6 
Shavell found that strict liability should be chosen as the rule of civil liability if 
(i) the underlying activities are uniquely identifiable, (ii) if the activity is worth 
controlling due to its imposition of non-negligible risks upon non-participant 
victims, and (iii) if the victim’s engagement with the risky activity is entirely normal 
and thus “activity that cannot and should not be controlled.”7  
Methane hydrate installations are clearly uniquely identifiable from other 
activities; they will be distinctive from both other forms of hydrocarbon extraction 
and of other offshore activities. Methane hydrates projects would pose non-
negligible risks onto non-participants; thus such activity is potentially worth 
controlling.8 Most victims would have no awareness of their interaction with the 
activities of the methane hydrate project other than that it exists and operates, the 
victims essentially do none other than maintain the lives they enjoyed prior to the 
onset of methane hydrate extraction activities. Thus elements (i) and (iii) are clearly 
met, but element (ii) is only partially met. Shavell’s model requires clarification on 
the issue of when does an activity merit control and when should that control be in 
the form of civil liability rules. However, one can reasonably infer that Shavell 
would have seen the potential for methane venting and subsea landslides as items 
worth controlling. Thus, all three elements would likely be seen as met, and 
Shavell’s ultra-hazardous rule would advocate for strict liability for offshore 
methane hydrate projects.  
The Landes-Posner conditions for strict liability require the satisfaction of four 
elements; strict liability should govern the activity: 
i. if the expected accidents costs are large,  
ii. if it is impossible for the risk of the accident to be reduced by addi-
tional precaution by the tortfeasor,  
iii. if it is impractical to alter the behavior of the victim in favor of the 
tortfeasor, and  
iv. if it is desirable to reduce risk by affecting the activity level of the tort-
feasor.9  
The potential harms from subsea landslides, offshore tsunamis, and potential 
environmental harms from methane and other emissions could certainly be costly. 
Both non-cataclysmic and cataclysmic accidents could pose massive discomforts 
and loss of livelihoods, loss of property, and potential injuries or deaths to humans, 
 
5  See discussion on point, supra, at ch. 5, sec. 2.2. 
6  Hylton’s related asymmetrical conditions for strict liability are addressed within appendices, 
infra, at Appendix II-C. 
7  See supra, at ch. 5, sec. 2.2. 
8  Somewhat adverse to Shavell's position, it is not a logical requirement that such spill-over 
risk mandates the imposition of social controls; Hylton's model provides a richer discussion 
on point. See the discussion on Hylton balancing of externalized social costs and benefits, 
infra at Appendix II-C. 
9  See discussion, supra, ch. 5, sec. 2.1. 
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fauna, and flora. The first aspect of the Landes-Posner conditions would likely be 
met in offshore methane hydrate accidents. 
It is not as clear that additional precautions would not affect the overall risk 
levels; given technological developments and on-going refinements to operational 
standards, one might assume that risks could be reduced. However, safety planners 
have to be responsive to the technologies and realities presented to them within 
their window of operational control, which be quarterly or annually measured.  
They will face fixed points of technology, budgets, and human and capital resources 
from which to optimize their accident management plans. As such, it is arguable 
that additional precautions would not be feasible once the initial plans are 
developed; while safety improvements might become available in future time 
periods they would be irrelevant for the prevention of accidents within the decision 
maker’s timeframe. Thus, arguendo, the second aspect of the Landes-Posner 
conditions would be met in offshore methane hydrate accidents. 
As argued in the previous paragraph, the victims have next to no interaction 
with the installations thus a certain policy goal would be to protect the daily lives 
and routines of the potential victims as much as possible. The third aspect of the 
Landes-Posner conditions would likely be met in offshore methane hydrate 
accidents. 
Finally, it is not clear that merely reducing the activity levels of the methane 
hydrate operator is a socially beneficial agenda; the commercial operation of 
methane hydrate fields could be potentially of much social value. However, the 
commercial operation of methane hydrate fields could also come with great harm 
and damage, those costs must be balanced against the previous opportunities for 
social welfare gains. Thus, there are many potential vectors within which the 
activity levels of certain parties or at certain locations should be curtailed by 
economic incentives. E.g., certain fields would present higher levels of risks than 
other fields; incentives should be provided to encourage operators to prefer the 
safer methane hydrate deposits. E.g., certain operators would be more technically, 
scientifically, and financially capable of safely managing offshore methane hydrate 
operations; incentives should be motivated to prevent incompetent operators from 
engaging in this industry.  As such, while the commercial development of offshore 
methane hydrate might avail of broad benefits to the general public, many vectors 
of its implementation could be severely adverse to the general public and thus 
public policy would likely want to govern the activity level in those sectors of the 
industry. As such, the fourth aspect of the Landes-Posner conditions would likely 
be met in offshore methane hydrate accidents. Given that all four conditions of the 
Landes-Posner test have been readily met, strict liability would be advised for the 
development of offshore methane hydrates.  
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2.1.3. Achieving decentralization 
The ability to achieve decentralization is a key concern; as discussed, supra,10 strict 
liability efficiently enables decentralization. Decentralization is the ability of each 
tortfeasor to make their own unique determination of how to attain the optimal 
levels of activity and precaution whilst observing their own private costs to attain 
those goals. Decentralization enables each tortfeasor to coordinate their private 
costs efficiently without the need to match an exogenously determined standard. 
Multiple researchers have presented models that suggest a rule of negligence often 
fails to obtain decentralization whereas a rule of strict liability more robustly does 
obtain it.11  
Decentralization has been demonstrated to be obtainable under certain 
versions of negligence. Miceli demonstrated that by carefully setting the duty of 
care to a high level, to that of the least cost of care tortfeasor,12 then the highest 
degree of “vigilance, care and precaution” could be attained alongside 
decentralization. Similar requirements could be set for rules applicable to methane 
hydrate extraction operations. Miceli’s methods also address the concerns that only 
under strict liability would a tortfeasor spend an efficient amount in search of 
precautionary technologies.13 Thus, the choice for a rule of negligence need not 
prevent the attainment of decentralization in governing accidents resultant from 
methane hydrate accidents.  
However, Miceli’s requirements to set the standard duty of care at the level of 
that “least cost of care tortfeasor” would likely require knowledge not available ex 
ante to initial accidents and litigation or prior to the development of an information 
obtaining regulatory framework. Making no argument here that such a regulatory 
framework is not also a public good; it suffices to say that strict liability would 
efficiently obtain decentralization prior to those collections of data by regulatory fiat.  
The onset of offshore methane hydrate operations will arrive with a host of 
new technologies and expertises that will for the most part be managed as 
intellectual property and as operational trade secrets based on in-house experiences. 
Each methane hydrate operator would likely face substantially different safety 
functions and decentralization would be a valuable policy attainment. As strict 
liability is widely held as more robust in supporting decentralization, it should be 
preferable to negligence. Considering that decentralization is readily and efficiently 
 
10  See discussion, supra, at ch. 5, sec. 2.3. 
11  See discussion, supra, at ch. 5, sec. 2.3. 
12  By setting the due care level with regard to that of the tortfeasor with lowest costs of 
precaution, Miceli has accomplished two items. First, he has created a market for operators to 
seek cost efficiencies in precaution, making more precaution more affordable. One assumes 
that the party with the lowest costs of precaution must, ceteris paribus, be in possession of 
the most efficient precaution technology, and thus, Miceli’s rule provides for the least waste 
in achieving the duty of care. 
13  See discussion, supra at ch. 5, sec. 2.4.2. See also H. B. SCHÄFER & A. SCHÖNENBERGER, Strict 
Liability versus Negligence, in: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 605 (Edward Elgar, 
2000). 
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attained under strict liability, variants of negligence should not be preferred to it 
without additional reasons to avoid strict liability being noted.  
2.1.4. Handling uncertain ex ante duty of care 
Schäfer et al. suggested that a rule of strict liability would be preferable to a rule of 
negligence when the duty of care is not ex ante clearly observable by the tortfeasor;14 
if the values are hidden then they cannot be accurately included in decision-making.  
In the case of a nascent industry such as methane hydrates, it is likely that 
barring extra measures the eventual duty of care could be obscure ex ante.15 As such, 
the logical conclusion is that strict liability might be preferable to negligence at least 
until a consensus developed to establish a clear determination of what duty of care 
would be employed by a negligence rule and thus make a clear ex ante duty feasible. 
However, one finds it unlikely that an industry such as methane hydrate 
exploitation would be capable of reaching development without some form of 
regulation. A longer discussion of the expected application of regulation to offshore 
methane hydrates is found, infra, at Section 3. 
Offshore methane hydrates will be found in government owned or 
administrated waters and as national assets the hydrates would likely face some 
form of regulation with regards to waste prevention and safe extraction. Most 
countries would likely require some form of permit process to produce those 
hydrates from their jurisdictional waters and this licensing process would itself 
likely be subject to regulation; e.g., such regulations often require filing of EIAs and 
contingent emergency plans by the prospective operators. There are many reasons 
to expect that the extraction of most hydrates would come under several forms of 
regulation. Given the variety of regulations that offshore methane hydrates would 
likely engage, 16  and the need of various regulatory bodies to respond to the 
circumstances of offshore methane hydrates, that it is unlikely that offshore 
methane hydrates could move into development without ex ante standards being 
regulatorily established ahead of initial licensing and development activities. 
In conclusion, while the theoretical advantage is probably given to the choice 
of strict liability, the underlying problem of an uncertain ex ante duty of care is not 
likely to be a substantial problem due to the coincidental development of 
regulations as the onset of methane hydrate exploitation approached. 
 
14  See discussion, supra at ch. 5, sec. 2.4.1.  
15  However, the duty of care could be clarified and established ex ante by several means. The 
most direct means would be to buttress the application of negligence with regulations that 
provide guidance as to required duties of care and precaution. Industrial groups could agree 
to certain industry wide standards of care. See the discussion on regulation and private 
regulation, infra, at ch. 6. 
16  For a more complete discussion, see the four chapters within Part III. However, the mere 
onset of acquiring licenses to begin development of offshore methane hydrate would spark 
regulatory reviews in the U.S. under OCSLA and the CWA and under similar regulatory 
frameworks in the EU and its Member States. See Chapters 10 and 11, infra, in Part III. 
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2.1.5. Provide incentives for safety innovations 
There is an established argument that strict liability provides better incentives to the 
tortfeasor to develop safety and precautionary technology because the rule places 
all of the costs of harm at the tortfeasor’s feet.17  
In the case of methane hydrates this is doubly likely to be effective, as few 
parties beyond the operators would have access to the relevant technologies, to the 
fields and activities in question, and to the operation awareness of encountered 
risks. Those operators will also have pre-existing financial capacities to develop 
such technologies in advance of development and production and would also be 
recipient of the revenues from methane sales from the installations to provide future 
funding of safety and precautionary technologies. While coordination with 
universities, government institutes, and local communities should be fostered, the 
effective development of the required safety and precautionary technologies will 
likely need the leadership and cooperation of the operators. 
Thus both from a practical and a theoretical perspective, it is quite advisable to 
employ a rule of strict liability to best create the incentives that would result in the 
most sure development of safety and precautionary technologies. 
2.1.6. Preventing victim coordination problems 
Schäfer et al. raised a concern that when there are too many plaintiff victims, that 
interactive due care between the victims leads to problems of victims raising each 
other’s risk levels; by choosing a rule of strict liability such a problem can be 
prevented.18  
In the case of methane hydrate projects, the scale of “too many victims” 
reaches another level of analysis, that of the potential efficiency of public 
regulations over the basic efficiency of any rule of civil liability due to the larger 
potential number of victims.19 However, as will be argued infra, 20 the preferred 
solution would be a combination of a rule of strict liability alongside public 
regulations. 
2.1.7. Minimizing the costs of justice 
Civil liability rules need to be enforced by courts, but such efforts incur substantial 
transaction costs. Due process, discovery, and the costs of trial are all non-trivial, 
even in the best of circumstances. Models demonstrate that strict liability is more 
 
17  See discussion, supra, at ch. 5, sec. 2.1. 
18  See discussion, supra at ch. 5, sec. 2.4. Also, arguendo, while the case of unilateral accidents is 
driven by the behavior of the tortfeasor to create damage unilaterally to the victim, the any 
rule of civil liability depends on the damage being brought to court for adjudication in order 
to provide the incentives to the tortfeasor. Without that potential litigation and resultant 
judgment for damages, the incentive would be voided of impact. 
19  See discussion, supra at ch. 6, sec. 2.4. 
20  See discussion, infra, at sec. 3.3. 
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robust than negligence because it is foreseeable that strict liability could result in a 
higher percentage of pre-trial settlements and also that the rule of strict liability 
present simpler cases to litigate. Thus, strict liability is preferable if the transaction 
costs of the administration of justice are of material concern. 
For offshore methane hydrate projects operating in developed countries, this 
may not present as large a concern as it might to those projects located offshore of 
countries with weak or developing legal institutions. Thus, those jurisdictions might 
well benefit from the application of strict liability. 
But even in developed settings, the ability of community representatives to 
obtain justice might be challenged if they need compete against the resources of 
large methane hydrate operators. In those countries with weak or developing legal 
institutions, both the operators and various community representatives might find 
the legal institutions poorly suited to the litigious needs of major methane hydrate 
accidents. Especially for that scenario, the goal should be to facilitate the reliability 
and stability of access to justice for all parties. Because the standard models 
demonstrate that a rule of strict liability places less stress, or transaction costs, on 
the local justice system, strict liability should be applied in those conditions.21 
2.2. Arguments for applying negligence to offshore methane hydrates 
2.2.1. Lack of risk-averse actors in offshore methane hydrate development 
Under an analysis of risk aversion and risk allocation, the rule of negligence was 
found to be more robust.22 Perhaps most importantly, if risk aversion does manifest 
in the invest decision, and a strict liability rule is in place, it has been modeled that 
such a situation could prevent socially beneficial activity from occurring at all. If the 
development of methane hydrate does in fact offer the benefits that it is expected to 
bear, then the rule of strict liability could prevent the receipt of those benefits.  
However, it is unlikely that the operators of offshore methane hydrate projects 
would suffer from material levels of risk aversion. Prima facie, the investment itself 
is a risky enterprise, and thus investors with substantial risk aversion would likely 
shy from such project. Second, the type of operators expected to enter into the 
development of offshore methane hydrates would likely have engaged in decades 
of previous risky offshore oil and gas projects; if they had once had substantial risk 
aversion problems, financial or otherwise, they have likely found tools to address 
those concerns in the interim. Indeed, most of the expected operators have large 
capital holding and routinely self-insure on their larger projects.  
Thus, it is unlikely that substantially risk-averse actors would be engaged in 
offshore methane hydrate operations. Even if some elements of risk aversive 
behaviors survived into the nascent industry, the existing offshore oil and gas 
operators would be expected to be able to transfer know-how and means to address 
those concerns without affecting their ability to rationally address their risks 
 
21  See the mathematical notes to Shavell, in Appendix II-A. 
22  See discussion, supra at ch. 5, sec. 3.1.1. 
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management strategies. As such, there is no particularly strong reason to promote a 
rule of negligence merely to address risk-averse actors.  
2.2.2. Insolvency of operators 
The problem of potentially insolvent tortfeasors is more robustly addressed with a 
rule of negligence.23 While one hopes that investors in methane hydrate projects 
would not be ex ante expected to be insolvent, all companies face the risk of 
insolvency.  
Many corporate structures are designed to limit overall risk and liability by 
limiting the amount invested within the corporate entity, so insolvency remains an 
issue for daughter affiliates of an otherwise solvent corporation. Additionally, it is 
routine in the oil and gas industry to place each well or lease within its own 
corporate entity to enable certain financial and tax planning opportunities, 24 so 
capitalization for the corporate entities in possession of the well may well be 
insolvent against major accidents.  
Insolvency of offshore methane hydrate operators is a concern to be addressed; 
and as negligence is generally found more robust for conditions facing insolvency, 
negligence should be preferred for offshore methane hydrates, at least on this issue. 
However, insolvency can be addressed within a regulatory framework as well, to 
better ensure that sufficient capital stocks and insurance policies are instituted to 
minimize the potential of operators to become insolvent while licensed to operate 
offshore methane hydrate installations.25 E.g., mandates could be required to ensure 
that the corporations holding offshore methane hydrate installations remain solvent 
or retain certain levels of capital funding to prevent insolvency from becoming a 
functional problem. 26 
Thus there is a finding that insolvency would potentially remain a risk for the 
development of offshore methane hydrate operators, but that a rule of negligence is 
neither the exclusive means nor necessarily the optimal means with which to 
address the problem. 
 
23  See discussion, supra at ch. 5, sec. 3.1.2. 
24  One such strategy is known as “worthless stock deduction” planning, which enables pass-
through of dry-hole losses to tax accounts while receiving uplift on producing wells via tax 
credits. 
25  See discussion, supra at ch. 6, sec. 2.3. 
26  E.g., many licensing and permitting regulations require certain financial proofs of sufficient 
financial reserves to operate such offshore installations. Additionally, many corporate acts 
enable look-through or veil-piercing rules when corporate behavior is financially tortious, as 
such might well be the case in certain avoidance strategies following major industrial 
accidents. See the discussions, infra, both in ch. 6 Regulations and the latter chapters of 
addressing particular existing laws in Part III.  
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2.2.3. Strategic operators: avoidance and precaution 
The traditional operators of offshore oil and gas installations are financially 
sophisticated; they routinely have very large-scale investments in offshore projects 
in multiple jurisdictions around the globe.27 It is to be expected that these investors 
would be fully aware of functional means of avoidance and of precaution and that 
their legal counsel would be engaged in ensuring that those corporations bore no 
legally unnecessary levels of liabilities. But that is not the same as to suggest that 
these parties have incentives to strategically avoid their liabilities.  
However, there are always certain risks that certain corporate structures, 
intended for other financial or tax planning purposes, might effectively create 
similar results to avoidance stratagems. It is not unusual for the financial operations 
of an offshore investment to operate primary beyond the local jurisdiction of a 
wellsite or project.28 Similarly, operational control might be structured in a manner 
that the operational joint venture sits beyond the local jurisdiction.29 And of course, 
there will always be reference to such corporate characters as Enron, who left many 
in the public wary of the bona fides of major corporations. Thus, although this 
present author would expect few direct bad faith avoidance strategies, it is 
reasonable to expect that other good faith measures might create de facto results too 
similar to ignore. 
But there are many existing regulations in place to reduce the overall risk to be 
addressed by the choice of civil liability rules. Thus, while the opportunity for 
avoidance strategies could be present during the development and operation of 
offshore methane hydrate operations, and while a rule of negligence might be more 
robust for this particular concern, regulations, particularly pre-existing regulations, 
might functionally pre-empt the advantages provided by a rule of negligence. 
2.2.4. Behavioural operators of offshore methane hydrate projects 
To the extent that modeling has been undertaken on the role of behavioral 
economics and law, it emerges that negligence is more robust at dealing with the 
 
27  Just the list of ExxonMobil, RD Shell, Chevron, and BP conjure the very idea of sophisticated 
international corporations. But it is not only these major independent oil corporations (IOCs) 
that investors, as there are a wide variety of major national oil corporations (NOCs) that often 
dwarf these IOCs in financial capacity and access to markets. It has been reported that NOCs 
now control over 90% of the world’s conventional oil and gas reserves, are currently 
exceeding IOC investments in R&D by 20% p.a., and generally receive more favorable terms 
in the financial markets when raising capital. See J. Leis, J. McCreery & J. C. Gay, National Oil 
Companies Reshape the Playing Field, Bain Brief, 1, 1-2 (2012). 
28  Such planning could be required for various corporate law compliance requirements or to 
efficiently structure dividend and tax obligations. 
29  E.g., the joint venturers might hold the project in a partnership in country A, which then 
holds the project within a corporation within country B. Operational decisions could be 
executed from within jurisdiction A since the corporation located in B would be wholly 
owned and operated by the parental partnership. 
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routine errors identified by behavioral economists. 30  Humans are generally 
observed underestimating the chances that they can avoid environmental 
accidents. 31  At the same time, they are overly pessimistic about catastrophic 
accidents. Both types of events are potentially part of a methane hydrate event, and 
thus these behavioral impacts are important to consider.  
However, the types of corporations and other investment bodies likely to 
engage in the development and commercialization of offshore methane hydrate 
assets are not likely to suffer from these behavioral defects. First, their financial 
decision processes are far removed from singular decision makers; the teams of 
managers, engineers, lawyers, and investors required to execute a successful 
methane hydrate project would require operational procedures of control that 
would do much to offset any behavioral economic issues such as might be found in 
natural humans.  
This is not to suggest that those decision-making procedures would not 
contain the potential for error, just that the behavioral concerns of optimism and 
pessimism would be expected to be mitigated by corporate controls procedures. As 
such, behavioral economics is not likely to be a prevailing concern of governing 
methane hydrate accident risk. Ergo, behavioral economics will not present 
sufficient argument for the application of a rule of negligence for offshore methane 
hydrate projects. 
2.2.5. Insurance markets and the operators of offshore methane hydrate 
projects 
A rule of negligence is more robust than a rule of strict liability when insurance 
markets are imperfect.32 The insurance market for methane hydrate accidents will 
need to be responsive to the novel harms of offshore methane hydrates. It is unclear 
at this time how that might be done, thus, functionally it is unclear what kinds of 
insurance products would be available to investors in offshore methane hydrate 
installations. 
 
30  See discussion, supra at ch. 5, sec. 3.1.4. 
31  It is important to underscore the role of actual humans in the study of behavioral economics. 
The field is focused on the errors made by humans, not by other entities such as corporations. 
Corporations clearly can make errant decision processes, but the discussion of such problems 
would not be included within this area. To a sub-argument that corporations are still 
governed by groups of humans and therefore might display behavioral economics, the very 
fabric of corporate law is the study of the principle/agent dynamic at many contrasting 
levels; e.g., shareholders vs. executives vs. employees. In that matrix of opposing forces, 
cognitive decisions errors do occur, but they are generally of another character. See H. A. 
SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR. (New York: Free Press, 1965), as an early seminal study 
on such corporate decision making processes. Similarly, Oliver Williamson’s body of research 
on “bounded rationality” was centered on the cognitive functions of corporate bodies; see O. 
E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87(3) Am. J. 
Sociology 548 (1981). 
32  See discussion, supra at ch. 5, sec. 3.1.5. 
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The industry of methane hydrates is novel and the risks are to some extent 
unknowable until a certain amount of operational experience accrues. The potential 
costs of harms from the more extreme cases could need to respond to tsunami and 
landslide impacts on coastal communities, to respond to certain economic losses 
from those injuries and potentially respond to mass loss of lives; such a risk would 
be extremely expensive. Not to say that there are not means available, but the more 
financially demanding a market is, the more likely it is to reach problems. 
Given the particular risks of the novel industry,33 a rule of negligence may be 
more efficient for methane hydrate accidents. However, the expected operators of 
offshore methane hydrate installations, as discussed supra at section 2.2.1 with 
regards to risk aversion, have likely addressed similar concerns before and have the 
financial sophistication to address these types of concerns. The major existing 
operators have deep financial capacity to self-insure and to purchase insurance.34 As 
such, there is not a pressing need to employ a rule of negligence to remedy the 
potential problems posed by a lack of insurance.35 
2.2.6. Addressing imperfect or inaccurate sanctions against methane hydrate 
accidents 
If the expected judgments do not match the actual harms,36 or if there is systematic 
slack in the assignment of judgments,37 negligence has been found more robust at 
achieving proper levels of precaution. To the extent that real world conditions 
following a methane hydrate accident may mismatch, and one certainly might think 
it possible, the choice of rule should be for negligence.  
But the types of accidents that might befall an offshore methane hydrate 
operation are not likely to result in precision injuries or damages. Both the non-
cataclysmic and cataclysmic injuries would be expected to either be limited 
 
33  Calabresi and Klevorick have argued that strict liability might present incentives to acquire 
new information more robustly than a rule of negliegence; but, they found that the choice of 
rule was complex and they did not find a definite result.See G. Calabresi & A. K. Klevorick, 
Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. Legal Stud. 585, 621 and at 626 (1985).  
34  E.g., as was seen at the BP Macondo incident, BP was able to immediately produce $20 billion 
to establish the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, a type of settlement fund, prior to the onset of tort 
litigation. It is generally understood that the funding came solely from BP’s own capital and 
current revenues. It is not unlikely that this particular industry would be unable to provide 
its own insurance if the market was otherwise unable to support such a need. 
35  One might ask how climate change harms impacts this analytical result. It would appear that 
the scope of harms from accelerated climate change, induced by a methane hydrate accident, 
could be so severe as to dwarf the impact of both rules from civil liability; it might not make 
any difference which rule as in application as the sum of the damages might well exceed the 
capital of the operator and thus prevent the impact of either rule’s incentive mechanisms. In 
such cases, regulation would be more robust, and potentially, there might be need to hold 
certain acts that increase such risks as criminal or bellicose in character. Thus, the application 
of strict liability remains more robust for those situations wherein civil liability would be 
effective; regulations or other non-civil liability means would be needed in other situations. 
36  See discussion, supra at ch. 5, sec. 3.2. 
37  See discussion, supra at ch. 5, sec. 3.2. 
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primarily to the wellsite, and thus bypass this concern, or affect a larger onshore 
community of residents. Should the accident affect an onshore community, 
damages will be at best approximations.38 But the critical question to ask is whether 
the difference in damages would be sufficient for an actor under strict liability to 
reduce their level of precaution. In the case of offshore methane hydrates, it would 
appear that the tortfeasor would stand to lose on their own personal account, in 
terms of loss of revenue, property, and personnel, that one reasonably wonders if 
additional incentives would be necessary to motivate efficient levels of precaution.  
2.2.7. Need for data transparency 
Negligence offers an opportunity to present more evidence and arguments at trial 
than strict liability would require. Thus it has been argued that perhaps a rule of 
negligence can be usefully employed to provide information to the courts and to the 
public that could enable efficient determinations of appropriate precaution and 
activity levels.39 
The commercial development of methane hydrates faces perhaps a somewhat 
unique situation in that its basic science and engineering have been primarily 
developed under the subsidies and guidance of national governments. As such, a 
large body of information on the risk and hazards of that same technology will be 
publicly available prior to the first applications for commercial development. 
Further, many nations require EIAs to be completed prior to the approval or 
licensing for new projects, improving the likelihood that offshore methane hydrate 
projects would not be developed without public awareness of its risks and hazards. 
Thus the risk of insufficient data for public determination of appropriate precaution 
and activity levels is relatively lighter for offshore methane hydrates than many 
other new industrial processes that were developed without such ex ante public 
involvement. As such, there is little to no need to apply the rule of negligence to 
offshore methane hydrate projects based on this concern. 
2.2.8. Balancing of externalized benefits and risks 
Gilead and Hylton, separately, have both provided an analysis of determining rules 
of civil liability based on the ratios of externalized social benefits and social costs.40 
 
38  If an onshore community is impacted by a methane hydrate accident, one would expect a 
large number of claims on a wide variety of matters. Also, in certain cases, particularly after 
more severe accidents, records or evidences might be damaged or lost in the cataclysms 
following. Therefore, precise determinations of injuries might not be efficiently or even 
feasibly rendered for such cases. 
39  See discussion, supra, at ch. 5, sec. 3.3. 
40  See I. Gilead, Tort Law and Internalization: The Gap Between Private Loss and Social Cost, 17 Int’l 
Rev. L. & Econ. 589 (1997). See also K. N. Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict Liability. 4(1) 
Review of Law & Economics 153 (2008) (Due to licensing limits where the present study was 
undertaken, its research relied on the working paper version of Hylton’s article; as such, all 
point citations are to that source material. See K. N. Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict Liability. 
Æ
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Each determination must first resolve the ratios of externalized risks and of 
externalized benefits. A case could be made that the benefits of offshore methane 
hydrate projects would match or exceed their risks; but it is also not unforeseeable 
that some stakeholders might envision lower potential benefits of additional 
methane exploitation.  
According to Hylton’s quadrant analysis of comparative externalized risks and 
benefits,41 the rule of strict liability should be applied if and when the tortfeasor’s 
externalized risks exceed those posed by the victim and when the tortfeasor’s 
externalized benefits are the same or less than those posed by the victim. Methane 
hydrate projects will externalize a substantial amount of risk, certainly in excess of 
the externalized risks from the potential victims. However the ratio of externalized 
benefits is not as clear for methane hydrates; thus, it is unclear if the externalized 
risk/benefit ratios of a methane hydrate project would support the application of 
strict liability.  
The externalized risks of methane hydrates are more readily foreseeable but 
one could reasonably expect some divergence of opinion amongst policy makers on 
the externalized benefits. For this reason, Hylton’s four-quadrant model of civil 
liability rules might not render a clear determination which quadrant offshore 
methane hydrate might sit within; as such, Hylton’s method is indeterminate for 
offshore methane hydrate projects.  
Gilead’s model of the “Gap” provides additional insight into the complexities 
caused by not only the symmetries or asymmetries of externalized costs and 
benefits but also to the impact on rule choice when those asymmetries are 
compounded by a “Gap” in estimating the privately assessed damages versus the 
actual public negative externality. 42  Gilead provided insight into when strict 
liability might be more robust than negligence in such conditions, and that is when 
the internalized “Gap” is small.43 Additionally, Gilead advised that strict liability 
should be applied when externalized costs are high and only limited welfare 
benefits are generated for third parties;44 in this he and Hylton were in theoretical 
agreement. 
2.3. Complexity in implemention 
One of the problems of implementing rules of civil liability is the complexity of it; 
there are many several manners in which the rules can be frustrated if not correctly 
implemented or if the circumstances are not sufficiently compatible. Hereunder a 
quick survey of several concern areas is developed. Particular attention is spent to 
both the impact on selection of strict liability versus negligence and on the impact of 
the circumstances of offshore methane hydrate operations. 
 
(Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 06-35, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=932600). 
41  See discussion, infra, at sec. 3.4, and see also Table 3 in Appendix II.C. 
42  Gilead, supra at note 40, en passim. 
43  Id., at 607. 
44  Id., at 608. 
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2.3.1. Joint and several liability 
The concept of joint and several liability primarily appears to operate from a 
compensatory purpose;45 however, one might want to evaluate if joint and several 
liability were to be applied, would it affect the choice of liability rule? The answer is 
that joint and several liability does two things; (i) it solves insolvency problems in 
enabling a victim to switch from insolvent actors to solvent actors, and (ii) it forces 
the tortfeasors to monitor each other, potentially providing them with incentives to 
set private standards of acceptable precautionary and activity levels. 
Tietenberg stated that the group of comingled tortfeasors would have an 
incentive to monitor each other; that monitoring could both reduce the overall 
likelihood of a tort event and also enable the tortfeasors to provide information to 
the plaintiffs and court in discovery.46  Similarly, Feess and Hege have proposed an 
alternate rule for determining the shares of damages for scenarios wherein a group 
of co-tortfeasors would be made responsible for monitoring the risks and 
procedures for an activity.47   
If one assumed that joint and several liability did result in enhanced cross-
tortfeasor observation and data collection, and if a main advantage of negligence 
was its ability to force the collection of similar data, then the presence of a joint and 
several liability rule might reduce the benefits of a negligence rule for that effect. 
Also, forcing the potential co-venturers of a risky project, such as offshore methane 
hydrates, to ex ante recognize their joint and several liabilities might well provide 
incentives for them to privately negotiate amongst themselves to reduce the risk of 
strategic avoidance or insolvency as such events would directly burden the other 
co-venturers. Thus, the implementation of a joint and several liability rule might 
mitigate some of the advantages ascribed to the rule of negligence, supra.48  
The traditional commercial operations of oil and gas operators might also 
illuminate this issue. Traditionally, multiple co-venturers split ownership of the 
offshore energy investment and designate one of the co-venturers as the operator. 
But each of the co-venturers is generally a peer of the operator, of similar size, 
technical acuity, and of capital and financial resources; indeed, it is likely that the 
same group has other joint ventures in common and each might be operator at the 
different projects. Thus, in this environment the group of co-investors cum co-
tortfeasors could establish a potentially responsible peer-arrangement with 
functions akin to auditors. They would be able to have access to private data 
 
45  An attempt to use joint and severable liability rules as a compensation system instead of an 
incentive system would dilute the incentives to efficiently avoid accidents; that result should 
be avoided in general if the primary goal is to manage the levels of accidental harms. 
46  M. G. Faure, Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from CO2 Storage Sites, 59 
(2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); citing to T. H. Tietenberg, Indivisible 
Toxic Torts: The Economics of Joint and Several Liability, 65 Land Econ. 305 (1989). 
47  M. G. FAURE, Environmental liability, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS, 247, 259 (Edward Elgar, 
2009); citing to E. Feess & U. Hege, Safety Regulation and Monitor Liability, 7 Rev. Econ. Design 
173 (2002). 
48  See the discussions, supra, at sec. 3.1 and 3.3 within this chapter. 
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usually difficult to obtain by outsiders or regulators and yet they would have good 
cause to maintain a state of vigilance because a lapse of safety could lead to shared 
damages and liabilities; it becomes a commercial necessity to meet the local rule of 
civil liability because the operator would likely face private liability to his co-
venturers for his own failures to maintain agreed to standards of precaution. Thus, 
joint and several liability would likely be of substantial benefit for offshore methane 
hydrate installations and thus also provide a greater likelihood of overall accident 
avoidance.49  
2.3.2. Causality: threshold or proportionate 
Causality is required for the judicial finding of a tort; some actor needs to be found 
causing the sequence of events that resulted in the injury to the victim. While the 
causation of a simple tort may be readily apparent, e.g., who hit whom, the facts and 
events of a chemical emission may be much more difficult to causally connect to an 
injury.50 
Difficulties may include multiple sources and background risks:51  
i. Multiple potential sources of the specific chemical, e.g., there were 
multiple sources of industrial emissions,  
ii. The chemical in question is also found in the ambient natural 
environment to some degree, so a question might arise as to what 
degree the industrially emitted chemical is causally connected to the 
injury versus those exposures to the chemical from natural settings.  
iii. Multiple ambient sources of risks, of which only one is the 
industrially emitted chemical. 
For such events, uncertainty is an unavoidable issue in the decision of causality. 
Traditionally, many courts have relied on the threshold rule of “more likely than 
not,” which is usually interpreted as meaning a greater than 50% chance of 
 
49  Given that such investors in offshore methane hydrates would likely be engaged in multiple 
projects in multiple locations, as do oil and gas operators today, one might expect that at least 
the private arrangements and private regulations suggested here could become standardized 
across jurisdictions for transaction cost efficiencies. Further, it has been argued that even 
those states with appropriate legal institutions, sufficiently safe hydrate deposits, and with 
access to state-of-the-art prevention technologies would want to provide for a broader global 
management of methane hydrate resources to preserve the potential to exploit their own 
hydrates without the collateral of accidents and harms from those resource owners less well 
situated. See R. A. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus: Planning Ahead for the Commercial Development 
of Offshore Methane Hydrates, 14:2 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y (December 2014 Forthcoming). 
50  There is no reason to limit the following discussion to emitted chemical other than to provide 
ready and comparable references to the different models evaluated. The actual torts involved 
are too numerous to list, but it is hoped a common semantic makes the discussion easier to 
follow. 
51  Faure, supra at note 46, at 59; citing to J. Trauberman, Statutory Reform of Toxic Torts: Relieving 
Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 Harv. Envtl L. Rev. 177 (1983), 
and S. D. Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury Litigation, 
59 Mich. L. Rev. 259 (1960). 
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likelihood to be the cause of the injury.52 Yet this method presents risks of erroneous 
determinations; actors might face 100% judgments for the costs of damages when 
their role in the harm was less than 100% — actors would face incorrect high costs, 
which could cause over-deterrence in the type of activity.53  
A more recent development is the proportionate liability role, which avoids 
the threshold issue by determining what extent of the injury was causally related to 
the emitted chemical.54 Instead of focusing on liability for the whole injury, the rule 
of proportionate liability refocuses the liability trial to a determination of how much 
of the injury was caused by the acts of the disputed tortfeasor.55 This has benefits for 
both sides; the plaintiffs need only to establish some amount of non-zero causality 
to enable a finding of liability and the respondent will likely face a smaller overall 
liability judgment. Transaction costs and certainty are both more efficiently 
achieved under the proportionate liability rule; if in practice the correct 
determination could be made by the courts then the result would be efficient.56  
However, theory and practice are expected to diverge in real life settings. 
There are substantial concerns that science is limited in its ability to reconstruct 
events of causation and thus a certain amount of error is likely to be present in the 
courtroom.57 As such, scholars have warned that reliance on even proportionate 
systems of causality is likely to remain inefficient.58  
Methane hydrate accidents, especially those of cataclysmic character, may 
develop from a complex combination of events and from multiple incremental 
activities over a long period of time.59 Or, they might occur suddenly from singular 
 
52  See Faure, supra at note 47, at 258; citing to C. Miller, Causation in Personal Injury: Legal or 
Epidemiological Common Sense?, 26 Legal Stud. 545 (2006). 
53  Id., at 257; citing to S. Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil 
Liability, 28 J. L. & Econ. 587 (1985), and H. Kerkmeester, De betekenis van het 
waarschijnlijkheidsbegrip voor de aansprakelijkheid uit onrechtmatige daad: Meijers 
geactualiseerd (The Meaning of the Concept Probability from Tort Law: Meijers Actualized), 
6111 Weekblad voor Privaatrecht 767 (1993). 
54  Id., at 258; citing to L. BERGKAMP, LIABILITY AND ENVIRONMENT (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague, Netherlands, 2001). 
55  Id., at 257; citing to D. Rosenberg, The Casual Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A Public 
Law Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849 (1983); D. Kaye, The Limits of the 
Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple 
Causation, 7 L. & Soc. Inquiry 487 (1982); M. J. Rizzo & F. S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment 
in the Law of Torts, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1399 (1980); and M. J. Rizzo & F. S. Arnold, Causal 
Apportionment: A Reply to the Critics, 15 J. Legal Stud. 219 (1986). 
56  Id., at 258; citing to W. M. Landes & R. A. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for 
Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. Legal Stud. 417 (1984); G. O. Robinson, Probabilistic 
Causation And Compensation For Tortious Risk, 14 J. Legal Stud. 779 (1985); and J. Makdisi, 
Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion Tort Damages Based on Probability, 67 
N.C. L. Rev. 1063 (1988). 
57  Id.,  at 258. 
58  Id.; citing to Estep, supra at note 51, and L. H. Tribe, Trial by mathematics: Precision and ritual in 
the legal process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1971). 
59  E.g., cracking the mudlayer above the hydrate reservoir could accumulate from vibrations, 
fluid injections, and even from local weather phenomena. The cumulative effect could take a 
long period to suffice before the field erupted. 
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acts of singular actors.60 The types of risks associated with methane hydrate fields 
are basically the type of events associated with triggering equilibria or tipping 
point; a certain amount of activity can occur and build up until finally a sudden 
release or event could occur that results in the particular harm and damage. In such 
conditions, causality may be quite difficult to determine; especially after a 
cataclysmic event the necessary physical or eyewitness evidence may be eliminated 
coincidently with the accident itself. In such lights, a rule of strict liability might be 
more robust, in that its evidentiary burden is a lighter one than the burden under a 
rule of negligence as no duty of care needs review. In the type of accidents that 
methane hydrate fields are likely to have, especially on the severe end, strict liability 
might be more likely to be implementable after an accident in contrast to a rule of 
negligence. 
2.3.3. Difficulties of long-term liability issues.  
From the dateline of the FID61 for a methane hydrate project, the development 
period might last 5 to 10 years and the production period several decades beyond 
that to potentially much longer. The abandonment and sequestration phase of a 
methane hydrate project could last decades to much, much longer, especially if the 
methane hydrate project engaged in carbon sequestration alongside the methane 
production. The time frame of risk, from FID to the final risky event, could be a 
century or more in length.  
The decision at FID is to initiate this very long sequence of risky events; how 
can the operator make that decision if actors might become liable after the decision, 
or if duties of precaution change after behaviors are undertaken, or if future 
liabilities even matter given sufficient passage of time? These are problems of time 
frame management; the next three sections of this chapter are focused on these 
issues. This first section discusses the challenges of ex post facto determinations of 
liability. The next two sections discuss ex post changes in the expected levels of 
precaution and time frame management. 
When an activity that was previously not a source of liability later becomes a 
source of liability, an ex post facto determination of liability, then the operator would 
not have received the incentive it needed to operate efficiently. Thus, it would 
appear to have no validity as a tool to reduce the incidence of accidents.62  On the 
other hand, if operators could reasonably forecast that additional future liabilities 
 
60  E.g., horizontal drilling and resistance within the mudlayer could cause sufficient mechanism 
stress and vibration that it might suddenly cause a section of the mudlayer to fail. 
61  FID stands for “Financial Investment Decision.” FID can refer both to the decision and to the 
date of the decision to initiate the development, production and marketing phases of a 
hydrocarbon field. It is commonplace for FID models to anticipate cost structures and 
potential revenue forecasts from FID till abandonment. FID models attempt to determine the 
overall profitability of a given project over the whole lifetime of the project to create a metric 
that can enable projects to compete for limited capital resources within the operator’s assets. 
See discussion, supra, at ch. 3, sec. 2 on the “Economics of Methane Hydrates.”  
62  Faure, supra at note 47, at 261. 
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might be determined ex post, then they could decide to include those expected 
damages into their decision making process. Having received an incentive to reduce 
their overall precautions;63 it becomes effectively the same math as operating with 
an expectation that one might be find liable regardless of behavior, so the care level 
is reduced.  
Another way in which incentives can become muddled is when the judicially 
enforced duty of care is changed as time goes by and becomes a new liability rule ex 
post facto for events from the past. One could make a reasonable assumption that in 
most cases that duty of care level change would result in a higher level of care. 
Indeed, the foreseeability of such a reasonable assumption was studied by Shavell; 
it is reasonable in some cases for an operator to assume that duty of care levels 
would increase over time so that they should take such foreseeable adjustments into 
account ex ante.64  
But is this ultimately efficient, to require an operator to forecast both 
technological advancements and social responses to that new knowledge; indeed, 
“is it even feasible?” one might ask. Indeed, there are substantial dangers to this 
approach in that it might lead to over-deterrence in the regulated activity and cause 
a decrease in overall welfare.65  
The development of methane hydrate projects is likely to spur rapid 
advancement in both the underlying associated technologies and in the public’s 
awareness and understanding of the risks and benefits of methane hydrate projects. 
To that extent, if operators needed to take any and all foreseeable or possible ex post 
changes to liability into account, it would likely have the effect of setting a higher 
bar to entry than the inclusion of ex ante liability rules. That higher standards would 
evolve over time is of course a most reasonable thing.66 American common law has 
a tool called prospective overruling, that enables a judge to rule on a specific case 
that for the immediate defendant that the older duty of care applied but prospective 
and future cases would be held under a new standard of care.67  
While operators are to be held liable, it is foreseeable that methane hydrate 
projects that span decades of operation might outlast the initial operators or even 
outlast the regulatory body that originally licensed and permitted the project. The 
decisions to be made by the initial operator at the time of the development and 
production phases will have an impact on overall safety and reliability over the 
whole time-frame yet the foreseeability that the operator may not be solvent or in 
operations that far into the future plus the toll that discount rates will have on the 
 
63  Id.; citing to J. Boyd & H. Kunreuther, Retroactive Liability or the Public Purse?, 11 J. Regulatory 
Econ. 79 (1997). 
64  Id., at 262; citing to S. Shavell, Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J. 
Legal Stud. 259 (1992). 
65  Id. 
66  Id., at 263; citing to C. Ott & H. B. Schäfer, Negligence as Untaken Precaution, Limited 
Information, and Efficient Standard Formation in The Civil Liability System, 17 Int’l Rev. L. & 
Econ. 15 (1997); and A. Endres & R. Bertram, The Development of Care Technology Under 
Liability Law, 26 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 503 (2006).  
67  See J. Boyd & H. Kunreuther, Retroactive Liability or the Public Purse?, 11 J. Regulatory Econ. 79 
(1997). See also the discussion at Faure, supra at note 47, at 263. 
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economic decisions related to the project will strongly limit the serous and due 
consideration of some of the risks of the project. 68 For this reason, it should be 
considered that liability rules might not be completely efficient at mitigating all of 
the risks of methane hydrate projects.  
However, there are several reasons to hold that most of the decisions made for 
the long-term risks actually are identical to decisions to be made for more near-in-
time risks for which the operators are indeed likely to take liability rules into 
consideration. Thus, while the long-term long tail risks are present within methane 
hydrate projects, it is unlikely to cause unique or specific risks otherwise 
unaccounted for by the already suggested combination of regulation and liability 
rules.  
First, the risks for offshore methane hydrates are likely to be front loaded, in 
that technology and practical experience will build over time making precautionary 
planning more accurate and thus more efficient. Accidents are reasonably more 
likely to happen in the early years as the learning curve builds. Thus a potential 
majority of the risks for the initial operator are in the early decades.  
Second, the discount rate on financial accounting will also create a focus for 
near term safety, as interruptions to operations in early years could be substantial 
impediments to the overall return-on-investment for the project.  
Third, and perhaps unique to offshore methane hydrates, the need to replace 
wells and continue with in-field development over time means that while the field 
itself might remain in operation for scores of years, localized wellsites will rotate in 
and out of production more frequently so that the whole life cycle of production 
and abandonment might be encountered at some sties within the first several 
decades of production. The types of activities to be seen at the end of the field will 
actually be seen at some of the earlier wellsites within decades of the field’s start-up.  
Finally, the sequestration and abandonment of methane hydrate fields is 
expected to be endothermic and thus self-stabilizing or self-cementing, somewhat 
unlike the re-injection of natural gas (CH4) or carbon dioxide (CO2) into 
conventional depleted reservoirs. Thus, one might reasonably conclude that the 
project operators will focus on the near-term risks in alignment with long-term 
risks; albeit short-term here might reference to a period of several decades. 
To the extent that carbon sequestration is a co-factor of the abandoning and 
sequestration of the methane hydrate field, the rules and regulations addressing 
CCS should be applied;69 CCS within and without methane hydrate projects should 
face a common regulatory structure.  
 
68  See the discussion on financial planning and the impact of discount rate, supra, in ch. 3. 
69  There is much interest in replacing the extracted methane volumes with carbon dioxide 
volumes. Indeed, both Germany and Japan have actively invested in this potential means of 
obtaining carbon-neutral methane volumes. See the discussion, supra, in ch. 3. 
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2.3.4. Real world overlap in implementations of strict liability and 
negligence 
There are a variety of ways in which the theoretical versions of strict liability and 
negligence differ from their implementations in the real world. In particular, as 
various defenses and different precautionary standards are coordinated with either 
rule, the functional results tend to blend or merge into a continuum. For example, 
the OPA provides for a rule of strict liability to be imposed on those who spill oil 
into a marine environment;70 but it also determines the provision, or lack thereof, of 
liability caps based on whether grossly negligent behavior was involved in causing 
the oil spill. So the OPA is a rule of strict liability that still calls for an examination of 
the level of precaution undertaken at the time of the accident. 
Traditional nuisance also functions in-between strict liability and negligence.71 
Nuisance functions akin to negligence in its determination of a violation of a 
conduct norm; as such, if a tort could be properly classified as a nuisance then it 
would be properly governed by a rule of strict liability.72 Nuisance law holds a 
tortfeasor liable only if he has “unreasonably interfered” with the use and 
enjoyment of another’s land; this unreasonable interference tests the balancing of 
externalized benefits and externalized costs73. E.g., when the courts find reasonable 
exchange benefits and harms, the courts will find no occurrence of nuisance.74  
Hylton has argued that it lays closer to strict liability. Hylton’s model of strict 
liability suggested that nuisance is a situation wherein typically the risks caused by 
the activity are unreciprocated by other actors or activities, so a state of excessive 
externalized risks prevails in a nuisance.75 It is not explicitly stated, but the analysis 
implicitly assumes that the nuisance provides insufficient externalized welfare 
benefits conditions, in that no substantial externalized social benefits accrue from 
the nuisance generating activity.76 As such, the model presented integrates nuisance 
alongside strict liability in alignment with his model’s externalized risk versus 
benefit analysis.77  
 
70  See ch. 11, sec. 4, for a more complete treatment on OPA. 
71  G. C. Keating, Nuisance as a Strict Liability Wrong, 4 J. Tort L. 11 (2012). 
72  See K. N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?, 41 Washburn 
L.J. 515 (2001)(Due to licensing limits where the present study was undertaken, its research 
relied on the working paper version of Hylton’s article; as such, all point citations are to that 
source material. See K. N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation? 
(Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 01-11, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=285264), at 9-12; and see Hylton supra at note 40,, en passim. 
73  Id., at 9. 
74  Id. 
75  In the mathematical phrasing of his model, ݍ஺ > ݍ஻ . Hylton, supra at note 40, at 21-22. See also 
description of the model, supra, at Appendix II-C. 
76  In the mathematical phrasing of his model, ݓܣ ൑ ݓܤ.  Id., at 21.  
77  Id., at 15, 21-22. Hylton stated that nuisance could also be identified by the six-part test for 
abnormally dangerous activities from the RS (2nd) Torts. For a more complete discussion on 
Hylton’s quadrants of negligence, strict liability and subsidization, see the discussion, infra, at 
Appendix II C. 
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Thus, in conclusion, while a modeler might propose the adoption of strict 
liability or negligence, the policy maker must be aware that combining that rule 
with additional defenses or standards of precautions could lead to unanticipated 
results vis-à-vis the efficient governance of risk from accidents. Likewise, modelers 
should take care to advise with awareness of the existing institutional preferences 
and biases within each jurisdiction to ensure that the functional result is obtained, 
even if the name on the civil rule is other than that advised in the model. 
2.4. Conclusions – apply strict liability 
This chapter has attempted to provide a study of which rule of civil liability would 
be preferable for the commercial development of offshore methane hydrates. The 
fundamental advantages of both rules were evaluated in turn.  
Strict liability was found to be preferable for a variety of circumstances likely 
to match the circumstances of offshore methane hydrate operations. Included 
among those circumstances were two of the most important considerations for 
implementing a rule of strict liability: Unilateral accidents and abnormally 
hazardous activities. Both of those sets of circumstances were found to be 
reasonable descriptions of offshore methane hydrate operations and related 
accidents.  
“Environmental pollution can in most cases certainly be considered a 
unilateral accident … Since the victim cannot influence the accident 
risk, strict liability seems to be the first best solution to give the 
potential polluter optimal incentives for accident reduction in those 
cases.”78 
Further, because strict liability places all of the costs of harm with a single actor, the 
tortfeasor, a variety of informational challenges can be overcome efficiently. 79 Even 
when the accident was of a bilateral nature, if the tortfeasor was the least cost 
avoider of the accident, then a rule of strict liability was found to be the preferred 
rule.80 
Negligence was found preferable for a variety of deviations from the standard 
unilateral and bilateral models. While all of those issues are real world concerns, the 
unique circumstances of methane hydrate operations did not substantially require 
the cures offered by negligence for these issues.  
 
78  M. G. Faure, Designing Incentives Regulation for the Environment, 16 (Maastricht Faculty of Law 
Working Paper 2008-7, 2008). See also a similar summation of this idea at M. G. FAURE, 
‘Regulatory Strategies in Environmental Liability’, in THE REGULATORY FUNCTION OF 
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, 129, 136 (F. Cafaggi, F., Watt, H. Muir, eds., Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2011). 
79  This result is predicated upon the tortfeasor having reasonably accurate forecasts of 
accurately rendered damages. See discussion, supra, at sec. 3.2  
80  As demonstrated, supra, the operators of methane hydrate projects would indeed be the likely 
lowest cost avoider of methane hydrate accidents. 
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It may well be that in the modern world that the lines between strict liability 
and negligence have blurred in practice. Almost nowhere do strict liability and 
negligence exist in the pure state employed by the theoretical models. And almost 
nowhere do the rules operate with no regulatory framework somehow addressing 
safety and responsibility of one form or another. But no foundation was discovered 
within those concerns for switching from a recommendation of strict liability for 
methane hydrate projects. 
In conclusions, it is recognized that no theoretical rule of civil liability would 
ever perfectly fit a real world activity and that in the modern world it is very more 
certain that an activity like methane hydrate exploitation would face some complex 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the conclusion is affirmed by a review of the 
advantages of strict liability, of negligence, and of the complexities of 
implementation that the rule of strict liability is the more preferable of the two rules 
for application to the development of offshore methane hydrates. This is in 
alignment with the broader trends of evolving environmental law, as strict liability 
is increasingly viewed as the default preference for environmental torts.81 
 
3. Governing offshore methane hydrates with regulations 
3.1. Regulations for offshore methane hydrates 
As developed in Chapter 6, the primary role of public regulations is to set optimal 
standards when rules of civil liability would be inefficient to determine those 
standards. Shavell provided three primary circumstances wherein civil liability 
rules would either become inefficient or dysfunctional:82 
i. Information asymmetry 
ii. Insolvency risk 
iii. Underdeterrence 
The following sub-section will demonstrate that the Shavell conditions would be 
realistic concerns for the commercial development of offshore methane hydrate 
installations. A regulatory body could be robust in addressing these concerns and 
be able to develop appropriate standards for the development of offshore methane 
hydrates.  
An argument is also presented that the regulations could and should be 
implemented complementary to the implementation of civil liability rules. Further, 
following the earlier analysis that strict liability would likely be preferable to a rule 
of negligence for offshore methane hydrate projects, it is recommended that a rule 
of strict liability be implemented alongside of regulations to provide optimal levels 
 
81  See a discussion on the passage of strict liability rules within European states and the 
European Union at Faure, supra at note 78, at 138. See also the discussion on existing laws 
within Part III of this current study. 
82  See the discussion in ch. 6, sec. 2. 
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of safety for the operational and post-operational activities of offshore methane 
hydrates.  
Additionally, exploration of the potential for private regulation or integrated 
regulatory design to assist in setting standards for the development of offshore 
methane hydrates.  
3.1.1. Information asymmetry 
Shavell stated that if the tortfeasor and victim were to have more information, that 
the risk would be more efficiently managed by civil liabilities, but if a regulatory 
body would be better informed, then regulations would be preferable.  
An argument is presented that a regulatory body could avail to itself certain 
economies of scale that victims, or even certain operators, might not obtain, that 
certain risks and hazards would be better investigated by a singular regulatory 
body than by the general public or operators in the case of offshore methane 
hydrate activity. As such, there is a clearly defined role for a regulatory body to 
relieve certain informational asymmetries that are likely to exist for offshore 
methane hydrate facilities. An argument is not being made herein that a regulatory 
body would be better informed on all the risks and hazards, merely that it might be 
more efficient at transforming a more balanced set of information regarding all of 
the parties and thus be more efficient at developing the necessary standards. 
As the fundamental task of regulations is to set standards, sufficient 
information must be possessed to determine what standards should be set and to 
what specifications.  
The question of information asymmetry engages two questions;  
i. Is there an incomplete supply of information that could prevent prop-
er function of civil liability rules, and  
ii. Could a regulatory body provide a cure for that problem?83  
With application to methane hydrates, there would likely be a potential 
information-processing problem for the potential victims. The first problem is that 
many victims might not even self-identify as victim prior to an accident, as the 
actual radius of harm might be only vaguely determinable prior to an actual event. 
As such, they would be unlikely to appropriately invest in learning about offshore 
methane hydrates or its risks. Also, some victims may not be able to process the 
scientific content or the voluminous data that might be required to develop 
functional understandings of the potential risks. Thus, even if information about the 
risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates were publicly available, there are 
potential concerns that such information might not induce the efficient operation of 
civil liability rules to generate optimal standards. A regulatory body might be 
needed to possess and process that data in order to better provide the necessary 
standards. 
 
83  See the discussion in ch. 6, sec. 2.1. 
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As a second line of concern, while it had been earlier argued that much of the 
current research and development has been fostered by public investment and thus 
information would be more available than had the technologies been developed 
privately, there remain several other forms of potential informational asymmetries.  
As to be expected, the majority of offshore methane hydrate extraction 
activities would happen not only offshore but also near or in the seabed. On-going 
operations would not be observable by the general public, thus potential victims 
would not have adequate access to monitor and be aware of critical developments 
that could impact the risk levels from that extraction activity. But, it would also not 
be desirable to enable local observation by numerous visitors, because that type of 
activity could place the hydrate bed at risk, frustrating the very purpose that the 
observations were meant to cure. A regulatory body could both collect relevant data 
and provide various means of publication of that data without adding material 
levels of marginal activity levels to the hydrate beds.  
The on-going development of offshore methane hydrates will generate a lot of 
scientific data, which again, would likely be in need of publication and a regulatory 
body could both act to ensure the quality and reliability of that data and to ensure 
its ready collection and distribution. But data is not directly useful for the routine 
potential victim without some additional layer of translation. A regulatory body 
could ensure that the public was informed of relevant and material updates to the 
status of field conditions and of potential dates of risk or precaution. 
So, while certain informational elements would already be public knowledge, 
on-going operations will continue to create new events of risk and on-going needs 
of awareness and assurance for the general public. It would be very inefficient and 
highly risky to permit the general public to privately engage in monitoring, thus the 
role for a regulatory body is readily confirmed.  
3.1.2. Insolvency risk 
As discussed in the previous chapters, insolvency frustrates rules of civil liability 
because insolvency limits the impact of negative financial incentives; a firm would 
not pay a judgment in damages if it is insolvent and thus its behaviour would not 
be modified from its a priori disposition.84 To affect activity decisions ex ante, the 
actor or firm would need to expect in advance of its risky activities that it would be 
insolvent ex post of the activities and thus be rendered immune to damages. 
Regulations can play several roles in addressing insolvency problems with offshore 
methane hydrate projects. 
Regulations can set standards to both prevent insolvency in offshore operators 
and to set standards to address those scenarios wherein offshore operators are 
insolvent. First, they can require certain financial standards be met by prospective 
operators. Operators might need to establish certain financial bona fides, 
 
84  See a more complete discussion on the concerns regarding insolvency and the potential 
interfaces with both civil liability rules and regulation at ch. 5, sec. 3.1.2. and at ch. 6, sec. 2.3. 
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demonstrating their history of being financially responsible to both investors and to 
recipients of legal judgments against the operators. 
Second, regulations could provide standards to facilitate on-going financial 
disclosures and audits to better monitor and prevent the situation of the methane 
hydrate field being operated by a likely insolvent operator. Parameters could be 
included to enable the regulatory body to replace foreseeably insolvent operators 
with more financially secure operators.  
Third, regulations could require various financial and insurance tools be 
employed so that even unforeseeable events that might otherwise render the 
tortfeasor suddenly insolvent could provide sufficient financial means to prevent 
operational insolvency results. If the insolvency is not curable, perhaps such a 
regulation could delay the insolvency problem long enough to replace the operator 
as described above.  
3.1.3. Under-deterrence 
It is perhaps with under-deterrence that regulations could be of the most assistance 
to ensuring the optimal levels of safety over the long life of an offshore methane 
hydrate installation. To the extent that rules of civil liabilities become underutilized, 
they would likely fail to optimally set standards. Regulations can be used to set 
standards for those scenarios wherein rules of civil liabilities would falter.  
Shavell listed three primary sources of under-deterrence:85 
i. Disparate plaintiffs. 
ii. Lack of evidence. 
iii. Missing parties. 
Methane hydrate accidents are not likely to impact just one or two parties; they are 
likely to affect broad areas of ocean and then impact large numbers of victims. 
While the potential for injury to certain victims might be sufficiently large to merit 
private and individual recovery, the costs of litigation against a very large operator 
might be prohibitive. A regulatory body could assist to level the playing field and 
better facilitate unified litigation where feasible or to directly represent the victims, 
in lieu of individual lawsuits, when coordinated litigation becomes too complex to 
be effective. Additionally, the costs of investigation after a methane hydrate 
accident would not be efficiently pursued by individuals; a regulatory body might 
have the means to more efficiently inquire into the important questions that would 
need revelation prior to litigation.  
Another problem with evidence is that courts have found it difficult with 
current scientific models to provide sufficient connections between the acts leading 
to climate change and the results and damage that result from that climate change. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has wrestled with this issue in several cases and has 
resisted climate change damages due to the technical problems of associating a 
 
85  See the discussion in ch. 6, sec. 2.4. 
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specific tortfeasor to the specific damage rendered to a specific victim.86 Add to the 
inability of connecting the tortfeasor to the victim to the complexity of methane’s 
interactions in both the water column and then in the atmosphere and one becomes 
appreciative of the potential evidence problems that might limit victims from 
effectively bringing their cases to trial. 
Methane hydrates are combinations of water and methane trapped in seabed 
layers of mud, they are about as ephemeral an energy supply as one might imagine. 
After a seabed eruption or landslide, there may very well be little left in direct 
evidence at the site of the origins of the harmful events. Further, were methane 
volumes to erupt, they are explosive and could severely damage local installation 
facilities. Should tsunamis or similar large-scale disturbances take place, large areas 
of nearby recording keeping facilities might also be lost. And this assumes that the 
cascade of events is within a short time frame; it might be that the chain of causal 
events were decades slow to unzip and that much of the evidence might have been 
obscure for years prior to the harmful events. As discussed at section 3.1.1, there is 
much that that a regulatory body could do to collect and ensure the retention of 
relevant data from the field and its occupants. Thus there is a clear role for a 
regulatory body to prevent and ameliorate the problem of lacking evidence. 
Further, it is quite possible that after certain cataclysmic accidents, that a 
number of victims may simply become untrackable or lost. Much as can occur in 
any tsunami, seaside villages might be swept away. But there is the more banal 
issue that the fields are likely to be operated for multiple decades and that the post-
operational plugging and abandonment phase might need much longer periods of 
observation and monitoring. Few of the operators are likely to remain in place for 
that long, field assets are routinely bought and sold; likewise operators themselves 
are subject to the same market forces as all other major corporations in that they are 
acquired, merged, and spun off over their lifetimes. Victims as well should be 
expected to move in and out of the potential impact zones as the years go by.  
Thus, it can be readily seen that Shavell’s conditions are both likely to be 
present in the operational and post-operational years of an offshore methane 
hydrate installation. Under-deterrence is likely to be a realistic problem that 
regulations could address more robustly than singular application of civil liability 
rules. 
Offshore methane hydrate installations might be operational for many decades. 
Potential onshore victims would move in and out of the zone of hazard over those 
years. Acts in early years might accumulate over time with other acts in later years 
to create hazards and harms not readily detected at either time period. The risky 
activities of today might not impact victims until many years later; those present at 
the event of the risky act might not be the victims present at the time of the injury. 
Thus, there are substantial coordination problems that might need to be addressed 
as offshore methane hydrates are developed and produced. 
 
86  For an in-depth discussion on the difficulties the U.S Supreme Court has faced with climate 
change cases and the problem of climate-tort evidence, see R. A. Partain & S. H. Lee, Article 20 
Obligations Under the KORUS FTA: The Deteriorating Environment for Climate Change Legislation 
in the U.S., 24 Stud. on Am. Const. 439 (2013). 
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Furthermore, as Schäfer and Schönenberger stated,87 there if there were to be a 
risk that some victims would fail to bring lawsuits, then the tortfeasors would 
logically assume more risk. In that case, regulations could act to fill the gap to 
provide standards that would have otherwise been provided under rules of civil 
liabilities. With offshore methane hydrates, the scale difference between the 
financial and technological capacities of the operators and the potential transaction 
costs faced by routine victims might cause the victims to hesitate in their pursuit of 
litigation. In that face of non-cataclysmic accidents, e.g. a fisherman loses a 
traditional area of fishing due to methane venting from the seabed, that fisherman 
might need the assistance of a regulatory body that could better match the operator 
in court. Also, due to the scientific complexity of a variety of the potential 
interactions, many of the potential non-cataclysmic accidents and harms might 
escape direct notice by the victims; again, a regulatory body might be better 
resourced to both detect and pursue remedy with the operators. 
3.2. A role for private regulation or integrated regulatory design 
As explored in Chapter 6, Section 5, there might be reasons to include private 
regulation or integrated regulatory designs alongside of public regulation. Private 
regulations enable those possessing specialized knowledge on the risk activity to 
develop standards.  
The ability of certain interested private actors to remain avant-garde is 
especially relevant when risky activities are highly novel and in a state of rapid 
innovation, because public regulations might not be able to keep abreast of the 
optimal standards as precautionary technologies and scientific understandings of 
the risks and hazards progress.88 Also, where legal institutions are less likely to be 
able to process the technological or scientific challenges of the risky activity,89 then 
it might be beneficial to address those risks with the assistance of private 
regulations.  
For offshore methane hydrates, it is likely that both of the above conditions 
would be present in many of the locations that such hydrates would be located.  The 
technology and scientific understanding of both the means of production and of the 
potential risk and harms are likely to continue to advance quickly. It would be 
useful for the technology stakeholders to participate in developing the appropriate 
standards, if not exclusively through private regulation then through mediated 
integrated regulatory mechanisms alongside of public regulations. 90  The 
participation of parties beyond the operator might also be advantageous in setting 
 
87  See ch. 6, sec. 2.4. 
88  See ch. 6, sec. 3.1 on regulatory stickiness. 
89  See M. G. Faure, M. Goodwin & F. Weber, Bucking the Kuznets Curve: Designing Effective 
Environmental Regulation in Developing Countries, 51 Va. J. Int’l L. 95 (2010). 
90  See N. Gunningham & D. Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for 
Environmental Protection, 21 L & Pol’y 49 (1999). 
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standards; much the leading expertise on offshore methane hydrates currently sits 
with university researchers and environmental observers.91 
The second utility of private regulations would occur when offshore methane 
hydrates are developed in regions lacking historical experience in regulating 
offshore resources or lack experience in administrating regulations on high-tech but 
high-risk activities. In such scenarios, the operators might possess strategic 
advantages in the ability to both set optimal standards and to ensure the exercise of 
those standards vis-à-vis the local governments.92 If industry had been engaged by 
governments in a developed jurisdiction in integrated regulatory mechanisms, then 
it is also possible that developing areas would indirectly benefit from the private 
standards set in the developed areas. 
Thus for the development of offshore methane hydrates, given its likely 
trajectory of innovation and its geographic diversity, private regulations could be 
implemented in parallel to public regulations. Not only operators but also other 
private groups could become engaged in a strategy of integrated regulatory 
mechanisms with a central regulatory body. 93 The privilege to institute private 
regulations, however, should be counterbalanced with requirements of disclosure, 
transparency, and of public access and audit. Further, diverse and potential adverse 
groups should be included within the private regulatory process; that might 
provide both policy balance and watchfulness. Private regulations can work 
effectively, but they should remain within the spirit of democracy and not run work 
to effect escape from other legal norms and requirements. 
3.3. Complementing strict liability with regulations 
As established, supra, at Chapter 6, Section 3, it is generally advisable to coordinate 
rules of civil liability with complementary regulations.  And both public and private 
regulations can be implemented in a coordinated integrated regulatory mechanism.  
Rules of civil liability, of public regulation, and of private regulation could all play 
roles in setting the optimal standards for the development of offshore methane 
hydrates. 
If regulations are not efficient in all circumstance, then there might be 
opportunity to implement rules of civil liability alongside those regulations as a 
buttress. Regulations may fall short of efficiency or optimality under several 
circumstances.94 And likewise, rules of civil liabilities have certain circumstances 
within which they are less robust and provide poor incentives to achieve optimal 
levels of precaution and activity; but those circumstances can be improved upon in 
some case by regulations. 
 
91  See N. Gunningham, M. Phillipson & P. Grabosky, Harnessing Third Parties as Surrogate 
Regulators, Achieving Environmental Outcomes by Alternative Means, 8 Bus. Strategy 
Environment 211 (Australian Centre for Environmental Law, 1999). 
92   See the discussion at ch. 6, sec. 5.1. 
93  See Gunningham, Phillipson, & Grabosky, supra at note 91. 
94  For a more complete discussion discussing the circumstance within which regulations are 
likely to become inefficient, see ch. 6, sec. 4, supra. 
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It has already been demonstrated, supra at Section 2, that the more robust rule 
of civil liability for offshore methane hydrates would be a rule of strict liability. 
Rules of strict liability provide optimally for the accident risks of unilateral 
accidents, certain bilateral accidents, and abnormally hazardous accidents, among 
others.95  But rules of strict liability cannot efficiently provide incentives for certain 
circumstances; complementary regulations could assist to remedy those 
circumstances.96 
Given the demonstrations, supra, that both strict liability and regulations could 
effectively govern certain circumstances of the development of offshore methane 
hydrates and yet that both approaches provide for distinguishable circumstances, 
then it would reasonably be prudent to ensure that both strict liability and 
regulations were complementarily implemented to provide for a more 
comprehensive portfolio of incentives to optimally govern the commercial 
development of offshore methane hydrate installations. 
4. Conclusion – governing with strict liability and regulations 
This chapter has provided a review of the arguments on how to best govern the 
risks and hazards from the commercial development of offshore methane hydrates. 
This chapter presented the recommendations that strict liability should be applied 
in coordination with both public and private regulations.97  
The present chapter has assayed the arguments for both strict liability and 
negligence and found that the application of strict liability to the circumstances of 
offshore methane hydrates was more likely to provide for robust and optimal 
governance of their risks and hazards. The character of offshore methane hydrate 
accidents are expected to be primarily unilateral in nature, strict liability is efficient 
for that case. Even when bilateral types of accidents could occur it was found that 
the primary ability to prevent or manage those accidents would remain dominantly 
in the operator’s control thus strict liability would be more efficient to govern the 
operator. 
The character of the expected development, production, and abandonment 
and sequestration activities would likely qualify as abnormally hazardous activities 
and thus merit governance under a rule of strict liability. To the extent that certain 
ex ante standards of care or precaution are unclear or remain in formation, and one 
would reasonably expect such standards to be in evolution given the novelty of 
offshore methane hydrate operations, strict liability would be a more robust 
 
95  See discussions, supra, in ch. 5 and within this chapter at sec. 2. 
96  See discussions, supra, in ch. 5, sec. 3, on when strict liability is less robust than negligence. 
97  Since Plato, and likely before him, the question of how to obtain good governance, of how to 
ensure that governance institutions are well used and not abused, has been a topic of much 
debate. It would appear from recent history that the processes of democracy and 
transparency are central to ensuring that those institutions that we choose to govern 
ourselves by remain functional and optimal; it would appear no less so for the enactment and 
enforcement of the suggested governance mechanisms for offshore methane hydrates as 
proposed within this Chapter. 
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mechanism than a rule of negligence. A rule of strict liability provides no 
indemnification for meeting a duty of care and thus provides a more clear incentive 
to the potential operators to innovate in matters of safety and precaution. Given the 
diversity of risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates and the emergent need 
to address those risks with technological solutions, strict liability’s capacity to 
provide those aforementioned incentives for safety and precautionary innovations 
would be preferred over the weaker incentives provided by a rule of negligence. 
Additionally, the literature supported findings that a rule of strict liability 
could be more efficient in addressing the transaction costs of justice. A rule of strict 
liability might ultimately prevent problems of complex interaction between the 
victims. Further, the implementation of a rule of strict liability would enable the 
attainment of decentralization; decentralization would enable each operator to 
achieve optimal levels of offshore methane hydrate activities with optimal levels of 
safety and precaution as based on upon their own unique technology sets and cost 
functions. 
The potential application of a rule of negligence was reviewed; the results 
supported the choice of strict liability. The circumstances of offshore methane 
hydrate activities were investigated to determine if various issues known to be 
more robustly addressed by a rule of negligence would be present. Risk averse 
operators, insolvent operators, operators demonstrating strategic avoidance of 
liabilities, operators facing imperfect insurance markets, and operators facing mis-
estimated damages were all reviewed; it was generally found that the circumstances 
of offshore methane hydrates did not present these risks in a manner that supported 
the application of a rule of negligence.  
The chapter has also provided an analysis whether regulations might provide 
efficient governance of the risk s and hazards of offshore methane hydrates; it was 
found that regulations could so provide. A fundamental issue is that public 
regulations would be able to set standards prior to the development of offshore 
methane hydrates development and production activities. A regulatory body would 
be capable of addressing certain informational asymmetries that might be present in 
the development and operation of offshore methane hydrates.  Regulations could 
provide direct standards to prevent insolvency and to provide non-financial 
incentives to those operators that do become insolvent. A regulatory body could act 
when rules of civil liabilities would be challenged by problems of under-deterrence.  
Arguments have been presented that private regulations, particularly when 
part of smart regulation or integrated regulatory mechanisms, could improve 
standard setting and improve on the benefits of public regulation. Such a 
mechanism could thus benefit from the participation of regulatory bodies, of 
operators and investors, of university researchers and scientists, and of informed 
observers such as environmental groups. Because the technology of offshore 
methane hydrate operations would be expected to be rapidly advancing, the private 
actors engaged in that technological development could bring their knowledge to 
the design of the standards and ensure that the standards remain “best available” 
and up-to-date to avoid regulatory stickiness. As a separate concern, offshore 
methane hydrate can be found in many locations where local governments might 
lack historical experiences governing the risks of offshore resources or might be 
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institutionally challenged to address the technological complexity of the hydrate 
operations. In such settings, private regulations could facilitate the local 
governments’ efforts to govern the risks and hazards; the role of integrated 
regulatory mechanisms can in part be shared from areas with offshore experience to 
areas lacking those experiences. 
The final conclusion and recommendation of this chapter is that strict liability, 
public regulation, and private regulation should be complementarily implemented 
to govern the risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates. One observation was 
made that there are multiple risks and hazards, that civil liability and regulations 
possess strengths in different areas, and that the integrated implementation of both 
would provide a portfolio of incentives to govern a wider collection of risks and 
hazards. Another observation was that the operations of civil liability rules can 
function to protect and enhance the operations of regulatory efforts and vice versa 
that regulatory efforts could provide information and other transaction cost reliefs 
that could enhance the operation and efficiency of rules of civil liability.  
In conclusion, this chapter supports the joint application of strict liability, 
public regulations, and private regulations in complementary implementation. The 
chapter finds that both public and private regulations could be engaged in an 
integrated regulatory mechanism. Combining the civil liability rule of strict liability 
together with an integrated regulatory mechanism could enable reinforcing 
feedback, enhancing and improving the function of both sides.  
These recommendations for the joint implementation of strict liability, public 
regulations, and private regulations will be applied in analysis to existing laws and 
conventions in the following four chapters of Part III. Part IV of this study will 
present an integration and summary of the findings on the circumstances of 
offshore methane hydrates from Part I, of the analysis herein on rules of civil 
liability and regulations from Part II, and of the state of existing laws and 
conventions from Part III. 
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CONVENTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
Part III presents a collection of analyses on existing laws and conventions that 
potentially apply to the development of offshore methane hydrates. The laws, 
conventions, and legal instruments reviewed in each chapter were chosen for their 
prima facie potential to be applied to the development of offshore methane hydrates. 
As the overall set of laws that might apply would be too numerous to include for 
the purposes of this study, major or representative laws and conventions were 
chosen.  
There are two primary focuses of the analyses. One focus is to review the laws 
or conventions to determine if they would in fact apply to offshore methane 
hydrates. A second focus is to determine if the laws or conventions match the 
recommendations from Chapter 7 to complementarily implement strict liability, 
public regulations, and private regulations.  
Chapter 8 focuses on the international conventions of the United Nations. 
Chapter 9 addresses both international maritime conventions and international oil 
spill conventions. Chapter 10 reviews the legal instruments of the EU. Chapter 11 
provides analysis on federal laws of the U.S. A summary of these results and 
integration with the broader results of Parts I and II are provided in Chapter 12 
within Part IV.  
1. Introduction 
The international legal community has taken dramatic steps in the last several 
decades towards clarifying a common perspective on international environmental 
law. While much work remains to develop complete and comprehensive 
international regulations, a set of Kelsian norms have at long last been established.  
The overall results of these efforts are the common recognition of the 
importance of the environment and of the need for international comity to 
prospectively protect and preserve the global environment. The balancing of state 
sovereignty rights and the recognition of the common human heritage to the 
environment is a key focus of the new paradigm. Acts of war and hegemonic 
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authority are discouraged, to be replaced by a united effort to achieve global 
sustainable development.  
2. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (UNCLOS),1 is one of 
the most comprehensive international law conventions functioning in 
environmental law. 2  Originally drafted in 1982, it did not enter into formal 
operation until 1994. UNCLOS governs many aspects of activities that occur within 
coastal, marine, and oceanic locations.  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas and the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development provide the modern paradigm of 
sustainable development within the oceans and seas. If methane hydrates are to 
become commercially developed in any country outside of Peru, Syria, Turkey, the 
United States, and Venezuela, then the coastal states engaged in that development 
effort will be regulated by UNCLOS and guided by the Rio Declaration.  
The guidance from UNCLOS and the Rio Declaration will guide methane 
hydrate resource owners to engage in the development of rules and regulations to 
guide the development activities to provide for the protection of the environment. 
That protected environment is both the areas under the coastal state’s jurisdiction 
and those ecologies further afield. Additionally, UNCLOS provides that the 
International Seabed Authority can also develop similar rules and regulations for 
those hydrates within the high seas Area. Both UNCLOS and the Rio Declaration 
call for the provision of clear regulations to provide recovery and compensation for 
all environmental harms that would be caused by the development of methane 
hydrates.  
2.1. Rules on mineral exploitation 
UNCLOS establishes the oceanic boundary lines for coastal states. The “Zone” is 
defined as that area of the oceans and seas that is beyond national jurisdiction.3 It is 
the idea of the Zone and of the usages of the Zone that are the subject of UNCLOS. 
The territorial limits of coastal states are set at 12 miles offshore, as measured 
against the baseline of its coastal geography.4 For the 12 miles beyond the territorial 
waters, coastal states are given rights to their contiguous zones, which are intended 
to enable them to enforce their territorial waters.5 Within these areas, the coastal 
states retain comprehensive sovereignty.  
 
1  1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, Montego Bay, 
Jamaica. 1833 UNTS 3, 21 ILM 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
2  C. H. Allen, Protecting the Oceanic Gardens of Eden: International Law Issues in Deep-Sea 
Vent Resource Conservation and Management, 13 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 563, 586 (2000). 
3  UNCLOS art. 1.1(1) 
4  Id., art. 3 
5  Id., art. 33 
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For the exploitation of minerals, coastal states enjoy Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZ) that extend far beyond their territorial waters. The EEZ are limited to stretch 
no further than 200 nautical miles beyond the baseline that determines their 
territorial waters. 6  Additional details are provided on the definition of the 
continental shelf, which is similarly defined at 200 nautical miles beyond the 
baselines, in the base case, but there are more concerns about the actual underlying 
geography and geology and may enable a coastal country to claim up to 350 
nautical miles beyond its baseline.7  
Coastal states enjoy full sovereignty over the minerals contained in the sea, 
seabed, and its subsoil in both the EEZ and the continental shelf areas. Coastal states 
retain their:  
 ę sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or 
non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed 
and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic 
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of 
energy from the water, currents and winds[.]”8  
And coastal states exercise:  
ę... exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose 
of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. ... The natural 
resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other non-
living resources of the seabed and subsoil together ...”9 
Coastal have the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling on the continental 
shelf, and thus within their EEZs, for all purposes.10 
There are economic differences though. For minerals extracted from within the 
EEZs’ 200 nautical mile limits, the coastal states retain all of the economic benefits of 
produced minerals. The coastal states are required to make payments, or payments 
in kind, to the International Seabed Authority (ISA) against the net value of 
minerals with mineral extraction that occurs beyond the 200 nautical miles.11  
i. The first five years are free of payments;  
ii. Then in year 6, a 1% payment is required;  
iii. Every thereafter increases the toll by 1%, until the toll rate equals 7%;  
iv. All subsequent years pay a toll rate of 7%. 
The ISA is to redistribute those funds “to States Parties to this Convention, on the 
basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of 
 
6  Id., art. 57 
7  Id., art. 76 
8  Id., art. 56.1(a), 
9  Id., art. 77 
10  Id., art. 82 
11  Id., art. 82.2. 
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developing States, particularly the least developed and the land-locked among 
them.”12  
2.2. Protection of the environment 
In addition, the coastal states retain the jurisdiction and duty to handle “protection 
and preservation of the marine environment.”13  
While UNCLOS provides guidance as to where coastal states retain certain 
aspects of sovereignty at different points in the ocean, UNCLOS does that to define 
and delimit the Zone, that area of the oceans beyond any national jurisdiction. 
Within that zone, all minerals and resources, living and non-living, as said to 
“belong to the common heritage of all mankind.”14 Resources include methane 
hydrates, as resources are defined as “all solid, liquid” or gaseous mineral resources 
in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed.”15 So, within the Area, all methane 
hydrates belong to all of mankind; their development and exploitation will be 
administered by the ISA.16  
UNCLOS takes a very clear line that environmental concerns should remain 
front and center with all activities taking place in the Area. The operational 
behavior of the member states in the Area are controlled by UNCLOS. State parties 
are liable for the damages, including environmental damages, caused on their 
behalf within the Area.  
Within all three locations, the EEZ, the continental shelf, and within the Area, 
“States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.” 17 
Within the areas under their sovereignty, States have the “right to exploit their 
natural resources” but only if “pursuant to their environmental policies and in 
accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.”18   
There are several requirements set out to establish the manner in which the 
ocean and its associated ecologies must be protected. 19 Those subsections most 
relevant to the commercial development of methane hydrates are listed hereunder:  
i.  ęStates shall take ... all measures consistent with this Convention that are 
necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine 
environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable 
means at their disposal”20  
ii. ęStates shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under 
their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by 
 
12  Id., art. 82.4. 
13  Id., art. 56.1(b)(iii), 
14  Id., art. 136 
15  Id., art. 133 
16  Id., art. 151.1(a). 
17  Id., art. 192 
18  Id., art. 193. 
19  Id., art. 194, 
20  Id., art. 194.1 
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pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising 
from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not 
spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights”21  
iii. ęThese measures shall include, inter alia, those designed to minimize to 
the fullest possible extent: (c) pollution from installations and devices 
used in exploration or exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed 
and subsoil, in particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing 
with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating 
the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of such 
installations or devices”22 
Within the Area wherein states lack sovereignty or jurisdiction, state parties are 
liable for their own behavior as well as “state enterprises or natural or juridical 
persons which possess the nationality of States Parties or are effectively controlled 
by them or their nationals.”23  
The Area shall only be used for the “benefit of mankind as a whole.”24  
ę (a) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution and other 
hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline, and of 
interference with the ecological balance of the marine 
environment, particular attention being paid to the need for protection 
from harmful effects of such activities as drilling, dredging, 
excavation, disposal of waste, construction and operation or 
maintenance of installations, pipelines and other devices related to 
such activities;”25 (Underscoring added.)  
Art. 145 further clarifies the environmental duty of care: 
ę(b) the protection and conservation of the natural resources of the 
Area and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the 
marine environment.”26  
As operational details of how environmental safety should be guarded and 
preserved with preventative behaviors are to be provided by UNCLOS,27 Annex III 
provides a full set of operation guidelines for the ISA to manage the exploitation of 
minerals within the Area. Key among the concerns enumerated: 
 
21  Id., art. 194.2 
22  Id., art. 194.3(c) 
23  Id., art. 139.1. 
24  Id., art. 140 
25  Id., art. 145(a). 
26  Id., art. 145(b). 
27  Id., art. 147 
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i. Given that the extraction and production of methane hydrates are 
regulated by UNCLOS, the selection of qualified operators is to be 
determined by the rules, regulations, and procedures of the ISA.28  
ii. To be qualified, the Annex requires both financial and technical 
competence to be established.29 (Underscoring added.) 
iii. Additionally, the applicant operator must be sponsored by a Member State 
and the Member State must be able to demonstrate that they have the 
capacity to “ensure, within their legal system” that the applicant operator 
will be required to operate to the environmental protection standards of the 
ISA.  
That said, if the Member State has sufficient regulations and institutions to 
“reasonably appropriate for securing compliance” from the applicant operator, and 
that operator later fails its duties under the Member State’s laws, then the Member 
State itself will not be liable for any harms caused by the sponsored operator. Thus, 
in the event that extraction from methane hydrates becomes operationally 
commercial in nature, then Member States have a strong incentive to provide sound 
regulatory regimes and institutions to better defend themselves under UNCLOS.  
2.3. Risk governance under UNCLOS 
UNCLOS requires the development of regulatory systems prior to the commercial 
development of methane hydrates. “Rules, regulations and procedures shall be 
drawn up in order to secure effective protection of the marine environment from 
harmful effects directly resulting from activities in the Area” if undertaken with 
regards to the exploitation of minerals, such as methane hydrates.30  
Should an operator cause harm, they will be liable for the actual amount of 
damage; but if the damage was caused by a failure of the ISA to operate correctly 
under UNCLOS and thus to manage the operator’s behavior, then the ISA shall be 
liable for the actual amount of damages.31 The operative term for responsibility is 
the act of a “wrongful act” by either the operator or the ISA.32 It does not appear 
that “wrongful act” is explicitly defined within UNCLOS; albeit there are behavioral 
requirements for environmental stewardship set out at Part XII that might be 
applicable in illuminating the phrase. 
While there are requirements for the operators to demonstrate their financial 
capacity to respond to the harms they might create, nowhere in UNCLOS is it 
explained where the ISA or the UN more broadly might receive sufficient revenues 
to handle the burdens of a major methane hydrate catastrophe. But the requirement 
 
28  Id., Annex III, art. 4.1. 
29  Id., Annex III, art. 4.2. 
30  Id., Annex III, art. 17.2(f) 
31  Id., Annex III, art. 22 
32  Id. 
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for a regulatory body to address insolvency is reassuringly close to the model of 
governance suggested, supra, at Chapter 7. 
Also intriguing under UNCLOS is the idea that all technology developed to 
operate within the Area should be shared and distributed as part of the “common 
heritage” paradigm of UNCLOS.33 The data from activities in the Area is required to 
be shared and transferred inter-members. 34  This type of arrangement would 
normally assume a regulatory body to be involved; perhaps the ISA would 
coordinate but it is not clear if other regulatory bodies could lead or if the ISA and 
the UN could coordinate a “methane hydrate data clearinghouse registry.” 
In conclusion, UNCLOS has sufficient ambit to regulate the development of 
the methane hydrates. If the extraction of methane hydrates happened within the 
Area, then the environmental regulations would apply and there would need to be 
a new set of regulations and rules to establish proper safety practices and methods 
of handling environmental damages. Such rules and regulations do not currently 
exist.  
3. Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 
The United Nations Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents (UNCTEIA) will not likely apply to the development of offshore methane 
hydrate projects.35 But the convention might apply to the onshore facilities related 
to the processing and marketing of natural gas and hydrogen. If it did apply, it 
appears that it would favor a civil liability rule of negligence over that of strict 
liability.  
3.1. Exclusion of certain hydrocarbon accidents 
The Convention is to be applied to “the prevention of, prepared for, and response to 
industrial accidents capable of causing transboundary effects, including the effects 
of such accidents caused by natural disasters.”36 However, the Convention provides 
a nine-point list of exceptions to the Convention.37 Within that list, accidents that 
occur in the marine environment, including seabed exploration and exploitation, are 
excluded from the Convention.38 Similarly, leakages into the sea, such as oil or other 
harmful substances, are excluded from Convention coverage.39 Thus, any accidents 
related to the seeping, leakage, or venting of methane from an offshore methane 
hydrate project is excluded from the coverage of the Convention.  
 
33  Id., Annex III, art. 5. 
34  Id., Annex III, art. 14 
35  United Nations Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, March 17, 
1992, 2105 U.N.T.S. 457 [hereinafter UNCTEIA] 
36  UNCTEIA art. 2, sec. 1. 
37  Id., art. 2, sec. 2. 
38  Id., art. 2, sec. 2(f). 
39  Id., art. 2, sec. 2(g). 
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3.2. Application to onshore facilities of offshore installations 
If the project had onshore facilities, otherwise related to the offshore activities, but 
an accident arose onshore from those associated onshore facilities, without direct 
causation from the offshore activities, then the Convention might apply. Such 
events might be the leakage of a gas transportation pipeline or the rupture and 
conflagration of an onshore methane storage facility. It is not likely that such events 
would become transboundary in the general sense of the term, but a quick review of 
the potential implications is developed, infra.  
The Convention provides that industrial accidents result from the loss of 
control during hazardous activities over hazardous substances; either during the 
processing or storing within an installation or when such hazardous substances are 
in transport.40 Hazardous activities are those activities that engage in hazardous 
substances and which are capable of transboundary effects.41 Transboundary effects 
are those serious effects that occur within one jurisdiction as a result of industrial 
accidents in other jurisdictions, so long as both jurisdictions are under the 
sovereignty of signatories to the Convention.42 Also, the industrial accident needs to 
qualify as such and also not be listed as an exception to the Convention; e.g., 
onshore methane processing, storage, and transportation are not per se excluded.43  
Methane and hydrogen gases are reasonably characterized as hazardous 
substances under the Convention. A substance is a hazardous substance if it is listed 
under Annex I, either as a named substance or as a chemical that needs certain 
minimum quantities.44 Methane, as natural gas, is a listed as a named substance 
under Annex I; either as regular gaseous methane or as a cryogenic liquid such as 
LNG.45 To the extent that hydrogen is extracted,46 or otherwise associated with the 
onshore activities, it would also be named substance under Annex I.47  
3.3. Risk governance under UNCTEIA 
Once the character of a hazardous activity has been identified, such as an onshore 
methane processing facility or a hydrogen generation facility, then the obligations of 
the Convention are binding upon the parties.48 Foremost among the obligations is 
“to protect human beings and the environment against industrial accidents by 
preventing accidents as far as possible,” by reducing the frequency and severity of 
 
40  Id., art. 1(a)(i) and (ii). 
41  Id., art. 1(b). 
42  Id., art. 1(d) and (f). 
43  Id., art. 2. sec. 1 and 2. 
44  Id., Annex I. pt. I and II. 
45  Minimum quantity of 200 metric tons, a functionally tiny amount of methane for a methane 
producing facility. Id., Annex I. pt. II. sec. 11. 
46  See discussion on producing hydrogen from methane hydrates at Chapter 3, Section 5.2. 
47  Minimum amount required is 50 metric tons. If daily production of hydrogen is assumed, to 
provide a green fuel stock, then this volume would be readily met. UNCTEIA. Annex I. pt. II. 
sec. 5. 
48  Id., art. 3, generally. 
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those accidents that do occur and by mitigating the effects of the accidents that do 
occur.49  
The Convention thus establishes a very high duty of care, to prevent accidents 
“as far as possible”;50 but it does not appear to be an unlimited demand but rather 
the highest reasonable levels of due care implying a balancing of social benefits and 
costs. The Parties are to “take appropriate measures for the prevention of 
accidents,”51 the Parties are to “take appropriate measures to establish and maintain 
adequate emergency preparedness...,”52 and “the Parties shall support appropriate 
international efforts to elaborate rues, criteria, and procedures in the field of 
responsibility and liability.”53  
Is the requirement for “as far as possible” efforts a strict liability rule or a rule 
of negligence? It is likely that the drafter had a strict liability rule in mind, but left 
sufficient flexibility for a narrow version of a negligence rule to be implemented by 
some states; the Convention itself does not clearly set a negligence rule, leaving the 
details of such to the further efforts of the Parties.54 The overall semantic character 
of the Convention reasonably appears to support and suggest the development of a 
rule of strict liability, or a unique form of a negligence rule with the duties of care 
set at the highest feasible levels. 
Indeed, one might be able to comply with a combination of regulations and 
civil liability rules. E.g., the Convention highlights the type of minimal goals of 
safety that should be addressed by the implementing state; Annex IV provides a 
non-binding non-obligatory listing of methods to prevent industrial accidents.55 Yet, 
precisely because of this non-binding non-obligatory character of these rules, no 
particular duty level is prescribed therein. Thus, there is little evidence for the duty 
of care needed for a rule of negligence; yet, the means to attain decentralization 
under a rule of strict liability has been left unblocked by the regulatory suggestions. 
Thus, a combined regulatory and strict liability framework would coordinate with 
the Convention. 
That the Convention engaged in such discussions with regards to sufficient or 
fitting levels of precaution, suggests the drafter expectations that a regulatory 
approach would be taken by many and as such would benefit from some sort of 
template to facilitate later coordination intra-parties.  
 
49  Emphasis added. Id., art. 3, sec. 1. 
50  Id., art. 3, sec. 1. 
51  Id., art. 6, sec. 1. 
52  Id., art. 8, sec. 1. 
53  Id., art. 13.  
54  Id., art. 13. 
55  See “Such measures may include, but are not limited to ...,” (emphasis added), at UNCTEIA. 
art. 6. sec. 1.; and “the following measures may be carried out ...,” (emphasis added), at Id., 
Annex IV. Preamble. 
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4. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (UNFCCC),56 
addresses the problems posed by anthropogenic climate change; it is particularly 
focused on the issues related to the emissions of greenhouse gases.57 Additional 
details necessary for the effective administration of the UNFCCC were developed 
and adopted as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol.)58  
4.1. Governance of anthropogenic climate change 
The UNFCCC defines greenhouse gases in a scientific frame, “gaseous constituents 
of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic that absorb and re-emit infrared 
radiation.”59 The Kyoto Protocol provides an enumerated list of greenhouse gases: 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorcarbons 
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). 60 Thus methane 
and methane hydrates are potentially regulated by the UNFCCC.  
The UNFCCC recognizes two determinants of anthropogenic greenhouse 
gases, emissions and sinks. Emissions are the release of greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere.61 Emissions arise from a source of greenhouse gases; a source is any 
process or activity that releases greenhouse gases or their precursors to the 
atmosphere. 62  Sinks are those processes, activities, or methods that remove 
greenhouse gases or their precursors from the atmosphere.63 
The anthropogenic venting and seeping of methane to the atmosphere from 
offshore methane hydrate installations qualify as emissions under the UNFCCC 
because methane is a listed greenhouse gas and the transmission to the atmosphere 
would qualify as an emission. Likewise, there is a reasonable argument to be made 
that the release of carbon dioxide from interactions of vented or seeped methane 
volumes could also qualify as emissions, however there is an intermediate role 
played by Nature in converting that methane into carbon dioxide thus the emission 
is indirectly anthropogenic in character.  
The absorption of carbon dioxide back into the hydrate beds in replacement of 
the extracted methane volumes would likely qualify as a sink under the UNFCCC.64 
 
56  92 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, New York, USA. 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 31 ILM 849 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
57  UNFCCC. Preamble. 
58  1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
December 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, 37 ILM 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
59  UNFCCC. art. 1. sec. 5. 
60  Kyoto Protocol. Annex A. Greenhouse Gases. 
61  UNFCCC. art. 1. sec. 4. 
62  Id., art. 1. sec. 9. 
63  Id., art. 1. sec. 8. 
64  E.g., Japan has expressed interest in a plan that would extract the methane to fuel offshore 
electrical generation coordinated with re-injection of the exhaust carbon dioxide volumes 
back into the hydrate reservoirs. Also, Germany has a research interest in offshore CCS that 
Æ
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Many of the promoted means of developing offshore methane hydrate installations 
have included the option of CCS alongside methane production in part to facilitate 
minimizing the net impact of offshore methane hydrate installations under the 
UNFCCC. Thus offshore methane hydrate installations might qualify as both 
emitters and sinks and need netting under the UNFCCC accounting procedures. 
4.2. Governance of regulatory character 
The UNFCCC requires its Contracting Parties to employ the precautionary principle, 
that they should “take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize 
the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.” 65 However, the 
UNFCCC takes a measured approach to which strategies should be undertaken, in 
that requires the “measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so 
as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”66  
Additionally, the UNFCCC is sensitive that each country or culture may face 
different determinants of cost-effectiveness and that each country is enabled to take 
its unique circumstances into account.67 Thus, the potential for methane hydrate 
projects to both emit and sink greenhouse gases needs to be integrated within the 
framework of the precautionary principle. 68  However, the UNFCCC does not 
particularly determine how a particular country might utilize its methane hydrate 
resources, that depends on the unique “socio-economic contexts” of each 
Contracting Party.  Thus, the UNFCCC has preserved to its Contracting Parties the 
 
coordinates with methane hydrate reservoirs; Projekt SUGAR and Eco2 lead those efforts. See 
a more complete discussion, supra, in Chapter 3, Section 5.1.   
65  UNFCCC. art. 3. sec. 3. The precautionary principle has been difficult to convert into practical 
procedural terms under the UNFCCC; for a broader discussion on the application of the 
precautionary principle in international and EU law, see Arcuri 2007. 
66  Id., art. 3. sec. 3. Arcuri described cost effective assessments (CEAs) as an aspect of the 
precautionary principle. A. Arcuri, The Case for a Procedural Version of the Precautionary Principle 
Erring on the Side of Environmental Preservation, (Global Law Working Paper No. 09/04, 2007). 
It remains unclear how exactly the precautionary principle is to offset against the 
cost/benefits models prescribed by the prevention and proportionality principles from law 
and economics; however, it appears that the CBM approach might be more robust for cases of 
risk whereas the precautionary principle might be intended to apply to situations of 
uncertainty. Id., at 16-17, relying on Frank Knight’s terms of risk as opposed to uncertainty, 
see id., at 11-12. 
67  Id., art. 3. sec. 3. 
68  There are a variety of potential schemes that might be utilized to either prevent riskier fields 
from coming into development or to control access to the key technologies. However, many 
states possessing offshore methane hydrates would have strong incentives to resist those 
schemes; public welfare needs or private greed could overtake preventative efforts. A 
proposal has been suggested for methane hydrate banking; unsafe fields could defer 
development in exchange for revenues from safer fields in production. If those riskier fields 
become safe due to later improvements in legal institutions or technological advances, those 
fields could go into development and repay those field owners that shared revenues in the 
earlier time period. This idea is introduced in R. A. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus: Planning 
Ahead for the Commercial Development of Offshore Methane, 14:2 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 
(December 2014 Forthcoming). 
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decisions of regulations or rules of civil liability. The burden is imposed at the state-
level and not lower. 
While all of the Contracting Parties are obligated to undertake broad 
responsibilities to ameliorate and reduce the threat of anthropogenic climate 
change,69 the UNFCCC distinguishes between Annex I Parties and Annex II Parties. 
Annex I Parties are developed countries, and as such are expected to lead the 
UNFCCC’s Parties by establishing national policies and measures to limit 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and to protect and enhance 
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.70 The Annex I Parties are obligated to provide 
measurements and metrics on their progress in achieving those goals.71 The Kyoto 
Protocol took the next step to make those requirements functional.72 The Protocol 
set an aspirational goal to limit anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. 73 
There is a new list of Parties so committed at Annex B to the Protocol. 74 The goals, 
as drafted within the Protocol, are percentage targets against an estimated level of 
emissions from the year 1990; e.g. the United States committed to reduce its 
emissions to 93% of its 1990 emission levels.75 The overall changes to emissions are 
reduced by increases to sinks and reservoirs;76 thus the use of methane hydrate 
deposits as both energy resource and as CCS facility could be tallied on both sides 
of the emissions target.  
Groupings of Annex I Parties can agree to achieve their targets as an 
aggregate; 77  this could assist methane hydrate projects by including a 
transboundary perspective on the combined emissions and sink planning related to 
the project. Additionally, Parties may volitionally transfer or acquire emission 
reduction units by engaging in projects that reduce anthropogenic emissions or 
enhancing their removal by sinks. 78  The Protocol also provides for a Clean 
Development Mechanism, (CDM), which enables Parties outside of Annex I to 
engage in sustainable development in line with the UNFCCC.79 The CDM enables 
developed countries to sponsor efforts within the developing countries that would 
assist the attainment of UNFCCC targets by enabling the Annex I Parties to receive 
some emission reduction units for their own accounts.80 Also, more broadly the 
Annex II Parties and other developed Parties are obligated to provide new financing 
mechanisms to support the attainment of the UNFCCC targets by assisting in the 
financing of projects that would limit emissions and enhance sinks.81 Thus, there are 
 
69  Id., art. 4. sec. 1(a) through (j). 
70  Id., art. 4. sec. 2(a) 
71  Id., art. 4. sec. 2(b) and (c). 
72  Kyoto Protocol. art. 2. See art. 2., sec. 1(a) for a list of specific obligations. 
73  Id., art. 3. 
74  Id., art. 3. art. 1. and at Annex B. 
75  Id., art. 3. art. 1, 2, and 3. and at Annex B. 
76  Id., art. 3. art. 3. and at Annex A. 
77  Id., art. 4. 
78  Id., art. 6. 
79  Id., art. 12. sec. 2. 
80  Id., art. 12. sec. 3(a) and (b). 
81  Id., art. 11. 
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several means for the financing and development of methane hydrate projects if 
they are characterized as green energy projects that reduce emissions and enhance 
sinks.  
Annex II countries undertook additional financial, technological and burden-
sharing obligations to assist developing countries to reduce and mitigate their own 
anthropogenic emissions.82 The Developed Parties have special obligations to assist 
those countries particularly vulnerable to be impacted by the effects of climate 
change due to anthropogenic emissions.83 There are particular concerns raised for a 
limited number of critical situations:  
“ (a)  Small island countries;  
(b)  Countries with low-lying coastal areas;  
(c)  Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to 
forest decay;  
(d)  Countries with areas prone to natural disasters;  
(e)  Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification;  
(f)  Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution;  
(g)  Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous 
ecosystems;  
(h)  Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated 
from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of 
fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products; and …”84  
Subsections (a), (b), (d), and (g) could be adversely affected by the potential harms 
and hazards of methane hydrate projects. Subsections (c), (e), and (f) might benefit 
from the potential freshwater reserves associated with methane hydrates or the 
pollution abatement that methane hydrates might offer over existing energy 
resources. Finally, subsection (h) raises a query on the potential impact on those 
countries highly dependent on other non-methane hydrate but fossil fuel industries 
from the development of methane hydrate technologies. For if methane hydrates are 
developed as a form of green energy under the UNFCCC, then surely it would 
affect the revenues of those countries previously benefiting from coal and crude oil 
industries.  
4.3. Risk governance under the UNFCCC 
The approach to risk governance taken under the UNFCCC is best described as 
regulatory in nature. What discipline that exists is to coordinate at the state level of 
international law and not below to lesser actors, thus rules of civil liability are not 
engaged in directly by the UNFCCC.  The previous paragraphs, supra Section 4.2, 
demonstrated a variety of requirements that could only be properly be undertaken 
by regulatory bodies at both the UNFCCC level and within its party states.  
 
82  UNFCCC. art. 4. sec. 3. 
83  Id., art. 4. sec. 4. 
84  Id., art. 4., sec. 8. 
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To the extent that ratifying states opt to facilitate their own domestic 
obligations under the UNFCCC by enacting domestic regulation or civil liabilities to 
limit the risks of unplanned emission accidents is not explicitly addressed within 
the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. Some countries have taken stricter discipline 
into account,85 but others countries have not.86  
Thus, the main impacts of the UNFCCC on methane hydrate projects would 
be two-fold. First, for those countries having undertaken discipline to achieve their 
UNFCCC emission targets, methane hydrate venting or seeping of methane or 
carbon dioxide could bring regional discipline against the country permitting the 
project but not any particular notion of civil liability.  
Second, there are means to share emission reduction units via several 
mechanisms that could provide financial support to methane hydrate projects if the 
projects were sufficiently green in focus.  
In conclusion, the UNFCCC does support a regulatory body’s oversight of the 
data and operations of offshore methane hydrate installations. To the extent that a 
Contracting Party needs to monitor its overall levels of emissions and sinks, the 
offshore installations could fit within that regulatory rubric. To the extent that such 
observation data overlaps with similar data needs for accident awareness and 
prevention, that regulatory framework could both directly improve preventative 
efforts and could also provide secondary support to reducing the various 
transaction costs of implementing a strict liability regime. 
5. Espoo EIA Convention 
The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 
functions as the UN’s equivalent to the EU’s EIA Directive.87 When a proposed 
activity emerges that would be likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary 
impact, then the Contracting Parties have a duty to notify those other Contracting 
Parties that would be affected by the activity.88  
Appendix I provides a list of activities that are likely to have transboundary 
effects.89 Offshore hydrocarbon production is a listed activity under the Appendix; 
it is defined to include the extraction of natural gas if the installation extracts more 
 
85  See discussion on EU efforts to limit greenhouse gases, infra, at Chapter 10, Section 7, which 
established fiscal discipline for Member States falling short of their commitments. 
86  Several key developed countries, and thus significant emitters, have not ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol despite their ratification of the underlying UNFCCC; e.g. the United States. 
87  The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 
February 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Espoo EIA Convention]. 
88  Espoo EIA Convention. art. 3. sec. 1. 
89  Id., art. 3. sec. 1. and Appendix I 
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than 500,000 cubic meters of methane a day.90 However, as of January 2014, the 
Appendix I was not in effect as not enough Contracting Parties had ratified it.91  
The commercial development of a methane hydrate project would have the 
potential to make an impact on “on the environment including human health and 
safety, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, climate, landscape and historical monuments or 
other physical structures or the interaction among these factors;” there is no 
requirement for adverse effects.92 To the extent that such impacts could cross from 
one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction, such an impact would qualify as a 
transboundary impact.93 In that sense, the awareness of an impending methane 
hydrate project that would have a transboundary impact would raise the 
requirement to provide notification to the other impacted Contracting Parties.  
This system of notifications would be primarily a regulatory action that collects 
information but provides for no judicial damages; thus the Convention provides no 
explicit form of ex ante anticipation of ex post costs to provide incentives in the 
manner that civil liability systems provide. But the convention would clearly be an 
information clearing house that would complement a strict liability system. 
6. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was held 
in 1992; it has been described as one of the most ambitious international 
environmental conferences of the twentieth century.94 Both binding conventions, 
such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and soft law documents, such as the 
Rio Declaration of Principles, were accomplished at that conference. 95  The 
conference effectively shifted international customary law towards a paradigm of 
precautionary law and a broader notion of protecting whole eco-systems, as 
contrasted against earlier paradigms of limited numbers of specifically targeted 
species.  
The Rio Declaration is akin the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in that 
it is aspirational in character. Unlike the previous discussed matters, supra in 
Section 2, 3, 4, and 5, the Rio Declaration is not binding law. It might reflect 
developing opinio juris, but it is a relatively source of soft law.  
 
90  Id., Appendix I. sec. 15. “Offshore hydrocarbon production. Extraction of petroleum and 
natural gas for commercial purposes where the amount extracted exceeds 500 metric 
tons/day in the case of petroleum and 500 000 cubic metres/day in the case of gas.” 
91  Only 21 Parties had ratified the Appendix as part of the second amendments as of January 26, 
2014. The underlying Convention has 45 Parties, so a total of 34 Parties need to ratify the 
Appendix; i.e. 13 more Parties. Available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-4-
c&chapter=27&lang=en 
92  Espoo EIA Convention. art. 1. sec. (vii). 
93  Id., art. 1. sec. (viii). 
94  Allen, supra at note 2, at 599. 
95  Id., at 599-600. 
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The document lists twenty-seven specific principles and guidelines for future 
efforts to better coordinate economic growth and ecological conservation.96 Several 
of those principles have direct application to the development of methane hydrates.  
Principle 2: States maintain their sovereign rights to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental and 
developmental policies, but they have a corresponding duty 
under international law to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other of areas beyond the limits of their national 
jurisdictions. 
Principle 4:  Requires that planning and actions to mitigate potential 
environmental harms are included within all efforts of 
development and growth.  
Principle 7:  Calls for the global community to act in comity to conserve, 
protect, and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s 
ecosystem.  
Principle 10:  Calls for all states to engage their citizens in the due and 
deliberative processes of engagement and decision making on 
matters that could affect the environment. Information sharing 
and awareness building are also called for.  
Principle 11:  Calls, amongst other targets, for a recognition that different 
states have different legal institutions and stages of economic 
development, and as such the regulatory standards applied by 
some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted 
economic and social cost to other countries.  
Principle 13:  Calls for the development of national laws regarding liability 
and compensation for the victims of pollution and other 
environmental damage. States should also cooperate to develop 
international law regarding liability and compensation for 
adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities 
within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their 
jurisdiction.  
Principle 15:  Calls for states to protect the environment by widely adopting 
the use of the precautionary approach, limited only according to 
their capabilities.  
 
96  Rio Declaration. Principles 1 to 27. The whole Declaration can be found within the UN's 
archives; available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=116
3. 
241_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Chapter 8 
 211 
Principle 16:  Calls for the international adoption of the polluter pays principle 
into domestic and international laws.  
Principle 17:  Calls for Environmental impact assessments to become a 
standard activity for all activities which might endanger or 
harm the environment. 
The Rio Declaration does establish more clear norms of comportment with regards 
to prospective acts of commercialization and the aspirational goals of the 
international legal community for the prospective protection of the environment.   
6.1. Risk governance under Rio Declaration 
Perhaps the most important risk governance issues with the Declarations are 
the recognition of (i) the necessity to establish liability systems to address 
environmental protection concerns, (ii) that both regulatory and civil liability 
systems could be engaged, and (iii) that different countries and cultures might need 
different manners of liability and regulations implementations, (iv) that 
precautionary principles should be applied and (v) that the polluter pays principle 
should be applied. 
The general call for liability rules reflects a growing recognition that polluters 
or tortfeasors need to know ex ante that they will be held accountable for their 
decisions. It is probably true that the flexibility of the Declaration reflects an 
inability to have agreed to greater specifity; but for the present study it enables the 
retention of legal flexibility, particularly for jointly and complementarily 
implementing civil liability rules and regulations as circumstances fit. The 
precautionary principle sets a Coasian right to the general public, that they have a 
right to retain their current enjoyment of Nature and to their way of life; it places 
the burden on the tortfeasor to prevent harm even if it is unclear that harm would 
result. The polluter pays principle, without additional clarification, lacks a 
mechanism to recognize a prophylactic duty of care for the tortfeasor, if you pollute 
then you will need to pay the damages. Put together, it would appear that the 
Declaration on the whole is more closely aligned with a strict liability perspective or 
a very stringent regulatory system and not with a rule of negligence or permissive 
regulatory framework. 
In the case of methane hydrates, prior to the onset of commercial 
development, there would need to be a serious and substantial effort to develop 
effective and clear rules and regulations to ensure the safe and proper operation of 
the methane hydrate projects, to preserve both the local and afar ecologies. The 
rules and regulations should be established not unilaterally but in international 
comity, to yet to recognize the differences in legal institutions of different states. 
There should scientific undertakings to provide environment assessment reports to 
the impacted communities. And finally, the international community should 
establish, by consensus, a clear regime regarding liability and compensation for the 
victims of pollution and other environmental damage from the development of 
methane hydrates.  
242_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
Conventions of the United Nations 
212 
7. Conclusion 
The conclusions of this review of United Nations conventions is that while their 
applicability to individual or corporate level actors might be limited, the 
conventions do support using liability rules and regulations to govern risk from 
accidents, particularly environmental accidents.  
While the various conventions address liability for offshore accidents, it would 
appear that hydrocarbons have been excluded in certain arrangements, perhaps due 
in part to the parallel functions of the regional marine pacts and oil pollution pacts 
discussed in the next chapter.  
Nevertheless, the UN conventions do appear to prefer the application, or at 
least the spirit, of a strict liability rule or its parallel in regulatory matters. In that 
vein, the conventions align with the recommendation of a complementary strict 
liability and regulation framework as developed in Chapter 7. It is also correct that 
the UN conventions do not address methane hydrates directly, but they do address 
many aspects of the development and operation circumstances of offshore methane 
hydrates. 
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INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONVENTIONS AND  
OIL SPILL CONVENTIONS 
The rise of oceanic transportation of fuel and other potentially hazardous materials 
gave cause to the development of a group of regional marine pacts and 
international oil spill pacts. The two groups of conventions are somewhat 
interwoven, as they both address the potential leakage of hazardous elements into 
the ocean.  
Both of these legal paradigms provide the development of a risk governance 
scheme with historical perspective and insight. While the oil spill pacts are 
predicated solely on responding to the risks and hazards of crude oil shipments, the 
regional pacts also contain substantial language addressing hydrocarbon incidents. 
Overall, the international maritime conventions and oil spill conventions provide 
rubrics of strict liability and of effective incentives to seek optimal levels of 
preventative caution whilst also fostering the commercial benefits of marine 
transport and of energy supplies. 
Yet, it will be seen that both sets of conventions are likely to apply only 
indirectly to the potential risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates. As will 
be explored, infra, some of that disconnection stems from the ocean going vessel 
paradigm underlying the conventions and some of the disconnection arises from 
linguistic word choices that leave methane and related concerns out of the domain 
of the conventions. 
1. Regional marine conventions 
There are a collection of regional conventions that address the protection and 
sustainable exploitation of particular oceans, seas, and surrounding environments. 
Some of the regional marine conventions are explicitly focused on the potential 
harms and hazards of hydrocarbons while others are more general in scope.  
Herein is provided a review of four of the major regional marine conventions:  
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i. the OSPAR Convention (North East Atlantic Ocean),1  
ii. the Barcelona Convention (Mediterranean Sea),2  
iii. the Bonn Agreement (North Sea),3 and  
iv. the Helsinki Convention (Baltic Sea).4  
Please also find the table of Contracting States to each agreement or convention, 
infra, following the conclusion.5  
1.1. OSPAR Convention (North East Atlantic Ocean) 
OSPAR stands for Oslo and Paris and the acronym refers to the documentary 
history of the Convention in that it conjoined the Convention for the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, “Oslo Convention (1972),” 
against at-sea dumping of wastes with the Convention for the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution from Land-Based Sources, “Paris Convention (1974),” against land-based 
sea pollution and oil pollution.6 OSPAR was founded under Art. 197 of UNCLOS 
for global and regional cooperation.7  
OSPAR requires the Contacting Parties to take all possible steps to prevent 
and eliminate pollution to protect the maritime area. 8  OSPAR requires the 
Contracting States to adopt programs and measures and to cross-harmonize their 
policies.9 OSPAR states that nothing in OSPAR is to be taken to prevent Contracting 
States from undertaking more stringent measures than that required within OSPAR, 
both substantively and procedurally, to protect the maritime area. 10  OSPAR 
requires application of both the polluter pays principle 11  and the precautionary 
principle 12  in the design of the program and measures to be adopted by the 
Contacting Parties.  
 
1  See discussion, infra, at Section 1.1. 
2  See discussion, infra, at Section 1.3. 
3  See discussion, infra, at Section 1.2. 
4  See discussion, infra, at Section 1.4. 
5  Table 1 can be located after Section 3. 
6  The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 
September 22, 1992, 2354 UNTS 67, 32 ILM 1069 [hereinafter OSPAR]. available at 
http://www.ospar.org/html_documents/ospar/html/OSPAR_Convention_e_updated_text
_2007.pdf. See also OPSAR. Preamble and art. 1.(q) and (r). See also “History.” About OSPAR. 
OSPAR Commission Website; available at 
http://www.ospar.org/content/content.asp?menu=00350108080000_000000_000000 . 
7  OSPAR. Preamble. See discussion on UNCLOS, supra, at Chapter 8, Section 2. 
8  Id., art. 2. sec. 1(a). 
9  Id., art. 2. sec. 1(b). 
10  Id., art. 2. sec. 5. 
11  Id., art. 2. sec. 2(b) 
12  Id., art. 2. sec. 2(a) 
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OSPAR mandates the best available techniques and the best environmental 
practices.13 The term ‘best available techniques’ requires the use of the latest stage of 
development or state of the art of processes or methods of operation.14 Economic 
feasibility is to be taken in account when determining the best available technique.15 
The best available technique should be based on those recently successful 
comparable processes or methods of operation and up-to-date technological 
advances and changes in scientific knowledge and understanding. 16  Given the 
inputs of economic feasibility, advancing science and newly successful comparable 
processes and methods, the best available techniques should be expected to change 
over time.17  
The phrase of ěbest environmental practices’ means the application of the most 
appropriate combination of controls and strategies.18 In developing the combination 
of measures, seven key factors are to be taken into consideration. 19  The 
environmental hazard of the product and its production is to be considered.20 The 
social and economic implications of the measures should be integrated with the 
analysis. 21  The potential for substitution and the scale of use should both be 
considered, as well as the potential environmental benefit or penalty of substitute.22 
Advances in scientific knowledge and understanding should be taken into 
account.23 And finally, the time limits for implementation of the measures should be 
considered.24  
The Contracting Parties are required to undertake all possible steps to prevent 
and eliminate pollution from offshore sources, as guided by the OSPAR’s Annex 
III.25 Offshore sources is defined in include both offshore installations and offshore 
pipelines.26 An offshore installation is any “man-made structure, plant or vessel or 
parts thereof, whether floating or fixed to the seabed, placed within the maritime 
area for the purpose of offshore activities.27 Pollution is defined as “introduction by 
man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the maritime area which 
results, or is likely to result, in hazards to human health, harm to living resources 
 
13  Id., art. 2. sec. 3(b)(i). See also the explicit requirements for offshore sources. Id., Annex III. art. 
2(a) and (b). 
14  Id., Appendix I. sec. 2. 
15  Id., Appendix I. sec. 2(c). 
16  Id., Appendix I. sec. 2(a) and (b). 
17  Id., Appendix I. sec. 3. 
18  Id., Appendix I. sec. 6. 
19  Id., Appendix I. sec. 7(a) through (g). 
20  Id., Appendix I. sec. 7(a). 
21  Id., Appendix I. sec. 7(g). 
22  Id., Appendix I. sec. 7(b), (c) and (d). 
23  Id., Appendix I. sec. 7(e). 
24  Id., Appendix I. sec. 7(f). 
25  Id., art. 5. 
26  Id., art. 1(k). 
27  Id., art. 1(l). 
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and marine ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other legitimate 
uses of the sea.”28 However, vessels and aircrafts, and wastes therefrom, are exempt 
from inclusion under offshore sources.29 Vessels include any water-borne crafts, 
including “air-cushion craft, floating craft whether self-propelled or not, and other 
man-made structures in the maritime area,” but excludes offshore installations.30 
The critical definition is that of offshore activities, which are those activities 
undertaken for “exploration, appraisal or exploitation of liquid and gaseous 
hydrocarbons.”31  
All potential discharges or emissions from the offshore installations and 
activities must be authorized and regulated by competent authorities of the 
Contacting Parties. 32  Accidental venting or seeping of methane would not be 
considered dumping, as dumping requires the deliberate act of disposal.33 Thus, 
accidental venting and seeping of methane would not be regulated under Annex 
III’s Art. 3.34 Thus, the exclusion of weather and other cause based force majeure 
does not apply to accidental venting and seeping, unless so granted under domestic 
laws of the Contracting State.35  
OSPAR Annex III has already addressed the offshore sequestration of carbon 
dioxide, in that such carbon dioxide is not considered a dumping of waste for 
OSPAR. 36  So, offshore sources of pollution basically arise from offshore 
installations, vessels, and pipelines associated with the exploration, appraisal or 
exploitation of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, such as methane from offshore 
methane hydrate deposits. If the development of methane hydrate projects offers 
risks of harm and hazards from offshore installations that may potentially emit 
pollution, then OSPAR’s Contracting Parties would be obligated to prevent and 
eliminate hazards to human health, harm to living resources and marine ecosystems 
from those potential methane hydrate projects.  
1.2. Bonn Agreement (North Sea) 
The Bonn Agreement covers the North Sea and attempts to protect it from pollution 
by oil and other harmful substances.37 The Agreement is fairly brief and leaves out 
much in the way of detail, as opposed to the details seen in OSPAR or in the 
 
28  Id., art. 1(d). 
29  Id., Annex III. art. 1 (a) and (b). 
30  Id., art. 1(n). 
31  Id., art. 1(j). 
32  Id., Annex III. art. 4.1. 
33  Id., art. 1(f)(i) and (f)(ii) 
34  Compare OSPAR’s Annex III. art. 3.2. with Annex III. art. 4.1. 
35  OSPAR. Annex III. art. 4.2. and Annex III. art. 6. 
36  Id., Annex III. art. 3.3(a), (b), (c), and (d).  
37  Agreement for cooperation in dealing with pollution of the North Seas by oil and other 
harmful substances. O.J. (L 188), 9 [hereinafter Bonn Agreement]. 
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Barcelona Convention. 38 The Agreement serves primarily to coordinate national 
level efforts to respond to specific pollution events. 39  Additionally, the Bonn 
Agreement coordinates within the OSPAR Convention’s shadow.  
The Agreement is to be invoked whenever a Contracting Party is presented 
with either the actual presence or the prospective presence of oil or other harmful 
substances. 40  The phrases “oil” and “harmful substances” are not defined nor 
detailed within the Agreement.  
The Agreement was not intended to alter in any form the underlying laws or 
civil liability rules that affect the prevention and combat of marine pollution.41 
While the Agreement itself coordinates international action and facilitates cost-
recovery between the Contracting Parties,42 nothing in the Agreement limits further 
pursuit by the Contracting Parties against third-parties.43  
Where the Bonn Agreement lacks substantive details, its affiliated Manual 
provides some details.44 The chapter addressing oil pollution clearly is focused on 
persistent crude oils and liquid petroleums. 45  Natural gas and methane are 
addressed as flammable and exploding gases within the chapter on hazardous 
materials; however the operatic paradigm is vessel transported gases.46 Hazardous 
chemicals are sorted into four classes; evaporators, floaters, dissolvers, and 
sinkers.47 Evaporators are sub-sorted into three response modes: toxic gas cloud, 
toxic and explosive gas cloud, and explosive gas cloud.48  
Methane is listed as being both a health risk gas, for distances within 200m of 
the gas cloud, and as an explosion risk for distances within 200m of the gas cloud.49  
It is perhaps noteworthy that the development of offshore windmill farms has 
been included within the coverage of the Bonn Agreement. 50  The installations 
 
38  See the discussion on the Barcelona Convention, infra. 
39  Bonn Agreement. En passim. 
40  Id., art. 1. 
41  Id., art. 8. sec. 1. 
42  Id., Arts. 9 and 10. 
43  Id., art. 11. 
44  Bonn Agreement Counter Pollution Manual. As of 15 January 2014. Available at 
http://www.bonnagreement.org/eng/html/counter-pollution_manual/welcome.html. 
45  See the frequency and dominant use of the phrase “oil slick” to describe oil pollution, en 
passim, at “Policy Strategy of Oil Pollution Combating.” Available at 
http://www.bonnagreement.org/eng/html/counter-
pollution_manual/Chapter22_Policy%20strategy%20oil%20pollution%20combating.htm . 
46  See the discussion on how harmful substances leak from vessels. Bonn Agreement Counter 
Pollution Manual, Chap. 26. sec. 1. “Categorisation of hazardous substances.” 
47  Id., Subsec. 4. 
48  Id., Subsec. 8. 
49  Bonn Agreement Counter Pollution Manual. Addendum 1: “Intervention on gases and 
evaporators, card number F1.1, F1.2, F1.3”. p. 2. It is important to recall that the risk states 
therein is related to leaks of methane from LNG-type containers at sea, not methane vented 
or leaked from the ocean at any low or high rate. 
50  See id., ch. 8: Offshore Windfarms. 
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associated with offshore windfarms are seen as novel risks for shipping and the 
installations could also complicate oil pollution recovery and abatement efforts.51 To 
the extent that methane hydrate projects are foreseen in the North Sea area, it would 
probably be reasonable to assume that a similar chapter might be drafted to take the 
particular harms and hazards of subsea methane extraction into the greater Bonn 
Agreement framework.  
1.3. Barcelona Convention (Mediterranean Sea) 
The Barcelona Convention and its associated documents are designed to provide 
protection to the Mediterranean both within and without the EU. 52 It applied 
general concepts of transboundary coordination and of monitoring.53  
Pollution is defined as the introduction by man, both directly and indirectly, of 
substances or energy into the marine environment that could cause a variety of 
harms to both the marine environment and human use and enjoyment thereof.54  
The Barcelona Convention implements several key environmental law 
policies. It requires the application of the precautionary principle; a lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures. 55 All appropriate means should be undertaken to preserve biological 
diversity. 56  This implementation of the precautionary principle balances the 
prevention of environmental degradation against the costs-effectiveness of such 
measures.57 The best available techniques and the best environmental practices are 
called for within the Convention;58 this clarifies the precautionary principle but also 
requires data sharing among both competent authorities and operators. Finally, the 
means to be undertaken are to reflect the reality of the social, economic, and 
technological conditions of the signatories.59  
While the Convention calls for early implementation of potentially effective 
measures, it constrains it call to cost effective socially balanced measures; it does not 
call for any and all measures at all costs.  
The Convention applies the polluter pays principle.60 The costs of pollution are 
to be borne by those individuals that introduce the pollution to the environment.61 
 
51  Id., 
52  Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the 
Mediterranean and its Protocols, February 16, 1976, 1102 U.N.T.S. 27 [hereinafter Barcelona 
Convention]. 
53  See Barcelona Convention. Arts. 9, 11, and 12. 
54  Id., art. 2(a). 
55  Id., art. 4. sec. 3(a). 
56  Id., art. 10.  
57  Id., art. 4. sec. 3(a). 
58  Id., art. 4. sec. 4(b). 
59  Id., art. 4. sec. 4(b). 
60  Id., art. 4. sec. 3(b). 
61  Id., art. 4. sec. 3(b). 
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The Convention calls for the contracting parties to formulate and adopt appropriate 
rules and procedures for the determination of liability and compensation resulting 
from harms to the Mediterranean region.62 
The Convention requires the signatories to take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate and remediate pollution from the exploration and exploitation of the 
continental shelf, the seabed, and its subsoil. 63  These requirements make no 
reference to hydrocarbons, instead they apply to any and all minerals, including 
hydrocarbons and potentially methane hydrates.  
The Convention expands the concepts from the EU’s EIA Directive to the 
broader Mediterranean region. 64  Functionally, the Convention supports the 
development and adoption of Protocols to expand and details the objectives of the 
Convention.65 For the purposes of this study, the most important protocol to the 
Convention is the “Offshore Protocol.”66  
The stated goal of the Protocol is that:  
“[t]he Parties shall take, individually or through bilateral or 
multilateral cooperation, all appropriate measures to prevent, abate, 
combat and control pollution in the Protocol Area resulting from 
activities, inter alia, by ensuring that the best available techniques, 
environmentally effective and economically appropriate, are used for 
this purpose.”67  
The Protocol does not designate a rule of civil liability, but requires that such be 
employed by the signatories to ensure that the polluter pays, i.e. the operator, and 
that the polluter pays prompt and adequate compensation. 68 Also, the Protocol 
requires each signatory to ensure sanctions exist to punish violators; the character of 
the requirements appear to be more regulatory than civil liability in design:  
ę[e]ach Party shall prescribe sanctions to be imposed for breach of 
obligations arising out of this Protocol, or for non-observance of the 
national laws or regulations implementing this Protocol, or for non-
fulfilment of the specific conditions attached to the authorisation.”69  
Additionally, the Protocol requires the operators to maintain insurance or other 
financial securities to ensure that the problems of insolvency do not arise at the time 
 
62  Id., art. 16. 
63  Id., art. 7. 
64  Id., art. 4. sec. 3(c). 
65  Id., Arts. 21 and 22. 
66  Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from 
Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil. O.J. (L 
4), 15 [hereinafter Offshore Protocol]. 
67  Offshore Protocol. art. 3. sec. 1. 
68  Id., art. 27. sec. 1 and 2(a). 
69  Id., art. 7. 
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of compensation.70 The Protocol provides for certain limited applications of force 
majeure and certain public welfare justifications. 71  But those exceptions are 
terminated if “intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that 
damage will probably result.”72  
Methane hydrate projects broadly appear to qualify to be regulated under the 
Offshore Protocol. ‘Activities’ is defined to include scientific activities, exploration 
activities, and exploitation activities that would include development and 
production stages of a methane hydrate project but apparently not the 
abandonment and sequestration period. 73  Removal of Installations, otherwise 
known as sequestration and abandonment within oil and gas, are defined and 
addressed within the Protocol;74 similar EIA and authorizations requirements are 
found.75 Installations are defined as floating, mobile, or fixed; they include drilling 
units, production units, storage units, and loading and transporting units. 76  
Operators include both those authorized or licensed to operate offshore facilities or 
those in de facto control of such facilities. 77 Article 6 of the Protocol essentially 
requires the performance of an EIA, and strictly does so for EU waters.78  
The Offshore Protocol does not list methane or natural gas as ‘oil.’79 Oil is 
defined as “petroleum in any form including crude oil, fuel oil, oily sludge, oil 
refuse and refined products.”80 Crude oils, and various refinery products, are listed 
as harmful or noxious substances.81 But the Protocol integrates the definition of 
pollution from the Convention, so methane or natural gas might qualify as a form of 
a substance that could be deleterious to the environment. 82  Additionally, the 
venting or seeping of methane into the water column may be seen as adding energy 
and thus qualify as pollution in that sense.83  
 
70  Id., art. 27. sec. 2(b). 
71  Id., art. 14. sec. 1(a). 
72  Id., art. 14. sec. 2. 
73  Id., art. 1(d). 
74  Id., art. 20. 
75  Id., art. 20. sec. 1 and 2. 
76  Id., art. 1(f)(i) through (v). 
77  Id., art. 1(g)(i) and (ii). A literal reading suggests that even non-normal personnel might be 
included within this scope; e.g. a pirate or terrorist of an offshore facility might be classified 
as a de facto operator. 
78  Id., art. 6. sec. 1, 2, and 3. 
79  Id., art. 1(l). See Annex V and the Appendix. But the Appendix title carries a footnote that 
states, “the list of oils should not necessarily be considered as exhaustive.” Nevertheless, 
nothing in the list, nor the nomenclature of oil and refining, suggests that methane should be 
included within the category of oil under the Protocol. 
80  Id., art. 1(l) 
81  Id., Annex I. pt.  A. sec. 6. 
82  Id., art. 1(e) 
83  Id., art. 1(e)  
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The Protocol addresses both support of developing countries within the region 
and the support of transboundary concerns.84  
1.4. Helsinki Convention (Baltic Sea) 
The Helsinki Convention serves a similar role as OSPAR and the Barcelona 
Convention, to protect a marine region from environmental harms.85 Overall, the 
Helsinki Convention is drafted similarly to other regional marine conventions.  
It carries the same definition of pollution as seen in other regional marine 
documents, supra, the “introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or 
energy into the sea … which are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm 
living resources and marine ecosystems … .”86 The Convention has an identical 
definition to dumping as OSPAR. 87  Oil is narrowly defined as oils, refinery 
products, or sludge; 88  definitely exclusive of natural gas or methane. Harmful 
substance is defined as any substance that could cause marine pollution.89  
The Helsinki Convention mandates that the Contracting Parties take all 
appropriate legislative, administrative, or other relevant measures to prevent and 
eliminate pollution in the region.90 The Convention requires the application of the 
precautionary principle.91 It requires the application of the best available technology92 
and of the best environmental practice.93 The Contacting parties are required to 
apply the polluter pays principle.94 The Convention requires the prevention of the 
introduction of harmful substances95 and pollution from ships,96 including waste 
dumping.97 The Convention requires the Contracting Parties to take all appropriate 
action to conserve natural habitats and biological diversity and to protect ecological 
processes.98 Broadly speaking, the Helsinki Convention is well aligned with both 
other regional marine conventions and UN environmental policies.  
The exploration and exploitation of the seabed and its subsoil require both the 
prevention of pollution and the preventative preparations to ensure adequate 
 
84  Id., art. 24 and 26. 
85  Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, April 9, 1992, 
1507 U.N.T.S. 167, 1994 OJ (L 73) 20, 13 ILM 546 (1974) [hereinafter Helsinki Convention]. 
86  Helsinki Convention. art. 2. sec. 1. 
87  Id., art. 2. sec. 4. 
88  Id., art. 2. sec. 6. 
89  Id., art. 2. sec. 7. Methane, hydrogen or even potentially freshwater or mud might qualify. 
90  Id., art. 3. sec. 1. 
91  Id., art. 3. sec. 2. 
92  Id., art. 3. sec. 3. 
93  Id., art. 3. sec. 3. 
94  Id., art. 3. sec. 4. 
95  Id., art. 5. 
96  Id., art. 8. 
97  Id., art. 11. 
98  Id., art. 15. 
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preparedness is maintain in order to provide immediate action to respond to 
accidental pollution when it occurs. 99  Annex VI to the Convention provides 
additional guidelines for offshore oil and gas activities. 100  Offshore activity is 
defined to be any exploration or exploitation of oil and gas by either fixed or 
floating installations.101 An offshore unit is any particular installation engaged in oil 
or gas exploration, exploitation or production activities, including transportation.102 
EIAs are required before any licensing can occur within the marine region. 103  
Among the items to be investigated during the EIA assessment should be included 
a compositional analysis of the deposit zone, of its sediments, hydrocarbon content, 
and of potentially hazardous substances or hazards.104 On-going and subsequent 
studies should be made on the deposit zone to ensure the prevention of pollution 
and the emission of harmful substances.105 Finally, each offshore unit should have a 
pollution emergency plan to ensure quick and appropriate responses to accidents.106  
1.5. Risk governance under the regional marine conventions 
The regional marine conventions are very similar in design with regards to risk 
governance. While they are all high level international agreements that leave 
specific implementation to the signatory states, the conventions provide clear 
guidance on the types of governance needed to both attain the policy goals and to 
enable coordination across parties.  
They all call for the contracting states to implement liability rules that function 
in harmony with the polluter pays principle. The polluter pays principle does not 
provide for a duty of care that would indemnify tortfeasors as a rule of negligence 
would. The polluter pays principle at its core would be opposed to the idea that 
victims of environmental pollution would need to bear the costs of damage simply 
because the tortfeasor operated reasonably; the quintessence of the polluter pays 
principle is that the polluter always pays; this is the spirit of the rule of strict 
liability. The polluter pays principle could be implemented in regulations, but the 
overall spirit that the victims are not to blame and not to pay would remain the 
same. 
There is clearly support within the conventions for the use of regulations to 
govern risk. There many items to be achieved and confirmed and it would be very 
inefficient to allow private civil liability claims to pursue that level of investigation; 
additionally, no rule of civil liability would be able to enforce or perform those 
investigations until an actionable cause arose, thus, the purpose and function to 
 
99  Id., art. 12. 1. 
100  Id., Annex VI. 
101  Id., Annex VI. Reg. 1. sec. 1. 
102  Id., Annex VI. Reg. 1. sec. 2. 
103  Id., Annex VI. Reg. 3. sec. 1. 
104  Id., Annex VI. Reg. 3. sec. 2(d). 
105  Id., Annex VI. Reg. 3. sec. 3 and 4. 
106  Id., Annex VI. Reg. 7. 
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provide on-going safety monitoring would be defeated. A regulatory body would 
be far better suited to the needs of on-going monitoring and procedural assurances.  
Another aspect is that the conventions require active steps be undertaken to 
prevent and eliminate pollution; again, a regulatory body could act daily and 
currently without need of actionable causes so long as the regulations receive a 
sufficient delegation of power to act. 
Further, in the conventions there is much discussion of permits and licensing, 
this remains the exclusive territory of regulatory bodies. 
There is also much scientific and other specialized knowledge sets required to 
implement the obligations of the conventions. It would be more efficient to train 
and maintain a dedicated pool of experts instead of the stop and start of civil 
liability lawsuits.  
In conclusion, the conventions set high standards and provide a framework for 
contracting states to base their domestic enactments upon. Both regulations and 
rules of civil liability are encouraged, but it would appear that more attention has 
been given the development of the regulatory framework. If a rule of civil liability is 
employed by a contracting state, it would likely need to be a rule of strict liability. 
As such, the regional marine conventions align with the recommendations of 
Chapter 7 to implement regulations alongside of strict liability rules. 
2. International oil spill conventions 
2.1. A brief history of marine oil spill conventions 
The current oil spill regimes were developed primarily as a reaction to several 
significant spills, all from seagoing vessels. The paradigm of oil spills as currently 
understood by existing oil spill regimes is the broken tanker or leaking well in 
shallow waters paradigm.  
That the laws and conventions responding to catastrophic oil spills respond 
primarily to this paradigm made practical sense. Historically, this type of oil 
spillage in shallow waters has been the most common type of offshore-based oil 
spill, as documented in governmental records.107 In a recent Congressional Research 
 
107  This is not to say that offshore well-based leaks were unknown; however these well-based 
catastrophes were “the exceptions that proved the rule” until recently. Two well-known 
examples are the Union Oil event offshore Santa Barbara, CA, and the Ixtoc event offshore 
the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico. Both of these events pre-date the 1990 Oil Pollution Act and 
the International Convention of 1992. The Santa Barbara offshore blowout and seeps began 
on January 28, 1969. It was the third largest oil leak in U.S. history, ranked behind only the BP 
Macondo explosion and the Exxon Valdez shipwreck. It was however in only 57m of water, 
so the effects were largely similar to a vessel leak. The Ixtoc was an offshore drilling 
catastrophe that began on June 3, 1979. It too was in 50m of water, so its leak while massive 
and long lasting functionally resembled a massive vessel leak in many ways. 
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Service report, it was documented that only approximately 1% of all oil spill 
incidents were from extraction activities.108  
The marine oil spill paradigm assumes that crude oil is spilled near or at the 
ocean surface, for the oil to collect at the surface or very near the surface, and that 
the oil is likely to spilled sufficiently close to shore to quickly threaten the shoreline 
and coastal areas with persistent crude oil contamination. The paradigm assumes 
that only certain heavy crudes will yield persistent crude contamination removing 
lighter fuels such as gasoline or natural gas from substantial focus of the damages.  
The original spill of concern was the Torrey Canyon spill of 1967,109 which 
contaminated 80 km of French coastlines and 190 km of Cornish shorelines in the 
United Kingdom. This spill leaked 119,000 tons of crude oil into the sea.110 That spill 
resulted in several legal regimes and conventions: the Civil Liability Convention of 
1969,111 the Fund Convention,112 TOVALOP,113 and CRISTAL.114  
These four conventions were revealed for their weaknesses under the Amoco 
Cadiz spill of 1978. The Amoco Cadiz spilled 223,000 tons of crude oil onto the 
shores of Brittany, France, nearly double the amount spilled in the earlier Torrey 
Canyon spill. That accident led to updates to the CLC and the Fund Convention. 
The updates were entitled the “Protocols.” The two protocols were the Protocol of 
1984 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Pollution Damage 
1969 and the Protocol of 1984 to amend the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution 
Damage.115 
 
108  J. L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33705, OIL SPILLS IN US COASTAL WATERS: 
BACKGROUND, GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 3 (2010). 
109  M. G. Faure, & H. Wang, The International Regimes for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: 
Are They Effective?, 12 Rev. Eur. Commun. & Int’l Envtl. L. 242, 242 (2003). 
110  International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, Ltd. ITOPF. Oil Tanker Spill Statistics 
2011. 2012. At  p. 7; available at http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-
statistics/statistics. 
111  International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, November 29, 1969, 973 
U.N.T.S 3; 9 ILM 45 [hereinafter CLC]. The CLC is still in force as updated by the CLC of 
1992. ; available at 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-
Convention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(CLC).aspx 
112  International Convention for the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels, December 18, 2012) 
113  The Tanker Owners' Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution, 
(TOVALOP), was originally intended as a stop-gap measure by the owners and operators of 
oil-transporting vessels until the adoption of the CLC in 1975. No longer operational as an 
industrial convention since February 20, 1997; available at 
http://www.itopf.com/about/history/ . 
114  The Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution, 
(CRISTAL), was originally intended as a stop-gap measure by the producers and refiners of 
petroleum until the adoption of the Fund Convention in 1975. No longer operational as an 
industrial convention since February 20, 1997; available at 
http://www.itopf.com/about/history/ . 
115  Faure & Wang, supra at note 109, at 245. 
257_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Chapter 9 
 227 
Despite the public support for the international conventions, the U.S. failed to 
sign on as a signatory to any of the conventions. After the Exxon Valdez spill of 
1989, again a large sea-going vessel leak,116 the U.S. finally responded with the 
enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).117 In responding to the Exxon 
Valdez incident, OPA primarily targeted the shipment of oil in tankers and the 
types of harm caused by those spills. Global awareness to the Exxon Valdez spill 
resulted in additional updates to the CLC and Fund Convention, they are known as 
the 1992 Conventions.118 The OPA does apply to offshore oil and gas facilities, and 
thus would now apply in some contexts to offshore methane hydrate facilities; the 
lessee is the deemed tortfeasor and the liability for offshore facilities is distinct from 
other sources of oil pollution. 119 The OPA also provides a limited liability version of 
strict liability due to certain caps placed on the maximum amount of assessable 
damages.120 
However, OPA is substantively different from several important sections of 
the CLC and Fund Convention, so the legal responses to oil spills are significantly 
distinguishable from each other.121  
There are doubts on the ability of the MOP regimes to address major spills 
from deep sea wells, such as the BP Deepwater Horizon, or potentially, methane 
hydrate extraction projects. Houck called for more detailed and reviewed “worst 
case planning” by the EPA under NEPA; he details how three major worst case 
studies were ignored prior to the BP spill.122 A recent extensive review and critique 
of the overall liability system of U.S. oil spill law has been provided by Faure and 
Wang.123  
2.2. Civil Liability Convention of 1969/1992 
The Civil Liability Convention of 1969/1992, (CLC), derives from an earlier 
sequence of agreements originally designed to respond to crude oil spills from 
 
116  Interestingly, the Exxon Valdez spill only released 37,000 tons of crude oil, much less than the 
earlier volumes that drove enactments in Europe. 
117  For more information on OPA, see infra, at Chapter 11, Section 4. 
118  See discussion on CLC, infra, at Section 2.2. 
119  See the definition of “responsible party” at 40 U.S.C. §2701(32)(C). See also the limitations on 
liability for “offshore facility” at 40 U.S.C. §2704(a)(2). 
120  OPA provides for routine strict liability up to certain maximum limits; below those limits 
there are no duty of care protections for the tortfeasor. See at 40 U.S.C. §2702(a). The types of 
damages are limited to certain categories of damages. See at 40 U.S.C. §2702(b)(2). And there 
are defense of cause majeure, see 40 U.S.C. §2703(a) and limited defenses of contributory 
gross negligence on the part of the victims, see 40 U.S.C. §2703(b). 
121  See relevant discussions, infra, at Section 2.2., and at Chapter 11, Section 4. 
122  See Houck 2010, p. 11035, 11037-11039. 
123  M. G. Faure, & H. Wang, Civil Liability and Compensation for Marine Pollution - Lessons to Be 
Learned for Offshore Oil Spills, 8 Oil, Gas, Energy L. Intelligence 29 (2010). 
258_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
International Maritime Conventions and Oil Spill Conventions 
228 
vessels and boats and were later extended to include other hazardous substances.124 
It would not likely apply to damages resultant from methane hydrate harms, but it 
is guiding in its approach to liability management.  
The CLC defines oil as “any persistent hydrocarbon,” and provides examples 
of crude oil, fuel oil, diesel oil, and lubricating oil; 125 however, nothing in this 
definition appears to include methane or any of the lighter alkanes that might be 
found in methane hydrate deposits. The definition of pollution damage as “loss or 
damage outside the chip by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of 
oil form the ship…,”126 and while the definition provides extensions of damage to 
include the environment, it does not appear to include any pollution caused by 
forces or substances other than oil. As the CLC provides exclusively with regards to 
pollution damage within the territories of the Contracting States,127 it would be 
difficult to connect the hazards and harms of methane hydrates to the CLC.  
The owner of a ship is to be held liable for any pollution damage caused or 
associated with that ship.128 Owner’s liability is extinguished if (i) damage resulted 
from war or hostilities,129 (ii) damage resulted from exceptional, inevitable, and 
irresistible natural phenomena,130 (iii) wholly caused by undertaking by a third 
party’s act or omission, 131 (iv) caused by Governmental negligence or wrongful 
act,132 and if in partial or whole causation by the victim of the pollution damage.133 
As such, the rule employed is essentially a rule of strict liability. 
Liability is limited to a fixed amount determined by the tonnage of the ship; 
the maximum amount of liability was set at 89,770,000 accounting units, today the 
 
124  International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, November 29, 1969, 973 
U.N.T.S 3; 9 ILM 45 [hereinafter CLC]. The CLC is still in force as updated by the CLC of 
1992. Available at 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-
Convention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(CLC).aspx.  
125  CLC art. I., sec. 5. See the additional language defining crude oil and fuel oil found within the 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for the 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 at art. 1., sec. 3(a) and (b). Crude oils are 
defined as liquid hydrocarbons, apparently in distinguishing them from gases, and fuel oils 
are heavy distillates or residues. Neither definitional refinement appears to include any light 
alkanes, especially not methane. 
126  Id., art. I., sec. 6(a). 
127  Id., art. II., (a). 
128  Id., art. III., sec. 1. See also art. IV., wherein that liability is extended to joint and severable 
liability if multiple ships are involved in joint causation of pollution damage. 
129  Id., art. III., sec. 2(a). 
130  Id., art. III., sec. 2(a). 
131  Id., art. III., sec. 2(b). 
132  Id., art. III., sec. 2(c). 
133  Id., art. III., sec. 2(d). If the victim is wholly and solely responsible for the acts of causation, 
then no liability attaches to the owner; if the victim is partially at cause, then the owner’s 
liability is limited to that extent covered by the victim. 
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equivalent of 134,655,000 USD.134 However, that limit to liability is not preserved if 
the act that resulted pollution was committed with intent to cause such damage, or 
recklessly and with knowledge of probably resultant pollution damage. 135  The 
availability of the limited liability is predicated on the establishment of a fund 
capable of making such payments in presentation to the court before which 
liabilities are established. 136  Expenses undertaken by the owner to prevent or 
remediate the pollution damage are equally ranked for recompense under the fund 
with other pollution damage claims.137  
It is a reasonable statement that the assignment of liability under the CLC 
appears to display liability channeling to the owner, a form of strict liability in that 
no excuse of reasonable care is provided, multiple defenses to the strict liability 
rendering it close to a functional negligence rule, and that the idea of strict liability 
must be tempered with the recognition of limited liability.  
As the primary focus of the “Civil Liability Convention” is on civil liability, its 
text is primarily focused on establishing strict liability as the agreed to rule and the 
means of coordinating civil liability across affected jurisdictions. There is not ample 
material to draw conclusions on regulations. 
2.3. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL) 
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
(MARPOL),138 was designed to address marine pollution and contamination from 
crude oil and noxious liquids. Because exploitation of subsea minerals is exempt 
from MARPOL, because methane is excluded from consideration as an oil, and 
because methane is not a defined liquid or noxious liquid, MARPOL would not 
likely apply to methane hydrate projects. MARPOL follows the CLC in establishing 
strict liability for accidental emissions.  
MARPOL’s definition of harmful substances is very broad; if the substance 
might harm human life, marine life or the local ecology, then it is a harmful 
 
134  Id., art. V., sec. 1. That accounting unit is defined to be the Special Drawing Rights unit of the 
International Monetary Fund. See CLC art. V., sec. 9(a). See also the converter tables at 
International Monetary Fund, “SDRs per Currency unit and Currency units per SDR last five 
days,” available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_five.aspx 
135  Id., art. V., sec. 2. 
136  Id., art. V., sec. 3. See International Fund for the Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 
for the details of the fund and its stewardship. It is because of the advancements in the 
funding under this Convention that other earlier funds such as CRISTAL (Contract 
Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution) and TOVALOP 
(Tanker Owners' Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution) have since 
been abandoned or folded into the International Fund. See W. TETLEY, INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME AND ADMIRALTY LAW, 454 (Editions Yvon Blais, Thomson Company, 2002). 
137  Id., art. V., sec. 8. 
138  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, November 2, 1973, 34 
UST 3407;1340 UNTS 184 [hereinafter MARPOL]. 
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substance. 139  MARPOL’s definition of ships includes all sea-going vessels and 
platforms that might be related to an offshore methane hydrate installation.140 A 
discharge would be the release by any cause of harmful substances from a ship into 
the oceanic environment, 141  however, events arising from the “exploration, 
exploitation and associated offshore processing of sea-bed mineral resources,” are 
exempted from the definition of discharge. 142 Thus to the extent that methane 
hydrates or methane were held to be harmful substances, if they were released, e.g. 
vented or seeped, from activities associated with a methane hydrate project, then 
that situation would not be a discharge and not a reportable incident of a discharge 
of harmful substances.143  
Annex I of MARPOL 73/78,144 hereafter simply Annex I, provides extensive 
rules on the handling, disposal and leaking of oil from ships and platforms. 
However, it would not apply to methane hydrate accidents.  
It defines oil as “petroleum in any form including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil 
refuse and refined products … and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, 
includes the substances listed in appendix I to this Annex.”145 The listed chemicals 
at Appendix I include the classes of Asphalt solutions, Gasoline blending stocks, 
Gasolines, Oils, Jet Fuels, Distillates, Naphthas, and Gas oils, but nowhere in the 
listings are light alkanes nor methane products.146 Thus, Annex I would not apply to 
the types of harms and hazards contemplated by this study.  
MARPOL could apply to offshore facilities. Oil tanker is defined as a ship that 
primarily carries oil;147 similarly, a combination carrier is a ship designed to carry a 
combination of oil and solid freight. 148  Furthermore, the regulation primarily 
applies to ships;149 but offshore structures engaged in the “exploration, exploitation 
and associated offshore processing of sea-bed mineral resources,” whether floating 
or fixed, will be treated as legally equivalent to ships of 400 tons gross tonnage.150  
 
139  MARPOL 1973. art. 2(2). “Harmful substance means any substance which, if introduced into 
the sea, is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, 
to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, and includes any 
substance subject to control by the present Convention.” 
140  Id., art. 2(4). “Ship means a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine 
environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft 
and fixed or floating platforms.” 
141  Id., art. 2(3)(a) 
142  Id., art. 2(3)(b)(ii). 
143  Id., art. 2(6). 
144  Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil. See at 
[http://library.arcticportal.org/1699/1/marpol.pdf] 
145  MARPOL. Annex I. Reg. 1(1). 
146  Id., Annex I. Appendix I. 
147  Id., Annex I. Reg. 1(4). 
148  Id., Annex I. Reg. 1(5). 
149  Id., Annex I. Reg. 2(1). 
150  Id., Annex I. Reg. 19. 
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Annex II responds to noxious liquids other than oils.151 Methane will not likely 
present as a liquid in Nature, nor is it technically a liquid within hydrate 
structures;152 it would also not qualify under the Annex II definition of liquid.153 
Thus, the concerns on noxious liquids do not relate to the harms and hazards of 
methane hydrate projects.  
2.4. International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and 
Cooperation (OPRC) 
The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Co-operation focuses on the actual events and incidents of oil pollution.154 The 
focus, though, is tightly on oil. Oil is defined as “petroleum in any form including 
crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and refined products;” thus methane hydrates 
and methane are excluded from the category of oil.155 Oil pollution incidents are 
defined as situations wherein oil is discharged, 156 thus methane hydrate events 
would not normally lead to an oil pollution incident.  
However, methane hydrate project installations might qualify as offshore 
units, which are defined to include offshore natural gas installations.157 And, the 
2000 Protocol158adopted the term hazardous and noxious substances which could 
include methane and methane hydrates.159 Thus it is feasible that the OPRC would 
apply to pollution incidents from methane hydrate projects under the 2000 Protocol 
whereas it would not have found an oil pollution incident under the original OPRC.  
 
151  Annex II of MARPOL 73/78, Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid 
Substances in Bulk. Available at http://library.arcticportal.org/1699/1/marpol.pdf. 
152  See the discussion on the chemistry of methane hydrates, supra, in Chapter 2. 
153  MARPOL. Annex II. Reg. 1(5). “Liquid substances are those having a vapour pressure not 
exceeding 2.8 kp/cm3 at a temperature of 37.88C.” 
154  OPRC. art. 1. sec. 1. “Parties undertake, individually or jointly, to take all appropriate 
measures in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and the Annex thereto to 
prepare for and respond to an oil pollution incident.” 1990 International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, November 30, 1990, 1891 UNTS 51, 30 
ILM 733 [hereinafter OPRC]. Available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1990/1990-international-
convention-on-oil-pollution-preparedness-response-and-co-operation/ . 
155  OPRC. art. 2. sec. 1. 
156  Id., art. 2. sec. 2. 
157  Id., art. 2. sec. 4. “Offshore unit means any fixed or floating offshore installation or structure 
engaged in gas or oil exploration, exploitation or production activities.” 
158  2000 Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances. (2000 Protocol.) 14 Mar 2000, London. See at 
[http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2000/2000-protocol-on-preparedness-response-and-co-operation-to-
pollution-incidents-by-hazardous-and-noxious-substances/] 
159  OPRC. 2000 Protocol, art. 2., sec. 2. “Hazardous and noxious substances means any substance 
other than oil which, if introduced into the marine environment is likely to create hazards to 
human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere 
with other legitimate uses of the sea.” 
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Should methane hydrates qualify as hazardous and noxious substances, then 
the OPRC would require every nation engaged in methane hydrate activities to 
establish a national system for responding promptly and effectively to pollution 
incidents.160 The 2000 Protocol requires extensive pre-planning and preparation for 
potential pollution incidents, and strongly encourages the cooperation of the 
Contracting Parties to coordinate where possible on response capability and 
research into preventative technologies and strategies.161 But for most countries in 
Europe and North America, the requirements are in parallel to other similar 
commitments.162  
2.5. Risk governance under international oil spill conventions 
Of the international oil spill conventions that address liability, they all called for the 
implementation of strict liability regimes with limited defences of force majeure-
type events and limited defences from grossly or recklessly negligent victims. The 
conventions also assume that many procedural aspects of oil pollution prevention, 
detection, and remediation can be coordinated internationally; it is hard to imagine 
how that might be coordinated without manifestations tantamount to regulations.  
Indeed, several of these conventions are overseen by a common regulatory body, 
the International Maritime Organization under the United Nations. Thus, the 
international oil spill conventions are in alignment with the recommendations of 
Chapter 7.163 
3. Summary and conclusions 
The regional marine conventions and the international oil spill conventions are all 
problem-solving oriented; they are primarily aimed at preventing and limiting 
pollution of the marine environment from petroleum and hazardous substances.  
At large, the international maritime conventions and oil spill conventions are 
in alignment with the recommendations from Chapter 7. They all either explicitly or 
implicitly called for the implementation of strict liability; not a single convention in 
the collection advocated or supported a rule of negligence. None of them 
disavowed the useful role of regulation and most provided frameworks of the 
regulations that they expected to be put into place to both provide a certain 
standard of sufficient breadth and coverage of contracting states’ resultant 
 
160  Id., art. 4., sec. 1. 
161  Id., en passim. 
162  The OPRC does not explicitly discuss liability beyond the recovery of costs of the parties; 
liability is assumed to be dealt within in separate proceedings beyond this convention.  
163  There will always be concerns that the limited liability aspects of certain regimes are not in 
complete alignment with theoretical models; however, perhaps these limits reflect more 
completely on the impact of Coasian negotiations, that transaction costs to achieve liability 
rules limited the ultimate result. In that case, the rules in place might align well with a more 
detailed model of liability in consideration of the transaction costs to enact and enforce the 
rules, and thus, might reflect well on optimal incentives. 
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regulations and to provide for better intercommunication and cooperation on the 
eventual need to work together to address transboundary problems associated with 
oil spills and other marine pollutants.  
However much alignment might exist between the international maritime 
conventions and the oil spill conventions and the recommendations of Chapter 7, 
there remains a fundamental disconnect in that most of the aforementioned 
conventions would barely be applicable to the risks and hazards of offshore 
methane hydrates. Not that the conventions are in any form structurally opposed to 
such, but rather that it appears that need for such coverage was not imaginable at 
the time the conventions were drafted and implemented. Indeed, much of the 
language and vocabulary of the conventions could readily be extended to 
coordinate with the particular circumstances of offshore methane hydrates. Because 
the existing international maritime and oil spill conventions do reflect both a history 
of diplomatic draftings and accumulated practical experiences, it might be wise to 
build upon their foundations in addressing the risks and hazards of offshore 
methane hydrates. 
The employment of standards such as requirements to maintain “best available 
techniques” and “best environmental practices” are clearly relevant in providing 
the standards for offshore methane hydrates. Many of the functional definitions 
from these conventions, such as “offshore activities” and “offshore installations” 
can readily be extended to cover similar or identical concepts related to offshore 
methane hydrates. Other definitions, e.g., such as “pollution” within OSPAR, 
already might be interpretable as applicable to methane hydrates, as it includes all 
“substances or energy” that could result in hazard to human health or the marine 
ecosystem. However, more clear standards could be set by provision of explicit 
terms that make clear that emissions, seeps, and ventings from methane hydrates 
should be included within that definition when introduced by human activities.  
The international maritime and oil spill conventions have histories of textual 
evolution. E.g., OSPAR has an Annex III that addresses novel concerns related to 
CCS events. E.g., the Barcelona Convention has an Offshore Protocol to address 
offshore exploitation events more directly. Thus, it is a reasonable option to 
consider that the existing international maritime and oil spill conventions might be 
amendable to include the circumstances related to the events of offshore methane 
hydrates that could lead to risk and harms of the oceanic domains that those 
conventions currently protect.  
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Table 1: Signatories to Major Regional Marine Conventions near major 
European water bodies. 
 Regional Marine Conventions 
 OSPAR Helsinki Bonn Barcelona B. Offshore 
Albania    yes yes 
Algeria    yes  
Belgium yes  yes   
Croatia    yes  
Cyprus    yes yes 
Denmark yes yes yes   
Egypt   yes   
Estonia  yes    
EU yes yes yes yes  
Finland yes yes    
France yes  yes yes  
Germany yes yes yes   
Greece    yes  
Iceland yes     
Ireland yes  yes   
Israel    yes  
Italy    yes  
Latvia  yes    
Lebanon    yes  
Lithuania  yes    
Libya    yes yes 
Luxembourg yes     
Malta    yes  
Monaco    yes  
Montenegro    yes  
Morocco    yes yes 
Netherlands yes     
Norway yes  yes   
Poland  yes    
Portugal yes     
Russia  yes    
Slovenia    yes  
Spain yes     
Sweden yes yes yes   
Switzerland yes     
Syria    yes yes 
Tunisia    yes yes 
Turkey    yes  
U. K. yes     
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EUROPEAN UNION LAWS 
The European Union has a wide variety of legal instruments that address 
environmental protections and related industrial torts; thus the selection of 
materials to be reviewed herein is necessarily quite limited. An effort has been made 
to select those directives or frameworks more likely to be engaged in the 
governance of risks and hazards from offshore methane hydrate installations.  
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Strategic Environment 
Assessment (SEA Directives) have been chosen for their broad role with regards to 
both the approval of projects and the review of programs and plans.1 They both 
serve to increase the awareness level of policy makers as to the specific 
environmental risks and hazards posed by various projects or programs; as such, 
they aid in standards-setting decision processes. (A review of the EIA and SEA 
Directives also provides some perspective on the similarly drafted NEPA within the 
U.S.) 
Several directives have been selected because they touch on the regulation and 
liabilities attending to industrial accidents. The Environmental Liability Directive 
(ELD) was selected due to its role in providing oversight of the legal issues related 
to environmental damages.2 The ELD extends legal protection to aspects of nature 
that might not otherwise be protected under more traditional rules of injury. The 
Seveso III Directive provides for the prevention and control of events surrounding 
industrial accidents.3  
The Offshore Directive was selected because it is perhaps the closest legal 
instrument that the EU currently has to address the extraction of natural gas from 
offshore methane hydrate deposits.4 Many aspects of traditional offshore oil and gas 
operations would be similar to the eventual operations of offshore methane hydrate 
installations.  
 
1  See at sec. 1 and 2. 
2  See at sec. 3.1. 
3  See at sec. 3.2. 
4  See at sec. 4. 
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The Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) Directive is included due to the 
major overlap between the two endeavors of carbon dioxide sequestration and 
methane hydrate extraction; 5 indeed, as explored in Chapter 3, many offshore 
methane hydrate development plans foresee both activities running concurrently in 
offshore methane hydrate installations. In some ways, it is not unreasonable to 
imagine that a hypothetical Offshore Methane Hydrate Directive would be an 
amalgam of the Offshore Directive and the CCS Directive. 
The EU coordinates extensive governance of its waterways and oceans; the 
Marine and Water Frameworks are reviewed for the potential impacts the 
development of offshore methane hydrate might pose.6  
Finally, the EU is fully engaged with the goals and obligations of the United 
Nations’ UNFCCC. As such, it has developed a Greenhouse Gas Mechanism to 
enable it and its Member States to set and coordinate greenhouse gas emissions 
targets. 7  The methane that could directly be emitted and the resultant carbon 
dioxide from metabolized or combusted methane are both listed as greenhouse 
gases within the Kyoto Protocol and are thus governed within the Greenhouse Gas 
Mechanism. 
1. The EIA Directive 
The laws and regulations on environmental harms and hazards are guided by two 
central directives; the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)8 Directive and the 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA)9 Directive. These two directives require 
the ex ante review of projects, programs and plans that might in some manner have 
an impact on the environment.  
The EIA and SEA Directives are elements that are invoked in a wide array of 
EU laws; they are used to ensure that consistent review and forethought are applied 
to environmental issues across the EU and its member states. In addition to their 
role as positive law within the EU matrix, the EIA and SEA provide foundational 
 
5  See at sec. 5. 
6  See at sec. 6. 
7  See at sec. 7. 
8  Directive 2011/92/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Of 13 December 
2011 On The Assessment Of The Effects Of Certain Public And Private Projects On The 
Environment. O.J. (L. 26) [hereinafter EIA Directive 2011/92/EU]. The EIA Directive, reflects 
the codification of the original Council Directive 85/337/EEC and its subsequent 
amendments Directives 97/11/EC, 2003/35/EC, and 2009/31/EC. The Directive is currently 
undergoing review for amendment to provide streamlining to the procedures and to improve 
cross member state consistency. See “Review of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
Directive;” available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/review.htm. See also “Proposal 
for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending 
Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects 
on the environment,” available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/COM-2012-
628.pdf. 
9  Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the 
assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment. O.J. (L 197), 
30 [hereinafter SEA Directive]. 
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legal norms for similar review efforts within both EU member states and for 
countries and associations beyond the EU. As such, their influence is often guiding 
on activities at the earliest stage of drafting and development.  
The EIA Directive applies to any project, public or private in nature, prior to 
the issuance of a permit for the onset of the project’s development.10 A project 
includes the execution of construction projects (including installations) and other 
interventions in the natural surroundings and landscape including extractive efforts 
such as mineral resources.11 The person held responsible for the drafting of the EIA 
report is the developer, the applicant who initiates a project by requesting 
authorization, or development consent, for the project.12 Member states may elect to 
apply the EIA to projects related to their national defense, on a case-by-case basis.13 
The EIA Directive allows projects that are designed through legislative processes 
and adopted by specific acts of national legislation to be exempt from the EIA 
Directive; the Directive holds out that similar due diligence reviews are assumed of 
the legislatures as guided by the EIA Directive.14 Member states are required to 
integrate the designs of the EIA Directive into their national laws to ensure that 
prior to consent for development all projects likely to have significant effects are 
properly assessed.15  
1.1. Offshore methane hydrates qualified under Annex I 
Methane hydrates projects would require the completion of an EIA review. The EIA 
Directive provides two manners of determining when a project should be reviewed 
under this Directive. There is a specific list of project types that must complete an 
EIA review at Annex I; these reviews are not optional.16 There is a secondary list of 
activities at Annex II that may need review; member states can either review those 
projects on a case-by-case basis or provide ex ante threshold guidelines.17  
Annex I has multiple activities that would characterize offshore methane 
hydrate projects. It is almost certain that a methane hydrate project would qualify as 
an Annex I project, as it per se qualifies under several listed categories and arguably 
could be included under several other Annex I categories. Or, depending on how 
the process of project development was managed and how the member state(s) in 
question decide how to handle such a review process, there are potentially several 
different aspects of a methane hydrate project that might need their own EIA review 
procedures.  
 
10  EIA Directive, supra at note 8, art. 1, sec. 1. 
11  Id., art. 1, sec. 2(a). 
12  Id., art. 1, sec. 2(b) and (c) 
13  Id., art. 1, sec. 3. 
14  Id., art. 1, sec. 4. 
15  Id., art. 2. 
16  Id., art. 4, sec. 1. 
17  Id., art. 4, sec. 2(a) and (b). 
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So long as the methane hydrate project is designed to produce in excess of 
500,000 m3 of methane daily,18 then the project would certainly qualify as an Art. 
4(1) - Annex I project requiring a full EIA process.19 The methane extracted from 
methane hydrates is the same chemical as the term natural gas, thus methane 
extraction is per se natural gas extraction.20 It is fairly unlikely that methane hydrate 
reservoirs contain substantial quantities of petroleum as distinct from natural gas; to 
the extent that any hydrocarbon liquids are recovered it is very reasonable to 
assume that they would fall below the “500 tonnes/day” minimum requirement.21  
Several ancillary aspects of methane hydrate projects would also likely qualify 
under Annex I. To the extent that CCS technologies are engaged to offset the extract 
volumes of methane with carbon dioxide, then the project would be a storage site 
pursuant to Directive 2009/31/EC (“The CCS Directive”). 22  Depending on the 
location of the methane hydrate project and the gathering and transportation needs 
to move the methane and relate fluids from the wellsites to the platforms to onshore 
facilities, the project may qualify as a pipeline.23 Assuming that methane qualifies as 
natural gas and if the pipelines involved in its transport were wider than 80 cm and 
longer than 40 km, then the pipelines of the project would qualify.24 If similar 
pipelines were utilized to transport carbon dioxide to the wellsites for sequestration 
then those pipelines would also qualify under Annex I.25  
Methane hydrate projects could be characterized as an integrated chemical 
installation for the production of basic organic chemicals.26 Methane is an organic 
chemical; its extraction involves “chemical conversion processes” to convert 
methane hydrates to methane and other components. 27  One would reasonably 
assume that the scale of investment required to construct methane hydrate projects 
presumes chemical product volumes sufficient to qualify as “on an industrial 
scale.”28 To the extent that the project is engaged in the conversion of the methane 
and water volumes into steam and hydrogen, the project might qualify as in the 
“production of basic inorganic chemicals.”29 In that case, the chemical processes to 
convert methane to hydrogen would like better satisfy the “chemical conversion 
processes” requirement.30  
 
18  The equivalent of 17,600 kcf/d. See natural gas calculator at the U.S. Dept. of Energy; available 
at  http://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-analyses/energy-calc.html . 
19  EIA Directive, supra at note 8, Annex I, Sec. 14. 
20  See chemistry of methane hydrates, supra, ch. 2, sec. 2. 
21  EIA Directive, supra at note 8, Annex I, Sec. 14. See chemistry of methane hydrates, supra, ch. 2, 
sec. 2. 
22  Id., Annex I, Sec. 22. See CCS and methane hydrates, supra, ch. 3 
23  Id., Annex I, Sec. 16. 
24  Id., Annex I, Sec. 16(a). 
25  Id., Annex I, Sec. 16(b). 
26  Id., Annex I, Sec. 6(a). 
27  Id., Annex I, Sec. 6 and 6(a). For details on the chemical processes involved, see supra, 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
28  Id., Annex I, Sec. 6. 
29  Id., Annex I, Sec. 6(b). 
30  Id., Annex I, Sec. 6. 
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Methane hydrate projects might could be characterized as groundwater 
abstraction schemes to the extent that the water volumes associated with the 
methane in the hydrate formations is produced alongside the methane.31  
It is possible that methane hydrate projects could be characterized as “trading 
ports, piers for loading and unloading,” if the offshore structures are built in such a 
manner to facilitate transport of produced methane, water, or hydrogen volumes.32  
Methane hydrate projects should not be characterized as crude-oil refineries 
nor as gasification/liquefaction installations of coal or bituminous shales.33 Methane 
hydrate projects would lift negligible amounts of crude oil, if at all, and no volumes 
of coal or shale would be extracted nor processed. To the extent that any 
hydrocarbon liquids would be produced coincidentally at a methane hydrate 
project, it would be very unlikely for those chemicals to be processed or refined 
onsite; more likely they would be relocated to a regular refinery location for 
disposition.  
1.2. Offshore methane hydrates qualified under Annex II 
Even though the EIA procedures will almost certainly be invoked by the Annex I 
analyses, it is remains worthwhile to review the Annex II categories because there 
are several additional categories of activities that are not present in the Annex I list 
that might also merit review under a methane hydrate project.  
Under the category of Energy Industry, there are several subcategories that 
might be involved as support systems to a methane hydrate project. Industrial 
installations for carrying gas, steam or water may be involved in both offshore 
efforts to extract the methane or as part of onshore support systems.34 To the extent 
that the methane hydrate project is producing substantial volumes of natural gas 
that will need translation into an onshore distribution network, it is likely that the 
facilities will need storage facilities to provide safe and reliable delivery of the 
natural gas into the distribution pipelines. As such, the methane hydrate project 
may include the sub-categories of surface storage of natural gas, underground 
storage of combustible gases, and surface storage of fossil fuels.35  
As the methane hydrates are in a solid form prior to removal from the deposit, 
it would be reasonable to describe their extraction as an extractive industry 
category. First, the surface industrial installations for the extraction of natural gas 
that will be associated with a methane hydrate project would likely independently 
qualify as an Annex II category project.36 As the hydrates are underground, they 
potentially involve underground mining.37 While not immediately foreseeable, it is 
not impossible to imagine that marine or fluvial dredging may be involved in either 
 
31  Id., Annex I, Sec. 11. See chemistry of methane hydrates, supra, ch. 2, sec. 2. 
32  Id., Annex I, Sec. 8(b). 
33  Id., Annex I, Sec. 1. 
34  Id., Annex II, Sec. 3(b). 
35  Id., Annex II, Sec. 3(c), (d), and (e). 
36  Id., Annex II, Sec. 2(e) 
37  Id., Annex II, Sec. 2(b). 
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the direct extraction of methane hydrates or utilized as a means of facilitating the 
removal of methane hydrates. 38  While the phrasing of deep drilling is left 
unclarified in Annex II, it is conceivable that fresh water can be produced from the 
hydrate deposits and then positioned as potable water for human or livestock 
consumption.39  
Certain aspects, or sub-projects, of a methane hydrate project are likely to fit 
within several of the sub-categories of Infrastructure Projects. Depending on the 
overall footprint of the project and its associated co-projects, e.g. electrical power 
generation, it might be engaged in the development of an industrial estate project.40 
To the extent that carbon dioxide sequestration is involved in the methane hydrate 
project, it would likely involve gas pipeline installations and pipelines for the 
transport of the to-be-injected carbon dioxide.41 And without regard to the use of 
hydrate waters as potable waters, if the project plans to remove those waters from 
the deposit then the project could be seen as engaged in the abstraction of 
groundwater.42  
It is not likely that the products from a methane hydrate project would qualify 
as petroleum, petrochemicals, or as chemical products. 43 Nor is it likely that a 
methane hydrate project or its products would be considered as part of a chemical 
industry category.44 Nor would the methane hydrate project fit any of the categories 
under Annex II’s Mineral Industry, as the listed items are fairly specific and exclude 
any of the materials involved in a methane hydrate project.45  
Qualification under Annex II requires a determination from the relevant 
member state on whether the project needs an EIA assessment.46 The requirements 
for the determination are detailed at Annex III;47 they are broad and detailed in 
scope. Annex III requires the detailing of the project’s characteristics; of note are the 
use of natural resource, the production of waste, the associated pollution and 
nuisances, and the risks of accident with particular regard to the substances or 
technologies involved in the project. 48  The location of the project is critical, 
especially with regards to the existing use of the area, the regenerative capacity of 
the project’s surroundings, the impacts on wetland and coastal zones, and nature 
reserves and parks.49 Finally the characteristics of the potential impact must be 
detailed. 50  All of the issues previously addressed in Annex III must also be 
addressed with regards to extent of the impact on populations and the geographical 
 
38  Id., Annex II, Sec. 2(c). 
39  Id., Annex II, Sec. 2(d)(iii). 
40  Id., Annex II, Sec. 10(a). 
41  Id., Annex II, Sec. 10(i). 
42  Id., Annex II, Sec. 10(l). 
43  Id., Annex II, Sec. 6(c) 
44  Id., Annex II, Sec. 6 
45  Id., Annex II, Sec. 5. 
46  Id., art. 4, sec. 2. 
47  Id., art. 4, sec. 3. 
48  Id., Annex III, sec. 1(c), (d), (e), and (f). 
49  Id., Annex III, sec. 2(a), (b), and (c)(i)(ii) and (iv). 
50  Id., Annex III, sec. 3. 
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area, on the trans-frontier nature of the project, the magnitude and complexity of 
the impact from the project, the probability of the impact, and of the duration, 
frequency, and reversibility of the impact.51  
1.3. Risk governance within the EIA Directive 
Of focused interest to efficient governance of the risks and harms from methane 
hydrate projects is the collection of data provided at this early stage of pre-
development. The risks of the project need to be clearly enumerated and stated,52 
the probability of the impact needs to be forecasted,53 and the duration, frequency 
of potential accidents needs to be squarely addressed.54 The actual nature of the 
impact, of the potential harms and hazards, needs to be surveyed; the potential for 
reversibility also needs to be evaluated.55  
There is value to this Annex II & III process, even if the member state decides 
to exempt the project from an EIA review. All of this data is collected prior to the 
onset of the EIA assessment itself and then provided to the public.56 Additionally, 
the public (which one assumes would include both the impacted communities and 
specialized public interest groups) has opportunity to engage in the determination 
process, enabling it to request information and explanations that the competent 
authorities might not have requested.57  
Once a project qualifies for assessment, 58  the EIA Directive requires 
application of §5 through §10 in the completion of the assessment. 59 Article 5 
requires that the assessment includes all of the information as directed under Annex 
IV.60 Additionally, the developer may request from the specific competent authority 
from the relevant member state for clarification on what types of information are to 
be included in the assessment.61 At a minimum, the developer should submit to the 
competent authorities:  
“(a)  a description of the project comprising information on the site, design 
and size of the project;”62  
“(b)  a description of the measures envisaged in order to avoid, reduce and, if 
possible, remedy significant adverse effects;”63  
 
51  Id., Annex III, sec. 3. 
52  Id., Annex III, sec. 1(f) 
53  Id., Annex III, sec. 3(d). 
54  Id., Annex III, sec. 3(e). 
55  Id., Annex III, En passim, see, sec. 2(c), 3(a) and 3(e). 
56  Id., art. 4., sec. 3 and 4. 
57  Id., art. 6, sec. 2. and especially at 2(g). This form of public interaction is of course in parallel 
to more discrete means of engagement, such as privately lobbying the competent authorities 
and other branches of the member state’s regulatory administration. 
58  Directly under id., art. 4, sec. 1. with Reference to Annex I, or, in the alternative under id., art. 
4, sec. 2 and 3. 
59  Id., art. 4, sec. 1 (for Annex I projects) and 2 (for Annex II projects). 
60  Id., art. 5, sec. 1. 
61  Id., art. 5, sec. 2. 
62  Id., art. 5, sec. 3(a) 
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“(c)  the data required to identify and assess the main effects which the 
project is likely to have on the environment;”64  
“(d)  an outline of the main alternatives studied by the developer and an 
indication of the main reasons for his choice, taking into account the 
environmental effects;”65  
“(e)  a non-technical summary of the information referred to in points (a) to 
(d).”66  
All five issues should address both their direct and indirect effects on (i) human 
beings, fauna and flora, (ii) soil, water, air, climate and the landscape, (iii) material 
assets and cultural heritage, and (iv) the interaction between all of these factors.67 
The Annex IV requirements are stated simply but they require both broad and 
detailed reports. The description of the project would need to explain both the 
production processes of the methane hydrate project and estimates of the expected 
residues and emissions which would include all forms of pollution.68 The breadth of 
the emissions definition, which includes such phenomena as vibrations, light and 
heat, might include disturbances such as earthquakes or tsunamis in the case of a 
methane hydrate project.69 A review of the alternatives is required to be submitted; 
clearly such information provides documentary proof of both options 
acknowledged to be known and tacit admissions of technologies unknown to the 
developer, if they cannot list them as an alternative one assumes that they are 
unaware.70 The developers are also responsible for explaining the choices made by 
the developers while taking into account the effects of those choices on the 
environment.71 In Annex IV, Art. 3, there is a repetition of the requirements found 
within the EIA Directive itself to report on the impacts on life, cultural assets and 
the environment. 72 Then, Annex IV requires a study of the impacts, including 
potential harms, of the project’s simple existence in the environment, of its use of 
natural resources, and of the potential of the project to emit pollution, create 
nuisances, and to eliminate, meaning discharge, waste products.73 Once the various 
impacts and potential harms and hazards have been itemized, potential means of 
prevention, reduction and offsetting measures should be provided in the 
 
63  Id., art. 5, sec. 3(b) 
64  Id., art. 5, sec. 3(c) 
65  Id., art. 5, sec. 3(d) 
66  Id., art. 5, sec. 3(e) 
67  Id., art. 3(a), (b), (c), and (d). 
68  Id., Annex IV, art. 1. “A description of the project, including in particular: (a) a description of 
the physical characteristics of the whole project and the land-use requirements during the 
construction and operational phases; (b) a description of the main characteristics of the 
production processes, for instance, the nature and quantity of the materials used; (c) an 
estimate, by type and quantity, of expected residues and emissions (water, air and soil 
pollution, noise, vibration, light, heat, radiation, etc.) resulting from the operation of the 
proposed project.” Underscoring added. 
69  Id., Annex IV, art. 1(c). 
70  Id., Annex IV, art. 2. 
71  Id., Annex IV, art. 2. 
72  Id., art. 3(a), (b), (c), and (d). 
73  Id., Annex IV, art. 4. 
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assessment. 74 To the extent that the developer can identify where shortfalls in 
knowledge or technology exist that would improve the assessment itself, they 
should ensure that such is provided in the report.75 An explanation of the scientific 
methods and techniques used to develop the above forecasts is to be included in 
this assessment of potential impacts.76 Finally, there is a requirement to provide a 
non-technical version of the above reports within the assessment.77  
While that assessment is in drafting and undergoing review, there are several 
opportunities for non-developer parties to engage in the process. Member states are 
to ensure that all of the relevant authorities are given opportunities to express their 
expertise on the assessment. 78 The general public has extensive rights reserved 
within the EIA Directive.79 Most importantly, the public is to be informed when and 
where the information gathered for the assessment will be made public and when 
the public can participate in the assessment review.80 The EIA Directive itself does 
not explicitly provide means of control, approval or veto, to the public, but the 
Directive would allow each member state to so grant to its own citizens under its 
own statutes.81 However, the public has a right reserved to it that either it does 
receive a sufficient interest in the review and development of the assessment or to 
have access to due process before a court of law or other independent and impartial 
body to challenge the decision, acts, or omissions on substantive or procedural 
grounds.82  
The EIA Directive requires that the assessment review engages other member 
states should they be discovered to be at transboundary risk. 83  Similarly, the 
transboundary-affected member state, once engaged, shall provide to its authorities 
and the public the same access to the information as was afforded to the parties in 
the original member state.84  
Critically important is the conclusion of the assessment process, at which time 
the member state(s) need to release the reasons for the decision (and any attached 
conditional requirements), an explanation of the impact of the public’s participation 
on the decision process, and a description of the main measures necessary to avoid, 
reduce, and offset the major adverse effects of the approved project.85  
Because the rules provide for both the technical and non-technical provision of 
the information, the public and other parties will face lower transaction costs in 
reviewing the materials. This would affect both the potential ex post litigation 
 
74  Id., Annex IV, art. 6. 
75  Id., Annex IV, art. 8. 
76  Id., Annex IV, art. 5. 
77  Id., Annex IV, art. 8. 
78  Id., art. 6, sec. 1. 
79  Id., art. 6, sec. 2(a) through (g). 
80  Id., art. 6, sec. 2(f) and (g). 
81  Id., art. 2. Of course, EU constitutional concerns apply to all such drafting efforts. 
82  Id., art. 11, sec. 1., as limited by, sec. 2 and 3. 
83  Id., art. 7. 
84  Id., art. 7, sec. 3(a) and (b). 
85  Id., art. 9, sec. 1(a), (b), and (c). 
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decisions made after an impact event, e.g., a harmful accident, or to better facilitate 
the ex ante drafting of necessary regulations.  
2. The SEA Directive 
Whereas the EIA Directive applied to projects, the Strategic Environment 
Assessment (“SEA”) Directive is targeted at plans and programs. 86  Plans or 
programs related to methane hydrate projects would most likely qualify under the 
categories of energy and industry, and potentially under the waste and water 
management categories.  
Plans and programs, broadly speaking, are those plans and programs that are 
undertaken by authorities within member states at local, regional or national levels 
and are subject to legislative procedures by Parliament or Government. 87  The 
overall character of the Directive is procedural in nature, not substantive.88 
The preamble of the SEA Directive explains that the precautionary principle 
was a central goal of the Directive, to preserve, protect and improve the quality of 
the environment, the protection of human health, and the prudent and rational 
utilization of natural resources.89  
A SEA is required for every plan or program that is likely to have significant 
environmental effects. 90 There are specific explicit requirements for SEAs to be 
drawn for any plan or program prepared for energy, industry, transport, waste 
management and water management, among others, if those plans or programs 
would set the framework for future development of those areas of interest listed 
within Annex I and II of the EIA Directive.91  
Additionally, member states should identify if other plans or projects would 
have significant environmental effect beyond those identified, supra; if review is 
undertaken and a SEA is found unwarranted then the authorities need to make that 
analysis public.92 These SEAs are to be accomplished and completed prior to the 
submission or adoption of the plans or programs by a legislative process.93  
Due to the nature of the plans and programs being essentially of a political 
and legislative nature, there is inherently a certain amount of due process and 
democratic political process within the EU to support an assumption that public 
ultimately does have a say on these plans and programs. However, the SEA 
Directive highlights the need and mandates the active participation of the public, 
and other authorities beyond the drafters of a SEA, to ensure that they have a 
 
86  SEA Directive, supra at note 9. 
87  Id., art. 2, sec. (a). 
88  Id., Preamble Sec. 9. 
89  Id., Preamble Sec. 1. 
90  Id., art. 3, sec. 1. 
91  Id., art. 3, sec. 2(a). 
92  Id., art. 3, sec. 4 and 5 and then at 6, respectively. 
93  Id., art. 4, sec. 1. 
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chance to review the findings of the SEA and to consult on the SEA.94 Furthermore, 
in the event of transboundary considerations, the SEA Directive has functionally 
similar mechanisms to the EIA Directive.95  
The information to be reviewed under a SEA assessment is detailed in Annex I 
to the SEA Directive. 96  In an effort to be as inclusive as possible of relevant 
information, the Annex advises to include all information from its immediate 
implications as well as its “secondary, cumulative, synergistic, short, medium, and 
long-term permanent and temporary, positive and negative effects.”97 It is clear that 
the assessment is to be drafted from as broad and inclusive a perspective as possibly 
feasible; if there are any harms affects due to the plans or programs evaluated, 
however vague, they should identified, quantified, and probabilistically modeled 
for both benefits and costs.98  
The notion of plans and programs are distinct from that of projects, they reflect 
potential legislation or policy enactments, and as such merit slightly different 
considerations than those listed under Annex IV of the EIA Directive.99 It should 
include an outline of the contents and main objectives of the plans or programs as 
well as any interconnection(s) with other plans or programs.100 It should describe 
the current state of the target environmental settings and how they might evolve 
without the plans or programs. 101  The assessment should make clear what 
characteristics are likely to be impacted by the plans or programs and how the plans 
or programs are expected to protect those areas or characteristics.102  
The SEA Directive’s Annex I repeats the mantra of life from the EIA 
directive; 103 it also requests specification of the measures envisaged to prevent, 
reduce, and offset any significant adverse effects of the plans or programs on such 
ecological and social concerns; this should include technical description of the 
various monitoring methods necessary to achieve these goals.104 It also calls for a 
listing of the reasons why the particular plans or programs were selected, which 
options were eliminated and the reason for their elimination, and what limits in 
knowledge frustrated or limited a more complete review of the options.105 Finally, a 
non-technical version of the above discussions is required.106  
 
94  Id., art. 6, sec. 1, 2, and with regards to NGOs Sec. 4. See also SEA Directive, 2001/42/EC. 
Preamble Sec. 15. 
95  Id., art. 7. 
96  Id., Annex I, 
97  Id., Annex I, sec. 1. 
98  Id., Annex I, sec. 1. 
99  The following description can be contrasted with that from the EIA discussion, supra, at sec. 1. 
100  Id., Annex I, (a). 
101  Id., Annex I, (b). 
102  Id., Annex I, (c) and (d). 
103  ęđ human beings, fauna and flora, soil, water, air …” et seq. See EIA Directive, supra at note 8, 
art. 3, en toto, see also id., Annex IV, art. 3. 
104  SEA Directive, supra at note 9, Annex I, (f), (g) and (i). 
105  Id., Annex I, (h). 
106  Id., Annex I, (j). 
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3. Environmental Liability and Seveso III Directives  
The EU has provided two legal instruments to address the commercial and 
industrial activities that could result in environmental and social harms, the 
Environmental Liability Directive (“ELD”)107 and the Seveso III Directive (“Seveso 
III”).108 These establish doctrines that then have broader applications in other areas 
of environmental regulation, such as the Birds and Habitats Directives, 109  the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive,110 and the Water Framework Directive.111 
The ELD is not likely to apply to the development of offshore methane hydrate 
projects, infra; the Seveso III is per se not applicable to the offshore development of 
hydrocarbons such as methane hydrates, also infra.  
Beyond those, the Directive on Natural Habitats governs the impacts on 
special environment ecologies and on certain protected species.  
3.1. Environmental Liability Directive 
3.1.1. Unsure applicability to methane hydrates 
The ELD was intended to address environmental harms and hazards generally. The 
Offshore Directive and the CCS Directive have also applied the ELD to address the 
liabilities from environmental harms from offshore activities and carbon 
sequestration activities.112 But there are several reasons why the ELD is not likely to 
address the events associated with methane hydrate projects.  
3.1.1.1. Limited scope of environmental damages 
The ELD governs environmental damages caused by occupational activities;113 its 
focus is squarely on damages to Nature.114  However, the ELD does not apply to all 
 
107  Directive 2004/35/CE Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Of 21 April 2004 On 
Environmental Liability With Regard To The Prevention And Remedying Of Environmental 
Damage. O.J. (L 143), 56. [hereinafter ELD.]  
108  Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the 
control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and 
subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC Text with EEA relevance. Official 
Journal of the European Union - Legislative. Vol. 197., 24 July 2012, Pp. 1–37. 
109  Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conservation of 
wild birds. (Birds Directive) Official Journal of the European Union - Legislative. Vol. 20., 26 
January 2010, pp. 7-25., and see the Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the 
conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (Habitats Directive) Official 
Journal of the European Union - Legislative. Vol. 206., 22 July 1992, Pp. 7-50, respectively. 
110  Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra at note 178. 
111  See Directive 2000/60/EC as an example of one of the major directives within that framework. 
112  It would at first appear that the ELD limits to itself to waters closer to the shoreline than 
where methane hydrates are deposited. However, the adoption of the ELD methods by the 
Offshore and CCS Directives would extend this zone of application. See ELD, supra at note 
107. 
113  ELD, supra at note 107, art. 3.1(a). 
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sources of environmental hazards.115 It declares that it addresses only those causes 
of harm that arise from a diffuse character wherein a causal link still functions to 
connect tortfeasor and accident.116 It also excepts various acts of God and force 
majeure that result in accidents otherwise covered within the ELD.117 The damage 
can be perfected in nature or of imminent threat to occur;118 an imminent threat 
requires a sufficient likelihood of the threat.119  
Environmental damage is defined as measurable adverse change in a natural 
resource which worsens the environment against a baseline, unless permitted by 
relevant authorities from the member states: 120 
“damage to protected species and natural habitats, which is any 
damage that has significant adverse effects on reaching or maintaining 
the favourable conservation status of such habitats or species. The 
significance of such effects is to be assessed with reference to the 
baseline condition, taking account of the criteria set out in Annex I”121  
“Damage to protected species and natural habitats does not include 
previously identified adverse effects which result from an act by an 
operator which was expressly authorised by the relevant 
authorities”122  
Thus, the scope of damages under the ELD is primarily centered on those 
‘parties’ that would not otherwise be able to bring their own plaints to trial. 
This limits the potential applicability of the ELD to the various potential 
 
114  Id., art. 2.1(a), (b), and (c). The Preamble suggests, see at Sec. 8, that the ELD should be applied 
to wherevers occupational activities present risks for human health. Of course, environmental 
harm can impact humans and human health in many ways, but the ELD handles the human-
related issues indirectly. There is a limit role of land damage to include those contaminations 
that might impact human health. See id., art. 2.1 (c).  
115  ELD, supra at note 107, art. 4. 
116  Id., art. 4, sec. 5. 
117  Id., art. 4, sec. 1(a) and (b). See also art. 4, sec. 6. for activities related to war or natural disasters. 
118  Id., art. 3, sec. 1(a) and (b). 
119  Id., art. 3, sec. 9. 
120  Id., art. 2, sec. 2. Clearly this raises an immediate issue of metrics and measurement, of 
observation and detection. These are not necessarily readily reduced to low cost technologies 
in many cases and thus might be seen as preventing recognition of certain damages less 
readily reduced to measurement or lack clear ex ante base lines against which to draw 
contrasts over time. Certain damages may have occurred in a location that ex ante to detection 
was not assumed to be a likely site of damage and so went unobserved at the beginning of 
the operations that ultimately led to the harm. Yet, this might also serve as an incentive to 
both protect the courts from the nuisance of unserviceable pleas in court and to encourage the 
development of baseline metrics by those interested in protecting their surroundings. Those 
best able to observe, suggests the ELD, have a duty to themselves to observe and take 
measurements. 
121  Id., art. 2, sec. 1. See also id., art. 2, sec. 3(a) and (b). The idea of protected species and natural 
habitats is detailed at Directive 79/409/EEC. art. 4(2) and at Directive 92/43/EEC Annexes II 
and IV. 
122  ELD, supra at note 107, art. 2, sec. 1(a). 
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injuries and harms that might result from offshore methane hydrate 
accidents.  
3.1.1.2. Lack of applicable Annex III activities 
The listed activities under Annex III do not appear to overlap with the general 
nature of methane hydrate projects. Annex III activities do not include activities that 
substantially related to methane hydrate project related activities.123 Issues of waste 
management, water disposal management, and water abstraction might be relevant 
to a methane hydrate project, but it is not clear that the intent of the Annex III 
listings had such an offshore purpose in mind. 124  It is also not clear that the 
operations at an offshore methane hydrate project would be seen as in the 
manufacture, use, storage, etc., of dangerous chemicals.125  
3.1.1.3. Potential non-Annex III activities 
Given the lack of applicable activities under Annex III and the lack of clearly 
excludable conventions under Art. 4, unless the environmental risks of methane 
hydrates are included within the scope of Annex III, those harms would likely only 
be found applicable under the at fault or negligence rule of Art. 3, Sec. 1(b). Thus, 
some focus needs to be put on those non-Annex III occupational activities that could 
damage protected species and natural habitats.  
While one might expect to find broad definitions of water damages as 
provided within the U.S.’s Clean Water Act, such is not available under the ELD. 
Water damage, another form of environmental damage, includes any damage that 
impacts “adversely affects the ecological, chemical and/or quantitative status 
and/or ecological potential” of the waters addressed within the River Basin Water 
Directive.126 This is partially due to separate EU actions on the EU related seas and 
oceans. 127  However, this nuanced definition would appear to prevent the 
application of the ELD to the waters under which the vast bulk of methane hydrates 
are expected to lay, as methane hydrates lay offshore the coasts beyond the reach of 
the River Basin Frameworks.128  
 
123  Id., Annex III art. 1 to 12. 
124  Id., Annex III art. 2, 3, 4, and 6. 
125  Id., Annex III art. 7. 
126  Id., art. 2, sec. 1(b). See also Directive 2000/60/EC, art. 2, sec. 1., infra, for surface water 
definitions relied on by this ELD. See also “waters” at ELD, supra at note 107, art. 2, sec. 5., 
which nominally limits waters to just that of the River Basin Frameworks. See the River Basin 
Frameworks at Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy. Official Journal 
of the European Union - Legislative. Vol. 327., 22 December 2000, p. 1-72. 
127  See the discussion, infra, sec. 6.1 and 6.3, on the various water protection frameworks within 
the EU. 
128  See discussions on methane hydrate geology and geography, supra, at Chapters 2 and 3. See 
also footnote 116, supra, on potential extension of ELD into offshore waters if the Offshore 
Directive, infra at note 169, were applicable to methane hydrates. 
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It is also difficult to connect the onshore harms of cataclysmic methane 
hydrate accidents to application under the ELD. Land damage is defined in a fairly 
limited sense to impacts on human health; “significant risk of human health being 
adversely affected as a result of the direct or indirect introduction, in, on or under 
land, of substances, preparations, organisms or micro-organisms.” 129   Perhaps 
sudden inundation by water would qualify as an ‘introduction of a substance that 
could adversely affect human health,’ but it reads beyond the intent of the ELD. 
There is a potential argument to boot-strapping the ELD into regulating the 
development of methane hydrate projects, in that arguendo methane hydrates are 
themselves a natural resource deserving protection under Art. 2.130 The definition of 
damage includes reference to adverse change to a natural resource; to the extent 
that a methane hydrate project did damage the hydrate deposits, the impairment of 
use and production for future generations, then the notion of environmental 
damage might reasonably apply.131 However, natural resource is a defined term 
within the ELD and appears to exclude natural resources such as methane hydrates, 
as they are not generally considered to be “protected species and natural habitats, 
water and land,” especially as land damage is previously defined at that which 
causes adverse risks to human health by the introduction of substances, 
preparations, organisms or micro-organisms.132  
Finally, there may be some protected species and natural habitats in the 
vicinity of methane hydrate projects; but it is most likely that if protection of the 
species and habitats near methane hydrates are to be protected that they will need 
to be more explicitly detailed as target under the relevant frameworks. Protected 
habitats could include methane hydrates, as “1180 Submarine structures made by 
leaking gas” is a designated habitat under the Habitats Directive,133 but 1180 is not 
currently listed as a priority habitat and thus is not protected under the ELD.134 It is 
also not clear that the structures itemized at 1180 are methane hydrate deposits 
versus other sources of subsea methane such as a volcanic vent.135 The 1180 is 
 
129  ELD, supra at note 107, art. 2, sec. 1(c). 
130  Id., art. 2, sec. 2. 
131  Id., art. 2, sec. 2. 
132  See id., art. 2, sec. 1(c) and 12. 
133  Directive 92/43/EEC's Annex I, See also Interpretation Manual of European Union Habitats. 
European Commission. EUR 28. DG Environment. Habitats Committee. April 2013, at 16-17. 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/legislation/habitatsdirective/docs/Int_Manual_E
U28.pdf. 
134  Interpretation Manual of European Union Habitats. European Commission. EUR 28. DG 
Environment. Habitats Committee. April 2013. Pp. 16. available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/legislation/habitatsdirective/docs/Int_Manual_E
U28.pdf. 
135  Interpretation Manual of European Union Habitats. European Commission. EUR 28. DG 
Environment. Habitats Committee. April 2013, at 16. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/legislation/habitatsdirective/docs/Int_Manual_E
U28.pdf. The Manual describes structures of carbonate cement and is less focused on the 
underlying reservoirs from whence the methane originates; the manual is focused on the 
Æ
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neither a special habitat nor is it occupied by specially protected species, so it is not 
an area currently protected by the Habitat’s Directive. As a result, it is not likely that 
the ELD’s damage to natural resources clause would apply to methane hydrates 
unless amended or clarified.  
3.1.1.4. Exclusion of international conventions on civil liability 
The ELD excludes a list of pre-existing conventions that are of a more specialized 
nature and thus deemed better suited to the particular harms addressed within 
those conventions.136 Of the conventions listed at Annex IV, four of the five listed 
address oil pollution:  
i. “International Convention of 27 November 1992 on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage;”137  
ii. “International Convention of 27 November 1992 on the Establishment 
of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage;”138  
iii. “International Convention of 23 March 2001 on Civil Liability for 
Bunker Oil Pollution Damage;”139  
iv. “International Convention of 3 May 1996 on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea;”140  
Given this extensive exclusion of the oil spill paradigm from the ELD, one wonders 
to what extent events from a methane hydrate project might be likewise become 
excluded from the ELD. A careful reading of the excluded conventions reveal that 
damages discussed in those conventions are unlikely to be co-incident with a 
methane hydrate accident.  Thus, the result is inconclusive. 
3.1.2. Governance of risk within the ELD 
The ELD provides that the prevention and remedying of environmental damages 
should be developed through the polluter pays principle. 141  Thus, operators of 
activities that create environmental damages should be required to be financially 
liable for those damages; this is explicitly intended to provide economic incentives 
 
locus of plants and animals near these structures. Usually, no plants but a large diversity of 
invertebrates are found in these areas. 
136  ELD, supra at note 107, art. 4. sec.2, with reference to Annex IV, and Sec. 3, with reference to 
certain maritime related conventions. 
137  Id., Annex IV, sec. (a). 
138  Id., Annex IV, sec. (b). 
139  Id., Annex IV, sec. (c). 
140  Id., Annex IV, sec. (d). 
141  Id., Preamble Sec. 2. See also Preamble Sec. 18 and see art. 1. 
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to motivate the operators to optimize the risks of such accidents to manage their 
liability exposure.142  
The ELD presents a mixed strategy with regards to liability; the ELD 
distinguishes between Annex III activities and non-Annex III activities.143 The ELD 
applies to environmental damages caused by activities listed at Annex III and to any 
damage to protected species and natural habitats caused by occupation activities 
not on Annex III. 144 Annex III activities are to be governed by a rule of strict 
liability.145 Non-Annex III activities are to be governed by “at fault” or negligence 
rules.146  
Should a competent authority find an operator nonresponsive and thus decide 
to undertake such measures by themselves, the competent authority is able to 
recover those expenditures from the operators. 147  To avoid a pass-through tax 
burden to tax payers, competent authorities may charge the operators fees for the 
transaction costs of addressing the environmental hazards and harms.148  
The ELD is limited to addressing environmental damage, and per se, the ELD 
is categorically denied application to matters of personal injury, private property 
damages, and forms of economic loss. 149  It also excludes several international 
conventions on civil liability.150 Additionally, the ELD yields no rights to private 
parties to make economic recoveries for damage to such protected species or 
habitats; its application remains on the public welfare.151 
3.2. Seveso III Directive 
Seveso III applies to the prevention and control of major accidents that introduce 
dangerous substances to the environment; is it further stated inter materia that the 
accidents are generally industrial in nature.152 In that regard, it is similar to the 
perspective of the United Nations Convention on the Transboundary Effects of 
Industrial Accidents and indeed Seveso III is the implementation of that Convention 
within the EU.153  
Seveso appears to take stronger language than the UN Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents. In contrast to the Convention’s 
repeated use of “appropriate,” Seveso repeatedly relies on the phrase “all necessary 
measures.” “Operators should have a general obligation to take all necessary 
 
142  Id., Preamble Sec. 2. 
143  The ELD explicitly avoids engagement with rights of compensation for traditional damage 
under international agreements on civil liability. See ELD, supra at note 107, Preamble, sec. 11. 
144  Id., art. 3, sec. 1(a) and (b). 
145  Id., art. 3.1(a) 
146  Id., art. 3.1(b). See also the Preamble at sec. 9. 
147  Id., Preamble sec. 18. 
148  Id., Preamble sec. 18. 
149  Id., Preamble sec. 14. 
150  Id., Preamble sec. 11. 
151  Id., art. 3, sec. 3. 
152  Directive 2012/18/EU. art. 1. For full citation, see discussion, supra. 
153  Id., Preamble at, sec. 1, 2, 3, and 5. 
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measures to prevent major accidents,” 154  “the operator is obliged to take all 
necessary measures to prevent,”155 the Member States must inspect to ensure that 
“the operator has taken all necessary measures,”156 and the discussion of the duties 
of a Member State after an accident uses the “necessary” phrasing thrice.157  
3.2.1. Inapplicability of Seveso III to offshore methane hydrates 
Seveso III provides the rules for the prevention of major accidents involving 
dangerous substances.158 And Seveso III does include both hydrogen and natural 
gas as dangerous substances.159  
However, Seveso III does not apply to the offshore exploration and 
exploitation of hydrocarbons such as methane hydrates.160 Seveso III does not apply 
to the exploration, exploitation, extraction, and processing of minerals from 
boreholes such as methane hydrates.161  
Seveso III does not apply to the underground storage of natural gas in 
conjunction with the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon such as methane 
hydrates.162 And finally, Seveso III would not apply to the pipeline transport of 
methane, hydrogen, or other dangerous substances.163  
As such, there is very little potential for the development of methane hydrate 
projects to be regulated by Seveso III.  
3.2.2. Risk governance within Seveso III 
Seveso III lacks a specific discussion on liability, other than of the obligations of the 
Member States to ensure that operators undertake all necessary measures. 164  
However, the preamble makes clear that operator failed compliance should be met 
with penalties that should be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.165  
Given the mandate to provide for penalties for compliance failures and the 
repeated phrasings of “all necessary measures,” there is a combined semantic sense 
of a duty that can be failed and that incentives should be provided to ensure that 
those duties are met. However, there is no discussion of what should occur if that 
duty is met and accidents still occur.  
 
154  Id., Preamble, sec. 12 
155  Id., art. 5, sec. 1. 
156  Id., art. 5, sec. 2. 
157  Id., art. 17. 
158  Id., 1. 
159  Id., Annex I, pt. 2, sec. 15 “Hydrogen” and 18 “Liquefied flammable gases” but not at Sec. 34 
“Petroleum Products”. 
160  Id., art. 2, sec. 2(f). 
161  Id., art. 2, sec. 2(e). 
162  Id., art. 2, sec. 2(g). 
163  Id., art. 2, sec. 2(d). 
164  Id., en passim. 
165  Id., Preamble, sec. 29. 
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Is a strict liability rule suggested in the requirement for the operator to 
undertake all measures necessary to “limit their consequences,”166 to the mandate 
that the “operator takes any necessary remedial actions?” 167  It is difficult to 
ascertain because there is a paucity of financial responsibility clarifications with 
Seveso III;168 presumably the details rest within each Member State’s individualized 
implementation. It is perhaps more reasonable that Seveso III expects domestic 
regulations to be drafted and implemented as part of a command and control 
regulatory framework.  
4. Offshore Directive 
As currently enacted, the Offshore Directive 169  would likely apply to the 
exploration, development and production of methane hydrates from offshore 
operations. 170  However, it will be shown that the Offshore Directive remains 
focused on viscous oil spill damage and could be in need of amending to better 
address the potential hazards of offshore methane hydrate operations.171  
 
 
166  Id., art. 5, sec. 1. 
167  Id., art. 17(c). 
168  Neither Annex II nor Annex IV provide explicit requirement to detail whence financing is 
sourced for the remediation and compensation budgets. Annex II Sec. 5(c) does refer to 
ęmobilizable resources.” 
169  DIRECTIVE 2013/30/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 
2004/35/EC. O.J. (L 178), 66 [hereinafter Offshore Directive].  
170  Exploration and production are defined terms of the Offshore Directive, at Offshore Directive, 
art. 2(15) and (16) respectively. The definition of exploration includes “drilling into a prospect 
and all related offshore oil and gas operations necessary prior to production-related 
operations”. Id., art. 2(15). However, traditional oil and gas parlance distinguishes between 
“exploration,” the project phase focused on finding and identifying producible oil and gas 
volumes, and “development,” the project phase that occurs after the financial investment 
decision and includes all the construction, drilling and preparations prior to the onset of 
production activities. 
171  The Offshore Directive was adopted in response to the events of April 20, 2010 when an oil 
and gas well broke near the christmas tree close to the seabed/ocean interface. The resulting 
accident brought awareness to the dangers of deep sea oil and gas exploration and 
production, as contrasted with the hazards of boat-based oil spills such as the Exxon Valdez 
of 1989. See Offshore Directive, Preamble at (5), see “Accidents relating to offshore oil and gas 
operations, in particular the accident in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, have raised public 
awareness of the risks involved in offshore oil and gas operations and have prompted a 
review of policies aimed at ensuring the safety of such operations.” 
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4.1. Applicability to offshore methane hydrates 
The subject and scope of the Offshore Directive is to ensure the provision of 
“minimum requirements for preventing major accidents in offshore oil and gas 
operations and limiting the consequences of such accidents.”172  
Major accidents are defined as incidents associated with installations that 
involve “explosion, fire, loss of well control, or release of oil, gas or dangerous 
substances” and could result in substantial human injuries.173 Other forms of major 
accidents include those that involve serious damage to the installation that also 
involve substantial human injuries,174 events that lead to the serious injury of five or 
more humans, 175  or those events that could result in major environmental 
damages.176 Those major accidents need to occur offshore, which is defined as those 
areas within the territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, or continental shelves of 
member states.177 The definition of offshore parallels the zones of “marine waters” 
for the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, thus the applicability of those 
regulations on the avoidance of environmental damages applies to offshore 
operations.178 Finally, offshore oil and gas operations include most regular aspects 
of oil and gas exploration, development and production except for trans-coastal 
transportation of oil and gas.179  
As methane is natural gas, and assuming methane hydrate operations would 
require an installation or infrastructure, then the Offshore Directive applies to the 
exploration, development and production of methane hydrates from offshore 
waters of the Member States of the EU. 180 Events resulting from the release of 
methane from methane hydrate fields would be considered major accidents if they 
also resulted in “significant potential to cause, fatalities or serious personal injury” 
or if the methane ventings or seepages resulted in “any major environmental 
incident.” 181 The additional cases of major accident also apply, those involving 
damages to the installation with corresponding human injuries or other incidents 
that result in substantial injuries to five or more persons.182  
 
172  Offshore Directive, supra at note 169, art. 1.1. 
173  Id., art. 2(1)(a). 
174  Id., art. 2(1)(b). 
175  Id., art. 2(1)(c). 
176  Id., art. 2(1)(d). 
177  Id., art. 2(2). 
178  Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy 
O.J. (L 164), 19 [hereinafter Marine Strategy Framework Directive]. See Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive, art. 3.1(a) and (b). This is also noted in Offshore Directive, Preamble at 
(58), which provides guidance that the “definition of water damage in Directive 2004/35/EC 
should be amended to ensure that the liability of licensees under that Directive applies to 
marine waters of Member States as defined in Directive 2008/56/EC.”  
179  Offshore Directive, art. 2(3). 
180  Id., art. 2(3). 
181  Id., art. 2(1)(a) and (1)(d). 
182  Id., art. 2(1)(b) and (1)(c). 
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4.2. Risk governance within the Offshore Directive 
Member States are required to ensure that operators undertake all “suitable 
measures” of prevention, to provide that operators remain liable for the acts of their 
sub-contractors, and that operators undertake all “suitable measures” to limit 
consequences for human health and the environment.183 The Directive requires that 
the Member States ensure that operators and licensees comply with the Directive.184 
The Member States are to provide penalties within their own legal systems for 
noncompliance. 185  The penalties should “effective, proportionate, and 
dissuasive.”186  
Environmental damage and harm caused by offshore activities are to be 
regulated under the Environmental Liability Directive. 187  The definition of 
environmental damage is inherited from the Environmental Liability Directive.188 
Member states do a have an affirmative duty under the Offshore Directive to ensure 
that licensed operators are financially liable for both prevention and remediation of 
environmental harms from offshore activities; this is to be accomplished by 
domestic legislation.189 The phrasing suggests a rule in comport with the operations 
of a strict liability rule, but the requirement does not particularly require a rule of 
civil liability, regulatory guidance would appear to suffice.190  
While the Preamble refers to a particular standard of care, that of “where the 
costs of further risk reduction would be grossly disproportionate to the benefits of 
such reduction,” 191 it does not appear that a rule of negligence was suggested; 
rather, the whole of the Directive appears to reflect the polluter pays principle and 
thus the rule of strict liability. 192  The licensee, as determined by Directive 
94/22/EC,193 is to be held financially liable for both the prevention and remediation 
of major accidents and their consequences.194 
 
183  Id., art. 3, sec. 1, 2, and 3. 
184  Id., art. 34. 
185  Id., art. 34. 
186  Id., art. 34. 
187  Id., art. 7. 
188  Id., art. 7.  For a more complete discussion on the limitations of the ELD with regards to 
offshore methane hydrates, please see the discussion on the ELD, infra, at sec. 6.1. 
189  Id., art. 7. 
190  Under the ELD, Annex III activities are per se under a strict liability rule, non-Annex III 
activities are under a “fault-based” rule. See discussion, supra, at sec. 3.1. 
191  Offshore Directive, supra at note 169, Preamble, sec. 14. 
192  All European Union environmental laws need to be read with the guidance of art. 191(2) 
TFEU, that the polluter pays principle is fundamental to all EU legislations. “Union policy on 
the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of 
situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle 
and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage 
should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.” 
193  Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the 
conditions for granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and 
production of hydrocarbons. [1994] OJ L 164. 
194  Offshore Directive, supra at note 169, art. 7. 
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Additionally, the Offshore Directive is subordinated to the rules under the EIA 
Directive, SEA Directive, and 94/22/EC.195 
4.2.1. Call for a regulatory body 
Overall, the Offshore Directive provides for a deliberate and cautious review of 
offshore oil and gas projects prior to their licensing and through-out their 
operational periods. The Member States are required to ensure the public of their 
participation during the review process.196 Prior to the issuance of a license for 
offshore oil and gas operations, the Member States must ensure that the applicant is 
technically and financially capable of meeting their responsibilities under the 
Offshore Directive. 197  The Member States shall also ensure that the there are 
sustainable financial instruments made available to better provide for the financial 
needs of major accidents and their risk management.198  
Competent authorities are to be established by the Member States to be 
responsible for overseeing the study, evaluation, regulatory compliance and 
monitoring of major hazards.199 Additional requirements set out at Annex III. The 
competent authority is to remain independent and objective; it should not be 
involved in the revenue or economic development discussions related to the 
offshore projects it oversees.200  
The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) shall provide technical and 
scientific expertise to the Member States and the Commission, with special regards 
to the detection and monitoring of transboundary oil or gas spills.201 EMSA may 
also assist in the drafting and development of the Member States’ external 
emergency response plans; it may also develop a catalog of available emergency 
equipment and services.202 EMSA may also assist the Commission in reviewing the 
external emergency response plans of Member States to ensure that the plans are in 
compliance with the Offshore Directive.203 EMSA can also run review exercises to 
test the designed emergency mechanisms for major accidents. 204  EMSA has a 
potentially major role to play in ensuring consistent safety levels are maintained 
Union-wide.  
 
195  Id., art. 1, sec. 3. 
196  Id., art. 5. 
197  Id., art. 4.1. and 2. 
198  Id., art. 4.3. 
199  Id., art. 8.1(a) through (f). 
200  Id., art. 8.2., 8.3., and 9(a). 
201  Id., art. 10.1 and 10.2(a). 
202  Id., art. 10.2(b) and (c). 
203  Id., art. 10.3(a). 
204  Id., art. 10.3(b) 
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4.2.2. Regulatory actions 
Member States are to require that all suitable measures are undertaken to prevent 
major accidents. 205 Suitable is defined to mean “right or fully appropriate”, in 
consideration of “proportionate effort and cost, for a given requirement or 
situation.”206  
The Member States are also to require offshore oil and gas operations to be 
managed on the basis of systematic risk management so that whatever risks or 
hazards that cannot be eliminated are acceptable.207 Acceptable is defined as a level 
of risk that the costs or efforts to further reduce its expected harms would be grossly 
disproportionate to the benefits received for such an effort.208 This is not a statement 
that once marginal benefits exceeds marginal costs to halt efforts at risk reduction, 
but a defense that not all technologically feasible measures need be undertaken if, 
on the whole, those resources might be put to better purposes for the impacted 
communities.  
In this process of review, the operator/licensee is to submit a variety of plans 
and procedural documents:  
i. a corporate major accident prevention policy,209 detailed at Annex I-8,  
ii. a safety and environmental management system applicable to the 
installation,210 detailed at Annex I-9 and Annex IV,  
iii. a design notification for a production installation,211 detailed at Annex 
I-1,  
iv. a scheme of independent verification, 212 detailed at Annex I-5 and 
Annex V,  
v. a report on major hazards for a production installation or a non-
production installation, 213  detailed at Annex I-2 and Annex I-3, 
respectively,  
vi. an amended report on major hazards in the event of a material change 
or dismantling of an installation,214 detailed at Annex I-6,  
vii. an internal emergency response plan,215 detailed at Annex I-10,  
viii. a notification of well operation and information on that well 
operation,216 detailed at Annex I-4 and Annex II,  
ix. a notification of combined operations,217 detailed at Annex I-7,  
 
205  Id., art. 3.1. 
206  Id., art. 2(6). 
207  Id., art. 3.4. 
208  Id., art. 2(8). 
209  Id., art. 11.1(a). 
210  Id., art. 11.1(b). 
211  Id., art. 11.1(c). 
212  Id., art. 11.1(d). 
213  Id., art. 11.1(e). 
214  Id., art. 11.1(f). 
215  Id., art. 11.1(g). 
216  Id., art. 11.1(h). 
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x. a relocation notification,218 detailed at Annex I-1, 
 
The application of these guidelines to methane hydrates is straightforward. They 
require the operator to demonstrate that the major hazards and potential accidents 
are well understood.  
i. Each and every potential major hazards resulting from the exploration 
and production of methane hydrates needs to be identified and 
cataloged. Not only surface-related hazards but also those subsea- and 
seabed-related should be thus identified.  
ii. The potential environmental harms from venting or seeping methane 
and resultant metabolites such as carbon dioxide needs to be 
inventoried. If additional chemicals are involved in the production of 
methane hydrates, such as injected carbon dioxide or in-situ fuels and 
oxidizers, then their potential environmental harms also need to be 
included in that study.  
iii. The interactive effects of multiple wells into a common deposit, the 
effects of various production stimulation efforts, the impacts of field 
deterioration, all of the combination events that might impact major 
hazards or major accidents should be analyzed. With regards to 
methane hydrates, particular attention needs to be placed on subsea 
and seabed activities.  
iv. The likelihood and consequences of all of the major hazards of 
methane hydrate exploration and production need to be determined. 
Environmental, meteorological and seabed limitations on safe 
operations need to be evaluated from the perspective of methane 
hydrate fields and not from traditional oil and gas well stability 
perspectives. Similarly, the environmental conditions for methane 
hydrates may need to include consequences from landslides, 
tsunamis, and oxygen-deprived atmospheres near the major accident 
sites.  
v. A list of operations and expected correlated major hazards will need 
to be drawn up for methane hydrate exploration and production. 
While an operator would need to report on the number of persons 
adjacent to the installation per the Offshore Directive, it might not 
suffice to stop there. Operators should probably advise on the number 
of people who while not involved in the operations of the installation 
may still be impacted as a “first wave” of injuries or deaths. Due to the 
tsunami, landslides, and atmospheric fire risks, those persons might 
be some distance from the installation. 
 
 
217  Id., art. 11.1(i). 
218  Id., art. 11.1(j). 
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The Member States will need to prepare their own SEAs as they develop their 
“plans and programs” in response to the Offshore Directive and each prospective 
operator will be expected to complete their own EIAs as they bring projects forward 
for licensing and approvals; licensing authorities are required to consult with 
competent authorities.219  
Prior to the onset of well operations and the commencement of offshore 
exploration and production, the Member States are required to ensure that the 
operators have in place internal emergency response plans.220 The Member States 
are to ensure the operator retains and maintains appropriate expertise and 
equipment to perform its internal emergency response plans without delay 
whenever major hazards should emerge.221 The Member States are also required to 
bring forward their own external emergency response plans and acts of emergency 
preparedness.222 Annex VII and Annex VIII provides guidelines for the drafting of 
the external emergency response plans together with the operators;223 once drafted 
the plans should be shared with the Commission and the general public for feed-
back.224  
Once operations commence, the Member States have the duty to require that 
the operator is taking all reasonable steps, in light of the definition of suitable, to 
carry out its functions and duties under the Offshore Directive.225 If a Member State 
ascertains that an operator no longer has the capacity to meet the relevant 
requirements, it should remove that operator and replace the operator with a new 
qualified operator.226 Amidst all of the EIA and similar risk and hazard studies that 
need to be presented, reviewed and enforced, the Member States need to enforce a 
variety of other measures as well. The Member States must ensure that only 
properly licensed parties are operators of installations within their jurisdictions.227 
Member States are required to enforce safety zones around the approved and 
permitted installations. 228  The Member States need to ensure that independent 
verification of the various risk and hazard studies is performed prior to the 
completion of design for production installations or prior to the onset of operations 
for non-production installations; the Member States must provide that the feedback 
from independent verifiers must be taken into consideration by the operators.229 The 
Member States are to ensure that both the plans and the equipment necessary to 
address major hazards or major accidents is constantly kept ready and in place by 
 
219  Id., Preamble at (16) and Offshore Directive, supra at note 169, art. 4.2. and 5.1. 
220  Id., art. 28.1. 
221  Id., art. 28.2. 
222  Id., art. 29.1. 
223  Id., Annex VI. 
224  Id., art. 29.2 and 3. 
225  Id., art. 6.1., 2., 3. 
226  Id., art. 6.4. 
227  Id., art. 6.1. and 6.2. 
228  Id., art. 6.7. 
229  Id., art. 17. 
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the operators.230 Member States are also required to investigate into major accidents 
outside of the EU if the operator is also registered within their jurisdiction.231  
The Offshore Directive does provide for extensive research and investigation 
into the potential causes and concerns related to major hazards and major accidents. 
Note the constellation of required documents focused on safe operation of offshore 
operations: the report on major hazards, a safety and environmental management 
system, a corporate major accident prevention policy, and the combination of 
internal and external emergency response plans.232 When combined, they present a 
host of obligations on the part of potential operators of offshore methane hydrate 
operations.  
The report on major hazards, for either production installations or non-
production installations, is be developed by the operator in conjunction with its 
workers’ representatives.233 In addition to data on the companies and employees 
involved in the proposed installation, the report should include a complete 
description of the proposed installation.234  
5. Carbon Capture and Sequestration Directive 
Directive 2009/31/EC, the “CCS Directive,” 235  provides for the regulation of 
geological storage of carbon dioxide.  
5.1. Applicability to offshore methane hydrates 
While the CCS Directive is intended to apply to the sequestration of carbon dioxide, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, many suggested plans for offshore methane hydrate 
projects include carbon dioxide injection and sequestration in to the depleted 
methane hydrate reservoirs. In those cases, the CCS Directive would apply directly 
to those types of offshore methane hydrate projects. Also, the concerns with gas 
leakage from subsurface reservoirs have parallels within the risks of offshore 
methane hydrate production stage and abandonment and sequestration stage. 
The geological storage of carbon dioxide for the purposes of the CCS Directive 
is defined to be the injection of carbon dioxide streams into underground geological 
formations.236 The CCS Directive applies to all geological storage of carbon dioxide 
within the territory of the Member States, including within their Exclusive 
 
230  Id., art. 19. Also additional requirements enumerated at Offshore Directive, Annex IV. 
231  Id., art. 20. 
232  Id., art. 11. 
233  Id., art. 12.1 and 2. 
234  Id., Annex I-2(1), (2), and (4). 
235  Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European 
Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 
2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, O.J. (L.140), 114 [hereinafter CCS Directive]. 
236  Id., Art. 3.1.  
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Economic Zones and on their continental shelves per UNCLOS.237 If the methane 
hydrates from those offshore zones were developed in conjoined re-injection of 
carbon dioxide into the hydrate deposits, then the CCS Directive would apply to the 
methane hydrate project. The storage of carbon dioxide within the water column is 
prohibited.238 
5.2. Risk governance within the CCS Directive 
The preamble to the CCS Directive indicated that the liability matters related to the 
operations of CCS facilities is to be broken up by the underlying character of the 
damages. Environmental harms and damages are to be governed by the ELD239 and 
climate change harms and damages by the Directive 2003/87/EC.240   
As was discussed, supra at Section 3.1, the ELD itself provides little foundation 
for governing the risks associated with offshore methane hydrates; so to the extent 
that environmental harms would result, the Offshore Directive would likely not 
provide sufficient incentives to the operators to employ optimal levels of due care 
or activity. It is also unclear, due to the bifurcated liability rules of the ELD, if 
methane hydrate accidents would be governed under its strict liability rule for 
Annex III activities or under its Art. 3.1(b) ‘at fault’ or negligence rules. 
Directive 2003/87/EC, as amended, provides for penalties in the case of 
unpermitted or excessive greenhouse gas emissions.241 Violators are required to 
purchase and submit sufficient allowances or to make payment of an excess 
emissions penalty.242 There is no provision for civil liability; the effort to govern 
greenhouse gases is solely regulatory in nature. This directive would apply to 
vented or seeped methane from offshore methane hydrate projects as methane is 
one of the listed greenhouse gases under Annex II of the Directive.243  
 
237  Id., 2.1. See also art. 2.2 that excludes certain research and testing projects from regulation 
under the Directive. 
238  Art 2.4. This is parallel to the regulations in the Marine Framework, which do regulate the 
emission of carbon dioxide and methane gases into the water column. See, infra, at sec. 4. 
While when methane is released at depth into the water column with insufficient velocity 
that methane is likely to become metabolized by local biota into carbon dioxide, it is not 
reasonable that such transport of methane into the water column should be interpreted as 
water-storage of carbon dioxide. 
239  For a discussion of risk governance under the ELD, please see the discussion, supra, at sec. 3.1. 
240  CSS Directive, Preamble, sec. 30. Directive 2003/87/EC is the directive that established the 
greenhouse gas emission trading systems within the EU. See Directive 2003/87/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council 
Directive 96/61/EC (Text with EEA relevance). Official Journal of the European Union – 
Legislative.  275, 25/10/2003, p. 32–46. 
241  Directive 2003/87/EC, art. 16. 
242  Id., art. 16, sec. 2 and 3. 
243  The list of chemicals denoted as greenhouse gases by Annex II are carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) , perfluorocarbons (PFCs), 
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). Directive 2003/87/EC. Annex II.  
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Member states are required to enact penalties for regulatory noncompliance 
within domestic law that are “effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.”244 
5.2.1. Assignments of Liability 
In the event of a “significant irregularity,” the competent authority is to require that 
the operator take the necessary corrective measures. 245  Should the operator fail to 
do so, then the competent authority is required to assume control and undertake the 
necessary corrective measures itself with the operator remaining liable for the costs 
of such efforts.246 While the original version of Directive 2003/87/EC provided that 
greenhouse gas emissions related to force majeure events would be potentially 
excludable from penalty, the current enactment no longer contains that provision.247  
At closing of the facility, the operator is to remain liable for the potential 
accidents from the storage facility until it has been deemed that the carbon dioxide 
will have been completely and permanently contained.248 After that point in time, 
the liabilities for the storage facility would be transferred to a competent 
authority.249 
5.2.2. Regulatory actions 
When the CCS Directive is applicable, the operators will be required to complete 
EIAs. The selection of storage sites,250 the permitting of exploration permits,251 and 
the permitting of storage,252 are likely to be seen as part of a “private project ... likely 
to have significant effects on the environment” and “involving the extraction of 
mineral resources” and thus require the completion of an EIA.253 
If an EIA is required, then the CCS Directive provides clear guidance on safety 
planning with regards to overall geological stability and risk assessment.254 These 
 
244  CCS Directive, supra at note 235, art. 28. See also Preamble, sec. 42. 
245  Id., art. 16, sec. 1 and 2. 
246  Id., art. 16, sec. 4 and 5. 
247  Directive 2003/87/EC. Formerly at art. 29. 
248  Id., art. 18. 
249  Id., art. 18. 
250  CCS Directive, supra at note 235, art. 4 
251  Id., art. 5 
252  Id., art. 6. 
253  Id., art. 1.1 and 1.2. 
254  Art. 7 details the informational requirements for storage permits. An assessment of the 
expected reliability of the storage facility is required at art. 7.3, the engineering details of 
expected field operations are required at art. 7.4., and a description of the preventative 
measures on significant irregularities is required at art. 7.5, art. 13 requires an extensive 
monitoring capability prior to permitting. Ongoing comparisons between modeling 
expectations and observed data are required at art. 13.1(a), the detection of significant 
irregularities is required at art. 13.1(b), the detection of migrating gas volumes is required at 
art. 13.1(c), the detection of leaking gas volumes is required at art. 13.1(d), the detection of 
significant adverse effects to the environment is required at art. 13.1.(e), the assessment of the 
Æ
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safety regulations are also a strong model for regulating the field safety of methane 
hydrate projects. In many places, one could replace “storage complex” with 
“methane hydrate deposit” and have a good first approximation of draft methane 
hydrate regulations.  
Annex I to the CCS Directive provides detailed guidance on what data and 
analyses should be provided in evaluating the safety of the storage complex of the 
CCS project and its surrounding area. 255  First, a wide array of scientific and 
engineering data must be collected. 256 Then, a variety of models must be produced 
to research potential future risks and hazards. 257  
The CCS Directive provides a detailed method for conducing risk assessments. 
There are three main components of that assessment, the exposure assessment, the 
effects assessment, and the risk characterization.258 The exposure assessment focuses 
on the “environment and the distribution and activities of the human population 
above the storage complex, and the potential behavior and fate of leaking CO2 from 
potential pathways.”259 This assessment demonstrates the nexus of the communities 
at risk versus the potential location of hazardous ventings and seepages. The effects 
assessment examines the particular risks and hazards of the venting and seeping 
gas on the various biota in the impacted communities, including on humans.260 The 
risk characterization is a combination of several reports on the short-term and long-
term expected safety, or lack thereof, from the proposed conditions of field usage.261 
The risk characterization should also include analysis and modeling of worst case 
scenarios.262  
 
effectiveness of corrective measures is required at art. 13.1.(f), and the continual assessment 
of the overall safety and stability of the storage complex is required at art. 13.1.(g). 
255  Id., Annex I, Steps 1, 2, and 3. 
256  Id., Annex I, Steps 1. Steps 1(a) through (g) requires the collection of a wide variety of data 
types, including geology and geophysics, hydro-geology, reservoir engineering, 
geochemistry, geo-mechanics, and seismicity and surveillance on natural and man-made 
pathways that could provide leakage pathways. Steps 1(h) through (l) require the collation of 
potential interactions with local flora, fauna, and habitats. 
257  Id., Annex I, Steps 2 and 3. Step 2 requires the building of a complicated three-dimensional 
geological earth model that can be used to forecast and understand likely stability and 
danger scenarios. Step 3 requires that the model developed in Step 2 be used to perform 
dynamic behavior models of the CCS activities. 
258  Id., Annex I, Step 3.3.2., 3.3.3, and 3.3.4. 
259  Id., Annex I, Step 3.3.2. 
260  Id., Annex I, Step 3.3.3 
261  Id., Annex I, Step 3.3.4. 
262  Id., Annex I, Step 3.3.4. 
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6. The Marine Framework  
6.1. Marine Strategy Framework Directive 
The MSF Directive requires that Member States develop strategies to ensure the 
present health and future viability of EU marine ecosystems and that such plans are 
developed and in place by the year 2020.263  
To the extent that the “programs of measures” called for under the Directive 
qualify as “plans and programs” under the SEA Directive, then they should be 
coordinated with the requirements of the SEA Directive; as such, there are 
opportunities for the public to engage in the drafting of the MSF Directive’s 
“programs of measure”.264  
The Member States are obligated under the Directive to implement marine 
strategies to:  
“(a) protect and preserve the marine environment, prevent its 
deterioration or, where practicable, restore marine ecosystems in areas 
where they have been adversely affected;”265  
“(b) prevent and reduce inputs in the marine environment, with a 
view to phasing out pollution … so as to ensure that there are no 
significant impacts on or risks to marine biodiversity, marine 
ecosystems, human health or legitimate uses of the sea.”266  
The reference to “no significant impacts” clearly requires some rationalization of 
which harms are significant and which impacts are not; ergo, it recognizes that 
some impacts are indeed tolerable and acceptable. The applied marine strategies are 
to take an ecosystem level perspective, this also suggests a net-sum perspective and 
the legislative permission to make trade-offs for the greater social welfare as the 
same section calls for the sustainable use of marine resources for future generations 
of human beings.267  
The MSF Directive has a broad definition of marine waters, they are defined as 
including the “waters, seabed and subsoil on the seaward side of the baseline” 
extending as far out as its Member States exercise jurisdiction under UNCLOS, to 
the EEZ or coastal shelf claims.268 Marine waters also include coastal waters, to the 
extent not already addressed by other EU Directives or legislation.269 Also to be 
 
263  Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra at note 178, art. 1, sec. 1. 
264  See supra, sec. 2. 
265  Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra at note 178, art. 1, sec. 2(a) 
266  Id., art. 1, sec. 2(b) 
267  Id., art. 1, sec. 3. 
268  Id., art. 3, sec. 1(a). See also discussion on UNCLOS, the EEZ and other marine jurisdictions, 
supra at ch. 8, sec. 2. 
269  Id., art. 3, sec. 1(b). 
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included within the scope of the MSF Directive’s purview are the major marine 
areas already covered by separate conventions.270  
Good environmental status is positively defined with the upbeat markers of 
ecological diversity, of clean, healthy and productive oceans, and of sustainability 
for the future generations. 271 The physiographic, geographic, geologic, climatic, 
hydro-morphological, physical, and chemical properties and characteristics of the 
ecosystems are to be protected and preserved.272 Pollution is defined as the direct or 
indirect introduction into the marine waters of items that could cause harm to those 
marine water ecosystems. 273  Sources of pollution can include human activity, 
substances, energy, and anthropogenic noise.274  
6.1.1. Applicability to offshore methane hydrates 
The Marine Strategy Framework Directive, (MSF Directive),275 would likely apply to 
the development of methane hydrate projects.  
The regulation of methane hydrate projects could be effected via the 
development of specific components of marine strategies applied to areas 
containing methane hydrate deposits. The MSF Directive requires its 
implementation in all of the marine areas of the EU and its Member States 
dependencies,276 thus it covers the areas that contain methane hydrates.277  
Each area containing methane hydrate deposits will need to address them 
within a program of measures to achieve and maintain good environmental 
status. 278 When the hydrates overlay transboundary marine ecosystems, then a 
regional cooperative effort is called for by the directive.279 If pre-existing regional 
conventions are already in place, then those conventions are called on to extend to 
adopt these measures and strategies.280  
The marine strategies would need to adopt a survey position on the targeted 
good environmental status, the strategies are to be developed in alignment with the 
descriptor elements in the Directive’s Annex I and the scientific factors at Annex 
 
270  Id., art. 4. Sections. 1 and 2. For examples of pre-existing conventions, see the Barcelona 
Convention on the Mediterranean Sea, the Bonn Agreement on the North Seas, or the 
Helsinki Convention on the Baltic Sea. 
271  Id., art. 3, sec. 5. 
272  Id., art. 3, sec. 5(a) and (b). 
273  Id., art. 3, sec. 8. 
274  Id., Thus the activities of the development and operation of a methane hydrate project would 
conceivably engage in multiple potential sources of pollution beyond just methane leakages 
and venting; they could introduce a variety of noises or energy sources into the marine 
waters. Additionally, there is potentially argument to be made that the energy released into 
the ocean by methane hydrate related landslides or tsunamis could be seen as energy releases 
from the project and thus be listed as a source of pollution under this Directive. 
275  Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra at note 178. 
276  Id., art. 4, sec. 1 and 2. 
277  See discussion on methane hydrate geography, supra at ch. 2, sec. 3 and 4. 
278  Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra at note 178, art. 5, sec. 2(b)(i). 
279  Id., art. 6, sec. 1 and 2. 
280  Id.,. 6. 
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III.281 The programs should itemize what actions need to be undertaken to ensure 
the achievement or maintenance of good environmental statuses for the targeted 
marine environments.282 The programs should establish a set of indicators and tests 
that can provide on-going metrics for the observation of the programs once in 
place. 283  It is required that the programs of measures are cost-effective and 
technically feasible and that cost-benefit analyses are undertaken to affirm those 
requirements prior to the placement of those measures into service.284 The costs of 
the development of the plans and their placement into service are to be supported 
by EU funding due to the priority of the agenda to sustainably preserve the marine 
environment.285  
It is at that pre-activation stage of planning that methane hydrates and the 
potential for harms and hazards from the development of methane hydrates 
projects could be included within these marine strategies. Particular attention could 
be brought to the potential to affect sea-floor integrity, 286  as seen with 
anthropogenic stressors leading to additional methane venting or seeping with its 
potential for subsea landslides. Similarly, the various activities and effects of 
methane hydrate exploration and extraction could lead to various introductions of 
noise and energy that could adversely affect the marine environment, these 
potential sources of pollution need to be discussed under the Directive. 287The 
potential for the effects of vented or seeped methane to create eutrophication in the 
waters and its potential adverse effects on marine biota could be another point of 
concern under the Directive.288 The observation of metrics on these concerns should 
be supported under the program of measures; effective monitoring programs 
should be put in place if the above concerns are found to be covered by the 
Directive.289  
The Commission issued its Methodological Standards Decision to further 
implement the MSF Directive. 290 The Decision provided an annex with greater 
depth on the environmental factors to consider when implementing the MSF 
Directive.291 There are substantial concerns raised on the overall chemical effects of 
emissions into the water columns, such as nutrient levels, nutrient enrichment, and 
the effects on oxygen levels; all of which could be impacted by the methane venting 
 
281  Id., art. 3, sec. 5. See also id., art. 8, sec. 1(a). 
282  Id., art. 13, sec. 1. 
283  Id., art. 10, sec. 1. 
284  Id., art. 13, sec. 3. 
285  Id., art. 22, sec. 1 and 2. 
286  Id., Annex I, sec.6. 
287  Id., Annex I, sec.11. 
288  Id., Annex I, sec.5. 
289  Id., Annex V. See also art. 11, sec. 1. and art. 24. 
290  2010/477/EU: Commission Decision of 1 September 2010 on criteria and methodological 
standards on good environmental status of marine waters. O.J. (L 232), 14 [hereinafter 
Methodological Standards Decision]. 
291  Id., Annex. En passim. 
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and seeping.292 Also, potential physical damages to the seabed and subsurface are 
detailed;  
“The main concern for management purposes is the magnitude of 
impacts of human activities on seafloor substrates structuring the 
benthic habitats. Among the substrate types, biogenic substrates, 
which are the most sensitive to physical disturbance, provide a range 
of functions that support benthic habitats and communities.”293  
Similarly at Descriptor 7, there are concerns on the geological and hydrographical 
impacts from marine activities:  
“Permanent alterations of the hydrographical conditions by human 
activities may consist for instance of changes in the tidal regime, 
sediment and freshwater transport, current or wave action, leading to 
modifications of the physical and chemicals characteristics set out in 
Table 1 of Annex III to Directive 2008/56/EC.” 294  
“Such changes may be particularly relevant whenever they have the 
potential to affect marine ecosystems at a broader scale and their 
assessment may provide an early warning of possible impacts on the 
ecosystem.”295  
The concerns within Descriptor 7 certainly fit the character of methane hydrate 
projects. 296 The overall extraction of methane from the hydrate deposits will be 
substantially an exercise in sediment and freshwater transport. The potential for 
landslides or tsunamis from cascade events from methane venting or seeping could 
impact currents and wave action. These issues could certainly have the potential to 
affect marine ecosystems at a broader scale. Thus, methane hydrate projects would 
likely be regulated under this Decision, if they are regulated under the MSF 
Directive.  
6.1.2. Risk governance within the MSF Directive 
Broadly speaking the MSF Directive is not liability focused but rather focused on 
the development of regulatory structures to ensure the maintenance of good marine 
environments; nowhere within the directive does it provide for liability rules or 
regulatory punishments.297 The Directive does not interface with the behavior of 
 
292  Id., Annex. pt. B, sec. 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. See also discussion on methane in water column, supra at 
ch. 4, sec. 3. 
293  Id., Annex. pt. B, sec. 6.1 and 6.2. 
294  Id., Annex. pt. B. Descriptor 7. 
295  Id., Annex. pt. B. Descriptor 7. 
296  See discussion on methane hydrate hazards, supra at ch. 4, sec. 3 and 4. 
297  The only sense of enforcement of the MSF Directive would be in the sense that any Directive 
is enforceable within general EU mechanisms, but as the MSF Directive is aimed at Member 
State action and not private parties, civil liability rules would not be applicable for failure to 
develop policy and plans. 
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private parties except indirectly through the implementation of the marine 
strategies. 
While not a system of civil liability, it does assign both a duty to Member 
States to retain and maintain certain good environmental statuses within their 
marine waters and it clarifies that they are to do so with cost-effective and 
technically feasible means. 298  A broad sense of cost/benefit analysis is found 
throughout the Directive.  
6.2. Dangerous Substances Directive 
The Dangerous Substances Directive will not apply to the development of methane 
hydrate projects because it has been phased out and superseded by the MSF 
Directive. 299  However, much of its guidance will survive within other sources 
incorporated into the corpus of material surrounding the MSF Directive, so it a brief 
review is warranted.300  
The Directive provides that Member States are to take the appropriate steps to 
eliminate pollution.301 Pollution is similarly defined as within the MSF Directive.302 
States are required to develop and implement programs to address discharges into 
the waters; if the substances are listed in Annex I’s List II, then the substances need 
to be given prior authorization by the competent authorities.303 Technically, this 
suggests that such emissions would be permitted and thus exempted from the ELD 
as permitted activities.304  
Of particular interest is the potential lack of methane from the listed 
substances under Annex I. List I of Annex I presents “persistent mineral oils and 
hydrocarbons of petroleum origin,”305 but methane is not a persistent hydrocarbon 
as it evaporates and dissipates rapidly if not explosively. List I also provides a 
listing for those substances that are carcinogenic, but methane is not generally 
thought to be carcinogenic. 306  List II includes “non-persistent mineral oils and 
 
298  Marine Strategy Framework Directive, supra at note 178, art. 1, sec. 2(a) and (b) and then at art. 
13, sec. 3, respectively. 
299  Directive 2006/11/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 February 2006 on 
pollution caused by certain dangerous substances discharged into the aquatic environment of 
the community. Official Journal of the European Union - Legislative. O.J. (L 64), 15 
[hereinafter Dangerous Substances Directive.] 
300  The argument here is that it is reasonable that no lessening of environmental protections was 
intended by the adoption of the MSF Directive, and to the extent that the Dangerous 
Substances Directive provides ecological safety standards one could reasonably assume that 
such guidelines, for the most part, remain persuasive and effective. 
301  Dangerous Substances Directive, art. 3. With reference to Annex I’s List I Substances and List 
II Substances. 
302  Id., art. 2, sec. (e). 
303  Id., art. 6, sec. 2. 
304  See discussion on the Environmental Liability Directive, supra at sec. 3.1. 
305  Dangerous Substances Directive, Annex I, List I, sec. 7. 
306  Id., Annex I, List I, sec. 4. For non-carcinogenic character of methane, see the health advisory 
on methane provided by the New Jersey Department of Health. Available at 
http://nj.gov/health/eoh/rtkweb/documents/fs/1202.pdf. 
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hydrocarbons of petroleum origin,” but it is not clear from the combined usage of 
oils and petroleum, (i.e., literally “oil from rocks”), that gaseous methane would be 
included whereas gasoline would surely be included. 307  Also, List II includes 
substances that could affect the taste or smell of products derived from the waters 
for human consumption.308 It is unclear if vented or seeping methane in the water 
column would affect the taste or smell of seafood or other such products. Ergo, 
methane hydrate projects might have been regulated under List II of Annex I, but it 
is uncertain.  
6.3. Water Framework Directive 
The Water Framework Directive (WFD) is very similar in intent and operations to 
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. 309 Instead of a focus on marine and 
oceanic waters, the WFD places its focus on what might called a river basin 
perspective; it focuses on inland waters, coastal waters, lakes and rivers.310 Where 
rivers flow into coastal areas and have confluence with saline marine waters, those 
transitional waters are covered by the WFD.311 Due to this focus on waters inland 
and very near the coast, it is unlikely that methane hydrate deposits would be 
found in those waters and thus it is unlikely that methane hydrate projects would 
be directly regulated by the WFD.312  
The WFD has a very similar definition of pollution to the one found in the 
MSF Directive.313 Similar goals of healthy aquatic ecosystems, as found within the 
MSF Directive, can be found within the WFD’s good ecological status, good 
ecological potential, quantitative status, and good quantitative status terms.314 The 
Member States are required to develop programs of measures that can achieve the 
ecological and environmental goals set out within the WFD.315 These programs are 
thus also covered by the SEA Directive, similar to the interface found within the 
MSF Directive.316 The WFD also requires coordination with other environmental 
oriented directives, including the EIA Directive.317  
 
307  Id., Annex I, List II, sec. 6. 
308  Id., Annex I, List II, sec. 3. 
309  Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy. O.J. (L 327) 1 
[hereinafter Water Framework Directive]. 
310  Id., art. 2, sec. 13; art. 3, sec. 1; and art. 4, sec. 1. See also art. 2, sec. 1, 4, 5 and 6. 
311  Id., art. 2, sec. 1 and 6. 
312  The caveat here is that the onshore facilities of a methane hydrate project, and those 
appurtenances in proximity to those installations in coastal waters, might be regulated under 
the WFD. 
313  Id., art. 2, sec. 33. 
314  Id., art. 2, sec. 21, 22, 26 and 28. 
315  Id., See art. 11, 16, and 17 on the requirement to develop programs of measures, and see art. 4. 
on the overall environmental objectives of the WFD. 
316  See discussion on SEA Directive, supra at sec. 2. 
317  Water Frameworks Directive, Annex VI, pt. A. See Sec. (v) for reference to the EIA Directive, 
supra at note 8. 
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7. Greenhouse Gas Mechanism 
The EU has implemented the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol.318 Once a year, the 
Commission is to compile an EU greenhouse gas inventory.319 This inventory will 
account for each Member State’s greenhouse gas emissions and sinks.320 To assist in 
coordination, the Community and its Member States are to establish registries to 
ensure accurate accounting, tracking, and accrual of records and credits.321  
Decision 280/2004/EC provides for the monitoring mechanisms required 
under those agreements.322 The targeted levels of emissions were finally set in 2010 
by Commission Decision 2010/778/EU. 323 These two GHG Decisions effectively 
coordinate the EU’s compliance efforts under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.  
7.1. Applicability to offshore methane hydrates 
The development of methane hydrate projects potentially put at risk large reserves 
of methane, a listed greenhouse gas. 324  Accidents, minor or major, could be 
considered as greenhouse gas emission events.  
The Kyoto Protocol called for the monitoring of all anthropogenic greenhouse 
gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrogen oxides (N2O), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride 
(SF6).325  
Decision 280/2004/EC set a mechanism to monitor all anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases by sources and sinks. 326  Decision 280/2004/EC 
 
318  For adoption of the UNFCCC, see 94/69/EC: Council Decision of 15 December 1993 
concerning the conclusion of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
O.J. (L 33), 11. For adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, see 2002/358/EC: Council Decision of 25 
April 2002 concerning the approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the joint 
fulfilment of commitments thereunder. O.J. (L 130), 1. See also Decision No 280/2004/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 concerning a mechanism for 
monitoring Community greenhouse gas emissions and for implementing the Kyoto Protocol. 
O.J. (L 49). 1. [hereinafter Decision No 280/2004/EC] 
319  Decision No 280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 
2004 concerning a mechanism for monitoring Community greenhouse gas emissions and for 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol. O.J. (L 49). 1. [hereinafter Decision No 280/2004/EC] 
320  Id., art. 4, sec. 2. 
321  Id., art. 6, sec. 1. 
322  Id. 
323  2010/778/EU Commission Decision of 15 December 2010 amending Decision 2006/944/EC 
determining the respective emission levels allocated to the Community and each of its 
Member States under the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to Council Decision 2002/358/EC 
(notified under document C(2010) 9009). O.J. (L 332), 41. 
324  Decision 280/2004/EC, art. 3, sec. 1(a). See also discussion on UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, supra at ch. 8, sec. 4. 
325  Id., art. 3, sec. 1(a). See also discussion on UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, supra at ch. 8, sec. 
4. 
326  Id., art. 1(a). 
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provides an accounting for both the outward emission of GHGs and an accounting 
of the capture and/or sequestration of GHGs to provide a net number emitted.327 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) are both listed as greenhouse gases to be 
monitored under the program.328  
7.2. Governing risk within the Greenhouse gas mechanism 
The Greenhouse gas mechanism is regulatory and nature and does not contemplate 
civil liability matters. There are financial mechanisms to dissuade Member States 
from exceeding their obligatory emission limits. Routine emissions of methane or 
carbon dioxide would need to be contained within the emission targets; methane 
hydrate projects would need strategies that balanced emission permits for routine 
emissions, emission credits for sinking activities on-site, and potential penalties for 
unpermitted emissions. 329  There does not appear to be a regulatory plan for 
cataclysmic levels of methane gas emissions. 
The EU has committed itself and its Member States to reducing their emissions 
of greenhouse gases.330 Member States are committed to specific reductions of their 
greenhouse gases. 331  Decisions 2002/358/EC, 280/2004/EC and 2010/778/EU 
require that each Member State and the EU as a community achieve targeted 
emissions level maximums, as listed and detailed in Decision 2010/778/EU.332  
 
Table 1: EU Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards 
Member Allocation333 2020 Target 
Belgium 673995528 –15 % 
Bulgaria 610045827 20 % 
Czech Republic 893541801 9 % 
Denmark 273827177 - 20 % 
Germany 4868096694 -14 % 
Estonia 196062637 11 % 
Ireland 314184272 -20 % 
Greece 668669806 -4 % 
Spain 1666195929 -10 % 
France 2819626640 -14 % 
Italy 2416277898 -13 % 
 
327  Id., art. 3, sec. 1. 
328  Id., art. 3, sec. 1(a). See also Decision No 406/2009/EC, art. 2, sec. 1., discussed infra. 
329  With regards to potential penalties, see Directive 2003/87/EC, art. 16. This Directive was 
discussed, supra, within sec. 5.2. 
330  Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the 
Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020. O.J. (L 140), 136 
331  Id., art. 3, sec. 1. 
332  Decision 280/2004/EC, art. 7, sec. 1.  
333  Decision 2010/778/EU. Annex. 
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Cyprus n/a -5 % 
Latvia 119182130 17 % 
Lithuania 227306177 15 % 
Luxembourg 47402996 -20 % 
Hungary 542366600 10 % 
Malta n/a 5 % 
Netherlands 1001262141 –16 % 
Austria 343866009 –16 % 
Poland  2648181038 14 % 
Portugal 381937527 1 % 
Romania 1279835099 19 % 
Slovenia 93628593 4 % 
Slovakia 331433516 13 % 
Finland 355017545 –16 % 
Sweden 375188561 –17 % 
United Kingdom 3396475254 –16 % 
    
The Decision provides that Member State emission need to remain within a 
specified range; they can remain within a three-year moving average and they can 
offset by 5% by borrowing from other year’s allotments.334 Member States can also 
consume Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units 
(ERUs) to account for reductions in their overall emissions.335 
The EU provided financial incentives to remain on target for greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions. First, the EU can sanction a Member State by reducing their 
next year’s allotment by the amount overused in the current year, as multiplied by 
1.08.336 Next, the Member State can be required to develop a corrective action plan 
within three month’s of notification of default.337 Finally, the Member States ability 
to plan, trade, and coordinate with other states can be curtailed until the emission 
targets are met.338  
It would appear that the GHG Mechanism would extend to all emissions 
within the sovereign waters of EU Member States. To the extent that methane 
hydrates were explored and exploited within the EEZ or coastal waters of those 
Member States, the GHG Mechanism and its emissions tracking, regulating, and 
enforcement powers should be applicable to emissions from those offshore methane 
hydrate projects. Thus, the development of offshore methane hydrates would need 
to be included in national emission budgets and planning.  
 
334  Decision No 406/2009/EC, art. 3. 
335  Id., art. 5, sec. 1. The Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units 
(ERUs) are established under Directive 2003/87/EC. 
336  Id., art. 37, sec. 1(a). 
337  Id., art. 37, sec. 1(b) and Sec. 2. 
338  Id., art. 37, sec. 1(c). 
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Further, cataclysmic failure at a methane hydrate field could frustrate efforts to 
achieve GHG emission controls via the GHG Mechanism.339 A massive offshore 
emission could require substantial and immediate curtailment of onshore emissions 
to remain within the Mechanism targets; such a reduction would likely impact both 
domestic industry and public enjoyment of transportation and general energy 
related utilities.  
8. Summary and Conclusions 
The EU presents a wide array of legal instruments to govern and control risky 
activities, particularly those with environmental impacts. 340  They demonstrate 
broad support for public regulations to lead in setting preventative standards.  
The EIA and SEA Directives support the general collection of information on 
potential environmental risk factors as related to pending reviews of both new 
projects and new programs or policies. It is clear that both the EIA and the SEA 
would be applicable to offshore methane hydrate projects and programs, 
respectively. In the case of methane hydrates, these collected data sets can then be 
employed by public authorities to ensure that sufficient standards have been set in 
place to address the set of risks posed by an activity under review. Additionally, 
that gathered set of information can also thereafter be shared with both the general 
public and the private parties operating the offshore methane hydrate installations. 
Thus the EIA and SEA serve to potentially improve standard setting measures and 
also to facilitate the operations of both rules of civil liability and of private 
regulations. 
 
339  Perhaps the purchasing of carbon credits could somewhat facilitate a response to a 
major methane release event, but one suspects that the carbon credit markets would 
already by functioning and clearing; thus, a dramatic and unexpected need for credits 
would both increase prices for credits upwards and potentially still fail to provide a 
sufficient quantity to cover the emission target requirements. However, to the extent 
that such need might be foreseeable, that potential demand could be reflected in current 
carbon credit prices and thus enable carbon emission reductions at other non-methane 
hydrate facilities. 
340  While the discussion has focused on achieving optimal incentives, there are clearly 
issues regarding the feasibility of that within the context of the EU regulatory scheme. 
The EU has committed itself to the precautionary principle; it has taken a policy stance 
that its citizens would prefer to gamble that ‘no change’ is safer than ‘change’ when 
knowledge is yet uncertain. To the extent that such is predicated on actual democratic 
voices, then rules might remain functionally optimal; but, if on the other hand, such a 
precautionary requirement is overcautious policy, then that principle might indeed be a 
form of over-deterrence. For now, this study assumes that the precautionary principle 
does reflect in some form the preferences of the citizens, albeit more GARP than actual 
preferences, as most citizens apparently prefer to protest over other matters more 
frequently than the precautionary principle. Nevertheless, the concerns on 
anthropogenic climate change and the potential incidence of cataclysmic harms such as 
tsunamis make the requirements of the precautionary principle less distant from ideal 
settings than might be the case with other less risky activities. 
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While many aspects of the Offshore Directive and the CCS Directive would 
appear applicable to offshore methane hydrate installations, both of these directives 
rely on the ELD and the GGM to govern environmental and climate change risks 
and hazards. This creates a problem, in that the ELD appears to have limited 
governance of the specific circumstances associated with methane hydrate 
accidents. This could be addressed by expanding on the protected waters under the 
Marine Framework and the wildlife species and protected habitats guarded by the 
Habitats Directive. Likewise, the GGM does not appear to explicitly provide for the 
type of methane or carbon dioxide emissions that might result from offshore 
methane hydrate projects. While the overall emission impacts could be included 
within national accounts, due to certain force majeure type exclusions it is not clear 
that the accidental emissions would be included. Also, it is not clear that those 
emissions that were included in national accounts would actually lead to the emitter 
being financially sanctioned; a lack of a readily transparent connection between 
emissions and economic damages could prevent the incentive mechanisms from 
operating efficiently. 
The EU could address these concerns by a combination of actions. Prior to 
drafting new instruments or determining the optimal standards of preventative and 
operational levels, the EIA and SEA could be invoked to support early research into 
establishing the potential harms and hazards facing diverse EU communities. 
Thereafter, first, the EU could expand the range of protected habitats and protected 
species to protect specific areas adjacent to the methane hydrate fields. Second, 
methane and carbon dioxide gas emissions from seeps or venting events at offshore 
methane hydrate operations could become more clearly connected to the accounts 
of the operators. Third, the EU could update the Offshore Directive to become 
inclusive of concerns related to the development of offshore methane hydrates and 
to provide for the overlapping operations of CCS technologies and storage within 
those offshore sites. 
Following the conclusion delivered in the previous chapter on international 
maritime and oil spill conventions, the legal instruments of the EU already function 
in much alignment with the recommendations of Chapter 7 but lack explicit 
language to ensure that the circumstances of offshore methane hydrates are 
included within that risk governance. While fresh instruments could be drafted and 
developed to address the circumstances of offshore methane hydrates, it appears 
reasonable to build upon the previously establish instruments and expand them to 
address offshore methane hydrates. 
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FEDERAL LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 
The United States has a sophisticated array of environmental regulations and was 
often an early adopter of such regulations; its National Environmental Protection 
Act, Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act were adopted years earlier than in many 
other jurisdictions.  
Not unlike the results of the studies in the previous chapters on international 
maritime and oil spill conventions and on EU laws, U.S. federal laws on oil and gas 
governance remain focused on the terms of crude oil; its accident laws and 
environmental laws more so. The U.S. would be in need of regulatory updating to 
better govern the risks from the development of offshore methane hydrates. It will 
be demonstrated that the federal laws might be readily expandable to include the 
circumstances of offshore methane hydrates. 
1. Introduction 
The United States has a variety of legal strategies to address environmental harms 
caused by hydrocarbon spills and similar events. The federal regulatory system 
provides federal statutes and regulations on several forms of environmental 
damage. The U.S. federal regulatory regime includes several major planks that 
might address harms from methane hydrate hazards.1 They include:  
x the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)2  
x the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),3  
x the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),4  
x the Clean Water Act (CWA),5  
 
1  J. L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33705, OIL SPILLS IN US COASTAL WATERS: 
BACKGROUND, GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 10-12  (2010).  
2  P.L. 91-190, as amended. The National Environmental Policy Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§4321 et seq. 
3  P.L. 95-372, as amended, codified at 43 U.S.C. §1801 et seq. 
4  P.L. 101-380, as amended, codified at 33 U.S.C. §2701 et seq. 
5  P.L. 92-500, as amended, codified at 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. 
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x the U.S.’s adoption of the International Convention Relating to 
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 
1969,6  
x National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan,7  
x the Clean Air Act (CAA),8 and 
x the Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act (MHRDA).9 
An observer is left with an interesting result. Oil spills and their environmental 
harms are squarely and well addressed by OPA, the CWA, and other regulatory 
acts. However, the concern over natural gas, i.e. methane, is comparatively 
understated for environmental harms.10  
Nevertheless, these federal laws as a whole comport well with the 
recommendations of Chapter 7, for a complementary implementation of both strict 
liability and public regulations. Additionally, the particular semantic structure of 
the federal laws might facilitate the adaption of those rules more readily than might 
be the case in other jurisdictions. Given that combination, it could be reasonably 
argued that the U.S. federal laws might be expanded to include the circumstances of 
offshore methane hydrates. Additionally, most of the federal laws have been in 
place for multiple decades and offer a sense of establishment and reliability that 
could be built upon. 
2. National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) 
Broadly stated, the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) provides a wide 
base of authority to the Environmental Protection Agency to enable deliberative 
efforts to be made to protect the environment of the United States.11 
NEPA contains neither direct provisions to civil liabilities nor regulatory 
penalties; it much resembles the afore-discussed EU EIA Directive in that manner.12 
But its overall impact is to provide public information, which could very much 
impact on both the development of regulations and on the implementation of civil 
liability rules. 
NEPA directs the EPA to handle a variety of executive and regulatory matters 
related to environmental legislation. One of its key duties under NEPA is the 
creation and administration of environmental reviews for bills of legislation.13 Such 
 
6  Codified at 33 U.S.C. §1471 et seq. 
7  Codified at 40 CFR Part 300. 
8  Codified at 42 U.S.C. §7401. 
9  P.L. 106-193, as amended and codified at 30 USC § 2001 et seq. 
10  This concern need not wait for the onset of offshore methane hydrates. There are numerous 
offshore natural gas wells that could have accidental releases of methane at levels dangerous 
for marine biota, human health, and climate change concerns. 
11  P.L. 91-190, as amended. The National Environmental Policy Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§4321 et seq. 
12  See a discussion on the EU EIA Directive, supra, in Chapter 10. 
13  K. ALEXANDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20621, OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT (NEPA) REQUIREMENTS, 2(2008). 
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bills would include the laws on leasing methane hydrate resources, laws on the 
regulated operations of federally held methane hydrates, and whatever 
environmental and tort laws would be enacted to protect the environment in the 
wake of methane hydrate development.  
Environmental reviews are not generally drafted within the EPA but rather 
within the specific Department or other governmental body proposing a particular 
piece of legislation or path of action. NEPA requires that the environmental reviews 
of the bills begin concurrently with the onset of the bill’s drafting and not after the 
bill has already been drafted. These prospective reviews are to encourage the 
integration of environmental considerations throughout the drafting process. 
Environmental reviews can take one of three forms: a categorical exclusion, (CE), an 
environmental assessment, (EA), or an environmental impact statement, (EIS).14. A 
CE is employed when the draft bill is expected to present no calculable 
environmental impact.15 An EA is undertaken if the draft bill presents potential 
environmental concerns; a positive finding under an EA leads to an exhaustive 
EIS. 16 Finally, an EIS is a comprehensive report to address all of the identified 
environmental concerns once the EA has identified them. 17. In general, federal 
agencies have institutionally been encouraged to tilt towards CEs and away from 
EAs, because they are cheaper to execute; this leaves many environmental aspects of 
draft bills often unexplored.18 While the NEPA statute does not overtly require 
public access or participation to the review process, the associated regulations do 
provide those rights to the general public.19  
Should methane hydrates approach commercial development, the NEPA will 
require both the drafting of rules and regulations to manage the overall impact to 
the American environment and NEPA will require a process that is open to the 
general public. NEPA also clarifies that the drafting of such bills of law will not 
occur within the EPA but within the departments or agencies previously appointed 
to oversee such areas of regulations.  
3. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) would regulate those methane 
hydrates within U.S. territorial waters. The OCSLA provides for the recognition of 
the mineral assets of the United States offshore in its territorial and EEZ waters. It 
also provides the regulatory framework to lease those minerals. 
The onset of methane hydrate development is also limited by previous efforts 
to prevent offshore development of oil and gas within the U.S. A variety of specific 
statutes banning offshore developments, e.g. the North Carolina Outer Banks 
Protection Act, and presidential executive moratoria have either directly prevented 
 
14  Id., at 3. 
15  Id., at 3. 
16  Id., at 3-4. 
17  Id., at 4. 
18  Id. 
19  Id., at 5. 
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the leasing of areas offshore both the West and East Coasts or have prevented 
budget allocations from supporting the administrative costs of that licensing. Today 
only the areas offshore Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas are active in development 
activities.20  
3.1. Applicability to offshore methane hydrates 
OCSLA defines minerals to include both oil and gas,21 and thus methane hydrates.22 
Likewise, OCSLA includes minerals, and thus methane hydrates, within its 
definitions of “lease”, 23 “exploration,” 24, “development,” 25, “production,” 26 and 
“fair market value.”27 As such, OCSLA provides the legal foundations for leasing 
and economically managing methane hydrates within the U.S.’s EEZ.  
What might not be expected, though, is that OCSLA provides to the Secretary 
of Commerce, not the Department of the Interior or the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the duties to perform environmental assessments on prospective and on-
going methane hydrate leases and operations. 28  NEPA remains in application, 
nevertheless, as it applies to all federal agencies.29 
3.2. Risk governance under the OCSLA 
OCSLA calls for the implementation of a regulatory framework and an overseeing 
regulatory body. The Commerce Secretary is required to monitor the human, 
 
20  See maps of some of the moratoria areas; available at http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-
Energy-Program/Leasing/Areas-Under-Moratoria.aspx . 
21  OSCLA provides the legal definitions of oil and gas separately. See “gas means natural gas as 
defined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,” and see “oil means a mixture of 
hydrocarbons that exists in a liquid or gaseous phase in an underground reservoir and which 
remains or becomes liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface separating 
facilities, including condensate recovered by means other than a manufacturing process.” 30 
CFR §559.002. (Underscoring added.) 
22  43 USC § 1331(q) “The term “minerals” includes oil, gas, sulphur, geopressured-geothermal 
and associated resources, and all other minerals which are authorized by an Act of Congress 
to be produced from “public lands” as defined in section 1702 of this title.” 
23  43 USC § 1331(c) “The term “lease” means any form of authorization which is issued under 
section 1337 of this title or maintained under section 1335 of this title and which authorizes 
exploration for, and development and production of, minerals.” 
24  43 USC § 1331(k) “The term “exploration” means the process of searching for minerals … ” 
25  43 USC § 1331(l) “The term “development” means those activities which take place following 
discovery of minerals in paying quantities, including geophysical activity, drilling, platform 
construction, and operation of all onshore support facilities, and which are for the purpose of 
ultimately producing the minerals discovered.” 
26  43 USC § 1331(m) “The term “production” means those activities which take place after the 
successful completion of any means for the removal of minerals, including such removal, 
field operations, transfer of minerals to shore, operation monitoring, maintenance, and work-
over drilling.” 
27  43 USC § 1331(o). 
28  43 USC § 1346(a)(1) and (b). 
29  See discussion on NEPA, supra, at Section 1. 
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marine, and coastal environments of the outer Continental Shelf and the coastal 
areas impacted by the development and production of methane hydrates.30 The 
Commerce Secretary, alongside the Coast Guard, is to “require, on all new drilling 
and production operations and, wherever practicable, on existing operations, the 
use of the best available and safest technologies which the Secretary determines to 
be economically feasible, wherever failure of equipment would have a significant 
effect on safety, health, or the environment[.]”31 
The Secretary is required to study any area included in an oil and gas lease sale 
in order to determine what information would be needed for the assessment and 
management of the environmental impacts on the human, marine, and coastal 
environments of the outer Continental Shelf and of the coastal areas which may be 
affected by oil and gas or other mineral development.32 The collection of that data 
should lead to regulations to protect the human, marine, and coastal environments; 
thereafter the Secretary, the Coast Guard, and the U.S. Army are required to enforce 
those safety and environmental regulations.33 The Act provides for both civil and 
criminal penalties and punishments for violations of those regulations. 
OCSLA does provide for both civil and criminal penalties, 34 and it allows 
citizen suits against both private and public parties, 35 but generally under the 
Chevron doctrine the Secretary of Commerce is given broad authority to interpret 
the statute and regulate accordingly. OCSLA provides no specific liability, remedy 
or punishment for environmental harms caused by the operation of the mineral 
leases assigned under its authority. 
4. Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 
The OPA is the major federal act of addressing hydrocarbon spills within the 
jurisdictional waters of the United States;36 thus it extends beyond state waters into 
federal jurisdictions offshore.  
 
30  43 USC § 1346(a)(1). 
31  43 USC § 1347(b). 
32  43 U.S. Code § 1346(a). 
33  43 U.S. Code § 1348(a). 
34  43 USC § 1350. 
35  43 USC § 1349. 
36  While the U.S. has taken notice of UNCLOS, it has not ratified it. Its own notions of 
jurisdictional waters take note of the vocabulary of UNCLOS but are enacted separately 
under federal law. Thus, OPA applies to the EEZ of the U.S., but the legal basis is not the 
international standard, per se. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (8) “exclusive economic zone” means the 
zone established by Presidential Proclamation Numbered 5030, dated March 10, 1983, 
including the ocean waters of the areas referred to as “eastern special areas” in Article 3(1) of 
the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Maritime Boundary, signed June 1, 1990.” The U.S. EEZ extends “200 
nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” 
See Presidential Proclamation Numbered 5030, archived at the UN; available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/USA_1983_Pro
clamation.pdf.  
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It was designed to consolidate federal regulatory authority and to clarify the 
liabilities attending oil spills in the wake of the Exxon Valdez incident in Alaska.37  
4.1. Inapplicability to offshore methane hydrates 
OPA applies to oil and to hazardous substances that are released in an unpermitted 
manner into water; but it does not apply to certain hazardous chemicals as defined 
under other statutes. 38 So while methane emissions might be regulated elsewhere 
under federal law as a hazardous substance, it is not so for OPA. 
While technically methane could be included under petroleum, it would not 
appear to be so contemplated within OPA. 39  There is not a singular reference to 
natural gas or methane within OPA. §2701(2) provides a standard definition for a 
volume measure of a barrel of crude oil, but nowhere in OPA is there a comparable 
definition of volume or mass for natural gas or methane, nor are there any 
conversion factors provided to convert them into barrels equivalent. On the whole, 
accidents primarily motivated by natural gas or methane events would appear to 
fall outside of the scope of OPA’s liability scheme. 
It is clear that the drafters of OPA were concerned with the particular 
ecological and community damages of the Exxon Valdez crude oil incident and 
focused on the impact of crude oil; the exclusion of natural gas and methane may 
have resulted from a lack of historical accidents that would have enabled popular 
political action. 
 
37  RAMSEUR, supra at note 1, at 12. 
38  See the discussions, infra, at Section 5 on the CWA for the list of hazardous substances that 
apply to water. Methane is not currently listed under these laws; e.g., methane is sometimes 
regulated under the CAA, but as an air pollutant and not as a hazardous air pollutant, which 
is what was carved out under OPA. For the purposes of OPA, oil “does not include any 
substance which is specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under 
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 101(14) of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act [42 U.S.C. §9601] and which is subject to the 
provisions of that Act [42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq.][.]” That subsequent definition refers to listings 
of hazardous substances under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §1317(a) 
and §1321(b)(2)(A), the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §6921, the Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. §7412, and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §2606.  
39  Oil is defined as any kind of oil but it is not explicitly stated that methane or methane 
hydrates would be included within that term; a reasonably reading suggests that natural gas 
and methane would be excluded from the definition of oil. See 33 U.S.C. §2701 (23) “oil” 
means oil of any kind or in any form, including petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil 
mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil, but does not include any substance which is 
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through 
(F) of section 101(14) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (42 U.S.C. § 9601) and which is subject to the provisions of that Act.” 
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4.2. Risk governance under the OPA 
OPA provides that the tortfeasor is to be held strictly liable for all public and private 
clean-up costs.40 It does not displace neither state-level jurisdiction nor state-level 
rules of civil liability nor state regulations to the extent that such rules exist and to 
the extent that certain federalism issues such as pre-emption are not in conflict; thus 
liability for oil spills in general might fall concurrently under both federal and state 
laws, including OPA.41 
There are limits to the liability imposed by OPA. Liabilities are ‘capped,’ or 
limited by the type of vessel from which the hydrocarbon escaped.42 The listings 
include vessels, ports, and rigs; 43 (i) tank vessels, 44 (ii) vessels, 45 generally, (iii) 
onshore facilities and deepwater ports, 46  (iv) offshore facilities (excluding 
deepwater ports),47 and (v) mobile offshore drilling units.48 These five categories 
have limits imposed by tonnage, hulling, and character of activity.49  
Those liability limits are set aside when the hydrocarbon spill results from acts 
of gross negligence or willful misconduct.50 Thus, while OPA functions with strict 
liability, it is important to note that the overall liability is determined under a 
variant of a ‘duty of care’ rule. Operators that avoid gross negligence or willful 
misconduct are effectively sheltered from catastrophic liabilities which in turn 
facilitates investment in the energy sector by responsible operators. Those operators 
that do display gross negligence or willful misconduct lose those protections and 
become liable. 
Additionally, it should be noted that OPA provides liability in complement to 
liabilities and penalty fines provided by other sources of law within the U.S., thus, it 
would be misleading to suggest that the complete set of damages to be faced by a 
 
40  Nichols 2010, p. 1; RAMSEUR, supra at note 1, at 12. See 33 U.S.C § 2701(32). 
41  33 U.S.C. §§ 2718(a) and (c). 
42  RAMSEUR, supra at note 1, at 13. 
43  Listings, infra, derive from the liability limiting rules found within 33 U.S.C. § 2704. 
44  33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1). 
45  33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(2). See also 33 U.S.C. § 2701(37) “vessel” means every description of 
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of 
transportation on water, other than a public vessel.” 
46  33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3). See also 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (24) “onshore facility” means any facility 
(including, but not limited to, motor vehicles and rolling stock) of any kind located in, on, or 
under, any land within the United States other than submerged land.” And see also 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2701(6) “deepwater port” is a facility licensed under the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (33 
U.S.C. § 1501-1524).” E.g., such as the crude oil offloading LOOP facility offshore Louisiana 
47  33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(4). See also 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (22) “offshore facility” means any facility of 
any kind located in, on, or under any of the navigable waters of the United States, and any 
facility of any kind which is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and is located in, 
on, or under any other waters, other than a vessel or a public vessel.” 
48  33 U.S.C. § 2704(b)(1) and (2).  See also 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (18) “mobile offshore drilling unit” 
means a vessel (other than a self-elevating lift vessel) capable of use as an offshore facility.” 
49  33 U.S.C. § 2704. 
50  RAMSEUR, supra at note 1, at 13. 
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tortfeasant operator would be strictly limited to these particular limits; they are 
merely the liability limits under OPA. 
The statue refers to both “removal costs” and “damages,” reflecting that the 
statute pursues both the immediate and indirect notions of damages.51 Those costs 
may include injury to natural resources, loss of personal property and resultant 
economic losses, loss of subsistence use of resources, lost revenues resulting from 
injuries to property or natural resources, lost profits and earnings from injuries to 
property or natural resources, and the costs of providing additional public services 
during or after the hydrocarbon spill incident.52  
Certain damages are only recoverable by units of the federal or state 
government.53 In particular are certain environmental damages and wasting acts 
that impact governmental revenues.54 
5. Clean Water Act (CWA) 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) would likely govern neither methane hydrates nor 
their potential association with environmental harms. Methane has not been 
included within the more general oil spill and hazardous substances discharge 
rules. 
5.1. Inapplicability to offshore methane hydrates 
Oil is defined as a viscous liquid and not as a gaseous substance.55 As such, methane 
and other natural gases would not qualify as oil. Similarly, there is a volumetric 
measure for crude oil, at “barrel,” but no such legal definition is provided for 
emitted gas within the CWA.56 
Methane from methane hydrates is not likely to qualify as chemical wastes, nor 
is it likely to fit any of the other enumerated items. It could be defined to become 
included under the term hazardous substances, but such would require explicit 
 
51  See an example of such phrasing at 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).  See also § 2701 (5) “damages” means 
damages specified in section 1002(b) of this Act [33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)], and includes the cost of 
assessing these damages.” And see also § 2701 (30) “remove” or “removal” means 
containment and removal of oil or a hazardous substance from water and shorelines or the 
taking of other actions as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the public 
health or welfare, including, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and private 
property, shorelines, and beaches.”’ And see also § 2701 (31) “removal costs” means the costs 
of removal that are incurred after a discharge of oil has occurred or, in any case in which 
there is a substantial threat of a discharge of oil, the costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil 
pollution from such an incident.” 
52  RAMSEUR, supra at note 1, at 12-13. 
53  33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(D). 
54  33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(D). 
55  33 USC § 1321(a)(1) “oil” means oil of any kind or in any form, including, but not limited to, 
petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil; 
56  33 USC § 1321(a)( (13) “barrel” means 42 United States gallons at 60 degrees Fahrenheit. 
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listing within the associated regulations. 57  The current listing of hazardous 
substances includes no mention of natural gas, methane, ethane, or butane.58 Thus 
as methane is neither an oil nor a listed hazardous substances, its emissions into the 
water sans co-produced oil are not covered by the CWA. 
Furthermore, oil and gas operations are specifically spoken of within this 
section; it excludes certain materials associated with oil and gas production.59 The 
CWA excludes “water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to 
facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil or gas 
production” from inclusion within the definition of pollutants.60  Thus, potential 
injectants into the hydrate deposits, such as carbon dioxide, would be exempt from 
the CWA; caveat, such injectants would need their own permitting as part of the 
operator’s licensing arrangement. 
5.2. Risk governance under the CWA 
The CWA is a very broad grant of regulatory power that supports much of the 
EPA’s activity base. As such, it supports a regulatory body.  
The CWA does provide for both regulatory penalties and civil liabilities for oil 
spills and hazardous substances discharges. The regulatory penalties provide for an 
administrative hearing process and are limited to $125,000.61  
Should the Secretary opt to forego the administrative route for judicially 
enforced civil liabilities, the judgment can get much larger.62 The civil liabilities are 
based on both the volumes of oil spill and a determination of the character of 
causations. Polluters of spilt volumes are to be held liability under a rule of strict 
liability.63   
Spilling events not derivative of grossly negligent behavior face liabilities cum 
civil penalties in an amount up to $ 25,000 per day of violation or an amount up to $ 
1,000 per barrel of oil or unit of reportable quantity.64 If the accident follows from 
grossly negligent behavior, then the liabilities cum civil penalties increase to not less 
 
57  See 33 USC § 1321(a)(14), directing the definition of hazardous substances to the rule of (b)(2) 
and see also 33 USC § 1321(b)(2)(A) The Administrator shall develop, promulgate, and revise 
as may be appropriate, regulations designating as hazardous substances, other than oil as 
defined in this section, such elements and compounds which, when discharged in any 
quantity into or upon the navigable waters of the United States or adjoining shorelines or the 
waters of the contiguous zone or in connection with activities under the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act or the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, or which may affect natural resources 
belonging to, appertaining to, or under the exclusive management authority of the United 
States (including resources under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976), present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or 
welfare, including, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches. 
58  40 CFR 117.3 
59  33 USC § 1362(6)(B). 
60  33 USC § 1362(6)(B). 
61  33 USC § 1321(b)(6). 
62  33 USC § 1321(b)(7)(F). 
63  33 USC § 1321(b)(7). 
64  33 USC § 1321(b)(7)(A). 
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than $ 100,000, and not more than $ 3,000 per barrel of oil or unit of reportable 
quantity.65 
6. Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 
Under the U.S.’s adoption of the International Convention Relating to Intervention 
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969, 66 offshore methane 
hydrates operations would not likely be regulated 
Oil is defined as ’convention oil’, i.e., “crude oil, fuel oil, diesel oil, and 
lubricating oil.”67 Non-liquid gaseous volumes such natural gas or methane would 
not be seen as included within convention oil. Similarly, “a substance other than 
convention oil” is defined to mean those oils, noxious substances, liquefied gases, 
and radioactive substances specifically listed within the protocol or determined to 
be a hazard to human health, to harm living resources, to damage amenities, or to 
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.68  
Natural gas or methane is only listed if included within “liquified gases” or as 
a harm to living resources as an interference with legitimate usages of the sea. 
Methane as extracted from offshore deposits would not manifest as a liquefied gas 
until substantially downstream of the extraction process. Methane is rendered into 
LNG only when prepared for oceanic transport via boat; should the methane be 
transported onshore for processing and marketing no LNG would likely be 
produced.  
Similarly, methane does not generally find itself included within noxious gases 
and it generally has no affinity with radioactivity, thus, it would likely fail to be 
included under the listings of those “oils, noxious substances, liquefied gases, and 
radioactive substances … determined to be a hazard to human health,” as methane 
would likely be qualified as one of the four categories.  
7. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency 
Plan 
For similar reason as seen in the U.S.’s Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties, the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan has not been applied to methane environmental hazard planning. 
Natural gas is usually not considered to be either oil or a hazardous substance . 
Also, most emergency response planners have not foreseen a need for “methane 
clean-up” in the same way that they need to plan for crude oil clean up operations.  
 
65  33 USC § 1321(b)(7)(D). 
66  Codified at 33 U.S.C. §1471 et seq. 
67  33 U.S.C. §1471(3) 
68  33 U.S.C. §1471(1) and at (1)(B) in reference to 33 U.S.C. §1473(a). 
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8. Clean Air Act (CAA) 
The Clean Air Act (CAA) could regulate methane emissions from crude oil and 
natural gas production operations, but so far methane has not been included. In a 
letter sent by New York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman to Lisa P. Jackson, 
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, he announced that the 
state of New York intended to sue the EPA to bring about changes in the CAA to 
include the regulation of methane emissions from oil and gas operations.69 New 
York was joined in the letter by the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The letter explains that while the EPA 
issued preliminary regulations on methane emissions from oil and gas operations in 
1985, those regulations were never made effective, contrary to the requirements of 
42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B). The states argue that the EPA needs to regulate methane 
emissions from existing sources of methane emissions, as well as from new and 
modified facilities, under 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(A). This case has not yet been 
brought to court and it will be several years at least before a final decision is 
rendered. But it is clear from the substantial efforts of these many states that the 
CAA is not currently regulating methane emissions and thus the CAA is not 
currently applicable to potential methane hydrate events or accidents. 
9. Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act (MHRDA) 
The Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act70 (MHRDA)  provided for 
the financing of research to develop technologies that could reduce the incidence 
and impact of damages from methane hydrate development, from methane 
“degassing” and from events related to drilling into methane hydrate deposits. But 
the MHRDA makes no provisions for the development or use of regulations on 
environmental hazards from methane hydrate development.  
The MHRDA was originally passed in 2000 and amended in 2005. Its design is 
to support the funding for research and development in methane hydrates; all of the 
research and development activities are to be coordinated by the Department of 
Energy.71  It provides for no civil liabilities and provides for little in the way of 
regulations beyond standard NEPA requirements. It does provide a research budget 
to ascertain if those items might become necessary. 
Intriguingly, nowhere in the act are methane hydrates or gas hydrates defined; 
the only functional reference to their character is a statement that methane hydrates 
can offset the decline in America’s domestic natural gas assets.72  
 
69  Letter from New York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman to EPA Administrator Lisa P. 
Jackson. Available at the website of the New York Attorney 
General,http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/ltr_NSPS_Methane_Notice.pdf . 
70  P.L. 106-193, as amended and codified at 30 USC § 2001 et seq. 
71  30 USC § 2003(a)(3). 
72  The quote: “methane hydrate may have the potential to alleviate the projected shortfall in the 
natural gas supply.” 30 USC §2001(5). 
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9.1. Risk governance under the MHRDA 
While there is a requirement for the investment in projects that:  
“(D)  assist in developing technologies required for efficient and 
environmentally sound development of methane hydrate resources;”73 
“(F)  conduct basic and applied research to assess and mitigate the 
environmental impact of hydrate degassing (including both natural 
degassing and degassing associated with commercial 
development);”74 
“(G)  develop technologies to reduce the risks of drilling through methane 
hydrates; and ... ,”75  
there is no regulatory language requiring the drafting or planning for the use of 
those technologies nor for the drafting or development of regulations that would 
respond to the incident of environmental damages from methane hydrate 
development.  
But at least there is official recognition that there is a technological problem 
that certain environmental harms could result and technologies to mitigate those 
harms should be invested in. The listed hazards to the environment are (i) the 
development of methane hydrates generally, (ii) methane hydrate venting (therein 
referenced as “degassing”), and (iii) the risks associated with drilling into methane 
hydrate deposits.  
MHRDA does require the assembly of a “Methane Hydrates Advisory 
Committee” that should include members from environmental organizations 
alongside other members from industrial enterprises, institutions of higher 
education, oceanographic institutions, and state agencies.76 However, none of the 
listed reports from that committee and the associated research has focused on the 
environmental hazards and their mitigating technologies.77  
The Secretary of the Department of Energy is also directed to ensure that the 
“data and information developed through the program are accessible and widely 
disseminated as needed and appropriate.”78  
Perhaps most interestingly, the MHRDA requires the Secretary to ensure that 
to “maximum extent practicable, greater participation by the Department of Energy 
in international cooperative efforts.”79 It is unclear to what extent that request is 
 
73  30 USC § 2003(b)(1)(D). 
74  30 USC § 2003(b)(1)(F). 
75  30 USC § 2003(b)(1)(G). 
76  30 USC § 2003(c)(1). 
77  See the list of reports as listed by the Department of Energy's website. Available at  
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-
gas/FutureSupply/MethaneHydrates/MH_ReferenceShelf/RefShelf.html  
and at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-
gas/publications/Hydrates/pdf/MHBibliography.pdf . 
78  30 USC § 2003(e)(3). 
79  30 USC § 2003(e)(6). 
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aimed strictly at research and technology or to what extent it can be responsive to 
the aspirations of the Methane Hydrates Advisory Committee.  
10. Summary and Conclusions 
The federal laws of the U.S. provide extensive legal foundations to address the 
challenges of offshore oil spills; but they lack a paradigm perspective for natural gas 
accidents. This could be readily remedied by extending current liability and 
regulatory frameworks to include natural gas within the existing laws. 
OCSLA currently provides for the leasing of methane hydrates as minerals 
offshore the U.S. but within its jurisdictional waters. OCSLA has regulated offshore 
leasing for over sixty years, and thus has a body of relevant definitions and 
regulations to draw upon. OCSLA calls for public regulations to ensure safety 
standards are established and maintained; OCSLA requires the application of the 
“best available and safest technologies,” in all offshore operations. To that end, the 
Commerce Secretary is tasked with ensuring that appropriate research is 
undertaken to protect human, marine, and coastal environments. Additionally, 
OCSLA provides for certain civil and criminal penalties to be applied when it or its 
derivative regulations are violated. OCSLA might be readily implemented as-is for 
offshore methane hydrates, although it would probably be beneficial to include 
more explicit language on the inclusion of offshore methane hydrates to better 
ensure the smooth operation of key terms of OCSLA. 
OPA provides for strict liability to be applied to petroleum spills; it requires 
the application of strict liability. OPA is designed to operate alongside other rules of 
civil liability, especially state level civil liability systems. It is also designed to 
operate in parallel to the regulatory systems under OCSLA; thus OPA and OCSLA 
provide a mirror to the recommendations of Chapter 7. OPA explicitly includes 
offshore extraction facilities as well as mobile offshore drilling units; thus it clearly 
anticipates offshore developments. But it appears that methane leakages, ventings, 
seepings, or other emissions are beyond the current scope of OPA; even 
conventional gas appears beyond the scope of OPA. OPA would need to add terms 
to define natural gas and methane hydrates, it would need to provide volumetric 
standards for methane the way it defines barrels for crude oil. With a few simple 
changes, OPA could be ready for offshore methane hydrates. 
The third major piece of the U.S. federal response to petroleum accidents is the 
CWA. The CWA enables a regulatory body to pursue either civil liability claims in 
court or to impose civil penalties as a matter of administrative power. The CWA 
enables penalties to be established based upon the volumes released by the 
petroleum accident. The penalties are set magnitudes higher than the market value 
of the spilt volumes, strict liability applies at $1,000 a barrel and increases to $3,000 
a barrel when the accident resulted from grossly negligent behavior; the economic 
incentive to prevent spills could be made more clearly to the tortfeasor. However, 
the CWA does not currently apply to methane volumes in the water, only to liquid 
lipids and oils or other listed hazardous substances. But again, as in OPA’s case, 
minor word-smithing might extend the application of the CWA to include water-
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borne methane either in its own character or as a listed hazardous substance. 
Similarly, the penalty provisions could be readily extended to include specific 
volumes of methane for the same penalty levels as is currently provided for barrels 
of oil or for other volumes of hazardous substances.  
Likewise, the U.S.’s federal implementation of the International Convention 
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969, 
could be extended as discussed for other similar international oil spill conventions 
within Chapter 9. 
The political complexity of amending the CAA to include methane emissions 
prevents ready analysis of how it might be extended to cover offshore methane 
hydrates.80  
Finally, the MHRDA provides, in anticipation of the needs of the OCSLA, for 
the research and development in efficient and safe technologies for the production 
of methane hydrates (both onshore and offshore), in environmental protection with 
special regards to methane venting and seeping (both natural and anthropogenic), 
and in risk reducing technologies for methane hydrate drilling. MHRDA also calls 
for the publication of the collection data and research results, which could then be 
used in standards setting, in civil litigation, and in public awareness building.  
The U.S. federal laws on petroleum accidents are in substantial alignment with 
the recommendations of Chapter 7, but they are in need of extension to include the 
circumstances of offshore methane hydrates. Due to the directness and simple 
penalty structures of the federal laws, such changes might be readily implemented. 
 
  
 
80  See R. A. Partain & S. H. Lee, Article 20 Obligations Under the KORUS FTA: The Deteriorating 
Environment for Climate Change Legislation in the U.S., 24 Stud. Am. Const. 439 (2013), for a 
more complete discussion of the issues involved, especially with regards to the Supreme 
Court’s resistance to hold that the CAA already grants such regulatory powers to the EPA. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. The potential impact of offshore methane hydrates 
The most important facts about methane hydrates can be summarized quickly. 
Offshore methane hydrates offer abundant energy and fresh water supplies to 
practically every coastal state in the world; both developed and developing 
economies could be substantially impacted by the commercial development of 
offshore methane hydrates. Offshore methane hydrates also offer the means to 
provide those benefits while also serving as substantial sinks for climate change 
policy makers. It is a policy trio of substantial benefits: water policy, energy policy, 
and climate change policy. But the downside is that the commercial development of 
offshore methane hydrates could unleash both cataclysmic and non-cataclysmic 
risks and harms.  
1.1. Benefits of offshore methane hydrates 
Methane hydrates are a potential source of both methane and fresh water.1 After the 
methane volumes are extracted, the methane can be converted expeditiously into 
routine natural gas for use as both industrial and residential energy supplies; 2 
extracted water could be used for both consumer and agricultural purposes. As the 
methane volumes are extracted from the hydrate deposits, streams of carbon 
dioxide can be injected into the same hydrate structures to provide CCS storage.3 It 
also appears that the costs of extracting and producing offshore methane hydrates 
are dropping and may become price competitive with other energy sources in the 
near future; it may already be price competitive with certain LNG prices.4 
 
1  See supra, at ch. 2, sec.  2. 
2  See supra, at ch. 3, sec.  3. 
3  See supra, at ch. 3, sec.  5.1. 
4  See supra, at ch. 3, sec.  2. The LNG comparison here is to spot prices seen in the recent decade 
in northeast Asia. 
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In the alternative, the methane can be combusted on-site to generate electricity 
and the exhaust therefrom can be re-injected into the hydrate deposits for CCS 
storage. Or, the methane can be reformed with steam (created with extracted fresh 
water and heated with methane) to create hydrogen fuel.5 From methane fuels, to 
carbon-neutral electricity, to hydrogen fuel options, the commercial development of 
offshore methane hydrates could enable a wide array of green and greener energy 
options. 6  In an era concerned with anthropogenic climate change, these are 
potentially exciting options. 
Methane hydrates exist abundantly in many locations; almost every coastal 
country is expected to possess methane hydrate reserves.7 Methane hydrates can be 
found onshore in arctic permafrost, but those countries containing onshore methane 
hydrates also possess offshore methane hydrates.8 Developed countries, such as 
Japan and South Korea, that do not currently possess strategic volumes of domestic 
energy supplies do possess substantial offshore methane hydrate supplies.9 Many 
developing countries with no domestic energy supplies are expected to possess 
substantial offshore methane hydrate reserves; many of those countries might also 
be interested in the fresh water co-produced with the methane hydrates to assist in 
their agricultural development and consumer fresh water needs. 
The world has faced critical energy supply shortages since the dawn of the 
fossil fuel era of industrialization. While not a perfect cure to that problem, the 
commercial development of offshore methane hydrates could enable local access to 
energy supplies and level the geo-political playing field of energy markets. The 
potential benefit to both lower energy costs and potential stability of supplies could 
assist global economic development. 
1.2. Hazards of offshore methane hydrates 
But the extraction of offshore methane hydrates is a “new thing under the sun.”10 To 
extract energy supplies from under subsea mud layers will require innovative 
technologies and engage in new risks here-to-fore unbreached in offshore energy 
extraction.11 Previously, offshore operators feared methane hydrates as one of the 
most dangerous aspects of offshore drilling and in gas-pipeline transportation. 
There will be a lot of unlearning to accomplish as methane hydrates are increasingly 
seen as valuable energy resources. 
Methane hydrates collect under mud layers in the ocean.12 The icy crystals are 
endothermically stable, in that they need extra energy to be added to their reservoir 
 
5  See supra, at ch. 3, sec.  5.2. 
6  See supra, at ch. 3, sec.  1. 
7  See supra, at ch. 4, sec.  2. 
8  See supra, at ch. 2, sec.  5. 
9  See supra, at ch. 3, sec. s 4.1. and 4.2. 
10  With obvious apologies to the author of Ecclesiastes 1:9.  
11  See supra, at ch. 3, sec.  3. 
12  See supra, at ch. 2, sec.  4. 
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system before they will begin to disassociate and release the methane volumes from 
the hydrate structures.13 Left alone, they are and have been stable for geologically 
long time frames.  
But scientists have found evidence that ancient earthquakes or landslides have 
added that necessary energy to ancient hydrate deposits.14 When that happened, 
earthquakes and tsunamis occurred; those events resulted in massive impacts on 
coastal flora and fauna. 15 E.g., the Mesolithic-era Storegga event sent tsunami waves 
40m high directly into the coasts of Iceland and Norway; such an event in modern 
times might kill millions of coastal dwellers and severely impact a broader radius of 
coastal communities. 16  
Without tsunamis, major disruptions of the mudlayer and of the underlying 
hydrate deposits could enable massive and sudden disassociation of methane.17 
Given a sufficient release of methane, the methane can create a funnel, or chimney, 
which can enable the methane to be directly released into the atmosphere without 
first transmitting through the water column. 18 Such a large emission of methane 
into the atmosphere could cause several problems. Methane itself is combustible 
and explosive; such an event would create a radius of danger preventing emergency 
crews from gaining immediate access to the damage area. Such volumes could also 
potentially asphyxiate first responders. Finally, the emission of methane into the 
atmosphere would be a grave accident in climate change consequences, as methane 
is considered substantially more dangerous than carbon dioxide for inducing 
climate change.  
Are cataclysmic events likely? Probably not; however, until more learning is 
acquired from more completely developed offshore extraction projects, the risk 
might remain difficult to ascertain. However, given that methane hydrates are 
endothermic and given the potential to measure the amounts of energy injected or 
placed into the hydrate deposits, it should be feasible to substantially limit black 
swan type events by setting standards to ensure that cautious energy budgets are 
enforced to prevent overstimulation of the hydrate deposits. Yet, given the 
complexity of the hydrate structures, given the limits of sub-mud-line surveillance, 
and given the complex marine interactions that will continue to exist from natural 
processes, it would likely remain impossible to prevent all likelihoods of 
cataclysmic events at offshore methane hydrate installations. Thus whatever result 
standards emerge to address the risks and hazards of offshore hydrate accidents, 
there will remain a need to ensure that those standards contemplate how to address 
cataclysmic accidents. 
Gentler events also could make substantial impacts to the adjacent coastal 
communities and to the flora and fauna of the oceans wherein the offshore methane 
 
13  See supra, at ch. 2, sec.  2. 
14  See supra, at ch. 4, sec.  5.2. 
15  See supra, at ch. 4, sec.  5.2. 
16  See supra, at ch. 4, sec.  5.2. 
17  See supra, at ch. 4, sec.  5.1. 
18  See supra, at ch. 4, sec.  5.1. 
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hydrate projects enable methane venting or seepage to occur.19 The preparation of 
fields for production involves a variety of drilling and vibration inducing activities. 
Extraction may well include various heating injections and flooding techniques.20 
The depletion of the methane or water volumes could cause hydrate bed collapses 
that in turn could lead to structural problems. 21 Both the development and on-
going operation of offshore methane hydrates could lead to non-cataclysmic 
methane accidents. Given the many modes in which the hydrate deposit could 
become disturbed and begin to emit methane, the chance of non-cataclysmic 
venting and seepage would not be expected to be slight; rather, one might 
reasonable conclude that minor events could reasonably occur in most fields. But it 
would also be more likely than not that such event would lose their energy source 
or be detected and addressed and thus be events of limited duration and of limited 
impact. 
Methane itself is a greenhouse gas and its constant seepage and emission 
could enable additional anthropogenic climate change to occur.22 Methane is also 
interactive with the biota of the ocean, both as a food stock for certain micro-biota 
and as a displacer of oxygen. 23  Methane can be digested and converted 
metabolically into carbon dioxide, which is another critical greenhouse gas. 24 The 
nuisance of emitted methane and carbon dioxide gas volumes, the potential 
interference into marine economies such as fishing and tourism, and the general 
anxiety that living near to a field of risk could all be considered part of the harms 
and hazards of living near offshore methane hydrate projects. 25 
The commercial development of offshore methane hydrate technologies would 
offer both risks and rewards. The needs of certain countries to achieve domestic 
energy supplies, to sustain economic development, and to potentially address 
parallel issues of fresh water supplies and of effective climate change policies could 
encourage an earlier timeframe of development. On the other hand, there are 
substantial risks and hazards that challenge both the communities local to methane 
hydrate accidents and global communities impacted by climate change events. The 
risks and benefits need to be balanced; efficient means of obtaining the optimal 
levels of safety and extraction activity are needed. 
 
19  See supra, at ch. 4, sec.  4.1. 
20  See supra, at ch. 4, sec.  4.3. 
21  See supra, at ch. 4, sec.  4.3. 
22  See the discussion, infra, at Appendix III. 
23  See supra, at ch. 4, sec.  4.2. 
24  Some marine biota can metabolize methane. There are also non-biotic chemical processes in 
the water column that can enable the decomposition of methane into carbon dioxide. See 
supra, at ch. 4, sec.  4.2. 
25  See supra, at ch. 4, sec.  4.2. 
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2. Model governance of the risks from offshore methane hydrates 
The primary tools available for the governance of accidental risk are rules of civil 
liability and regulations, both public and private.  
This study has investigated the overall circumstances of offshore methane 
hydrates and found that they would be best governed under a rule of strict 
liability.26 However, there would remain certain circumstances that might frustrate 
a rule of strict liability, in those cases public regulations were found to be efficient 
means of risk governance for offshore methane hydrates.27Additionally, it has been 
recognized that private regulation can be integrated into a regulatory mechanism 
with public regulation.28 
Ergo, it is be the recommendation of this study that a rule of strict liability be 
employed alongside public and private regulations for the optimal set of incentives 
to efficiently set the correct standards for safety and precaution and the correct 
levels of operational activity at the offshore methane hydrate installations.29 
2.1. A rule of strict liability should apply. 
In the last fifty-plus years since Calabresi’s first foray in the law and economics of 
accident law,30 much advancement has been made. There is now a substantial body 
of literature to draw from and a strong consensus has emerged on when certain 
rules of civil liability could be efficiently applied and under what circumstances 
other rules might be efficiently applied.31 Of course there remains much theoretical 
activity and not all models agree, but there is a workable standard model that can 
be utilized for the present study. 
When accidents are primarily or exclusively under the control of a single actor, 
theory suggests that a rule of strict liability would be more efficient than a rule of 
negligence.32 When accidents are a result of both the tortfeasor’s and the victim’s 
actions, but the tortfeasor’s acts are more critical to containing the risk of harm, 
again, theory suggests that a rule of strict liability would be more efficient.33 When 
the underlying activity creating the harm is abnormally hazardous, theory suggests 
that a rule of strict liability would be more efficient.34 When particular uncertainties 
are to be encountered, theory suggests that a rule of strict liability would be more 
efficient.35 And when it is important to prevent stress to a judicial system, theory 
 
26  See ch. 7, sec.  2.4. 
27  See ch. 7, sec.  3.3. 
28  See ch. 7, sec.  3.2. 
29  See ch. 7, sec.  4. 
30  G. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L. J. 499 (1961). 
31  See supra, ch. 5, sec.  1.2. 
32  See supra, ch. 5, sec.  2.1. 
33  See supra, ch. 5, sec.  2.2.1. 
34  See supra, ch. 5, sec.  2.2.2. 
35  See supra, ch. 5, sec.  2.2.4. 
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suggests that a rule of strict liability would present fewer transaction costs on the 
path to justice.36 
The development of offshore methane hydrates contains the circumstances that 
advocate for a rule of strict liability.37 Offshore methane hydrates projects would 
primarily be of a unilateral nature of activity and risk; the operator would be the 
primary if not sole determiner of which risky acts would be undertaken, of when 
they would be undertaken, and how they would be undertaken; thus a rule of strict 
liability would be the efficient policy choice.38 Even if there were a nexus of both the 
operator and local community members in that acts leading to methane hydrate 
accidents, i.e., a bilateral accident model, the determinants of risk would still 
primarily sit with the operator and thus a rule of strict liability would be the 
efficient policy choice. 39  When the potential risks of cataclysmic events are 
considered, the development of offshore methane hydrates could reasonably be 
characterized as abnormally hazardous. 40 But one need not rely on the risks of 
tsunamis and earthquakes, the damages from non-cataclysmic accidents could also 
be characterized as abnormally hazardous in that the combined risks both local and 
global are neither normal nor safe; thus a rule of strict liability would be the efficient 
policy choice.41 Given the novelty of the nascent industry, many uncertainties are to 
be encountered, such as indeterminate ex ante duty of care, uncertainty of future 
harms, and complex interactions of precaution and activity levels; a rule of strict 
liability would be the efficient policy choice.42 And given that many of the countries 
wherein methane hydrate deposits lay have developing legal institutions and may 
not be able to bear the full brunt of transaction costs from a major methane hydrate 
accident, a rule of strict liability would again be the efficient policy choice.43 
A rule of negligence cannot be excluded from consideration, 44  but the 
circumstances of offshore methane hydrates strongly fall on the side of those 
favoring a rule of strict liability.45 However, if only a rule of strict liability were to be 
employed, there would likely be a number of circumstances that would fail to 
provide the correct incentives to optimally set precautionary levels and activity 
levels. To correct for these potential events, public regulations should be employed 
in a complementary manner to the rule of strict liability.46 
 
36  See supra, ch. 5, sec.  2.5. 
37  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  2.1. 
38  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  2.1.1. 
39  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  2.1.2. 
40  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  2.1.2. 
41  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  2.1.2. 
42  See supra, ch. 7, sec. s 2.1.5 and 2.1.6. 
43  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  2.1.7. 
44  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  2.2. 
45  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  2.4. 
46  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  3.2. 
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2.2. Public and private regulations should be engaged. 
Public regulations can directly set standards ex ante of a tortfeasor’s engagement in 
a risky activity; as such, public regulations can enable the tortfeasor to make 
strategic decisions on activity levels and on care levels in alignment with the 
standards set by the regulatory body. This could facilitate the development of 
offshore methane hydrates by both setting optimal standards before financial 
investment decisions would need to be made. Clear ex ante regulations could also 
communicate to the engineers and developers of the offshore hydrate installation to 
what standards and tolerances for safety their designs and plans should achieve. 
The establishment of optimal standards, under the deliberative process 
requirements as set out under the EIA and SEA Directives and under NEPA,47 
would also disclose to the public critical information about the risky activities to be 
undertaken at the installations and enable many groups to engage in the 
development of those standards. 
Public regulations can be usefully applied to cure certain circumstances so that 
routine economic decisions can be properly performed; regulations can cure or at 
least ameliorate missing markets or market failures.48 The consensus view holds 
that regulations could be efficient at achieving optimal levels of precaution and 
activity levels when civil liability rules are stymied by (i) informational 
asymmetries, (ii) insolvency, (iii) problems of underdeterrence, and (iv) of 
institutional juridical capacity.49 
The development of offshore methane hydrates demonstrates aspects from 
each of the above concerns. Informational symmetries would likely be a concern as 
offshore methane hydrates projects are developed and operated.50 E.g., while the 
development of the technologies and science related to offshore methane hydrate 
operations has been greatly fostered by public investments, the ability to 
continually monitor on-going events would be dangerous and prohibitive if 
extended to all of the potential victims. Thus, there is an efficient role for a 
regulatory body to play to enable both a quality collection of data to be obtained 
and made publicly available while limiting the overall impact to the safe operations 
of the hydrate fields. Public regulations could be the efficient policy choice for 
methane hydrates to address informational asymmetries. 
While one would hope that the revenues from the sales associated with 
commercially operated offshore methane hydrates projects would ensure solvency, 
there a variety of reasons that policy vigilance should be maintained to ensure that 
potential insolvency of operators does not diminish the effectiveness of public 
safety planning.51 Whereas a strict liability rules begins to falter when the operator 
becomes insulated from the informational incentives of potential damages, 
 
47  See supra, ch. 10, sec. 1 and 2, and see ch. 11, sec.  2. 
48  See supra, ch. 6, sec.  2. 
49  See supra, ch. 6, sec. 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5. 
50  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  3.1.1. 
51  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  3.1.2. 
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regulations can provide policy tools to incentivize the operator to both stay solvent 
and to provide non-monetary behavioral incentives. Public regulations could be the 
efficient policy choice for methane hydrates to address insolvency. 
Underdeterrence results when various plaintiffs fail to plead their injuries and 
receive judicially determined damages. In the event of offshore methane hydrate 
accidents, there are a variety of means in which victims might fail to plead their 
injuries.52 E.g., in non-cataclysmic methane leakages and venting, plaintiffs might 
not have sufficient evidence of the leakage events, or they might not be able to 
directly connect their injury to the leakage event, or their incidental harm might not 
cost-justify litigation on an individual basis. In such scenarios, a regulatory body 
might be able to collect a superior set of evidence, be able to connect more points of 
causation, and be able to integrate many injury claims into a cost-justifiable set. In 
other considerations, potential victims may be missing; it might be due to the long 
timeframes of some injuries or the results of a cataclysmic accident that swept 
victims away. Public regulations could be the efficient policy choice for methane 
hydrates to address underdeterrence. 
Private regulations enable those closest to the activity and its risks to develop 
the optimal standards. 53  Because the technology of developing and operating 
offshore methane hydrate fields is likely to continue to advance and because the 
risks and hazards will become better understood as more experience is gained, it 
would be advantageous to have those parties closest to those learning engaged in 
setting the optimal standards.54 Additionally, it has been demonstrated that private 
regulations can be developed to function alongside of public regulation; such a 
mechanism is called an integrated regulatory mechanism. 55  It was the 
recommendation of this study that private regulation be developed in harmony 
with public regulation to ensure that all of the advantageously informed parties 
could participate in standards setting efforts.56 
Finally, in consideration of certain legal systems, not all jurisdictions have 
court systems that can support the litigious demands that a major methane hydrate 
accident event might entail.57 A regulatory or administrative body might be more 
efficient to gather and handle legal claims than a singular litigant with a rule of 
strict liability. The presence of private regulations could also assist with these 
concerns. 
 
52  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  3.1.3. 
53  See supra, ch. 6, sec.  5. 
54  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  3.2. 
55  See supra, ch. 6, sec.  5.1. 
56  See supra, ch. 6, sec.  5.1, and see ch. 7, sec. 3.2. It goes without saying that a private regulation 
system should remain within public scrutiny and the requirements of democracy; this study 
would not support unmonitored private regulation, rather it calls for coordinated co-
implementation of private and public regulations. 
57  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  3.1, and see ch. 4.2. 
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2.3. Application of civil liability, public regulations, and private regulations. 
Thus, public regulations and private regulations would be efficient in certain 
circumstances. But so was the rule of strict liability. Might they well be 
implemented in complementary fashion? Yes, they would.58 
Rules of civil liability can help to protect the effectiveness of public regulations 
when such regulations or regulatory bodies would be affected by agency costs and 
lobby capture. 59  Regulations can help to provide critical information to lower 
transaction costs and to better ensure the function of a strict liability rule in court.60 
When it is difficult to determine ex ante safety standards, regulations can serve as a 
floor beneath which potential tortfeasors are incentivized to stay above.61 In the 
study, other reasons for complementary implementation were reviewed and few 
reasons were found to support a contrary result.62 
Thus, this study supports the combined approach of both public regulation 
and rules of civil liability. This study further supports the choice of a rule of strict 
liability for the civil liability system. 
3. State of existing governance for offshore methane hydrate risks 
There are wide arrays of international, regional, and national legal frameworks that 
address situations analogous to offshore methane hydrate operations. Some of the 
governance directly addresses oil spills and related emissions into the ocean; others 
address various environmental liabilities or climate change concerns. Some of these 
legal systems appear to apply as currently enacted to offshore methane hydrates, 
but few properly provide sufficient attention to the particular needs of offshore 
methane hydrate accidents. It would appear that a lack of historical examples has 
prevented more complete drafting of the existing laws; this is not a critique, as laws 
need not regulate what is not yet in existence.  
3.1. Laws of the UN 
Within the UN’s umbra, there are several conventions that would likely govern or 
coordinate with domestic governance of offshore methane hydrates. First, UNCLOS 
would provide the jurisdiction over the waters and subsea lands that contain 
methane hydrates.63 While UNCLOS does not apply to every country in the world, 
its paradigm of EEZ does appear globally recognized, either by ratification of the 
Convention, by functioning opinio juris, or as with the U.S. by presidential 
declaration.  UNCLOS calls for comprehensive “rules, regulations and procedures” 
 
58  See supra, ch. 7, sec.  3.2. 
59  See supra, ch. 6, sec.  3.1. 
60  See supra, ch. 6, sec.  3.2. 
61  See supra, ch. 6, sec.  3.3. 
62  See supra, ch. 3, sec.  3. 
63  See supra, ch. 8, sec.  2. 
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to protect the ocean and its environment. Also, to the extent that methane hydrates 
were to found further offshore than the EEZ, then UNCLOS provides that the ISA 
would become the regulatory body to both establish the relevant regulations and to 
provide for the leasing of such methane hydrates.  
The Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 
(UNCTEIA) provides a per se exclusion to offshore hydrocarbon accidents with the 
understanding that oil pollution has been dealt with by separate international 
efforts;64 many conventions make similar provisions and assumptions. However, 
the UNCTEIA does establish what is likely an expectation for ratifying states to 
adopt strict liability type rules in their civil liability or regulatory systems. When 
states do develop those regulations, they are “to protect human beings and the 
environment against industrial accidents by preventing accidents as far as possible,” 
by reducing the frequency and severity of those accidents that do occur and by 
mitigating the effects of the accidents that do occur.65 Further, UNCTEIA does list 
methane and hydrogen as hazardous substances that might be within its ambit of 
regulation were it not otherwise specifically excluded for offshore oil and gas 
operations. So while UNCTEIA would not directly apply to the development of 
offshore methane hydrates, it does strongly suggest an approach to take in 
governing such risks. 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (UNFCCC) 
and its Kyoto Protocol do not provide a liability framework for accidental 
greenhouse gas emissions, but they do set absolute limits on emissions for a certain 
sub-class of signatories.66 Those countries that have assumed obligation emission 
limits are required to enforce those obligations with domestic law; the EU, its 
Member States, and Japan are such parties but the U.S. and Canada are not. The EU 
has a sophisticated mechanism to ensure compliance, see infra at Section 3.3, but 
many other countries with methane hydrate assets have not assumed emissions 
obligations. As such, the UNFCCC will be challenged by the development of 
offshore methane hydrates and further developments would be needed. 
3.2. Regional marine and other oil spill conventions 
The challenges of responding to oil spills resulted in multiple international 
conventions. The problems of transboundary oil spills, particularly in the waters off 
of Europe, led to a collection of regional marine pacts.  
The regional marine pacts, taken as a group, call for the adoption of two key 
legal principles: (i) the polluter pays principle, and (ii) the precautionary principle.67 As 
such, the fundamental tone of the regional marine pacts is to support rules of strict 
liability.68 The regional marine pacts also call for the implementation of certain 
 
64  See supra, ch. 8, sec.  3. 
65  UNCTEIA Art. 3. Sec. 1. See supra at ch. 8, sec.  3. 
66  See supra, ch. 8, sec.  4. 
67  See supra, ch. 9, sec.  1. 
68  See supra, ch. 9, sec.  1.3. 
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measures to ensure high safety standards are maintained; it is most likely that such 
measures would be carried out as public regulations. 69 These measures should 
include those measures that could eliminate and remediate pollution from the 
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf, the seabed, and its subsoil; 
such measures would be applicable to offshore methane hydrates and any potential 
methane venting or seepage. Several of the pacts, such as the Barcelona Convention, 
have additional protocols to specifically address the risks associated with the 
operations of offshore facilities, such as would be needed to extract methane 
hydrates.70 
The international conventions to address marine oil pollution have been 
extended to address other hazardous substances, but methane does not appear to be 
considered as hazardous for these purposes. 71 They generally set rules of strict 
liability with limited exceptions for the behaviors of third parties. Some, such as the 
CLC, cap the liability limits of owners; those caps are revoked when the accident is 
a result of gross negligence on the part of the tortfeasor.72 
Thus, a variety of efforts to address oil spills have advanced transboundary 
coordination and promoted the concept of strict liability for environmental 
damages. However, in their focus on oil they have not provided substantive 
language to directly address harms resultant from methane-based accidents. 
3.3. Laws of the EU 
The laws of the EU are more recently drafted, on the whole, than their counterparts 
in the U.S.; as such, many of them reflect more recent trends in legal theory.  
Generally speaking, the EU directives support the application of strict liability; this 
is in part due to the direct enactment of the polluter pays principle into the TFEU. The 
most relevant directives are the EIA & SEA Directives, the Offshore Directive, the 
CCS Directive, and the Marine Framework collection of directives. 
The EIA Directive and the SEA Directive provide for the cautious and public 
review of upcoming projects and plans that might substantially impact the 
environment.73 They call for exhaustive studies to be completed in advance of the 
granting of approvals or licenses, so that specific causes of harms or hazards could 
be addressed in full prior to the acceptance of such risks.74 While not providing 
specific requirements on how to implement civil liability or regulatory governance 
beyond the collection and review of environmental precautionary data, by the very 
collection of that data they do provide for many cures that would otherwise befall 
both rules of civil liability and public regulation of offshore methane hydrate 
 
69  See supra, ch. 9, sec.  1.5. 
70  See supra, ch. 9, sec.  1.3. 
71  See supra, ch. 9, sec. 2.2 and 2.4. 
72  See supra, ch. 9, sec. 2.2. 
73  See supra, ch. 10, sec. 1 and 2. 
74  See supra, ch. 10, sec. 1. See also, supra, ch. 10,sec. 3. 
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projects and of the policies and plans to facilitate their development. As such, they 
function as meta-rules on the rules applicable to offshore methane hydrates. 
The Offshore Directive provides for the regulation of offshore oil and gas 
installations.75 As such, to the extent that offshore methane hydrate installations 
would be viewed as a type of unconventional natural gas projects, the Offshore 
Directive would apply to their development and operations. The Offshore Directive 
provides both broad and deep requirements on precautionary planning related to 
offshore hydrocarbon operations. But a review of the Directive found that it was 
primarily focused on historical modes of offshore accidents and did not include 
provisions that would better address the needs of an offshore methane hydrate 
industry. 
The CCS Directive reflects the other half of the coin from the Offshore 
Directive, as it could regulate the injection of carbon dioxide into offshore 
reservoirs.76 As has been discussed, offshore methane hydrates can be extracted in 
conjunction with CCS injection activity; in fact, due to the economic uplifts from 
facilitating methane extraction and Kyoto Protocol concerns, most suggested 
commercialization studies have included some form of CCS-type injections in the 
extraction process. Similar ideas have been floated within the EU, Germany’s 
SUGAR Projekt would seek to inject carbon dioxide into offshore methane hydrate 
reserves. As such, it is likely that within EU waters that the development of offshore 
methane hydrates would be regulated by the CCS Directive. But the CCS Directive, 
even if applicable, would address only a slice of the operations related to the 
development, production, and abandonment and sequestration of the methane 
hydrates. The CCS Directive would probably be most important and most centrally 
applied during the abandonment and sequestration phases, as it might govern long-
term liability and post-production ownership of the methane hydrate fields. 
The Water and Marine Frameworks draw in a large number of marine, coastal, 
and riparian protecting directives, decisions, and regulations.77 They function in 
coordination to protect the biota and human communities that need their 
ecosystems and environments to continue to be healthy and vibrant.78 All marine 
projects, while still in the planning and pre-development stages, need to provide 
programs of measures to achieve and maintain good environmental status and 
when the hydrates overlay transboundary marine ecosystems, then plans for 
regional cooperation must also be provided. The various international regional 
marine conventions are called on by the Frameworks to extend this planning and 
cooperation. The Frameworks track a variety of hazardous activities, including 
chemicals transported through the water columns, to prevent accidental damages to 
those ecosystems. The Frameworks present a selection of known fragile 
environmental areas and endangered biota to specifically protect; while the 
presence of methane is known to affect marine biota in several substantial 
 
75  See supra, ch. 10, sec. 4. 
76  See supra, ch. 10, sec. 5. 
77  See supra, ch. 10, sec. 6. 
78  See supra, ch. 10, sec. 6.1. and 6.3. 
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pathways, the marine locations and biota adjacent to those areas do not currently 
appear to be specifically protected under the Frameworks.  
3.4. Laws of the U.S. 
The laws of the U.S. read like a spoonful of alphabet soup; NEPA, OSCLA, OPA, 
and the CWA would be the primary federal laws applicable to the development of 
offshore methane hydrates in American jurisdictional waters.79 It remains important 
to note that while the U.S. does not belong to UNCLOS, it does generally recognize 
similar legal notions as developed within UNCLOS; thus the U.S. does claim an EEZ 
beyond its traditional coastal waters.80 Also, while some methane hydrates might be 
found within state jurisdictional waters, the majority of the methane hydrate 
deposits are expected to be located in federal waters. And finally, while the methane 
hydrates might lay offshore in federal waters, onshore damages might be spread 
across multiple state jurisdictions with distinguishable common law traditions on 
tortious damages and differing state codes on liabilities. Thus, the U.S. model would 
be more complicated than surveyed herein. 
NEPA supports the function of the EPA, the U.S. de facto environmental 
ministry. 81  All existing and future acts of legislation and substantially related 
regulations need review by the EPA under NEPA. After enactment, the EPA would 
steward the overall management and enforcement of those environmental rules.82 
Most importantly, the EPA would likely steward enforcement litigation in the case 
of environmental damages. Thus, the EPA is granted wide and substantive 
authority to determine the scope and requirements of future regulatory efforts 
related to offshore methane hydrates. 
The OSCLA provides the underlying access to licensing of the offshore 
federally administered minerals.83 Critically important, OSCLA splits responsibility 
for specifically mineral-related planning from the EPA to the Commerce 
Department. To the extent that precautionary regulations or standards as related to 
the offshore methane hydrates themselves would need to be developed or 
approved, it would fall to the Secretary of Commerce to approve them. Thus, the 
environmental damages would be bifurcated into those directly related to the 
offshore methane hydrate operations and those only indirectly so damaged; one set 
of regulations would be developed primarily from a commerce perspective and the 
other from a primarily environmental perspective. In this result, the U.S. 
demonstrates that its approach to offshore methane hydrate planning would likely 
be commercially centered. Once the Commerce Dept. issues its safety regulations to 
protect the human, marine, and coastal environments; the Secretary, the Coast 
 
79  See supra, ch. 11, sec. 1. 
80  See supra, ch. 11, sec. 3. 
81  See supra, ch. 11, sec. 2. 
82  See supra, ch. 11, sec. 2. 
83  See supra, ch. 11, sec. 3. 
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Guard, and the U.S. Army are required to enforce those safety and environmental 
regulations.84  
The OPA applies to incidents of crude oil spills into the marine environment.85 
It has a very sophisticated strict liability rule alongside a system of liability 
assignment and of algorithmic liability caps based on tonnages, vessel types, and 
activities.86 It also provides two modes of liability caps for those operators acting 
non-grossly negligent and those acting grossly negligent. Yet, as it primarily 
addresses crude oil, if the methane hydrates accident does not co-produce oil into 
the ocean, then the OPA likely would not apply.87   
The CWA suffers from the same oil-focus as the OPA. As such, it would likely 
not apply to offshore methane hydrate accidents.88 However, again like the OPA, it 
provides a well-developed regulatory system of negative incentives to punitively 
encourage operators to not spill oil. 89 Daily fees or per-barrels-spilt fees can be 
imposed and the powers to bring tortfeasors to court are also provided under the 
CWA. It was these powers that first brought attention to the question of how many 
barrels were spilled at the BP Macondo incident, because the disparity in spillage 
estimates created billions of dollars in penalty differences. But again, while the 
CWA has a long and useful history of addressing crude oil and other hazardous 
substances in the ocean and other waterways, it does not currently have the ambit 
to cover oceanic methane emissions. 
4. Recommendations 
4.1. Emergent need for standards 
There is an emergent need to provide rules of civil liability and regulations for the 
development of offshore methane hydrates. Tremendous economic benefits are 
challenged by substantial accidental risks and hazards. The time to begin the studies 
for those rules and regulations should be soon, as the industry is likely to develop 
within the coming decade. The argument is that it is more likely than not that some 
investors or nations might begin the development of offshore methane hydrates in 
the very near future; as such, it would be advisable to develop the necessary 
standards in advance of those programs and projects.90 
 
84  See supra, ch. 11, sec. 3.2. 
85  See supra, ch. 11, sec. 4. 
86  See supra, ch. 11, sec. 4.2. 
87  See supra, ch. 11, sec. 4.1. 
88  See supra, ch. 11, sec. 5.1. 
89  See supra, ch. 11, sec. 5.2. 
90  To be clear, the argument presented is not an argument to stimulate investment to ensure 
earlier adoption of offshore methane hydrates. The argument is predicated on the recognition 
of several nations’ stated national agendas to begin the extraction of offshore methane 
hydrates and in recognition of the imminent technological feasibility of those agendas. 
Should any of those or other actors actually move forward with plans to develop offshore 
Æ
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Offshore methane hydrates could provide new sources of natural gas and fresh 
water supplies. Importantly for the timing of its development, many countries that 
currently lack access to domestic energy supplies are expected to possess reserves of 
offshore methane hydrates. For some countries, that access to local energy supplies 
within their political control could provide strategic stability and continuity of 
energy supplies critical for economic growth and development. Such policy 
concerns could motivate some countries to begin offshore methane hydrate 
production before it was commercially competitive with more conventional energy 
supplies.  
However, the engineering technology of offshore methane hydrates is rapidly 
advancing and the costs of its extraction and production are dropping. It is a 
common view of methane hydrate researchers that offshore methane hydrates may 
become commercially viable within the next ten years. Japan and South Korea have 
both established national research programs to obtain that commercial capability by 
2020.  
If it becomes the case that the technologies and cost structures of offshore 
methane hydrates reach commercial or politically sufficient levels of advancement, 
it would be beneficial for both energy investors and for the general public to have 
already determined optimal standards. Once the economic motives of methane 
hydrate projects become more evident, it might become more difficult to negotiate 
the development of the necessary standards.   
At the present moment, the development of offshore methane hydrates finds a 
fairly united community of researchers supported by both private investment and 
government support. Once projects would become commercial in nature, one might 
expect certain adversarial positions to be taken.91 It might be best to attempt to find 
common ground on standards and on optimal precautions and optimal levels of 
offshore hydrate development before that competitive aspect of eventual 
development opens up. 
4.2. General recommendations 
What the future of offshore methane hydrates needs is a clear and operational set of 
guidelines and incentives to ensure both for the private operators and the general 
public that such offshore operations will achieve the socially optimal safety level, so 
that both private profits and general welfare can be best obtained. The 
recommendations of this study are that a combined rule of strict liability for 
damages resultant and the development of effective public regulations would best 
provide for that optimal level of safety. 
 
methane hydrates, it would be constructive to have the necessary standards in place ahead of 
those development efforts. 
91  E.g., different energy corporations might try to gain proprietary advantages in technology by 
hiring key researchers. Also, e.g., governments might have alternative goals for national 
resources than commercial operators might have. 
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In summary of Section 3, supra, there are various laws that would be applicable 
as written but many would need adjusting to fit the circumstances of offshore 
methane hydrates.  
Those laws such as the EIA & SEA Directives and the NEPA, but also those 
like OSCLA, that require environmental assessments to be completed prior to the 
licensing and permitting of offshore activities are most complete and less in need of 
revision or updating, Those specific laws focused on hydrocarbon accidents and 
similar industrial accidents are generally poorly suited to the specific circumstances 
of offshore methane hydrates as currently enacted.  
The EU has two directives that are so close to the nature and character of 
offshore methane hydrate operations that one wonders if it might be feasible to 
adjust those existing directives.  
First, the Offshore Directive reflects careful drafting to be inclusive of both 
known historical oil spill accidents and other potential types of offshore accidents; 
the generic phrases “major accident,” “major hazard,” and “environmental impact” 
are oft used in lieu of more specific forms of accidents. However, the historical bias 
of well-known oil spill events does lurk within the legal paradigm of the Offshore 
Directive. The Preamble connects the Offshore Directive to oil spills caused by 
ships. 92 Additional language could be added to emphasize the potential for both 
crude oil and natural gas accidents within offshore extraction operations. Specific 
mention of the unique circumstances of methane hydrate accidents could buttress 
the application of the Offshore Directive to such events. 
In discussing the importance of the preservation of the Arctic’s environment, 
focus is put on Arctic marine oil pollution with no discussion of the harms of 
natural gas emissions, venting or seepage.93 The definitions section of the Offshore 
Directive includes an “oil spill response effectiveness” term, but no analog for 
methane hazards.94 Such could be readily remedied by either providing parallel 
definitions and concerns for methane related events or by expanding the current 
terms to be more inclusive and more clear. E.g., the EMSA is charged with the duty 
monitor the extent of an “oil or gas spill” (underscoring added); but gases do not 
spill as such, the word choice reflects historical expectations of an “oil and gas spill” 
event, alike the 2010 Gulf of Mexico incident, wherein crude oil has been the 
dominant semantic concern. 95   E.g., in the discussion on “Internal emergency 
response plans,” there is a requirement for an analysis of the oil spill response 
effectiveness of the proposed plans. 96 The internal emergency response plan is 
required to include a list of necessary equipment including those for capping a spill; 
no requirement or analog terms are made for dealing with gaseous venting or 
seepages.97  E.g., there is a requirement for environmental factors to be considered 
 
92  Offshore Directive. Preamble 49. 
93  Offshore Directive. Preamble 52. 
94  Offshore Directive. Art. 2(32). 
95  Offshore Directive. Art. 10.2(a). 
96  Offshore Directive. Art. 14.1. 
97  Offshore Directive. Annex I, 10(5). 
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in the estimate of the oil spill response effectiveness metric, but no symmetrical 
analysis is suggested for gaseous accident response plans.98  
Further, reference is made to dispersants, which only find use against crude 
oils.99 The external emergency response plan is required to address “oiled animals” 
that might reach the coast in advance of the “actual spill.”100 Similarly, when well 
operations are to be undertaken, a similar requirement exists for an analysis of the 
oil spill response effectiveness of the proposed plans.101 Neither requires an analysis 
for response effectiveness to methane accidents. The same asymmetry is found in 
the requirements for the report on major hazards for operation of a production 
installation 102  and for the report on major hazards for a non-production 
installation.103  
So while the Offshore Directive can be read to include planning for major 
accidents and major hazards of the exploration and production of methane 
hydrates, the Offshore Directive retains a semantic bias for crude oil spills. By 
broadening its existing terms or by providing parallel details for events related to 
both conventional and methane hydrate related accidents, the Offshore Directive 
could be extended to better cover the circumstances of offshore methane hydrates. 
As discussed earlier, the CCS Directive is a perfect fit for those aspects of 
offshore methane hydrate projects that do elect to engage in co-productive carbon 
dioxide injections back into the hydrate deposits. To that extent, the CCS Directive 
is well drafted for application to offshore methane hydrate projects. However, 
because of certain similarities between the CCS technologies and hydrate extraction 
technologies, they can be viewed as the reverse of each other, some of the terms 
developed within the CCS Directive might be employable within a future Offshore 
Methane Hydrate Directive or as terms to assist in the redrafting of the current 
Offshore Directive. “Leakage” is defined at Art. 3.5. to include any release of carbon 
dioxide from the storage complex, and “storage complex” is defined at Art. 3.6. to 
include the storage site and the surrounding geological domain. The definition of 
“significant irregularity” at Art. 3.17. parallels the concerns of deteriorating stability 
of methane hydrate fields; “significant irregularity means any irregularity in the 
injection or storage operations or in the condition of the storage complex itself, 
which implies the risk of a leakage or risk to the environment or human health.” 
Any efforts undertaken to correct significant irregularities or leakages are defined as 
“corrective measures” at Art. 3.19.  
If these types of suggestions were implemented, then the conjoint application 
of strict liability with sophisticated public regulations could be readily effected 
within the European Union and its Member States. 
 
98  Offshore Directive. Annex I, 10(8). 
99  Offshore Directive. Annex I, 10(12). 
100  Offshore Directive. Annex VII at (h). 
101  Offshore Directive. Art. 15.1. 
102  Offshore Directive. Annex I, 2(5). 
103  Offshore Directive. Annex I, 3(5). 
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The general trend of U.S. federal laws related to oil spills has focused on 
assignment of liability based on rules of strict liability, on liability caps, and on 
penalties for lost volumes. As such, the American federal laws could also be readily 
amended if their current character were to be retained. Once that were 
accomplished, existing safety regulations could be updated; as the American 
petroleum industry provides the bulk of such regulation privately within the API, 
one assumes that those materials could and would be updated as offshore methane 
hydrate projects approached early development. 
OCSLA primarily addresses the leasing of minerals and was found to be 
effectively applicable to offshore methane hydrates in its current form. OCSLA 
could be expanded with substantially minor edits to bring attention to the need to 
provide oversight for methane safety in addition to the existing language on crude 
oil and on minerals in general. OCSLA already provides grant of administrative 
powers to the Commerce Secretary to provide regulatory guidance to ensure the 
best available practices and safest technologies; these regulatory powers could be 
used to support development of the appropriate standards and rules for the 
development of offshore methane hydrates. 
OPA at large has a strict liability rule that could be readily adjusted to include 
methane hydrate accidents. OPA could have accidents and operators redefined to 
include the circumstances related to offshore methane hydrate accidents. 
Specifically, OPA could be amended to explicitly provide for the inclusion of 
marine-based methane emission accidents to parallel its current definition for oil 
spills. OPA could also include volumetric standards for methane to parallel with its 
crude oil barrel standards. OPA currently provides a taxonomy of vessel and 
facilities in defining the liability caps for oil spills; methane hydrates operations 
might deserve a similar but separate listing of facility types if liability caps were to 
be retained for methane hydrate operations.104 To better address particular concerns 
related uniquely to offshore methane hydrate accidents, there might be several 
enumerations of particular acts or omissions that would substantiate gross 
negligence for offshore methane hydrate operators.  
The CWA enables fines and penalties for marine pollution. The CWA could be 
amended more simply than would be required for OPA by including methane as a 
marine pollutant for the purposes of the CWA. Once included as a marine pollutant, 
volumetric standards for emitted, seeped, or vented methane should also  
developed and included in parallel to the existing volumetric measures provided 
for barrels of crude oil. Finally, the penalty areas of the CWA could be amended to 
include both barrels of crude oil leaked or volumes of methane emitted.  
In speaking of private regulations, there are existing organizations in place 
that could assist with the development of those private regulations for offshore 
methane hydrates. E.g., as mentioned supra105, the API provides over 600 standards 
 
104  E.g., offshore methane hydrate extraction facilities might be onboard a drilling and producing 
vessel or they might attached to moored or connected structure. 
105  See ch. 6, sec.  5.1, Footnote 148. 
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for the oil and gas industry. Additionally, there are other research groups and 
environmental groups that maintain research related to the development of offshore 
methane hydrates. These groups could be encouraged to begin drafting of 
suggested private regulations. Those draft regulations could also serve to inform 
public regulatory bodies in the development of their own regulations or in the 
coordinated development of integrated regulatory mechanisms. 
5. Final conclusions 
Offshore methane hydrates provide a cornucopia of potential benefits and hazards. 
Because the effects of these benefits and hazards would engage far beyond a private 
cluster of individuals, a public law response is needed.  
This study has also found that the technological hurdles are being reduced, 
that the costs of extracting and producing offshore methane hydrate are dropping, 
and that several nations have explicitly stated that they intend to produce offshore 
methane hydrates within this decade. As such, the timing to develop the necessary 
rules of civil liability and regulations is pressing. 
The theory of law and economics has provided a means of evaluating 
alternative rules of civil liabilities and of alternate public regulations. It is the result 
of this study that a rule of strict liability should be implemented in a 
complementary fashion with public and private regulations. That combination 
would provide a more complete set of precautionary incentives to the relevant 
actors, a more complete set of information to all parties, and the combination would 
reinforce the effectiveness of both systems of risk governance. 
It was found that there are existing and functional rules to address 
hydrocarbon accidents. The basic paradigm for spilt crude oil is broadly in 
alignment with the recommendations of this study. The rules generally display a 
preference for the rule of strict liability. The rules often call for extensive amounts of 
public regulations in parallel to the assignment of strict liability.  
Where problems were found it was found that they were usually a result of 
the simple problem that accidents predicated upon methane leakages were not 
explicitly included in the drafting of oil spill laws and conventions. Even when 
broader terms of hazardous substances were included within such frameworks, it 
appeared that water-borne methane was not included. Thus, water-born methane 
has fallen between the cracks, so to speak, of otherwise sound and useful laws and 
regulations. 
It is the conclusion of this study that such oversight could and should be 
readily remedied. The fundamental frameworks that already exist could and should 
be extended to include the potential for the commercial development of offshore 
methane hydrates. Such efforts could be dove-tailed into existing regulatory 
frameworks and case law histories by amending the existing laws to be more 
inclusive. 
Such a process, although perhaps the efficient choice from a transaction costs 
perspective, would still require extensive discussion and commentary. Changes to 
EU Directives would likely engage mechanisms under the EIA and SEA Directives, 
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changes to U.S. federal laws would require both administrative and public 
processes under NEPA. These procedural reviews would not be quick and should 
not be unsafely expedited; to provide sufficient time to ensure safety and public 
support, these reviews should be started sooner not later.  
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MAPS OF METHANE HYDRATES 
Appendix I. A. 
 
Map: Statoil’s map of methane hydrates near European waters. Reichel 2011. 
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Appendix I. B. 
 
Map: Mother Jones/The Atlantic global map of methane hydrate locations 
 
 
 
Global map of methane hydrates, as co-published by Mother Jones and The Atlan-
tic. The yellow squares indicate where methane hydrates have been extracted; the 
blue push-pins show where methane hydrates are expected to be found.  
(Image by Alice Cho.) 
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Appendix I. C. 
 
Map: Der Spiegel’s global map of methane hydrates, based on the Klauda Sandler 
map 
 
 
 
Der Spiegel presented an article on methane hydrates, this image became famous 
due to the overlapping topic in the novel “The Swarm”.  
 
Contrast this map with the image in Appendix I. D., which is the original map from 
Klauda & Sandler 2005. 
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Appendix I. D. 
 
Map: Klauda and Sandler’s global map of methane hydrate distribution. Klauda & 
Sandler 2005. 
 
 
 
This mapping of offshore methane hydrates is their original image. Most of the cur-
rent maps found in popular media are derived from this mapping of the potential 
methane hydrates. 
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Appendix I. E. 
 
Map: Map of likely methane hydrate deposits near India. Ramana 2006. 
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SHAVELL’S ECONOMIC MODELS OF ACCIDENTS 
Shavell was one of the first to develop a model of liability rules that enabled policy 
makers to evaluate the efficiency of a particular liability rule to achieve the optimal 
level of accident avoidance.1 Given the intent of the model,2 it is clear that Shavell 
examined liability rules from the perspective that liability rules are tools to provide 
ex ante incentives to avoid accidents and not from the perspective of how efficiently 
or justly those rules might provide compensation to victims.  
Shavell’s model of liability rules provides for both unilateral and bilateral tort 
events.3 A unilateral tort event is an event where only one party controls the actions 
that lead to an accident.4 A bilateral tort event is an event wherein both parties 
control actions that can lead to an accident between them.5 Shavell established a 
second dimension of analysis based on the relationships of the parties; (i) mutual 
strangers, (ii) sellers and non-customers, and (iii) sellers and customers or 
employees.6 He tested the liability rules of strict liability, of negligence, and of no 
legal recognized liability.7 Shavell found that in unilateral torts that strict liability 
was efficient in all of the cases, negligence in limited cases, and no liability rule in 
only one case.8  
 
1  See S. Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. Econ. 541 (1979); S. Shavell, Strict 
Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980); and S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
ACCIDENT LAW (Harvard University Press, 1987). 
2  “The aim of this article is to compare strict liability and negligence rules on the basis of the 
incentives they provide to “appropriately” reduce accident losses. ... In particular, there will 
be no concern ... with distributional equity—for the welfare criterion will be taken to be the 
following aggregate: the benefits derived by parties from engaging in activities less total 
accident losses less total accident prevention costs.” Shavell, supra at note 1, at 1. 
3  Id., en passim. 
4  Id., at 2 and 10. 
5  Id., at 6 and 17. 
6  See id., at 2-6 for the unilateral models and at 6-9 for the bilateral models.  
7  See an example of the rules in contrast at Tables 1, 2, and 3 at id., at 17, 21, and 22.  
8  See Table 1, p. 17, for tabular data on the results from Proposition 3 on seller-customer 
unilateral torts. Id. 
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In preview, Shavell suggested a theoretical preference for strict liability. 
Shavell found that strict liability was efficient in all of the examined cases for 
unilateral accidents, unlike negligence or no liability.9 For bilateral accidents, he 
found that the results were more complicated, in that none of the simple rules 
yielded efficient results. 10 In bilateral accident prevention, the civil liability rule 
choice depended on which actor(s) the community wishes to target to bear the 
burdens of accident avoidance.11 Finally, Shavell found that certain ultra-hazardous 
activities merit the application of strict liability.12  
1. Shavell on unilateral accidents 
Shavell found that in the stranger-stranger unilateral tort, that strict liability 
achieved efficiency by requiring the injurer to include the full costs of the accident 
in his overall welfare function.13  
In effect, strict liability forced the injurer to internalize adopt Kaldor-Hicks 
welfare efficiency. 14 The same scenario under negligence requires only that the 
injurer maintain a duty of care but no additional costs from whatever accidents 
occur, so long as the duty was met.15  
 
Table 1: Elements of Shavell's Unilateral Accident Model 
Term Explanation 
ݔ The tortfeasor’s care or precaution level 
 ݔ ؤ 0 Precautionary level is greater or 
equal to zero/ 
 ݔǉ  Duty of care level of precaution 
ݕ The tortfeasor’s activity level 
 ݕ ؤ 0 Activity level is greater or equal 
to zero/ 
݈(ݔ) Expected accident losses per unit of tortfeasor 
activity level 
ܽ(ݔǉ , ݕ) Income equivalent of the utility to tortfeasor 
from engaging in activity at level ݕ  while 
exercising care level ݔ 
ܹ(ݔ,ݕ) Social welfare 
 
 
9  See infra, Table 2. 
10  See infra, Table 3. 
11  See infra, at Section 2. 
12  See infra, at Section 3. 
13  Shavell, supra at note 1, at 11-12. See Equation (2). 
14  Id., at 11-12. See Equation (2). 
15  Id., at 11-12. 
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In Shavell’s formulation, the injurer has a care or precaution level, ݔ ؤ 0, and and 
activity level, ݕ ؤ 0. Social welfare, ܹ(ݔ, ݕ), was defined as the sum of income 
equivalent of the utility of the injurer, ܽ(ݔǉ , ݕ), less the costs ݈(ݔ) of the activity at 
activity level ݕ, െݕ݈(ݔ).16  
 ܹ(ݔ, ݕ) = ܽ(ݔ,ݕ) െ ݕ݈(ݔ) (1) 
 
Under strict liability, the injurer is able to optimize his utility as impacted by the 
costs he would bear in accidents. His optimand is the same as the social welfare 
function, thus strict liability is efficient.17  
 
 ܽ(ݔ, ݕ) െ ݕ݈(ݔ) (2) 
 
Under negligence, assume that the injurer chooses an ݔ = ݔǉ , that the care level 
selected is the efficient care level. 18 Then the injurer under a negligence rule is 
tasked with optimizing ܽ(ݔǉ , ݕ) given the injurer’s choice in ݕ. 19 The injurer will 
select ݕ(ݔǉ) > ݕכ(ݔǉ) , wherein ݕכ(ݔǉ)  denotes the welfare efficient level of activity 
given the due care level. 20   Thus in stranger-stranger unilateral contexts, the 
negligence rule would yield results of due care but at excessive levels of activity, 
resulting in higher than efficient levels of accidents with the victims being liable for 
the costs of those accidents. 21 This results in the injurer engaging in an excess of 
activity, excessive accidents result, and negligence is seen as inefficient. 22   
Under a “no liability” rule, the injurer exercises no duty of care and bears no 
costs of the accidents so the activity level of the injurer is guided solely by his 
personal utility, a(ݔ, ݕ), 23 and over engages in tortious conduct.  
Shavell ranks the results as Proposition 1:  
 
“PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that injurers and victims are strangers. Then 
strict liability is efficient and is superior to the negligence rule, which is 
superior to having no liability at all.” 24 
 
An identical result is reached for the seller-stranger scenario.25  
Under the seller-customer, or seller-employee, scenario, the results for strict 
liability are almost identical to the two previous analyses; strict liability is found 
efficient. 26 However, analysis of negligence in this scenario leads to new results. 27 
 
16  Id., at 10-11. 
17  Id., at 11. 
18  Id. 
19  Id., at 12. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
23  Id., at 11. 
24  Id., at 12. 
25  Id., at 14. 
26  Id., at 15. 
27  Id. 
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Negligence is found to be efficient if the customers or employees are aware 
expected accident losses of either each seller or of the overall average of the 
sellers.28  But if the customers or employees were faced with uncertainty as to the 
expected accident losses of the sellers, then negligence became inefficient. 29 When 
no liability rule is applied, only the case of knowledge of each seller’s duty of care 
level can result in efficiency; knowledge of average care levels or uncertainty about 
the safety levels results in inefficiency, although the former is more efficient than 
the latter.30  
In summary, Shavell found that in unilateral accidents that strict liability was 
efficient in every examined scenario but negligence was inefficient except when the 
victim is accurately aware of the care level of the tortfeasor. But that is tempered 
with the counterpoint that with sufficiently accurate information the results of a 
negligence regime are similar to no liability rules at all. Shavell thus demonstrated 
that for unilateral accidents strict liability is superior to both negligence and a lack 
of liability rules, yet negligence more efficient than a lack of liability rules.  
 
Table 2: Unilateral Accidents: Are Liability Rules Efficient? 
Encounter Strict Liability Negligence No Liability 
stranger-stranger Yes No No, worse 
seller-stranger Yes No No, worse 
seller-customer31 Yes Yes Yes 
 Yes Yes No 
 Yes No No 
 
 
2. Shavell on bilateral accidents 
When Shavell examines bilateral accidents, those accidents wherein both parties 
have control over actions that lead to accidents, he finds that the critical issue is 
“which party do we want to control, the injurer or the victim?” This is an extension 
of Calabresi’s earlier cheapest cost avoider rule, that the person who could have 
prevented the accident with the least cost of taking care should be the person held 
liable for the accident.32  
 
28  Id. 
29  Id., at 16. 
30  Id., at 16. 
31  Entries to the right reflect three orders of knowledge. Top row, the customer knows the risk of 
each seller. Middle row, the sellers' average risk. The bottom row, uncertain knowledge or 
misperception. 
32  H. B. SCHÄFER & F. MÜLLER-LANGER, ‘Strict liability versus negligence’ in: TORT LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, 10 (2009). See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1970). 
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In the stranger-stranger scenario, he finds that strict liability with defense of 
contributory negligence, efficiency cannot be achieved because the victims will bear 
no costs for accidents and will have no incentive to reduce their activity levels.33 The 
negligence rule in this scenario reflects the reverse, that the injurer will face no costs 
to reduce activity levels and thus the negligence rule is inefficient.34 Further, no 
liability rule and strict liability without contributory negligence are rated as inferior 
to either of the two previous results. 35. Thus, in bilateral stranger encounters, the 
policy choice is inefficient but does enable the policy maker to reduce either injurer 
activity levels under strict liability with contributory negligence or to reduce 
victim’s activity levels with the negligence rules.36  
 
Table 3: Bilateral Accidents: Are Liability Rules Efficient? 
Encounter Strict37 Strict38 Negligence No Liability 
Stranger-Stranger No*39 No***40 No**41 No*** 
Seller-Stranger No* No*** No** No*** 
Seller-Customer42 No No Yes Yes 
Durable Goods No No Yes No 
 No No No No 
Seller-Customer43 Yes No Yes Yes 
Non-Durable Goods Yes No Yes No 
 Yes No No No 
 
Indeed, Shavell proves that in stranger-stranger encounters, no simple liability rule 
can be efficient.44 These results are identical when the seller-stranger scenario is 
modelled; it is more efficient to use strict liability if the target is to reduce injurer 
activity levels and more efficient to use negligence if the target is to reduce victim 
activity levels.45  
 
33  Shavell, supra at note 1, at 19. Specifically, Shavell targets the condition of s = ݏҧ = ݏכ as the 
cause. 
34  Id., at 19. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Strict Liability with Defense of Contributory Negligence 
38  Strict Liability without Defense of Contributory Negligence 
39  *Limits Injurer’s Behavior 
40  ***Inferior to other inefficient results 
41  **Limits Victim’s Behavior 
42  Entries to the right reflect three orders of knowledge. Top row, the customer knows the risk of 
each seller. Middle row, the sellers' average risk. The bottom row, uncertain knowledge or 
misperception. 
43  Entries to the right reflect three orders of knowledge. Top row, the customer knows the risk of 
each seller. Middle row, the sellers' average risk. The bottom row, uncertain knowledge or 
misperception. 
44  Id., at 19-20. See Proposition 5. 
45  Id., at 20. See Proposition 6. 
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The seller-customer model is overall similar to the results seen in the unilateral 
case if the goods sold are non-durables;46 strict liability with defense of contributory 
negligence is efficient at all levels of customer knowledge, negligence is efficient 
with certain knowledge about the sellers but not against uncertain knowledge, and 
no liability is efficient only when presented with certain knowledge about each 
specific seller.47 An interesting plot twist is that the rule of strict liability without a 
defense is inefficient in every case of knowledge. But when the product is a durable 
good, then strict liability becomes inefficient both with and without defense at all 
levels of knowledge; this is primarily because the customer has no incentive to limit 
his activity level.48  
When the parties were seller-customer and the customer had accurate 
information about the safety levels of the seller, then both strict liability (with 
defense of contributory negligence) and negligence were efficient. In the same case, 
strict liability was efficient without knowledge but negligence was inefficient 
without information. But in the ’simpler’ case of stranger-stranger encounters, 
neither strict liability (of both types) nor negligence were efficient; they both failed 
to provide for efficient levels of care. However, the strict liability rule provided 
optimal behavior from the tortfeasor and the negligence rule provided optimal 
behavior from the victim – in bilateral events between parties with no market 
interaction, the liability rules can be used to control the party most able to cause 
hazard or harm but not both at the same time, a priority decision must be made.  
Shavell’s conclusions on bilateral accidents are much more complex than for 
the unilateral accidents. Because the results are substantially different, it highlights 
the importance of correctly identifying events as unilateral or bilateral events. 
Unlike the unilateral results, no rule was found to be consistently efficient.49 But, if 
the least cost avoider can be identified ex ante, then the application of that principle 
to determine which actor should be regulated can be combined with the appropriate 
choice of regime to obtain first best results.50  
 
46  Id., en passim. Non-durables are defined by Shavell to be those goods that created the event 
where the activity level of both the seller and the customer are identical. He provides the 
example of a restaurant meal; the restaurant prepares and serves one meal, the customer eats 
one meal. Id., at 8; see also Table 2. 
47  Id., at 21. See Table 2. 
48  Id., at 8. See also Table 3. 
49  However, there may be theoretical reasons to find negligence to be more robust than strict 
liability when this model's assumptions are relaxed. That was the result when Schäfer, et al., 
extended this section of Shavell's research. They found that when the identity of the lowest 
costs avoider was determined ex post, and not ex ante, then both parties face a probabilistic 
distribution as to potential judgment and damages. This result creates a problem of 
uncertainty, and that in turns results in the Uncertain Legal Standards model discussed, infra, 
at Appendix II-B, Section 1.4. See also SCHÄFER & MÜLLER-LANGER, supra at note 32, at 11. 
50  SCHÄFER & MÜLLER-LANGER, supra at note 32, at 11. 
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3. Shavell’s Ultra-Hazardous Strict Liability Rule 
Beginning courses in Tort Law often suggest that strict liability is employed for 
cases wherein abnormally hazardous activities are engaged in, to ensure that those 
parties that engage in that type of activity are responsible for any damages resulting 
from their decisions to undertake risky activities.51  
Shavell suggests that ultra-hazardous activities have two characteristics which 
especially merit the application of strict liability rules.  First, the activities are (i) 
uniquely identifiable and (ii) impose non-negligible risks on non-participant victims 
which “make[s] the activity worthwhile controlling.” 52  Second, the victim’s 
engagement with the risky activity is entirely routine in normal life, thus “activity 
that cannot and ought not be controlled.”53  
Shavell then states that given those descriptions of ultra-hazardous activities, 
that it falls within his Propositions 4 and 6 from his model of bilateral accidents 
between strangers.54 In so doing, he implicitly assumes that the ultra-hazardous 
scenarios involve victims cum strangers, and that a rule of contributory negligence is 
in effect.  
 
“PROPOSITION 4. Suppose that the injurer and victim are strangers. Then 
none of the normal liability rules is efficient. Strict liability with a defense of 
contributory negligence is superior to the negligence rule if it is sufficiently 
important to lower injurer activity levels. Strict liability without the defense 
and no liability are each inferior to whichever rule is better: either strict 
liability with the defense or the negligence rule.”55  
 
“PROPOSITION 6. Suppose that injurers are sellers and that victims are 
strangers. Then the results are as given in Propositions 4 and 5.”56  
 
As such, the goal is to efficiently incentivize the tortfeasor to control his activity 
level and leave the victim unaffected in his activity level;57 this is best achieved by 
the rule of strict liability with defense of contributory negligence.  
 
  
 
51  See Shavell, supra at note 1, at 24, “Concluding Comments. #4.” 
52  Id. 
53  Id. 
54  See “Concluding Comments. #4. Shavell 1980, p. 24. 
55  Shavell 1980, p. 19. 
56  Shavell 1980, p. 20. 
57  See  “Concluding Comments. #4. Shavell 1980, p. 24. 
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SCHÄFER, OTT, SCHÖNENBERGER AND MÜLLER-LANGER 
The Shavell model has been updated and explored by Schäfer and Ott, Schäfer and 
Schönenberger and by Schäfer and Müller-Langer,1 and that model is presented 
hereunder.2 
The model starts as a unilateral case wherein the victim has no role to play in 
the incidence of the harmful event. Schäfer et alia have presented a simplification 
wherein the activity level is given, to better focus on the duty of care, ݔ . The 
optimand becomes:3  
 min  ܿ(ݔ) + ݀(ݔ) (1) 
 
and if the first derivatives are set equal to each other, 4 
 
 ܿᇱ(ݔ) = െ݀ᇱ(ݔ) (2) 
1.1. Rule of No Liability 
Under a rule of no liability, the term ݀(ݔ) is not included in the tortfeasor’s decision 
process and thus only his own costs, ܿ(ݔ), are included into his considerations.5 This 
 
1  Schäfer co-authored earlier versions of this model with Ott  in 1995 and separately with 
Schönenberger in 1999; those articles were updated most recently in 2009 with co-author 
Müller-Langer. While the mathematic models are not completely identical, they are clearly 
closely related and thus are here presented as a joint-product. See:  
i. C. Ott & H. B. Schäfer, Negligence as Untaken Precaution, Limited Information, and 
Efficient Standard Formation in The Civil Liability System, 17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 15 
(1997).;  
ii. H. B. SCHÄFER & A. SCHÖNENBERGER, Strict Liability versus Negligence, in: 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Edward Elgar, 2000); and  
iii. H. B. SCHÄFER & F. MÜLLER-LANGER, ‘Strict liability versus negligence’ in: TORT LAW 
AND ECONOMICS (2009). 
2  Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 1, at 599-604. 
3  Id., at 599. 
4  Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 1, at 599. Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 1, at 5. 
5  Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 1, at 600. Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 1, at 5. 
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absence of the victim’s external costs will lead to a result that the tortfeasor will seek 
to optimize at the inflection point, where:  
 
 ܿᇱ(ݔ) < 0,ܽ݊݀ ܿᇱᇱ(ݔ) = 0 (3) 
 
Table 1: Schäfer, Ott, Schönenberger, and Müller-Lange Models of Civil 
Liability Rules 
Term Explanation 
ݔ Level of care or precaution6 
 ݔכ Socially optimal level of care 
 ݔככ Any level of care below the 
optimal level of care 
ܿ(ݔ) Accident prevention costs borne by the 
tortfeasor, given a certain level of care7 
݀(ݔ) total expected damages based on level of 
care; costs borne by victim 8 
ܽ Activity level of the tortfeasor9 
ݑ(ܽ) Utility of tortfeasor given activity level  
݉ Judgment error rate10 
 ݉݀ Resultant judgment damages11 
 
 
and thus the tortfeasor is expected to choose a lowest level of care. One could 
reasonably assume that lower costs of care imply higher accident costs, so the no 
liability rule case is expected to (i) not be efficient and (ii) “clearly not socially 
desirable.”12  
1.2. Unilateral negligence rule 
The negligence rule can be established as:13  
 
 ܤ < ܲܮ (4) 
  
which is Judge Hand’s formulation that an actor is negligent if the born burden of 
care, ܤ, was found to be less than the probable, ܲ, losses, ܮ, from the harmful event. 
 
6  Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 1, at 599. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. 
9  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 1, at 5. See Equation 4 therein. 
10  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 1, at 9. Explained in the discussions prior to Equation 
19. 
11  Id. 
12  Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 1, at 600. 
13  Id. 
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Assuming that the appropriate level of care is ݔכ, then the tortfeasor faces a choice, 
to either act under care and pay no accident costs or to not take due care, ݔככ, and 
pay accidents costs:  
 ܿ(ݔכ) ൑ ܿ(ݔככ) + ݀(ݔככ) (5) 
 
Since insufficient care is tantamount to low costs of care, the implied result is that 
the costs of total expected damages to the victim will be higher.14 As the definition 
of the appropriate level of care, ݔכassumes that less care results in more net costs, 
the tortfeasor should choose to follow the guided appropriate level of care; 
negligence is efficient for a unilateral case. 15   
Interestingly, if the amount of precaution costs required by the courts exceed 
the socially optimal level of care, efficiently minded actors will discard the 
negligence rule’s duty of care for the more efficient socially optimal level of care 
and simply bare what excess costs over their duty of care requires, as that would be 
cheaper than the court imposed duty of care.16 On the other hand, if the costs of due 
care are less than the imposed damages, then the imposed damages can also be less 
than the actual harms and the negligence rule will remain efficient.17 This is because 
it will remain rational to expend the lesser costs of due care than the more costly 
damages. 18 
It can be very difficult for judicial and legislative authorities to correctly 
determine the socially efficient duty of care.19 Schäfer et al. present the argument 
that it is far more flexible and computable to determine the cheapest alternative 
method that would have prevented the accident; the delta of the costs of the care 
assumed and the costs of the next alternative can be compared against the costs of 
the harms for an application of Hand’s Rule, supra at Eq. 4. 20 
Schäfer et al. provided a unilateral model that accommodates a variable for the 
activity level, ܽ.21 Given the utility function of the actor cum tortfeasor, ݑ,  
  
 max  ݑ(ܽ)െ ܽݔ െ ܽ݀(ݔ) (6) 
 
The optimal level of activity, ܽ, can be found by the first determinants,  
 
 ݑᇱ(ܽ) = ݔכ + ݀(ݔכ) (7) 
 
The result is that the tortfeasor should increase his activity level, assuming a 
predetermined level of care, until his marginal utility from additional activity 
 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Id., at 601. 
17  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 1, at 5. 
18  Id. 
19  This is an argument to consider against both statutorily determined duty of care levels and of 
certain regulatory controls. Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 1, at 602. 
20  Id. 
21  Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 1, at 603. 
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exceeds the marginal costs, both his own and the external costs, caused by increased 
activity level. 22 
1.3. Unilateral strict liability rule 
Under an unilateral strict liability rule, the tortfeasor has no required duty of care 
but he does face the total costs of the activity, both his own and the external costs.23  
 ܿ(ݔ) + ݀(ݔ) (8) 
  
As such, the social costs equal the private costs borne by the tortfeasor, so the 
private minimization of costs will have the same result. 24 Strict liability achieves a 
socially optimal level of care. 25 
1.4. Uncertain Legal Standards 
Court errors do occur and must be taken into account.26 There are three primary 
listed sources for court errors:  
(i)  Error in determinations in the level of efficient care, 27 
(ii)  Error in the assessments of an injurer’s actual rendered level of care, 28 
and  
(iii) The parties own inabilities to monitor and render specific levels of care 
continuously. 29 
 
These three problems have two effects on the efficiency of liability rules; to over-
comply or to under-comply. 30 Over-compliance better ensures that whatever the 
actually imposed level of care turns out to be that the injurer met that hurdle and 
will not bear the potentially larger costs of the harms rendered. 31 Under-compliance 
results from an awareness that errant courts might sometimes render no judgment 
for damages despite the injurer failing to meet the sanctioned level of due care, thus 
it becomes irrational to always pay the costs for meeting the sanctioned level of due 
care. 32 
The mechanics of the decision process are determined by three factors;  
(i)   the impact on the costs of care,33  
 
22  Id. 
23  Schäfer & Schönenberger, supra at note 1, at. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Schäfer & Müller-Langer, supra at note 1, at 8. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  Id., at 9. 
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(ii) the expected damages, 34 and  
(iii) the resultant impact on being held liable for negligence. 35 
 
In the case of an injurer choosing to increase their care level and to thus over-
comply, the mechanical results are that the costs of care are increased, the expected 
damages are decreased, and the probability of being held liable for negligence also 
decreases. 36 Given this mix of directions in costs changes, it is difficult to forecast 
what the injurer would choose to do without the specific costs being detailed; but it 
is most likely that either way the injurer is not likely to land on an efficient result. 37 
Under a negligence rule, it has already been demonstrated that under-
compensation can still result in an efficient level of due care.38 It is only when the 
error rate, ݉, approaches the limits of zero or of very large numbers,39 that the 
negligence rule would function inefficiently.40  
Under a strict liability rule, there is no resultant efficient outcome only 
inefficient over- or under-compliance. 41. ݉ > 1 always leads to over-deterrence and 
݉ < 1 always leads to under-deterrence.  
Thus when the error potential of the court system is considered, the negligence 
rule can be more robust and retain its efficiency in contrast to a less reliable strict 
liability rule. 42 
Additionally, when litigation costs are considered, because errant courts will 
bear substantial transaction costs, the optimal rule may not necessarily be 
foreseeable ex ante but a strict liability rule is expected to be less costly.43 There are 
three impact factors. First, because victims bear more costs to litigate under a 
negligence rule, as they have more to establish in court, they will initiate less 
litigation that those victims facing a strict liability rule. 44 Second, because the law of 
strict liability is both simpler, in that no causation need be developed nor any level 
of care be established, the legal consequences are more readily foreseeable. 45 Third, 
this foreseeability will lead to more pre-trial settlements, enabling lost cost 
transference of wealth from tortfeasor to victim. 46 
 
  
 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  See supra in discussion on Schäfer's et al. unilateral negligence model, at Section 2. 
39  The error rate is defined as m א {0 < ݉ < ߱}; wherein “zero error” would be m = 1 and ɘ  is 
a very large positive real number. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Id., at 16. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
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HYLTON’S POSITIVE THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY 
Hylton extended the “Shavell-Landes-Posner”1 model of civil liability to provide a 
theoretical foundation for the widespread application of negligence as opposed to 
strict liability. He extends the Shavell-Landes-Posner model by including three 
additional concerns.  
i. The model addressed the cross externalization of risk between the 
parties involved in an accident.  
ii. The model added more detail on the causal considerations central to 
tort law.  
iii. The model provided a treatment to explicitly handle the effects of 
benefits externalization. In so doing, the Calabresian lowest cost 
avoider is shown to be incomplete or inefficient. 
 
1. Alignment with Shavell’s Unilateral Models 
The model assumes unilateral causation and unilateral risk.2 It assumes that all 
actors are risk neutral.3 It assumes that reasonable care reduces accidents but is 
costly to effect. 4  The model assumes error-less litigation and that the costs of 
litigation are zero.5 It assumes that all victims receive what the law provides under 
the modeled civil liability rule, thus all victims win at court. 6 It then assumes that 
 
1  K. N. Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict Liability. 4(1) Review of Law & Economics 153 (2008) 
(Due to licensing limits where the present study was undertaken, its research relied on the 
working paper version of Hylton’s article; as such, all point citations are to that source 
material. See K. N. Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict Liability, 4 (Boston University School of 
Law Working Paper No. 06-35, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=932600) 
2  Id., at 5.  
3  Id., at 4.  
4  Id. 
5  Id., at 5. 
6  Id. 
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the actors are rational in that they will choose reasonable care, ݔ௥, if the incremental 
costs of damages are greater than the costs of reasonable care. 7 
Table 1: Elements of Hylton’s Positive Theory of Strict Liability Model 
Term Explanation 
݅ and ݆  actors in the model, e.g., ܣ and ܤ  
ݍ௜  The likelihood that actor ݅ will cause harm to actor ݆ 
while actor ݅ exercises care ݔ௥  
 (1െ ݍ௜)  The likelihood that actor ݅ will not cause 
harm to actor ݆ while actor ݅ exercises care 
ݔ௥.  
݌௜   The likelihood that actor ݅ will cause harm to actor ݆ 
while actor ݅ exercises care ݔØ.  
 (1െ ݌௜)  The likelihood that actor ݅ will not cause 
harm to actor ݆ while actor ݅ exercises care 
ݔØ.  
 ݌௜ > ݍ௜ > 0  The likelihood of risk with no care is 
higher than the risk with care, which is 
non-negative.  
ݒ  Costs or loss due from an accident, per the unit of activity 
undertaken  
ݔ  Care, both the level and the cost of care. Care is available 
at two discrete levels:  
 ݔ = ݔØ = 0  No-care carries zero costs and zero level 
of precaution  
 ݔ = ݔ௥  Care exercised at reasonable level, ݔ௥ > 0   
 ݔ௥ + ݍ௜ݒ <
݌௜ݒ  
Reasonable care is rational, both privately 
and socially; equivalently stated as 
[ݔ௥ < (݌௜ െ ݍ௜)ݒ]  
ݕ  Activity level  
ܥ(ݕ)  Cost of activity level, at a unit of activity  
 ܥ௦௢௖(ݕ)  Social costs of activity ݕ  
 ܥ௣௥௜௩(ݕ)  Private costs of activity ݕ  
ܤ(ݕ)  Benefits of activity level ݕ, at a unit of activity  
 ܤ௦௢௖(ݕ)  Social benefits of activity ݕ  
ߜ(ݕ)  depreciation or capital exhaustion from ݕ  
ݓ  probability of conferring benefits/welfare on others  
ݖ  Benefit per unit of activity  
 
The duty of care is modeled through the choice of ݍ௜ versus ݌௜ . The probabilistic 
causation of injury is predicated on the assumption of care, those risks of causation 
based on no care are reflected by ݌௜  and those including reasonable care are 
reflected by ݍ௜ . Consider a situation with two actors ܣ and ܤ. Hylton stated that 
 
7  Id. 
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given a state of care, e.g. both of them take reasonable care, there are three ways an 
accident can occur; (i) they both cause an accident, (ii) A causes an accident, and (iii) 
B causes an accident.8 If they both took care and both caused an accident, then the 
likelihood of injury to both actors is ݍ஺ݍ஻. 9 Similarly, if A and B both exercise 
reasonable care but only A causes an accident, then the likelihood of injury is 
ݍ஺(1െ ݍ஻). 10   
Changing course, if A displayed reasonable care but B did not, and if A caused 
an accident and B did not, then the likelihood of harm would be ݍ஺(1െ ݌஻).11 The 
functional observation is that the level of duty of care or the lack thereof is indicated 
by the choice of ݍ஺ or ݌஺, respectively, and the act of causation is demonstrated by 
the simple probability ݍ஺ or ݌஺, and the lack of causation by the additive inverse of 
(1െ ݍ஺) or (1െ ݌஺). It is dense but functional notation.  
 
Table 2: Hylton’s Completed Likelihoods of Harm from A’s Perspective. 
  Causation by Actor ࢏ 
Re
as
on
ab
le
 
ca
re
 b
y 
A
ct
or
 ݅  ࡭ ࡮ ࡭ ר ࡮ Ø ࡭ ݍ஺(1െ ݌஻) (1 െ ݍ஺)݌஻ ݍ஺݌஻ (1െ ݍ஺)(1െ ݌஻) 
࡮ ݌஺(1െ ݍ஻) (1െ ݌஺)ݍ஻ ݌஺ݍ஻ (1െ ݌஺)(1െ ݍ஻) 
࡭ ר ࡮ ݍ஺(1െ ݍ஻) (1െ ݍ஺)ݍ஻ ݍ஺ݍ஻ (1െ ݍ஺)(1െ ݍ஻) 
Ø ݌஺(1െ ݌஻) (1 െ ݌஺)݌஻ ݌஺݌஻ (1െ ݌஺)(1െ ݌஻) 
     
 
The model can be shown to replicate the basic tenet of the Shavell-Landes-
Posner model, that under unilateral accidents both strict liability and negligence are 
efficient. 12 Thereafter, the model can be extended to include other features and 
demonstrate the correlation between the model and real-world tort law institutions.  
Assuming B takes care and A does not, then A’s expected costs are 
represented thusly under a strict liability rule: 13.  
  
 
{݌஺ݍ஻[(ݒ െ ݒ) + ݒ]} + {݌஺(1െ ݍ஻)[0 + ݒ]}
+ {(1െ ݌஺)ݍ஻[(ݒ െ ݒ) + 0]}
+ {(1െ ݌஺)(1െ ݍ஻)[0 + 0]} 
(1) 
 
 
8  Hylton states that there are 12 causal pathways to consider, but his analysis suggested 16; he 
explicitly ignored the case of neither party causing an accident. Yet, he did include that case 
in his analytical equation enumerated (1) in his article. I have completed the implied set of 
sixteen at Table 2. See id., at 5-6. 
9  Id., at 5.  
10  Id. 
11  See the completed table on the likelihood of harms at Table 2. 
12  Id., at 6.  
13  Id. 
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Taken in pieces, the four stages of the function are the four events of (i) both parties 
cause harm to each other, (ii) A causes harm to B but B does not cause harm to A, 
(iii) A does not cause harm to B but B causes harm to A, and (iv) neither party 
causes harm.14  
First, ݌஺ݍ஻[(ݒ െ ݒ) + ݒ஻] demonstrates that B exercised care ݔ௥ thus the use of 
ݍ஻. A did not exercise reasonable care, thus the use of ݌஺. They both caused harm to 
each other, thus the causal form ݌஺ݍ஻. A suffered a loss ݒ, but he paid for that, thus 
(ݒ െ ݒ). Finally, B suffered a loss ݒ, which A paid. 
Second, ݌஺(1െ ݍ஻)[0 + ݒ] demonstrates that B caused no injury while being 
within reasonable care. A was both without precaution and caused an injury to B. A 
received no injury, ݒ = 0, but B was injured, so A paid ݒ א (ݒ > 0) to B.  
Third, (1െ ݌஺)ݍ஻[(ݒ െ ݒ) + 0] demonstrates that A caused no injury, (1െ ݌஺), 
to B even with A’s state of no precautions. B did cause an injury to A, ݍ஻. A’s injury 
was paid by A, thus (ݒ െ ݒ). And B was not injured, so A did not pay B.  
And finally, the fourth section (1െ ݌஺)(1െ ݍ஻)[0 + 0]  demonstrated that 
neither A nor B caused an accident, although an accident may have occurred. As it 
is clear that Hylton intended to work with definitions of strict liability and 
negligence that require the establishment of causation prior to the potential 
assessment of judgmental damages, neither party is in a position to have damages 
made liable against them, thus the term [0 + 0].  
When these sections are summed and simplified, they yield ݌஺ݒ. 15 As ݔ௥ +
ݍ௜ݒ < ݌௜ݒ was provided as an assumption underlying the model, then ݔ௥ + ݍ஺ݒ <
݌஺ݒ clearly requires a rational A to choose reasonable care as it is cheaper than ݌஺ݒ, 
demonstrating that strict liability could lead to efficient results.   
Similar expansions can be modeled against when both A and B take care and 
that obtains A’s expected costs of ݍ஺ݒ . 16  Assuming A took reasonable care 
necessitates ݔ௥  which is then added to ݍ஺ݒ ; ݔ௥ + ݍ஺ݒ < ݌஺ݒ , demonstrating that 
again strict liability could lead to efficient results. Or, when neither A nor B take 
reasonable care, then A’s expected costs will be found to be (݌ܣ െ ݍܣ)ݒ, which is 
per se the rational behavior assumption of ݔ௥ + ݍ஺ݒ < ݌஺ݒ  restated as ݔ௥ <
(݌஺ െ ݍ஺)ݒ. 17 So, yet again, the effort demonstrates that strict liability could lead to 
efficient results. We have seen when B takes care, when A and B take care, and 
when neither A nor B takes care. Given this exhaustion, strict liability is shown to be 
efficient.18 
It can readily shown, with strict liability demonstrated, that negligence is also 
efficient. 19 The incremental liability for failing to take care under negligence is 
 
14  This is the list of scenarios from the second row of Table 9.3. Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  Hylton did not discuss the case when only A takes care, for in that case it is assumed that A 
has exercised care ݔ௥ and that doing so reduced the overall accidents and v, and thus 
performed no worse than under the other three cases already presented. Id. 
19  Id. 
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݌஺ݒ. 20 And ݌஺ݒ is per se more costly than reasonable care, , per ݔ௥ + ݍ஺ݒ < ݌஺ݒ.21 
Thus, negligence will be efficient.  
2. Externalized Costs and Benefits 
The model can be expanded to accommodate considerations of externalized costs 
and benefits. 22 The model assumed that activities are such that both the costs and 
benefits are shared across both the actor preforming the activity and other actors; 
e.g., increased activity by A could increase the risks or costs to B. 23 
The total benefits of undertaking an activity ݕ are denoted as (ݕ) . 24 Hylton 
argued that the potential origins of benefits are too diverse to model, unlike his 
approach with costs. 25 Recalling the parameters ݓ  as the probability of actor ݅ 
conferring a benefit on actor ݆ and of ݖ denoting the benefit per unit of activity ݕ, the 
social benefits of ݕ have the following formula:26  
 
 ݕܤ௦௢௖(ݕ) = ݕ(ܾ(ݕ) + ݓ஺ݖ + ݓ஻ݖ) (2) 
 
The socially optimal level of activity ݕ is determined by the equating of marginal 
social costs of ݕ to the marginal social benefits of ݕ. Including the results from the 
demonstration of ܥ௦௢௖(ݕ) , infra, we can obtain the required formula for optimal 
social engagement in ݕ, when ݕכ denotes the socially optimal level of ݕ:27  
 
 ݔ௥ + ߜ(ݕכ) + ݍ஺ݒ + ݍ஻ݒ + ݕכߜ ᇲ(ݕ) = ܾ(ݕכ) + ݓ஺ݖ + ݓ஻ݖ + ݕܾ ᇲ(ݕכ) (3) 
  
The cross effects of risk are seen within ݍ஺ݒ + ݍ஻ݒ = (ݍ஺ + ݍ஻)ݒ and the cross effects 
of externalized benefits are seen within ݓ஺ݖ +ݓ஻ݖ = (ݓ஺ +ݓ஻)ݖ.28  
Two observations follow:  
i. Positive increases to (ݍ஺ + ݍ஻)ݒ  decrease the optimal amount of  
activity ݕ.  
ii. Positive increases to (ݓ஺ + ݓ஻)ݖ  increase the optimal amount of  
activity ݕ.  
 
The private cost of an activity y to A are denoted as ܥ௣௥௜௩(ݕ) and the social or 
externalized costs are denoted as ܥ௦௢௖(ݕ).29 ܥ௦௢௖(ݕ) will include several parts:  
 
20  Id. 
21  See Table 2, supra. 
22  Id. 
23  Id., at 7.  
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  b is well-behaved with regard to y with the standard assumptions of diminishing returns; 
b(ݕ) > 0,ܾᇱ(ݕ) < 0, and ܾᇱᇱ(ݕ) ൒ 0. 
27  Id., at 8.  
28  Id. 
29  Id., at 7. 
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i. the cost of taking reasonable care ݔ௥,  
ii. the depreciation, ߜ(ݕ), to capital assets by engagement in ݕ, and  
iii. the costs of accidents, ݒ. 30  
The model resumes the prior result that A and B will both take reasonable care 
under either strict liability or negligence, so the model assumes that both A and B 
did in fact take reasonable care.31 However, even with reasonable care accidents 
may happen. 32 The social cost of the accidents that occur under the reasonable care 
of A and B is the following formula: 33  
 
 ݕܥ௦௢௖(ݕ) = ݕ(ݔ௥ + ߜ(ݕ) + ݍ஺(1െ ݍ஻)ݒ + (1 െ ݍ஺)ݍ஻ݒ + 2ݍ஺ݍ஻) (4) 
 
 ݕܥ௦௢௖(ݕ) = ݕ(ݔ௥ + ߜ(ݕ) + ݍ஺ݒ + ݍ஻ݒ) (5) 
 
The private costs under a strict liability rule are the following formula: 34  
 
 ݕܥ௣௥௜௩(ݕ) = ݕ(ݔ௥ + ߜ(ݕ) + ݍ஺(1െ ݍ஻)ݒ+ (1െ ݍ஺)ݍ஻(ݒ െ ݒ) + ݍ஺ݍ஻[(ݒ െ ݒ) + ݒ]) (6) 
 
 ݕܥ௣௥௜௩(ݕ) = ݕ(ݔ௥ + ߜ(ݕ) + ݍ஺ݒ) (7) 
 
And similar logic supports the private costs formula under a negligence rule, 
presented here in the reduced form: 35 
 
 ݕܥ௣௥௜௩(ݕ) = ݕ(ݔ௥ + ߜ(ݕ) + ݍ஻ݒ) (8) 
 
The most immediate observation is that the private costs formulae under strict 
liability and negligence are identical but for one term, that of ݍ஺ݒ  versus ݍ஻ݒ , 
respectively, and the social cost formula includes the effects from both. 36 This 
reflects that the private liability rules provide different controls and that they do not 
necessarily provide the same result as the social welfare optimand. Under strict 
liability, the actor responds to the cost consequences of his own acts; under 
negligence the actor responds to the cost consequences of the acts of other actors.37  
Hylton took these observations on the cross effects of costs and benefits to 
provide a comparative risk analysis that forecasts when which civil liability rules 
 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Id., at 10. 
35  Id. 
36  Id., at 7 and 10. It is also potentially useful to observe that  ቀܥ௣௥௜௩(ݕ) + ܥ௦௢௖(ݕ)ቁ > ܥ(ݕ); that 
the total costs of an accident are less than the sum of the private and public costs because the 
private and public accounts overlap; thus their sum includes double-counting. 
37  Id. This finding aligns well with the Shavell's bilateral accident model, but the model herein is 
a unilateral accident model. Supra, Appendix II-A.  
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would be efficiently applied or at least more robust. Noting that more risk reduce 
the optimal levels of an activity but that the reverse is true for externalized benefits, 
Hylton observed the rule paradigms of strict liability and negligence provided 
offsetting and balancing results. 38 Under strict liability, the more externalized risk 
there is, the more damages will be assigned to the actor based upon his own activity 
level. 39  
But under negligence, the actor will have an incentive to reduce his activity in 
response to the risks externalized by other actors. 40  This led Hylton to propose the 
following two propositions:  
 
Proposition 1:41  
“If ݍ஺ > ݍ஻, holding ܣU strictly liable is preferable to using the negligence rule 
in regulating the activity level of ܣ. If, however, ݍ஺ ൑ ݍ஻, strict liability is 
not preferable to negligence. In simpler terms, if ܣ externalizes more risk to 
others than they externalize to him, strict liability is preferable to negligence. 
However, if there is a reciprocal exchange of risk between ܣ and ܤ, or if ܤ 
externalizes more risk than does ܣ, holding ܣ strictly liable is not preferable, 
as a method of regulating ܣ’s activity level choice, to the negligence rule.”42 
(Underscoring added.)  
 
Proposition 2:  
“If there is reciprocal exchange of risk between ܣ  and  (ݍ஺ = ݍ஻) , strict 
liability and negligence provide the same incentives for care and for activity 
level choices.” 43 
 
These results provide simple guidance, that strict liability should be used when the 
risk asymmetry is substantial, otherwise the negligence rule is at least equally 
efficient and potentially preferable.  
The results can be explained simply, the only functional difference in the 
private costs functions under strict liability and negligence are in the assignments of 
risk: 
i. the likelihood that ܣ  will cause injury to ܤ  while ܣ  undertakes 
reasonable care, ݍ஺, and  
ii. the corresponding risk from ܤ, ݍ஻. 44  
Under Proposition 2, if the risks are identical, then the results of the legal liability 
rules will be identical; the rules become simply ݕܥ௣௥௜௩(ݕ) = ݕ(ݔ௥ + ߜ(ݕ) + ݍݒ) 
without reference to any particular actor. 45  
 
38  Id., at 10. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Hylton did not thusly label the propositions, so this labeling follows the sequence in which 
they were presented in the article. 
42  Id., at 11.  
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
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The optimal level of activity, ݕ௦ǉ , for A under strict liability can be modeled by 
equating A’s marginal private benefits and marginal private costs: 46  
 
 ݔ௥ + ߜ(ݕ௦ǉ ) + ݍ஺ݒ + ݕ௦ǉ ߜᇱ(ݕ௦ǉ ) = ܾ(ݕ௦ǉ ) + ݓ஻ݖ + ݕ௦ǉ ܾᇱ(ݕ௦ǉ ) (9) 
 
The left side of the equation is the marginal private costs to A, the right side the 
marginal benefits to A.47 
Similarly, the optimal level of activity, ݕ௡ǉ , for A under negligence can be shown:48 
 
 ݔ௥ + ߜ(ݕ௡ǉ ) + ݍ஻ݒ + ݕ௡ǉ ߜᇱ(ݕ௡ǉ ) = ܾ(ݕǉ௡) +ݓ஻ݖ + ݕǉ௡ܾᇱ(ݕ௡ǉ ) (10) 
 
Comparing these two optimality equations, one can readily observe the role of ݍ஺ 
and ݍ஻; the relative risks determine the optimal activity levels:  
i) A will chose the same private activity level under both strict liability 
and negligence rules if ݍ஺ = ݍ஻.49 
ii) If a negligence rule is imposed, and if A poses a higher external risk 
than B, ݍ஺ > ݍ஻,  
(a) then A will chose a higher level of activity than the strict liability 
rule would determine for A, 50 
(b) but B would be incentivized to select a lower level of activity than 
he would under strict liability. 51 
 
Hylton summarized these results:  
 
 “Where there is asymmetry in risk externalization, negligence causes 
high risk-externalizers to increase their activity levels while low risk-
externalizers decrease their activity levels.” 52 
 
3. Hylton’s Quadrant of Negligence, Strict Liability and Subsidy/No 
Liability 
A negligence rule in the faced with asymmetrical externalization of risks results in 
more extreme behavior from the actors than under a rule of strict liability. The risky 
actors act more, the less risky act less.  
 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  A will only receive the benefits provided by B, A would not model the benefits conferred to B 
or other actors. Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Id., at 12. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  Id. 
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Furthermore, taking into account the previously issues with strict liability’s 
potential to detriment externalized social benefits, there should probably be a bias 
for employing negligence when such a condition exists.  
Under a strict liability rule, the marginal social costs curve would set lower 
values of y than the private marginal cost curve. 53  This is because the actor 
discounts the self-imposed harms and is only reactive to the harms posed externally 
to other actors. 54 Yet, the social to private analysis lies in the reverse direction for 
the marginal social and private benefit costs curves. The cost curves suggest the 
private actor would select more activity than the social community and the benefits 
curves suggest that the private actor would choose less than the social community 
would choose. 55 
The results are thus ambiguous at first glance, but they do clearly emerge from 
an analysis of two relationships; (i) the ratios of externalized probabilistic risks 
(ݍ஺: ݍ஻), and the ratios of externalized probabilistic benefits (ݓ஺:ݓ஻).56  
Hylton provided a review of four cases:  
1. (ݍ஺ > ݍ஻) and (ݓ஺ > ݓ஻). ܣ provides exceptional externalized risks and 
benefits. ܣ  externalizes both more risks, ݍ஺ , and more benefits, ݓ஺ , 
than his average community of actors externalize to the community. 57 
2. (ݍ஺ > ݍ஻) and (ݓ஺ ൑ ݓ஻). ܣ is risky but of average benefits. ܣ external-
izes more risks, ݍ஺, than the norm, but ܣ provides the same or fewer 
externalized benefits, ݓ஺, compared to the norm in his community of 
actors. 58   
3. (ݍ஺ ൑ ݍ஻ ) and (ݓ஺ > ݓ஻ ). ܣ  provides exceptional benefits at normal 
risks. ܣ provides the same or fewer externalized risks, ݍ஺ , than the 
norm, but externalizes more externalized benefits, ݓ஺ , against the 
norm in his community of actors. 59   
4. (ݍ஺ ൑ ݍ஻) and (ݓ஺ ൑ ݓ஻). ܣ is normal in externalized risk and benefits. 
ܣ provides the same or fewer externalized risks and benefits as com-
pared against the norms in his community. 60   
 
 
53  Id., at 14. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
382_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
Hylton’s Positive Theory of Strict Liability 
352 
Table 3: Liability Rule Expectations based on Externalized Benefits and Risks 
  External Benefits 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
R
is
ks
 
 ࢝࡭ > ࢝࡮  ࢝࡭ ൑ ࢝࡮  
ࢗ࡭ > ࢗ࡮  I. Negligence (probably)  II. Strict Liability  
ࢗ࡭ ൑ ࢗ࡮  III. Subsidy (no liability)  IV. Negligence  
   
   
 
Given that the models are probabilistic and that the goal of legal policy is to 
obtain results in the greater good, policy directions can be developed from these 
observations. This analysis provides an answer to those calling for rules of civil 
liability to provide a more explicit and positive model to address both the positive 
and negative externalities of the effects of those rules.61  
Strict liability is most likely to be of benefit to policy makers when (ݍ஺ > ݍ஻) 
and (ݓ஺ ൑ ݓ஻), i.e., when A displays extraordinary risks without sufficient offsetting 
benefits to the community. Negligence would see A undertake excessive activity, 
causing inefficiently high numbers of accidents to B, who would reduce his own 
activity to minimize his damages.62  
In the opposite direction is when A displays extra-ordinary benefits to the 
community with average risk; such a situation might be given a no liability rule or a 
subsidy, effectively the same, to encourage A to undertake more of this beneficial 
activity.63  
Hylton proposed that negligence is likely to be most effective or efficient when 
the risks ratios are symmetrical or when the externalized risks and benefits are well-
balanced with each other because “communities are likely to form around activities 
that cross-externalize similar risks.”64  
Hylton applies the model to explain the common law approach of strict 
liability for dangerous activities. In reference to the United States’ Restatement Tort 
2nd § 520, he develops an argument that the six-part definition therein of abnormally 
dangerous activities matches well the second quadrant of Table 9.5.65  
Those six elements of the definition are listed: 
  
“In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the 
following factors are to be considered: (a) existence of a high degree of 
risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; (b) 
 
61  M. G. Faure, Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from CO2 Storage Sites, 52 (2013) 
(unpublished manuscript)(on file with author). See also I. Gilead, Tort Law and Internalization: 
The Gap Between Private Loss and Social Cost, 17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 589 (1997). 
62  See Quadrant II of Table 3. Hylton, supra at note 1, at 15. 
63  See Quadrant III of Table 3. Id. 
64  See Quadrant I and IV of Table 3. Quadrant I is the high risk/high benefit case that probably 
merits negligence to ensure sufficient production of externalized benefits. Quadrant IV is the 
routine case wherein most ordinary activities with balanced risks and benefits fit. Id. 
65  Id., at 18-19. 
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likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability 
to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to 
which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) 
inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on 
and; (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by 
its dangerous attributes.” 66 
 
The argument is quickly made: (a), (b), and (c) are the queries to inquire if the risk 
externalized by A, even under reasonable care, is excessive to the norm, i.e. ݍ஺ > ݍ஻ 
— if so then strict liability should be applied; (d) is an inquiry to determine 
reciprocity, within this model Hylton states it is equivalent to testing for “if ݍܣ ് ݍ஻ 
then apply strict liability;” (e) is a similar inquiry to reciprocity but based on locality 
norm basis, within this non-geographical model that concept models essentially the 
same as for (d); and (f) appears to be a ranking of asymmetrical risk versus 
asymmetrical benefits, if externalized risks to harm outweigh externalized benefits 
then strict liability should be applied.67  
In conclusion, Hylton’s Positive Theory of Strict Liability provided a discourse 
on which to evaluate the externalized risks of harm and the externalized social 
benefits of a given risky activity. The model provides broader support for the 
application of negligence rules without frustrating the original Shavell-Landes-
Posner models.  
Ultimately, the model suggests that strict liability is correctly limited in 
efficient applications when externalized benefits are more fully accounted for 
within a framework. More specifically, strict liability should be reserved for those 
cases when the activity poses extensive social costs without counter-balancing social 
benefits. In other cases, some version of negligence rules should be employed. There 
is a minor case wherein externalized social benefits are obtained with little to no 
externalized social costs; for these cases no-liability rules or even subsidies should 
be provided.  
 
  
 
66  Id. 
67  Id., at 19-20.  
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NUSSIM AND TABBACH ON DURABLE PRECAUTIONS AND 
INTERACTIVE DECISIONS 
Nussim and Tabbach suggest that the standard model makes several assumptions 
that merit revisiting.1 They call their extension of the standard model a “durable 
precaution” model.2  
First, they question if the assumption that precaution costs are proportionate 
to activity levels; in particular, their model contrasts the roles of durable precautions 
as opposed to the general model’s non-durable or consumable precautions. 3  
Durable precautions are said to be buy once, use multiple times; non-durable 
precautions are bought once, used once. 4 Further, the costs of durable precautions 
may be wholly uncorrelated with the activity level. 5A lit exit sign in a movie theater 
is such a durable precaution as would be safety and training education.6 It can be 
difficult to model the costs of durable precautions, because “the marginal 
effectiveness of care may fall due to fatigue or wear and tear, increase under 
specialization, or remain unchanged if the means of care is perfectly durable.” 7 
Second, they note that activity level may affect marginal expected harm in 
non-linear ways; the marginal expected harm could be both increased or decreased 
with additional levels of activity. 8 
Third, they note that care and activity levels are interdependent; the marginal 
effects of one aspect impact the marginal behavior of the other. 9 Due to this 
interdependency, the socially optimal behavior of tortfeasors cannot be determined 
 
1  J. Nussim & A. D. Tabbach, A Revised Model of Unilateral Accidents, 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 169, 
169 (2009).  
2  Id., at 170. 
3  Id., at 169. 
4  Id., at 169-170. 
5  Id., at 170. 
6  Id. 
7  Id., at footnote No. 6 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
386_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
Nussim and Tabbach on Durable Precautions 
356 
in a two-step process but rather requires that the level of care and of activity be 
solved simultaneously. 10  
Fourth, the impact of the previous two notes drives a change in the analyses of 
mis-estimated damages for strict liability and negligence. 11 E.g., the standard model 
suggested that if damages were consistently set lower than actual harms then under 
a strict liability rule the tortfeasor would take insufficient precaution and engage in 
excessive activity level; but that analysis ignores the interdependency effect 
between activity level and precaution. 12 
Fifth, the model suggests that the issues of insolvent tortfeasors and of 
underestimation of damages are more distinct than observed under the standard 
model. 13 The effects of interdependency go in different directions for these two 
issues. 14 
Overall, the model presented is a model of unilateral accidents. 15 No 
contractual relationships are assumed between the tortfeasor and the victim, they 
are assumed to be strangers to each other. 16  Both activity level and levels of 
precaution are determinants of risk. 17 Victims play no role in the determination of 
risk, risk remains within the control of the tortfeasors. 18 
 
 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id., at 171. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. 
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Table 1: Elements of the Durable Precaution Model 
Term  Explanation  
ݖ  Tortfeasor’s activity level  
 ݖ௠௔௫  Upper boundary limit to ݖ  
ݔ  Tortfeasor’s precautionary level  
ݑ(ݖ)  Tortfeasor’s utility, based on activity level ݖ  
 ݑᇱ(ݖ) > 0  utility increases with more care  
 ݑᇱᇱ(ݖ) < 0  diminishing marginal returns  
ܿ(ݔ, ݖ)  Cost of precautionary level.19  
݄(ݔ, ݖ)  Expected level of harm, based on activity level, ݖ, and 
precautionary level, ݔ.20  
݌(ݔ, ݖ)  probability of accidents given a specific level of care and 
of activity.  
 ݌ᇱ(ݔ) < 0  increased precaution reduces 
probability of accidents  
 ݌ᇱᇱ(ݔ) > 0  increasing marginal returns  
 
The social objective is the sum of the utility less the costs of precaution and less the 
costs of harms and injuries to victims.  
 
 ܬ(ݔ, ݖ) = ݑ(ݖ) െ ܿ(ݔ, ݖ) െ ݄(ݔ, ݖ) (1) 
 
With the attendant requirements for an interior solution:  
 
 െ݄௫(ݔ, ݖ) = ܿ௫(ݔ, ݖ) (2) 
 
 ݑ௭ = ܿ௭(ݔ, ݖ) + ݄௭(ݔ, ݖ) (3) 
 
The rational condition that marginal investment in precaution is met by the 
marginal reduction in accident costs is set. Also, the marginal costs of increasing the 
activity level equal the marginal social costs of additional activity. These are 
impacted by their interdependency:21 
 
 ߲
ଶܬ(ݔ, ݖ)
߲ݔ߲ݖ = െܿ௫௭(ݔ, ݖ) െ ݄௫௭(ݔ, ݖ) (4) 
 
Certain behavioral options can be identified within this framework. First, consider 
the case of specialization, wherein exposure to a risky activity decreases the 
 
19  Not necessarily Shavell's c(ݔ, ݖ) = ݔݖ, but potentially many other function types as well. See id. 
Also see footnote No. 18. 
20  This model does not assume ݄௫௭(ݔ, ݖ) = 0, in that the relationship is potentially nonlinear. See 
id. Also at  footnotes No. 19 and 20. 
21  This can be contrasted with the standard model's assumption that ഃమ಻(ೣ,೥)ഃೣഃ೥ = 0. Id. 
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marginal costs of precaution; ܿ௫௭(ݔ, ݖ) < 0 . 22  The result is that precaution and 
activity are complements. Second, fatigue could cause the costs of precaution to 
increase with activity levels; thus increases in either activity level or in precaution 
increase the costs of precaution: ܿ௫௭(ݔ, ݖ) > 0. 23 When the fatigue effect is strong, 
then precaution and activity levels become substitutes. 24  
Retaining the behavioral assumption that the likelihood of harm is linearly 
related to the activity level of the tortfeasor, given a certain level of precaution, the 
model posits harm: 25 
 
 ݄(ݔ, ݖ) = ݌(ݔ)ݖ݄ (5) 
 
If the precautionary measures are durable precautions, then they can be 
characterized as ܿ(ݔ, ݖ) = ݔ.26 The resultant socially optimal results are simpler than 
the broader model, 27 supra:  
 
 ܬ(ݔ, ݖ) = ݑ(ݖ) െ ݔ െ ݖ݌(ݔ)݄ (6) 
 
 െݖ݌ᇱ(ݔ)݄ = 1 (7) 
 
 ݑᇱ(ݖ) = ݌(ݔ)݄ (8) 
 
The optimal choices driven by this variation of the model are denoted as ݔכ and ݖכ. 
Precaution and activity are complements.28 E.g., increasing precautions decreases 
the marginal expected costs of activity, in terms of generating expected harms, and 
thereby provides an incentive for higher levels of activity. 29 
For the negligence rule, this provides an unexpected result; when faced with 
high costs of ascertaining the effects of interdependency on resultant activity level 
and undertaken precautions, legislators and judges should set the value of due care 
higher than the otherwise established efficient level of care, at some ݔ > ݔכ . 30  
Legislators and judges cannot simply determine the activity level by setting a 
simple due care level, in that interdependency effects will require a simultaneous 
solution to both activity level and level of care.31 In some sense, this is captured by 
the idea of jointly permitting certain activity levels and safety standards within an 
 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  The input of either reduces the other, ceteris paribus: ഃమ಻(ೣ,೥)ഃೣഃ೥ < 0 
25  Id. 
26  Id., at 172. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id., at 173. 
31  Id., at 172. In some sense, this is captured by the idea of jointly permitting certain activity 
levels and safety standards within an environmental regulatory setting; as such, to the extent 
that regulatory means can better combine these two targets than civil liability might, 
regulatory means would be preferable. 
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environmental regulatory setting; as such, to the extent that regulatory means can 
better combine these two targets than civil liability might, regulatory means would 
be preferable.  
But much of the information needed to make such determinations is hidden or 
costly. Also, the durable aspects of precautions disconnect the costs of care from the 
activity level. So, the ideal rate to set the due care level at a level that solves 
െݖ݌௠௔௫ᇱ (ݔ)݄ = 1, 32 which is the optimand from above under durable precautions 
but set at the maximum level of safety available. This policy does not have a design 
intent to reduce activity by setting due care levels high, but instead is designed to 
match higher levels of activity with higher levels of precaution. 33 It is tantamount to 
observing that the costs of precaution are, on a unit basis, cheaper as the activity 
level increases.  
Thus, when it is difficult for the policy maker to determine the impact of their 
due care or activity level prescriptions, and when negligence allows a setting for 
due care levels but not activity levels, then the policy maker should set due care 
levels at a level higher than the otherwise socially optimal level. 34 
The mis-estimation of damages affects both the strict liability rule set and the 
negligence rule set. The mis-estimation of damages is believed to be a wide spread 
problem in the real world. 35 There are a variety of transaction costs problems that 
frustrate correct damage setting. 36 Punitive damages attempt top correct for some of 
those issues, but they are likewise frustrated by transaction costs problems. 37 The 
model is extended to include a function for the mis-estimation of damages; ݄(ߛ) =
݄ߛ, wherein ߛ is a representation of the error rate.38 This leads to the following 
reinterpretations of the basic optimands: 39 
 
 ܬ(ݔ, ݖ) = ݑ(ݖ) െ ݔ െ ݖ݌(ݔ)݄ߛ (9) 
 
 െݖ݌ᇱ(ݔ)݄ߛ = 1 (10) 
 
 ݑᇱ(ݖ) = ݌(ݔ)݄ߛ (11) 
 
Within these requirements, stable forecasts of policy setting for tortfeasors 
under rules of strict liability can be achieved only within two results. If damages are 
overestimated, then both care and activity level will be increased if and only if the 
elasticity of the probability of accidents given a level of precaution exceeds the 
 
32  Id., at 173. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id., at 174. 
38  Id. In this model ߛ = 1 represents no error, ߛ > 1 represents overestimation of error, and 0 < ߛ 
< 1 represents underestimation of error. 
39  Id.. 
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elasticity of the first derivative of the same.40 On the other hand, overestimated 
damages will decrease both activity and precautions if and only if the elasticity of 
the first derivative of the utility function is less than unity.41 All other results are left 
a mix of up in one aspect and down in the other, making results mixed, all due to 
the interdependency effects. The direct and indirect results of a specific policy may 
well be in conflict, creating a lack of clear effect. A rule of strict liability is not very 
robust when presented with mis-estimated damages and interdependent activity 
and precaution decisions.  
For a tortfeasor under a negligence rule, there are several results. First, under 
systematic overestimation of damages, ߛ > 1, the tortfeasors would operate at the 
prescribed level of care, ݔכ, and at maximum levels of activity, ݖ௠௔௫.42 Second, under 
systematic underestimation of damages, 0 < ߛ < 1 , the tortfeasors would face 
strategic choices.43 If the estimate error is small, then the tortfeasor will exercise due 
care, x*, and operate at maximum levels of activity, ݖ௠௔௫.44 However, if the error is 
significant enough, then the tortfeasor will exercise a lesser level of care, ݔ෤ < ݔכ, and 
operate below maximum levels of activity, ݖǁ < ݖ௠௔௫ . 45  Thus, only when the 
underestimation is substantial will the negligence rule not achieve due care. 46 
However, even in that case, a solution such as provided for uncertain legislators, 
supra, can be employed to counterbalance this result.  
Thus, in the face of mis-estimated damages and interdependent activity and 
precaution decisions negligence is more robust than strict liability.  
Shavell demonstrated that under insolvency constraints, the strict liability 
rules were likely to provide incentives to the tortfeasor to undertake insufficient 
precaution and over-engage in activity.47 When the durable precaution model is 
extended to the insolvency problem, it becomes a three tier analysis, when the assets 
exceed the expected costs of damages, when they equal them, and when the assets 
are less than the expected costs of damages. When the assets exceed the expected 
costs of damages, ܣ > ݖכ݄, then there are no effective constraints preventing the 
tortfeasor from choosing optimal levels of activity and precaution, ݔכand ݖכ.48  
However, if the marginal utility to the tortfeasor of additional activity do not 
decline, as in diminishing returns, then the tortfeasor is likely to pursue maximum 
activity levels, ݖ௠௔௫. 49 When the assets are less than or equal to the expected costs of 
damages, ܣ ൑ ݖכ݄ , then the tortfeasor faces declining marginal costs of damages as 
 
40  Id. See െቀ௣ᇲ(௫)௣(௫) ቁݔ > െቀ
௣ᇲᇲ(௫)
௣ᇲ(௫)ቁ ݔ 
41  Id. See - ቀ௨ᇲᇲ(௫)௨ᇲ(௫)ቁ ݖ < 1. 
42  Id. An overestimate of damages costs reinforces the calculus to avoid damages by operating at 
the due care level. 
43  Id. 
44  Id., at 174-175. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  Id., at 175, citing to Shavell 1986. 
48  Id., at 176. 
49  Id. 
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the activity level increases; those costs “plummet to zero.”50 This drop in costs 
encourages the tortfeasor to engage in the maximum level of activity, ݖ௠௔௫. This has 
a secondary effect on the precautionary level, which drops below the prescriptive 
level of care, ݔ෤ ൑ ݔכ.51  
These results are roughly in alignment with Shavell’s analysis on insolvency, 
but they diverge from the mis-estimation analyses and thus clarify that the choice of 
civil liability rules need to take these matters into separate account.  
 
  
 
50  Id., at 175. 
51  Id. 
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NELL & RICHTER’S RISK ALLOCATION MODEL 
Nell and Richter report that if a risky activities face imperfect insurance markets, 
then a negligence rule should be preferred to a rule of strict liability.1 They hold that 
the central equivalency of strict liability and negligence in the standard models is 
based (or biased) on the assumption that the actors involved are risk neutral.2 While 
not addressing all types of torts, they argue that for certain highly risky activities 
the assumption of risk aversion may both be unwarranted and incorrect.3  
They provide a list of reasons that corporate entities might be risk averse: 4  
i. corporate notions of risk aversion operate only for well-financed 
diversified portfolio holders which is contrary to many investors both 
private and public,  
ii. even for such parties as qualify as well-diversified portfolio holders, 
they can only achieve genuine risk neutrality if there is no system risk 
component which might not be true for certain highly risky 
(investment) activities,  
iii. there is much evidence of structural imperfections in the capital 
market which could frustrate efforts to diversify risk,  
iv. transaction costs tend to prevent portfolios from being sufficiently 
diversified,  
v. entrepreneurial decisions within firms are made by risk averse 
humans who are guided by careful strategies to remain in 
employment and are often rewarded for conservative stewardship of 
capital, and  
vi. those same human managers will have the potential to display risk 
aversion or pessimism against the risk of large losses.  
 
1  Nell & Richter 2003, p. 31. 
2  Id., at 32. 
3  Id., at 33. 
4  Id. 
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They developed a risk allocation model wherein the victims are risk averse, as are 
the injurers. 5 Risk allocation matters to risk averse actors; as such, the liability rules 
under risk aversion yield different results from the standard models. 6A loss of rule 
symmetry is observable as soon as risk aversion is introduced. 7They find that when 
a market-based relationship exists between the parties, the rule of negligence will be 
strongly preferable to strict liability. 8 Even when there is no market-based 
relationship between the parties, they also find a preference for negligence because 
strict liability leads to suboptimal levels of welfare enhancing activities. 9 
 
Table 1: Nell and Richter's Risk Aversion and Risk Allocation Model 
Term Explanation 
݊ Number of victims 
 ݊ ൒ 1 There are a positive number of 
victims 
ܮ෨ The losses for each victim; subject to a 2 point 
distribution : (ܮଵ,݌, 0)  
 0 < ݌ < 1 Losses are probabilistic. 
 ܮଵ > 0 Losses are of a positive cost. 
ݔ Tortfeasor’s care or precaution level 
 ݔ௠௔௫ Ceiling of prevention capacity 
ܿ(ݔ) Cost of care to the tortfeasor 
ݑ Utility of the tortfeasor 
ݒ Utility of the victim 
ݍ Division of loss borne by tortfeasor 
 0 ൑ ݍ ൑ 1 Tortfeasor could have all or 
none of the losses. 
ߙ Risk aversion of the tortfeasor 
 ߙ > 0 Tortfeasor is risk averse 
ߚ Risk aversion of the victim 
 ߚ > 0 Victim is risk averse 
 
Further, they suggest that develop and use of the insurance market for stability in 
financial planning strongly supports the idea that even well financed corporations 
face risk-averse management and shareholders. 10 But even that market is flawed, 
suggesting that firms that turn to insurance in risk aversion strategies need retain 
elements of their risks, as unwanted as those risks might be. For highly risky 
activities, there is often insufficient data to determine actuarially fair rates, 
 
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  Id., at 34. 
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especially if the pool of parties with similar behaviours or scale of needs is small. 11 
Thus rational decision makers would not leave their whole risk strategy to merely 
insurance. 12 Even if they did want to try to cover all of their liability needs with 
insurance, many liability insurance providers, if not most, require the retention of 
some level of risk by the purchaser to prevent fraud or mishandling of events. 13 
Nell and Richter suspect two reasons for the lack of attention paid to risk 
averse models of liability rules. 14 First, they suspect that the mathematics of risk 
aversion is complicated and efficiency in either negligence or strict liability is 
quickly lost. 15 Second, they suggest that to be able to enforce risk averse model 
rules in court might require the courts to know the utility functions facing the 
parties; such information would be at least expensive to obtain even if it could or 
would be produced by the parties. 16  Nell and Richter suggest that such a 
knowledge requirement is not involved for certain highly risky activities and so 
analysis and eventual application can be sustained. 17 
They also present an argument that it is mathematically important to 
differentiate between models of a singular victim and models of multiple victims, 
that risk neutrality provides equivalent results for both abstract singular victim and 
multiple count victims but that risk aversion has distinguishable results for the to 
cases.18 They provide a proof that the optimal level of care increases as the number 
of potential victims is countably increased. They demonstrate that the marginal cost 
of loss prevention is the negated product of the number of countable victims and 
the marginal expected loss as activity is increased. That is,19 
 
 ܿᇱ(ݔ) = െ݊ቆ݀ܧ[ܮ
෨|ݔ]
݀ݔ ቇ (1) 
  
Notably, the model does not take into account distinct injuries, just the overall 
composite total of injury across all of the victims and their harms. Thus, for specific 
 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. As evidence of lack of attention to such models, they do provide reference to papers by A. 
ENDRES, & R. SCHWARZE, Allokationswirkungen einer Umwelthaftpflicht-versicherung, in 
HAFTUNG UND VERSICHERUNG FÜR UMWELTSCHÄDEN AUS ÖKONOMISCHER UND JURISTISCHER 
SICHT, 58 (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1992), and F. Privileggi, C. Marchese, & A. Cassone, 
Agent’s Liability Versus Principal’s Liability When Attitudes Toward Risk Differ, 21(2) Int’l Rev. L. 
Econ. 181 (2001), as well to as several articles by Shavell, but the references are without 
specifics of topics or models on point. 
15  Nell & Richter, supra at note 1, at 34. 
16  Id. 
17  Id., at 34-35. 
18  Id., at 35. 
19   Wherein c(ݔ) is the cost of loss prevention, E[ܮ෨|ݔ]  are the expected losses given an activity 
level of x, and n is the countable number of identical potential victims, n א Zahlen. See id., at 
36. 
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forms of highly risky activities, an abstract victim might be used in the model, so 
long as the underlying assumptions are kept in mind.20  
The model then develops an optimal liability rule given a framework 
perspective of risk sharing. The risk aversions coefficients for the tortfeasor and the 
victim are denoted as ߙ and ߚ, respectively.21 The tortfeasor’s share of liability is 
ݍ א (0 ൑ ݍ ൑ 1); the victim’s share of risk is similarly (1 െ ݍ). The optimal liability 
for the injurer, meeting due care ݔ௠௔௫, is found to be:22 
 
 ݍכ = ࢼ݊ߙ + ߚ (2) 
  
This result provides that as the number of potential victims increases (and the 
tortfeasor is exercising due care ݔ௠௔௫ ) the correct assignment of risk allocation 
should shift from the injurer to the victims at large. This match the results of the 
negligence rule; the negligence rule emerges from this equation as ݍכ ՜ 0 as ݊ ՜ λ. 
Strict liability provides the opposite result, in ݍכ ՜ 1 as ݊ ՜ λ, and assigns all of the 
risk to the injurer. Negligence with a due care level set at the maximum level of care 
is the optimal rule, whereas strict liability is equally not optimal.  
The next step of the risk allocation model looks to the provision and impact of 
insurance on the parties risk allocation strategies. The end result is revealed to be 
that negligence is more robust than strict liability when n is large or when the 
insurers are risk averse. 23 If insurance markets were perfect, then injurers and 
victims could both eliminate their risks in exchange for purchasing insurance 
policies; but in the real world liability insurance limits coverage to leave some risks 
with the purchasers.24  
In the first sub-model, wherein insurers are assumed to be risk neutral, 
insurance premiums are assumed to be a combination of expected payments to 
claims, i.e. expected losses, and some form of proportional loadings. The loading 
factor is denoted m in the model and the level of coverage is denoted as ݀ א
(0 ൑ ݀ ൑ 1). 25 If the insurer charges a positive loading fee, ݉ > 0, then customers 
will choose coverage less than unitary because their expected claims and premiums 
would otherwise be equivalent, thus paying for the load and premium would be 
irrational. Thus they elect to pay for a coverage ݀ < 1, yet they do rationally choose 
insurance because it addresses their risk aversion, so they buy coverage ݀ > 0, thus 
integrated we obtain 0 ൑ ݀ ൑ 1. 26  This, plus the analysis related to optimization, 
results in a new optimal social liability sharing rule:  
  
 
20  Id., at 35. 
21  Where Ƚ > 0 and Ⱦ > 0. Id., at 37. 
22  Id., at 39. 
23  Id., at 42. 
24  Id., at 40. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
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 ݍכ = ࢼ݊ߙ(1െ ݀כ) + ߚ (3) 
 
As the amount of insurance coverage available increases, the amount of risk to 
be allocated to the injurer increases, ݍכ ՜ 1 as ݀ ՜ 1.27 Another way of saying this is 
that the optimal amount of liability for the injurer increases as the amount of 
insurance becomes available; the intuition herein is that if the injurer can purchase 
insurance efficiently then it is more efficient for social welfare for the risk to be 
moved from victim to injurer and onto the insurer, i.e. from the most risk averse 
towards less risk averse parties. 28. But there is a limit, in that injurers won’t buy full 
insurance so long as there is a positive loading fee, ݉ > 0, so ݀ will remain ݀ < 1, 
and ݍכ will not reach 1. However, there is simply no convergence to the negligence 
rule as was seen above. 29  
Yet, at sufficiently high levels of n, the maximum level of care becomes 
optimal. 30 Given the result that insurance companies will charge for claims and for 
loading fees, and that customer cum injurers will not pay for full coverage, neither 
strict liability nor negligence approximate the optimal solution. 31  
The efficiency of loading is critical, as ݉ ՜ 0, strict liability becomes more 
robust and as m, diverges from zero negligence becomes more robust. 32 Ergo, the 
more costly it is to provide insurance, the more negligence is preferable and the less 
costly insurance is the more strict liability is preferable.  
When the sub-model is altered to reflect risk averse insurers, then risk 
premiums would be expected to grow at a faster than linear rate. 33 As the insurers 
become wealth-affected, and as they bear proportionately more of the risk, their 
loading factor would grow. This would create a large ݉, so that loading costs would 
be high. In a repeat of analysis, supra, the negligence rule is preferable when ݉ 
diverges from zero. In short, strict liability has been preferable only when parties 
are risk neutral or when insurance is readily available, which in turn appears to 
require risk neutral insurance providers. 34 When the ideal terms for strict liability 
are not present, then strict liability leads to insufficient activity levels and 
increasingly less so as ݊ ՜ 0. 35 
Nell and Richter then make a clear argument that for sufficiently “large n the 
risky activity would be completely prevented, even if it is socially desirable 
according to,” the social welfare function. 36 
 
27  Id., at 41. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id., at 42. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id., at 43. 
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Finally, Nell and Richter load the whole wagon; if the injurer decides the level 
of activity as well as the level of care, and if there is a market relationship between 
the injurers and the victims, then the optimal rule would be negligence with a 
standard of care set to the maximum level of care; it would be superior to strict 
liability for highly risky activities. 37 Negligence is said to yield both optimal care 
and activity levels. In terms of risk allocation, negligence is seen as superior to strict 
liability for those activities with potential to affect large numbers of victims; also the 
same obtains when insurance markets display significant transaction costs or 
imperfections. 38.  
Nell and Richter find that strict liability rules that exclude events that could 
not have been prevented by modern technology or were otherwise unknown to 
science are actually functionally negligence rules with very restrictive senses of due 
care; it is the notion in their model of negligence with maximum care. 39 I.e., to avoid 
liability to victims all known feasible means must be undertaken. 40  
  
 
37  Id. 
38  Id., at 44. 
39  Id., at 45. 
40  Id. 
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GLACHANT’S ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION MODEL 
Glachant offers a critical appraisal of the Shavell analysis; informational asymmetry 
may present an intractable problem for policy makers in the choice of civil liability, 
regulation, or nothing at all.1  
1. Information acquisitions bear transaction costs. 
At the root of Glachant’s concerns is that Coase may have suggested a deeper 
paradigmatic shift than accounted for by Shavell, that costs of information searches 
are themselves a form of transaction costs and if they are included in the overall cost 
analysis the clarity to pursue regulatory guidance in the face of informational 
uncertainty or asymmetry might incomplete.2  
In fact, Glachant argued, it may be impossible to discern when civil rules, 
regulations or no policy at all might be preferable if the sum of the overall set of 
transaction costs is not readily resolvable.3 In such models, it is assumed that the 
regulator is less informed than the actor; the actor is closer to the facts or 
technologies that affect the safety levels.4 But in turn, the actor is less informed 
about the potential harms and hazards, particularly as they impact third parties 
beyond the actor. 5  
Due to the state of incomplete or imperfect data, economic tools are employed 
instead of direct quota systems, to enable the actor to integrate sufficient data to 
 
1  M. GLACHANT, The Use of Regulatory Mechanism Design in Environmental Policy: A Theoretical 
Critique, in:  SUSTAINABILITY AND FIRMS: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE CHANGING 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT, 179, en passim (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1998). 
2  Id., at 9-10. 
3  Id. 
4  Id., at 3. 
5  Id. 
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determine an efficient level of activity and of care. 6 A tax may be used to transfer 
information to the actor. 7 
2. Information Exchange as a Game Model 
If the regulator were to ask the actor for his estimated impact costs of pollution 
abatement, the actor would be tempted to over-report his costs in order to minimize 
the policy decision’s impact on his operations. 8 As Glachant stated the problem:  
 
ę[C]ommunication between agents is subject to strategic manipulation 
if (i) the objectives sought by the emitter and the receptor differ and 
(ii) the receptor’s decision influence emitter’s gains.” 9 
 
Table 8-1: Elements of Glachant's Asymmetrical Model 
Term Explanation 
݅ Actor ݅; there are ݊ actors 
ܥ௜ . Private pollution abatement costs for each actor ݅. 10 
 ܥ௜ᇱᇱ(ݍ௜) > 0 Higher safety objectives are increasingly 
expensive for each actor. 11 
 ܥ௜(0) = 0 The costs of no regulated objectives is 
no costs. 12 
ܤ Social welfare benefit due to avoided external costs. 13 
 ܤᇱᇱ(ܳ) < 0 Higher safety standards for the 
regulator result in decreasingly lower 
marginal social welfare benefits. 14 
 ܤᇱ(0) > ܥᇱ(0) At the beginning, the marginal increase 
in social welfare benefits exceeds the 
marginal costs to achieve them15 
ݍ௜ . Private pollution abatement objective to be met by actor 
݅.16 
 
 
6  Id. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  Id., at 4. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Thus providing the logical operand to regulate the private actors. Id. 
16  Id. 
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Glachant proposed using a model between a regulator and ݊ actors. The goal of the 
regulator in such a scenario is to design a policy which allows the efficient 
allocation of private objectives,17  
 
 ܣכ = (ݍଵכ, . . . , ݍ௡כ ) (1) 
with, 18 
  
 ܥଵᇱ(ݍଵכ) =. . . = ܥ௜ᇱ(ݍ௜כ) =. . . = ܥ௡ᇱ(ݍ௡כ ) = ܤᇱ ቀ෍ݍ௜ቁ (2) 
 
In order to obtain the necessary information, we need to add݉௜, the message sent by 
actor ݅ about his costs, ܥ௜ .19 The contents of message ݉௜ can be true or false. 20 The 
regulator is then required to commit to a message, that for each ݊ -tuple of messages 
(݉ଵ, . . . ,݉௡) there will be a policy result ܣ that is the space of allocations, 21 
  
 ܨ: (݉ଵ, . . . ,݉௡) ՜ ܣ = (ݍଵ, . . . , ݍ௡) (3) 
 
By making this ex ante commitment to connect the actors’ messages with specific 
policy results, the regulator has provided each actor with sufficient information to 
understand the consequences of each actor’s ݉௜ . 22  Because of the regulator’s 
transparent commitment to ܨ ՜ ܣ, each actor has an incentive to take into account 
not only his own strategy but also the strategies of all of the other  actors. 23 
These strategic interactions are the structure of a mathematical game. 24 ܩ(ܴ)  
is a game between the ݊ actors that strategically determine which values to place 
into their messages ݉௜ about their private pollution abatement costs, ܴ, so as to their 
respective gain from the message choice against the responsive regulation ܣ. 25 
The regulator searches for a collection of methods, ܨ, to transform the receipt 
of the messages into a functional policy ܣ that holds true for two conditions: 
  
i. that the regulator’s method can yield a specific policy each unique set of 
messages: ܨ(݉כ) = ܣכ,26 and  
ii. that for all combinations of private pollution abatement costs there will ex-
ist some set of messages from the ݊ actors that will establish an equilibrium 
 
17  Id. 
18  Id. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22  Id., at 5. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
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of the game: ׊ܴ, ݉כ is the equilibrium of ܩ(ܴ). 27   
 
Glachant states that indeed there is a menu of such methods to transform the 
messages from the actors into specific policies that will reveal the necessary 
information to the regulator.28  
It is the dynamic of the messages on the likely policy results that drive this 
potential to reveal information and balance the earlier recognized asymmetry.29  
3. Impacts of Transaction Costs on Policy Determination 
However, there are several concerns that this analysis reveals.  
First, an assumption of budgetary neutrality cannot be maintained, i.e., there 
will always be an effective capital flow from the regulator to the actors; subsidies 
will be provided for the information received. 30 
Second, because of the aforementioned capital leakage, the system is second 
best optimal. The results can be improved, but examples in the literature suggest 
that the mapping of F ĺ A might actually require drafting of unique policy 
instruments for each actor. 31 
As such, Glachant projects, in a Coasean manner, that the overall problem 
with routine mechanism design is that it assumes too readily zero-cost transaction 
costs to obtain information relevant for policy design. 32 As he states, “we are 
especially suspicious towards the zero administrative costs assumption.” 33 
He documents six problematic areas that are likely to not be zero-costs in the 
collecting or processing of information:  
 
i. The design of the menu options by the regulator. This is an exercise in 
scientific, engineering, and economic analysis of (݊ + 1) 
participants.34  
ii. The means of communicating the menu to the ݊ actors. 35 
iii. The strategic calculations undertaken by each actor to determine their 
message ݉௜  back to the regulator. 36 . Frankly, the interlinearity of 
actors responding to each other’s anticipatory strategies could be 
 
27  Id. 
28  Id., at 5-6. 
29  Id., at 6. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Id., at 7. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. And here is a latent assumption of a singular policy challenge; imagine the complexity 
facing real administrators facing numerous industrial settings. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
405_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Appendix II. F. 
 375 
computationally vexing in a way that would require next-best 
approximations.  
iv. The messages need to be correctly and timely collected and sorted by 
the regulator. 37 
v. The mapping of the received messages into a coherent and workable 
policy, especially if the policies need to be actor-specific, could be 
especially cost intensive. 38 
 
The results of Glachant’s study are that informational strategies do exist to rectify 
the observed informational asymmetries, but they will likely be costly and fail to 
efficiently resolve the needs of regulators. Thus, regulations might not be 
appropriately seen as more efficient than lawsuits in civil liability when 
informational asymmetry is too costly. But, the application of a regulatory process 
can suss out information that once acquired might aid either regulators or 
petitioners in addressing their Coasean negotiations or lawsuits.  
 
 
  
 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
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OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES AND CLIMATE CHANGE HAZARDS 
Anthropogenic climate change is a serious hazard from the development of offshore 
methane hydrates. The release of large volumes of carbon dioxide or of methane 
would be sufficient to cause worrisome impacts to climate stability.  
Climate change, it almost goes without saying, is one of the most severe 
threats facing humanity today. The signing of the UN’s Framework Convention on 
Climate Change was a turning point in the struggle for both recognition of the 
problem and a beginning of international legal standards to recognize the causes of 
anthropogenic climate change.1 It has been followed by a succession of agreements 
and understandings, most notably the Kyoto Accords.2 
The potential hazards of climate change are numerous and well-known; they 
include increasing severity of precipitation events, rising surface temperature with 
dramatic impacts on agriculture and livestock, rising ocean levels as ice sheets melt 
which turn threatens to flood many coastal and low-level areas of inhabitation, and 
the potential displacement of hundreds of millions of people around the globe. 
There are so many potential impacts that it is difficult to find any location or 
population that would not be substantially impacted by climate change; climate 
change is a global crisis in that every person would be affected. 
Methane hydrates release methane, that methane can in some cases become 
converted to carbon dioxide. Both methane and carbon dioxide are greenhouse 
gases and both enable additional climate change. There are multiple pathways in 
which either gas could become released from methane hydrate development 
projects.  
Thus, the risks from methane hydrate projects for increasing climate change 
hazards are both substantial and realistic and those risks must be squarely 
addressed prior to any development of such projects. 
 
1  92 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, New York, USA. 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 31 ILM 849 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
2  1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
December 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, 37 ILM 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
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1. Threat of Anthropogenic Climate Change from Methane Hydrates 
Several questions need to be addressed: 
i. What impact would the development of methane hydrates pose to the 
vectors of anthropogenic climate change? 
ii. Are the risks of offshore methane hydrates limited to their extraction 
sites, or do they persist downstream as well? 
iii. Would the recommendations of this present study have any effect on 
the prevention of anthropogenic climate change risks from offshore 
methane hydrate projects? 
1.1. Impact of Methane Hydrates on Anthropogenic Climate Change 
The development of offshore methane hydrates would enable both carbon dioxide 
and methane emissions to occur.3  
It is unclear what percent might be carbon dioxide or methane after oceanic 
metabolism of methane volumes and after atmospheric combustion events, but it 
would appear that most of the released emissions would be carbon dioxide. There 
are two primary reasons for this result;  
i. oceanic biota would metabolize the methane, and  
ii. all of the marketed methane would be combusted and most of the 
atmospherically vented methane would also be combusted.  
Thus, while volumes of methane would reach the atmosphere, the vast bulk of the 
greenhouse gas emissions from offshore methane hydrates would be from various 
sources of carbon dioxide. 
To what volume would be released would greatly depend on the future extent 
and scale of development project, on their locations vis-à-vis safe or unsafe deposit 
beds, and to the technologies and prevention methods employed; such are yet to be 
determined. It is the position of this present study that the ex ante development of 
appropriate governing mechanisms for offshore methane hydrates would assist to 
optimally set those decisions. 
1.2. Location of Risks 
The risks of emissions are not limited to their extraction locations. Those risks 
extend from the well site to the ultimate consumer. However, what risks extend 
beyond the offshore project to the consumer are already met in conventional 
offshore natural gas extraction projects. There are laws in place to both regulate the 
operational standards for safety, for the permitted emission and venting of natural 
gas, and for the safe distribution of natural gas in marketing lines.  
 
3  See the discussion, infra, at sec, 2. 
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To the extent that additional methane volumes would arise from the 
development of offshore methane hydrates, the problem might be characterized as 
an increase in activity level that might increase the likelihood of harm.4 
What is unique to offshore methane hydrates are the potential for novel harms 
that arise near to the hydrate deposits. The bulk of this study has focused on those 
harms. Those hazards are not properly addressed within existing mining or 
pollution laws.  
1.3. Addressing Climate Change Risks 
Methane hydrates are composed of methane and water. 5 Both in nature and in 
engineered settings, methane hydrates can be vented or emitted and subsequently 
be converted from methane into carbon dioxide. As such, the two gases of concern 
from the development of offshore methane hydrates are methane and carbon 
dioxide.  
Both carbon dioxide and methane are per se greenhouse gases under the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol called for the monitoring of all 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrogen 
oxides (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6).6  
Similarly, carbon dioxide and methane are both listed as greenhouse gases to 
be monitored under the EU’s Greenhouse Gas Mechanism program.7 The EU has 
committed itself and its Member States to reducing their emissions of greenhouse 
gases.8  
Such emissions are also arguably covered by the U.S.’s Clean Air Act, under 
the Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting for Petroleum and Natural Gas Systems,9 
 
4  While it is tempting to make an argument that abundant and cheap methane could displace 
dirtier fuels such as coal or crude oil, the underlying economics might be complex as those 
other energy resources competed on price and became available at lower costs to consumers. 
One possible outcome would include that cheaper methane might lead to increased 
consumption of cheaper dirty fuels as well.  
5  Methane hydrates are primarily the mixture of methane and water, of CH4 and H2O. The 
interactions of these two molecules can result in the release of various greenhouse gases such 
as carbon dioxide (CO2), carbon monoxide (CO), ozone (O2), and methane (CH4). 
6  Kyoto Protocol. Annex A. Greenhouse Gases. See also discussion on UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, supra at ch. 8, sec. 4. 
7  Decision No 280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 
2004 concerning a mechanism for monitoring Community greenhouse gas emissions and for 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol. O.J. (L 49). 1. [hereinafter Decision No 280/2004/EC] See  
Decision No 280/2004/EC , art. 3, sec. 1(a). See also Decision No 406/2009/EC, art. 2, sec. 1. 
8  Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the 
Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020. O.J. (L 140), 136 
9  See 40 CFR 98.232(a) and (b);  
“(a) You must report CO2, CH4, and N2O emissions from each industry segment specified in 
paragraph (b) through (i) of this section, CO2, CH4, and N2O emissions from each flare as 
specified in paragraph (b) through (i) of this section, and stationary and portable combustion 
Æ
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or by the federal Mineral Lands and Mining statutes within the U.S.10 Even where 
federal law is weak on methane gas emissions or on venting, state law often fills the 
gap within areas of state jurisdiction.11  
As such, potential greenhouse gas emissions are currently regulated in many 
jurisdictions. But those regulations assume a certain character of foreseeable 
emissions, as might be found at a factory or at a landfill. Methane hydrate extraction 
could enable greenhouse gas emissions of a character more in line with industrial 
accidents, thus additional governance might be usefully applied to the emissions of 
greenhouse gases from methane hydrate projects, such as was proposed in Chapter 
7. It has been found that those events that lead to methane and carbon dioxide leaks 
leading to climate change harm are also the events and acts that lead to other harms. 
Optimized incentives from a portfolio of governance mechanisms can be provided 
to operators and owners of offshore methane projects to impact their decisions on 
their activity level and care levels. By so doing, the risk of climate change causing 
emission could be controlled. 
Further, while this study does not advocate for the development of offshore 
methane hydrate resources, it does strongly advocate for the development and 
advancement of the governance mechanisms that could address these hazards from 
methane hydrates prior to the onset of such commercial investment projects. 12 
Particularly for the issues related to anthropogenic climate change, it would be of 
pressing importance to ensure that the correct incentives were in place prior to 
project planning. 
2. Notes on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Offshore Hydrates 
Offshore methane hydrates, in essence, are a problem of handling, treating, and 
transporting methane. Methane is a well-established greenhouse gas that is 
generally considered more dangerous than carbon dioxide for its potential to result 
in anthropogenic climate change. Methane’s presence in water and in the 
atmosphere can also result in its conversion to carbon dioxide, the greenhouse most 
commonly referred to in discussions on anthropogenic climate change.  
 
emissions as applicable as specified in paragraph (k) of this section.” 
“(b) For offshore petroleum and natural gas production, report CO2, CH4,and N2O emissions 
from equipment leaks, vented emission, and flare emission source types as identified in the 
data collection and emissions estimation study conducted by BOEMRE in compliance with 30 
CFR 250.302 through 304. … .” 
10  See the discussion at ch. 11, sec. 8.  
11  E.g., see Texas Administrative Code, Title 16, pt. 1, ch. 3, Rule 3.32(d) and (e), which limits the 
types of gas emissions and sets flaring regulations. But such state law does not extend to 
where much of the offshore methane hydrates would lie, which are in federally administered 
waters. Those waters are governed by 30 CFR 250.1160, which strictly regulate venting or 
flaring of methane from a licensed field location. That federal regulation is founded in the 
code on Mining and Minerals at 30 U.S. Code § 1751, et seq. 
12  For a longer essay on point, see R. A. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus: Planning Ahead for the 
Commercial Development of Offshore Methane Hydrates, 14:2 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 
(December 2014 Forthcoming). 
411_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Appendix III 
 381 
Below, the study explores two avenues for climate change impact from 
methane hydrate extractions. The first pathway is the intended pathway, which is 
fairly identical to contemporary means of producing and marketing conventional 
natural gas form offshore wells. The second pathway explores the novel risks due to 
the hydrates being fragile and under mud barriers.  
2.1. Routine Opportunities for Greenhouse Gas Releases 
Methane can become released at many points in its journey downstream from the 
deposit to the consumer, the industrial term of art is ‘fugitive gas.’13 This section 
explores the manners in which methane could leak from the extraction, production, 
treating, processing, transporting and marketing activities.  
These scenarios are more or less identical to the current problems facing 
conventional offshore natural gas well systems.14 It is important to note that these 
risks are already well regulated and addressed within developed economies;15 the 
concern here is could the increased volumes of gas from methane hydrate 
development projects place additional strain on these regulatory systems? In 
Shavell’s terminology, would the increased volumes from those projects effect an 
increased activity level that could result in additional harm under the existing 
rules? 
The wells could enable methane to become free within their internal layers 
and allow methane to vent to the mouth of the well at the christmas tree. The subsea 
assemblies, gathering lines, and manifolds could all have fissures that enable 
leakages of methane. The pipes that rise from the seabed to the offshore structures 
or vessels would be subject to the powerful momentum of ocean currents and 
waves; such wear and tear could enable fissures and seal breaches that could vent 
methane. Once on board the treating and processing vessel or structure, there 
would be hundred of pipes and pieces of equipment that might have flaws that 
could enable methane venting. Once treated and processed, the methane would 
need to be treated for transport to onshore reception facilities for downstream 
marketing. That transportation could be ship-borne or pipeline-bound. Ships 
rupture or sink, pipes burst or leak. Methane could escape in many moments prior 
to reaching the shoreline. 
Once on shore, the methane would likely be fed into an onshore distribution 
network of pipelines to move the gas downstream to a variety of customers and 
 
13  See Texas Administrative Code, Title 16, pt. 1, ch. 3, Rule 3.32(a)(1): “Fugitive emissions--
Releases of gas from lease production, gathering, compression, or gas plant equipment 
components, including emissions from valve stems, pressure relief valves, flanges and 
connections, gas-operated valves, compressor and pump seals, pumping well stuffing boxes, 
casing-to-casing bradenheads subject to the provisions of §3.17 of this title (relating to 
Pressure on Bradenhead), pits, and sumps, that cannot reasonably be captured and sold or 
routed to a vent or flare.” 
14  The methane can leak directly from the deposit through the muddy barriers to the ocean and 
above. More on this potential pathway is discussed in the following subsection, sec. 2.2.  
15  See the notes on UN, EU, and American laws on point, infra, in sec. 3.1. 
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marketing facilities. Those pipelines would likely be transboundary and 
international in many locations and be subject to varying levels of safety standards 
and inspections. The length of those pipes and their remoteness might make it 
challenging to fully inspect the pipelines for leaks and venting from poor welds, 
climate-exposure wear and tear, and from seasonal heating and cooling of the pipes. 
But those pipelines would also run through areas of habitation and transport and 
would thus be exposed to a variety of accidental ruptures.  
Gas marketing runs to two extremes, large industrial users and small 
consumer customers. Electrical generations plants, iron-smelting plants, and other 
manufacturing plants might rely on natural gas for generating large amounts of 
heat. Restaurants and smaller installations might use natural gas for cooking or 
room heating. A more recent technology has seen an increase in the sale of natural 
gas for fleet automobiles and buses to displace diesel engines. All of these 
applications of natural gas result in its combustion; that combustion process 
combines methane with ambient oxygen to result in carbon dioxide and water.16  
Thus, methane could vent at any point from deposit to customer and if it does 
not leak prior to the customer, the ultimate use of methane by most customers 
would be combust the methane and render carbon dioxide. Ergo, the extraction of 
natural gas, be it from conventional natural gas or from methane hydrates, results in 
the eventual venting of a greenhouse gas, either of carbon dioxide or of methane. 
To the extent that offshore methane hydrates are commercially developed as a 
source of natural gas and that gas is delivered on shore for industrial, commercial 
and residential purposes, it will potentially expand the scale of the existing in-place 
natural gas marketing networks and the volumes in play. As far this piece of the 
analysis goes, it is a danger from increasing the activity level of a pre-existing 
activity. Because the harm in question is climate change, and because the leaks 
provide the damaging carbon dioxide and methane gases, the increased activity 
level would be expected to increase the probability of harm. 
2.2. Alternative Means of Greenhouse Gas Release 
The above section attempted to sketch the possible opportunities for methane or 
carbon dioxide to enter the atmosphere from pipes, fittings, and such infrastructure. 
This section undertakes to establish the potential pathways for greenhouse gas 
release from natural locations. As explored in earlier chapters,  
 
16  In chemical notation, the basic reaction is CH4 + 2O2 ĺ CO2 + 2H2O. The actual reaction 
sequence is fairly complex and multi-factored. E.g., a certain sub-portion of the combustion 
will result in methyl groups, CH3, which are likely to result in the production of ethane, C2H6. 
However, ethane combustion similarly results in carbon dioxide and water vapor. The U.S. 
EPA has listed nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), trace amounts of 
sulfur dioxide (SO2), and particulate matter (PM) as contaminants of methane combustion 
when combusted in ambient air conditions. See the EPA guidance on natural gas combustion, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/ap42/ch01/final/c01s04.pdf. 
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Offshore methane hydrates are primarily found under mud layers, not under 
rock or salt structures as conventional natural gas deposits are normally found. 
Mud lacks the structural stability of the rock or salt traps; this presents several novel 
problems with regards to the safe extraction of methane from deposits underlying 
to the mud layers. 
Key among those risks is the potential for the hydrate deposits to lose their 
structural integrity and to begin the disassociation of the methane from the hydrate. 
Once the methane volumes become free of the hydrate structures, they could 
become emitted and released through the mud layers. Such leaks could be either 
persistent and stable or unstable and catastrophic.   
Persistent and stable leaks are not likely to lead to substantial volumes of 
methane reaching the atmosphere as most of the leaked or vented methane volumes 
would be metabolized into carbon dioxide before being emitted from the ocean 
waters.17 This process has been observed in conjunction with the BP Macondo spill 
event, wherein more methane was released than crude oil into the ocean.18 It was 
found that the methane was almost fully metabolized and that resulted in high 
oxygen levels in the ocean, leading to secondary problems of altered oceanic 
ecologies.19 Yet, there are also findings where methane could reach the atmosphere 
from depths in excess of 500m if the methane bubbles were covered in a 
surfactant,20 so the evidence on methane transmission remains in development.  
However, this process would still result in greenhouse gas emissions. Within 
certain circumstances, the carbon dioxide can become stable within the water and 
persist therein for very long periods of time; it might also potentially interact with 
certain oceanic flora that can further metabolize the carbon dioxide into other gases 
and outputs. When methane is released, either it directly or carbon dioxide or other 
greenhouse gases will eventually be released to the atmosphere. 
Unstable and catastrophic situations provide the most likely scenarios for 
large volumes of methane to reach the atmosphere. For methane to exit the ocean 
and reach the atmosphere intact as methane, the transmission must be quick. When 
large volumes moving at sufficiently velocity exit from methane hydrate deposits, 
 
17  “Methane emitted at the seafloor only rarely survives the trip through the water column to 
reach the atmosphere. At seafloor depths greater than ~100 m, O2 and N2 dissolved in ocean 
water almost completely replace CH4 in rising bubbles” C. D. Ruppel, Methane Hydrates and 
Contemporary Climate Change, 3(10) Nature Education Knowledge 29 (2011)  
18  J. D. Kessler, et al., A persistent oxygen anomaly reveals the fate of spilled methane in the deep Gulf of 
Mexico, 331.6015 Science 312 (2011). “Based on methane and oxygen distributions measured 
at 207 stations throughout the affected region, we find that within ~120 days from the onset 
of release ~3.0 × 1010 to 3.9 × 1010 moles of oxygen were respired, primarily by 
methanotrophs, and left behind a residual microbial community containing methanotrophic 
bacteria. We suggest that a vigorous deepwater bacterial bloom respired nearly all the 
released methane within this time, and that by analogy, large-scale releases of methane from 
hydrate in the deep ocean are likely to be met by a similarly rapid methanotrophic response.” 
Id. 
19  Id. 
20  E. A. Solomon, M. Kastner, I. R. MacDonald, & I. Leifer. Considerable methane fluxes to the 
atmosphere from hydrocarbon seeps in the Gulf of Mexico, 2 Nature Geosci  561 (2009) 
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they can form bubble columns that act as protective chimneys that enable the inner 
zones of that column to function as a gas pipeline to the surface. So long as the 
volume and velocity of the methane is sustained, the pipeline to the surface will 
remain fluid and open.  
A secondary means of transmission would be the structural failure of the 
deposit, enabling chunks of hydrates to break off from the main bed and float to the 
surface of the ocean. The chunks of hydrates would arrive at the surface and 
experience the lower pressure levels which would cause the hydrate chunks to 
disassociate rapidly into methane and water. Both forms of methane transmission 
routinely occur in nature. Chunks of floating methane hydrates have been observed 
offshore of Vancouver Island in western Canada and just recently it was announced 
that hundreds of chimneys lay offshore the east coast of the United States.  
The key to both means of methane transportation is the destabilization of the 
hydrate deposits and the disassociation of the methane volumes from the hydrates. 
While these events do happen in nature, they do not appear to be as easily triggered 
as some might fear, because hydrates are endothermic. An endothermic chemical 
reaction needs the introduction of energy to achieve the reaction; hydrates will not 
weaken or disassociate on their own, they need external stimuli to begin and sustain 
the reaction. Because of this endothermic character, hydrates are generally seen as 
self-stabilizing if no marginal energies are injected into them. 
It bears repeating, these sustained release events happen in nature and are 
observable. A recent study found over 570 active continuous methane hydrate seeps 
off of the mid-Atlantic coast of the U.S.21 Stark et al. found that many of the seeps 
had been active for more than a thousand years.22 Thus, methane does vent from the 
seabed and there are active emissions today. So, it is more than feasible that the 
endothermic reactions could be overcome and that such emissions could be 
sustained over long time periods; such is a daily event.  
The processes of hydrate extraction are focused on overcoming that 
endothermic character; they melt hydrates with heat, with chemical surfactants, and 
with pressure reductions that lower the energy required to begin and sustain those 
reactions. Once those reactions are started by commercial extractors, volumes of 
loose methane or water could accumulate within the deposit structure. Those 
volumes are also suspected in being able to set off disassociation sequences. But 
even with present triggering events, the continued disassociation of methane would 
require continued stimulation. 
A danger presents if the extractor operator is unaware of the subsurface 
accumulations and continues to artificially stimulate methane disassociation to 
support the production plans. Unknowingly, the operator might both have 
provided the means of a trigger and the continued energy required for a massive 
 
21  A. Skarke, C. Ruppel, M. Kodis, D. Brothers & E. Lobecker, Widespread methane leakage from the 
sea floor on the northern US Atlantic margin, 7 Nature Geoscience 657, 657 (2014). Ths 
population of seeps stands in contrast to previous estimates of less than a dozen such seeps. 
See id. 
22  Id. 
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disassociation event to occur. It is possible that such an event might lay unobserved 
for a sufficient period that the hydrate bed could be floated by disassociated water, 
become loosened by fluidized methane volumes and to generally lose its structural 
integrity. In such a case, it might be apparent till too late that a very large volume of 
methane hydrates is about to erupt and escape. Once that event occurs, because 
hydrates generally lay on a sloping floor, the removal of one area of hydrates might 
well enable a landslide of material lying above it on the sloping hillside. Once that 
landslide event is triggered, the mass of the mud and hydrate slurries falling onto 
lower lying hydrate deposits would supply the energies required for additional 
disassociations and further structural collapses.  
It bears repeating that this cataclysmic sequence, in order to overcome the 
endothermic character of methane hydrates, requires a class of Markov events 
rapidly following each other in stochastic succession; 23 however, with sufficient 
time and sufficient number of fields in play, such an event might eventually be a 
foreseeable hazard of methane hydrate extraction operations. 
Once the methane reached the atmosphere, combustion with ambient oxygen 
would be expected. For every gram of methane vented, 2.25 grams of water and a 
gram of carbon dioxide would be created;24 the balance of the mass is drawn from 
the ambient oxygen. While the immediate combustion is not expected to be 
completely efficient, meaning some methane would not combust,25 given sufficient 
time, most of the methane would likely combust in subsequent reactions. Those 
remaining non-combusted volumes methane would be expected to survive in the 
atmosphere for about 12 years, a much shorter time period than carbon dioxide’s 
potential for centuries of atmospheric presence.26 
 
23  This would be in contrast to a more stable and consistent melting of hydrates due to 
sustained geologic heat sources or warm water currents.  
24  Presentation of the Colorado Oil & Gas Association. Available at 
http://www.coga.org/pdf_articles/CombustionMethane.pdf.  
25  Methane has upper and lower limits on its methane to oxygen ration that enable combustion. 
If the methane represents higher than 15% of the ration, over the upper explosive limit (UEL), 
it will not combust. If it is under 4%, under the lower explosive limit (LEL), it will not 
combust. See Matheson Gas chart, available at 
https://www.mathesongas.com/pdfs/products/Lower-(LEL)-&-Upper-(UEL)-Explosive-
Limits-.pdf. It would be expected that the methane would reach the atmosphere at a rich 
density above the UEL and gradually drop to the UEL as the gas dispersed. The resultant 
combustion would both aid in greater dispersion and in additional ignition sequences, as the 
ambient temperatures would increase.  
26  “Carbon dioxide's lifetime is poorly defined because the gas is not destroyed over time, but 
instead moves among different parts of the ocean–atmosphere–land system. Some of the 
excess carbon dioxide will be absorbed quickly (for example, by the ocean surface), but some 
will remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years, due in part to the very slow process by 
which carbon is transferred to ocean sediments.” EPA, Overview of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, USA, 
2010) Available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/co2.html. See 
also EPA, Overview of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Methane Emissions (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Washington, DC, USA, 2010) Available at 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/ch4.html. 
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The point to be drawn herein is that the unique risks of methane hydrates to 
erupt from the seabed directly, in novel ways different from conventional offshore 
natural gas wells, will potentially enable large volumes of greenhouse gases to 
reach the atmosphere. But the composition of those vented gases is expected to be 
mostly carbon dioxide. While the initial feedstocks would be methane, it does 
appear that the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions to last beyond the immediate 
venting events would be carbon dioxide volumes. The slower release events that 
enable methane to remain in ocean waters for longer periods are expected to be 
almost fully metabolized into carbon dioxide before venting to the atmosphere. 
Even those volumes that might reach the ocean surface immediately and vent as 
methane to the atmosphere are expected to convert to carbon dioxide via 
combustion events. 27 Nevertheless, a mix of both methane and carbon dioxide 
would be emitted and both are greenhouse gases. 
To the extent that offshore methane hydrates are extracted from their deposits 
in ways that could loosen them and enable persistent or massive venting events, 
this would be the introduction of a novel form of risk.28 It would appear that while 
large amounts of methane could be released or emitted at the point of breach, the 
vast majority of those methane emissions would be converted to carbon dioxide 
either prior to atmospheric contact or very shortly thereafter. Thus, these novel 
forms of harm would primarily enable large releases of carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere. 
Thus the development of offshore methane hydrates poses a new activity, the 
risk of disturbing otherwise in-place methane hydrate deposits. These risks are 
different and distinguishable form the risks in the previous section, which were 
essentially increases in activity levels for a recognized risky activity. Here, the 
activity is new, the risk is somewhat unclear, and the proper care level remains 
debatable. How much damage might result is difficult to forecast, how the damage 
might occur or when it might occur is also difficult to forecast. There are reasons to 
believe that the risk is manageable in certain circumstances; offshore methane 
hydrates have been produced safely by Japanese researchers and methane hydrates 
appear stable in many situations as monitored by scientists.  
But the novelty of the situation remains. The potential risk for major climate 
change impacts remains.  
 
  
 
27  This is not to suggest in any form that the emissions of carbon dioxide are in any way 
preferable to methane emissions, but merely to indicate that the problem to be addressed by 
these novel greenhouse gas emissions might be primarily climate change events related to 
carbon dioxide emissions and not primarily those of methane emissions.  
28  While a variety of ‘bad things’ could occur, such as incidence of tsunamis, the discussion here 
focuses on climate change impacts. 
417_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Appendix III 
 387 
 
 
  
418_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
Offshore Methane Hydrates and Climate Change Hazards 
388 
 
 
 
419_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix IV 
 
 389 
389 
REFERENCES 
References 
Adam, D., ‘Methane hydrates: fire from ice’, Nature, 2002, p. 913–914.  
Adams, E. E. et al., ‘A tale of two spills: Novel science and policy implications of an 
emerging new oil spill model’, BioScience, 2012, p. 461–469.  
Alexander, K. ‘Overview of NEPA requirements’, 2007.  
Allen, C. H., ‘Protecting the oceanic gardens of Eden: international law issues in 
deep-sea vent resource conservation and management’, Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review, 2000, p. 563.  
Allison, E. & Boswell, R., ‘Methane hydrate, future energy within our grasp, an 
overview’, DOE Report, 2007.  
Arcuri, A., ‘Controlling environmental risk in Europe: the complementary role of an 
EC environmental liability regime.’ Tijdschrift voor Milieuaansprakelijkheid, 2001, p. 
39-40. 
Arcuri, A., ‘The Case for a Procedural Version of the Precautionary Principle Erring 
on the Side of Environmental Preservation’, Global Law Working Paper No. 09/04. 
2007. 
Arthur, W. B. ‘Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical 
events’, The Economic Journal, 1989, p. 116-131. 
Bangs, N. L. et al., ‘Massive methane release triggered by seafloor erosion offshore 
southwestern japan’, Geology, 2010, p. 1019–1022.  
Bar-Gill, O. & Ben-Shahar, O., ‘The uneasy case for comparative negligence’, 
American Law and Economics Review, 2005, p. 433–469. 
Bergkamp, L., Liability and Environment, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
Netherlands, 2001.  
420_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
References 
390 
Black, H.C., Nolan, J.R.,  and Nolan-Haley, J.M., Black’s Law Dictionary, West 
Publishing Company, 1990.  
Boswell, R., ‘Resource potential of methane hydrate coming into focus’, Journal of 
Petroleum Science and Engineering, 2007, p. 9–13.  
Boyd, J. & Ingberman, D. E., ‘The search for deep pockets: Is “extended liability” 
expensive liability?’ Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1997, p. 232–258. 
Boyd, J. & Ingberman, D. E., ‘Should relative safety be a test of product liability’ 
Journal Legal Studies, 1997, p. 433.  
Boyd, J., & Kunreuther, H., ‘Retroactive liability or the public purse?’ Journal of 
Regulatory Economics, 1997, p. 79–90.  
Boyer, M., & Porrini, D., ‘The Law and Economics of the Environment’, in: Law 
versus Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental 
Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA, 2001, pages 
249–79. 
Burrows, P., ‘Combining regulation and legal liability for the control of external 
costs’, International Review of Law and Economics, 1999, p. 227-244. 
Calabresi, G., ‘Some thoughts on risk distribution and the law of torts’, The Yale 
Law Journal, 1961, p. 499–553.  
Calabresi, G., The costs of accidents : a legal and economic analysis, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, Conn., 1970.  
Castaldi, M. J., Zhou, y., & Yegulalp, T. M., ‘Down-hole combustion method for gas 
production from methane hydrates’, Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering, 
2007, p. 176–185.  
Chatti, I., et al., ‘Benefits and drawbacks of clathrate hydrates: a review of their areas 
of interest’, Energy Conversion and Management, 2005, p. 1333–1343.  
Coase, R. H., ‘Problem of social cost’, The Journal of Law and Economics, 1960, p. 1. 
Cooter, R., ‘Prices and Sanctions’, Columbia Law Review,  1984, Pp. 1523-1560.  
Cooter, R.,  & Ulen, T., Law and Economics, Pearson Addison Wesley, 2004.  
Cranganu, C., ‘In-situ thermal stimulation of gas hydrates’, Journal of Petroleum 
Science and Engineering, 2009, p. 76–80.  
Dawe, R. A., & Thomas, S., ‘A large potential methane source—natural gas 
hydrates’, Energy Sources, 2007, p. 217–229.  
Demirbas, A., ‘Methane hydrates as potential energy resource: Part 1–importance, 
resource and recovery facilities’, Energy Conversion and Management, 2010, p. 
1547–1561.  
421_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Appendix IV 
 391 
Endres, A., & Schwarze, R.‚Allokationswirkungen einer Umwelthaftpflicht-
versicherung‘, in Haftung und Versicherung für Umweltschäden aus ökonomischer und 
juristischer Sicht, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1992, P. 58-82. 
Endres, A., & Bertram, R., ‘The development of care technology under liability law’, 
International Review of Law and Economics, 2006, p. 503–518.  
Englezos, P., & Lee, J. D., ‘Gas hydrates: A cleaner source of energy and opportunity 
for innovative technologies’, Korean Journal of Chemical Engineering, 2005, p. 671–
681.  
Estep , S. D. ‘Radiation injuries and statistics: the need for a new approach to injury 
litigation’, Michigan Law Review, 1960, p. 259–304.  
Etherington, J., Pollen, T., & Zuccolo, L., ‘Comparison of selected reserves and 
resource classifications and associated definitions’, Mapping Subcommittee, Final 
Report-December, 2005.  
Faure, M. G., Geen schijn van kans. beschouwingen over het statistisch causaliteitsbewijs 
bij milieugezondheidsschade. Inauguration, Antwerpen: Maklu., 1993.  
Faure, M. G., ‘Designing Incentives Regulation for the Environment’, Maastricht 
Faculty of Law Working Paper 2008-7, 2008. 
Faure, M. G., Environmental liability. In: Tort Law And Economics, Edward Elgar, 
pages 247–286, 2009.  
Faure, M. G., ‘Regulatory Strategies in Environmental Liability’, in: The Regulatory 
Function Of European Private Law, pp. 129-187, Cafaggi, F., Watt, H. Muir, eds., 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011. 
Faure, M. G., ‘Liability and compensation for damage resulting from CO2 storage 
sites’, 2013.  
Faure, M. G., Goodwin, M., & Weber, F., ‘Bucking the Kuznets curve: Designing 
effective environmental regulation in developing countries’, Virginia Journal of 
International Law, 2010, p. 95-157.  
Faure, M. G., & Hartlief, T., Insurance and expanding systemic risks. Paris, OECD, 2003.  
Faure, M. G., Koopmans, I. M., & Oudijk, J. C., ‘Imposing criminal liability on 
Government Officials under environmental law: a legal and economic analysis’, 
Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Journal, 1995, p. 529. 
Faure, M. G., Peeters, M., & Wibisana, A. G., ‘Economic instruments: suited to 
developing countries?’ in: Environmental Law in Development: Lessons from the 
Indonesian Experience, 2006, p. 218. 
Faure, M. G., and Ruegg, M. "Environmental Standard Setting through General 
Principles of Environmental Law." Michael Faure/John Vervaele/Albert Weale, 
Environmental Standards in the European Union in an Interdisciplinary 
Framework, Antwerpen, Maklu (1994): 39-60. 
422_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
References 
392 
Faure, M. G., & Ubachs, S., ‘Comparative benefits and optimal use of environmental 
taxes’, Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation, 2003, p. 29-49. 
Faure, M. G., & Van den Bergh, R., ‘Liability for nuclear accidents in Belgium from 
an interest group perspective’, International review of law and economics, 1990, p. 
241–254. 
Faure, M. G., & Van den Bergh, R., ‘Competition on the European market for 
liability insurance and efficient accident law’, Maastricht Journal of European & 
Comparative Law, 2002, p. 279.  
Faure, M. G., & Vanden Borre, T., ‘Compensating nuclear damage: A comparative 
economic analysis of the us and international liability schemes’, William. & Mary 
Environmental Law & Policy Review, 2008, p. 219.  
Faure, M. G., & Wang, H., ‘The international regimes for the compensation of oil-
pollution damage: Are they effective?’ Review of European Community & 
International Environmental Law, 2003, p. 242–253.  
Faure, M. G., & Wang, H., ‘Civil liability and compensation for marine pollution - 
lessons to be learned for offshore oil spills’, Oil, Gas, Energy Law Intelligence, 2010, 
p. 29. 
Faure, M. G. and Weishaar, S. E., ‘The Role of Environmental Taxation: Economics 
and the Law’, In: Handbook of Research on Environmental Taxation, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar, 2012, pp. 399-421. 
Feess, E., & Ulrich Hege, U., ‘Safety regulation and monitor liability’, Review of 
Economic Design, 2002, p. 173–185.  
Finsinger, J., & M Pauly, M., ‘The double liability rule’, Geneva Papers on Risk and 
Insurance, 1990, p. 159–174.  
Frey, B. S., ‘Morality and rationality in environmental policy’, Journal of Consumer 
Policy, 1999, p. 395-417. 
Friehe, T., ‘Victim interdependence in the accident setting’, Working Paper, 
University of Tuebingen, 2008, p. 1–17. 
Friehe, T., ‘Precaution v. avoidance: A comparison of liability rules’, Economics 
Letters, 2009, p. 214–216.  
Gabitto, J. F., & Barrufet, M., ‘Gas hydrates research programs: An international 
review’, Technical report, Prairie View A&M University, 2009.  
Gabitto, J. F., & Tsouris, C., ‘Physical properties of gas hydrates: a review’, Journal 
of Thermodynamics, 2010.  
Gigerenzer, G., ‘The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior’,  in: Is the Mind 
Irrational or Ecologically Rational?, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005, p. 37–67. 
Gilead, I., ‘Tort law and internalization: The gap between private loss and social 
cost’, International Review of Law and Economics, 1997, p. 589-608. 
423_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Appendix IV 
 393 
Glachant, M., ‘The use of regulatory mechanism design in environmental policy: a 
theoretical critique’, in:  Sustainability and firms: technological change and the changing 
regulatory environment. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1998, p. 179–188.  
Glasby, G. P., ‘Potential impact on climate of the exploitation of methane hydrate 
deposits offshore’, Marine and petroleum geology, 2003, p. 163–175.  
Glover, A. G., et al. ‘The deep-sea floor ecosystem: current status and prospects of 
anthropogenic change by the year 2025’, Environmental Conservation, 2003, p. 219–
241.  
Gunningham, N., Phillipson, M., & Grabosky, P. ‘Harnessing Third Parties as 
Surrogate Regulators, Achieving Environmental Outcomes by Alternative Means’, 
Australian Centre for Environmental Law, 1999. p. 211-224. 
Gunningham, N., & Sinclair, D., ‘Regulatory pluralism: Designing policy mixes for 
environmental protection’, Law & Policy, 1999, p. 49-76. 
Guppy, A., ‘Subjective probability of accident and apprehension in relation to self-
other bias, age, and reported behaviour’, Accident Analysis and Prevention, 1993, p. 
375–382. 
Houck, O. A., ‘Worst case and the Deepwater Horizon blowout: There ought to be a 
law’, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, 2010, p. 11033 – 11040. 
Hovland, M., ‘Gas hydrates’, in: Encyclopedia of Geology, Elsevier, Oxford, 2005, 
pages 261–268. 
Hylton, K. N., ‘When should we prefer tort law to environmental regulation’, 
Washburn Law Journal, 2001, p. 515.  
Hylton, K. N., ‘A positive theory of strict liability’, Review of Law and Economics,  
2008, p. 153–180.  
Javanmardi, J., et al., ‘Economic evaluation of natural gas hydrate as an alternative 
for natural gas transportation’, Applied Thermal Engineering, 2005, p. 1708–1723.  
Jolls, C., Sunstein, C., & Thaler, R., ‘A behavioural approach to law and economics. 
Stanford Law Review, 50:1471–1550, 1998.  
Jones, N., ‘Gas hydrate tests to begin in Alaska’, Nature News, 2013, p. 9758.  
Kahan, M., ‘Causation and incentives to take care under the negligence rule’, 
Journal of Legal Studies, 1989, 427–447.  
Kaye, D., ‘The limits of the preponderance of the evidence standard: Justifiably 
naked statistical evidence and multiple causation’, Law & Social Inquiry, 1982, p. 
487–516. 
Keating, G. C., ‘Nuisance as a strict liability wrong’, Journal of Tort Law, 2012.  
424_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
References 
394 
Keller, E. A., et al., ‘Tectonic geomorphology and hydrocarbon induced topography 
of the mid-channel anticline, Santa Barbara basin, California’, Geomorphology, 
2007, p. 274–286.  
Kerkmeester, H., ‘De betekenis van het waarschijnlijkheidsbegrip voor de 
aansprakelijkheid uit onrechtmatige daad: Meijers geactualiseerd (the meaning of 
the concept probability from tort law: Meijers actualized)’, Weekblad voor 
Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie, 1993, p. 767–773.  
Kerr, R. A.,  ‘Gas hydrate resource: smaller but sooner’, Science, 2004, p.  946–947.  
Kikuchi, R., ‘Analysis of availability and accessibility of hydrogen production: An 
approach to a sustainable energy system using methane hydrate resources’, 
Environment, Development and Sustainability, 2005, p. 453–471.  
Kim, N. J., et al., ‘Formation enhancement of methane hydrate for natural gas 
transport and storage’, Energy, 2010, p. 2717–2722.  
Klauda, J. B. & Sandler, S. I., ‘Global distribution of methane hydrate in ocean 
sediment’, Energy & Fuels, 2005, p. 459–470.  
Koh, C. A., ‘Towards a fundamental understanding of natural gas hydrates’, 
Chemical Society Reviews, 2002, p. 157–167.  
Koh, C. A., & Sloan, E. D., ‘Natural gas hydrates: Recent advances and challenges in 
energy and environmental applications’, AIChE Journal, 2007, p. 1636–1643.  
Kolstad, C. D., Ulen, T. S., & Johnson, G. V., ‘Ex post liability for harm vs. ex ante 
safety regulation: substitutes or complements?’, The American Economic Review, 
1990, p. 888-901. 
Kornhauser, L,. & Revesz, R., ‘Sharing damages among multiple tortfeasors’, Yale 
Law Journal, 1989, p. 831–884.  
Kornhauser, L., & Revesz, R., ‘Apportioning damages among potentially insolvent 
actors’, Journal of Legal Studies, 1990, p. 617–651.  
Krey, V., et al., ‘Gas hydrates: entrance to a methane age or climate threat?’, 
Environmental Research Letters, 2009, p. 34007.  
Krivchikov, A. I. et al., ‘Thermal conductivity of methane-hydrate’, Journal of low 
temperature physics, 2005, p.693–702.  
Kunreuther, H. C., & Freeman, P. K., ‘Insurability, environmental risks and the law’, 
in: The Law and Economics of the Environment, 2001, p. 302. 
Kurihara, M., et al., ‘Gas production from methane hydrate reservoirs’, in: 
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Gas Hydrates, 2011.  
Kvenvolden, K. A., ‘Potential effects of gas hydrate on human welfare’, Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, 1999, p. 3420–3426.  
425_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Appendix IV 
 395 
Landes, W. M., & Posner, R. A., ‘The positive economic theory of tort law’, Georgia 
Law Review, 1980, p. 851–924.  
Landes, W. M., & Posner, R. A., ‘Tort law as a regulatory regime for catastrophic 
personal injuries’, The Journal of Legal Studies, 1984, p. 417–434.  
Lee, S. Y., & Holder, G. D., ‘Methane hydrates potential as a future energy source’, 
Fuel Processing Technology, 2001, p. 181–186. 
Leifer, I. S., et al., ‘Engineered and natural marine seep, bubble-driven buoyancy 
flows’, Journal of Physical Oceanography, 2009, p. 3071–3090.  
Leifer, I. S., et al., ‘State of the art satellite and airborne marine oil spill remote 
sensing: Application to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill’, Remote Sensing of 
Environment, 2012, p. 185–209. 
Leis, J., McCreery, J. & Gay, J. C., ‘National oil companies reshape the playing field’, 
Bain Brief, 2012. p. 1-12. 
Lewis, B., ‘It’s been 4380 days and counting since Exxon Valdez: Is it time to change 
the oil pollution act of 1990’, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, 2001, p. 97 – 128.  
Lewis, T. R., & Sappington, D. E. M., ‘The Law and Economics of the Environment’, 
in: Horizontal Vicarious Liability, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, 
MA, USA, 2001, p. 71–91. 
Mackaay, E., ‘Economics of information and law’, Groupe de recherche en 
consommation, 1980. 
Makdisi, J., ‘Proportional liability: A comprehensive rule to apportion tort damages 
based on probability’, North Carolina Law Review, 1988, p. 1063.  
Makogon, Y. F., ‘Natural gases in the ocean and the problems of their hydrates’ 
Express-Information, Vol. 11., VNIIE-Gasprom, 1972.  
Makogon, Y. F., Holditch, S. A., and Makogon, T. Y., ‘Natural gas-hydrates—a 
potential energy source for the 21st century’, Journal of Petroleum Science and 
Engineering, 2007, p. 14–31.  
Marcelle-De Silva, J., & Dawe, R., ‘Towards commercial gas production from 
hydrate deposits’, Energies, 2011, p. 215–238.  
Maruyama, S., et al. ‘Proposal for a low CO 2 emission power generation system 
utilizing oceanic methane hydrate’, Energy, 2012, p. 340-347. 
Dari Mattiacci, G. D., ‘Economic Analysis of Law: A European Perspective’, in: Tort 
Law and Economics. 2006.  
Miceli, T. J., ‘On negligence rules and self-selection’, Review of Law and Economics, 
2006, p.349–361.  
Miller, C., ‘Causation in personal injury: Legal or epidemiological common sense?’, 
Legal Study, 2006, p. 545–569.  
426_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
References 
396 
Moridis, G. J. et al., ‘Toward production from gas hydrates: current status, 
assessment of resources, and simulation-based evaluation of technology and 
potential’ SPE Reservoir Evaluation & Engineering, 2009, p. 745–771.  
Moridis, G. J. et al., ‘Gas production from a cold, stratigraphically-bounded gas 
hydrate deposit at the Mount Elbert gas hydrate stratigraphic test well, Alaska 
North Slope: Implications of uncertainties’, Marine and Petroleum Geology, 2011, p. 
517–534. 
Muir, M. A. K., ‘Challenges and opportunities for marine deposits of methane 
hydrate in the circumpolar arctic polar region’, Retfaerd Aergang, 2009, p. 61–71. 
Nell, M., & Richter, A., ‘The design of liability rules for highly risky activities - is 
strict liability superior when risk allocation matters?’, International Review, 2003, p. 
31–47. 
Nichols, J. E., ‘Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA): Liability of Responsible Parties’, CRS 
Report for Congress R41266, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 
2010. 
Nixon, M. F., & Grozic, J. L. H., ‘Submarine slope failure due to gas hydrate 
dissociation: a preliminary quantification’, Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 2007, p.  
314–325. 
Nussim, J., & Tabbach, A. D., ‘A revised model of unilateral accidents’, International 
Review of Law and Economics, 2009, p. 169–177.  
Olson, M., The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups, Harvard 
Economic Studies, 1971. 
Ott, C., & Schäfer, H. B., ‘Negligence as untaken precaution, limited information, 
and efficient standard formation in the civil liability system’, International Review 
of Law and Economics, 1997, p. 15–29.  
Pacces, A., & Visscher, L. T., ‘Methodology of Law and Economics’, In: Law and 
Method: Interdisciplinary Research into Law, Tübingen: Möhr Siebeck, 2011, 85-107. 
Partain, R. A., & Lee, S. H., ‘Article 20 obligations under the KORUS FTA: The 
deteriorating environment for climate change legislation in the U.S.’, Study On The 
American Constitution, 2013, p. 439–489.  
Pecher, I. A., ‘Oceanography: Gas hydrates on the brink’, Nature, 2002, p. 622–623. 
Peeters, M., & Weishaar, S., ‘Exploring Uncertainties in the EU ETS: Learning by 
Doing Continues beyond 2012’ Carbon & Climate Law Review, 2009, p. 88. 
Pigou, A. C., The economics of welfare. Transaction Publishers, 1924.  
Polinsky, A. M., ‘Controlling externalities and protecting entitlements: Property 
right, liability rule, and tax-subsidy approaches.’ Journal of Legal Studies , 1979, p. 
1. 
Polinsky, A. M., ‘Strict liability versus negligence in a market setting’, 1980.  
427_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Appendix IV 
 397 
Posner, R. A., ‘A theory of negligence’, The Journal of Legal Studies, 1(1): 29–96, 
1972.  
Raghoebarsing, A. A., et al., ‘Methanotrophic symbionts provide carbon for 
photosynthesis in peat bogs’, Nature, 2005, p. 1153–1156.  
Ramseur, J. L., ‘Oil Spills in US Coastal Waters: Background, Governance, and 
Issues for Congress’, DIANE Publishing, 2010.  
Reichel, T., & Husebø, J., ‘Gas hydrate as a resource – Statoil’s hydrate initiative’ 
Technical report, Statoil, Exploration Global New Ventures, 2011.  
Rice, W., ‘Hydrogen production from methane hydrate with sequestering of carbon 
dioxide’, International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 2006, p. 1955-1963. 
Rizzo, M. J., & Arnold, F. S. ‘Causal apportionment in the law of torts’, Columbia 
Law Review, 1980, p. 1399–1429.  
Rizzo, M. J., & Arnold, F. S. ‘Causal apportionment: A reply to the critics’, Journal of 
Legal Studies, 1986, p. 219–226.  
Robinson, G. O., ‘Probabilistic causation and compensation for tortious risk’, The 
Journal of Legal Studies, 1985, p. 779–798.  
Rose-Ackerman, S., ‘Environmental liability law’, in: Innovation in Environmental 
Policy, Economic and Legal Aspects of Recent Developments in Environmental Enforcement 
and Liability, 1992, p. 223-243. 
Rose-Ackerman, S., ‘Public Law versus Private Law in Environmental Regulation: 
European Union Proposals in the Light of United States Experience’, Review of 
European Community & International Environmental Law, 1995, p. 312-320. 
Rosenberg, D., ‘The casual connection in mass exposure cases: A public law vision 
of the tort system’, Harvad Law Review, 1983, p. 849.  
Rubinfeld, D. L., ‘The efficiency of comparative negligence’, Journal of Journal of 
Legal Studies, 1987, p. 375–394.  
Schäfer, H. B., & Müller-Langer, F., ‘Strict liability versus negligence’ in: Tort law and 
economics, 2009.  
Schäfer, H. B., & Schönenberger, A., ‘Strict Liability versus Negligence’, in: 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Edward Elgar, 2000.  
Schmitz, P. W., ‘On the joint use of liability and safety regulation’, International 
Review of Law and Economics, 2000, p. 371–382.  
Schwartz, A., & Wilde, L. L., ‘Intervening in markets on the basis of imperfect 
information: A legal and economic analysis’, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 1978, p. 630. 
Schwartz, G. T.,  ‘Mixed theories of tort law: Affirming both deterrence and 
corrective justice’, Texas Law Review, 1997, p. 1801.  
428_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
References 
398 
Segerson, K., ‘Liability transfers: An economic assessment of buyer and lender 
liability’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1993, p. S46–S63. 
Shakhova, N., & Semiletov, I., ‘Methane release and coastal environment in the east 
siberian arctic shelf’, Journal of Marine Systems, 2007, p. 227–243.  
Shavell, S., ‘Sharing risks of deferred payment’, The Journal of Political Economy, 
1976, p. 161-168. 
Shavell, S., ‘On moral hazard and insurance’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
1979, p. 541–562.  
Shavell, S., ‘Strict liability versus negligence’, The Journal of Legal Studies, 1980, p. 
1–25. 
Shavell, S., ‘Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety’, The Journal of Legal 
Studies, 1984, p. 357-374. 
Shavell, S., ‘A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation’, The Rand 
Journal of Economics, 1984, p.271-280. 
Shavell, S., ‘Uncertainty over causation and the determination of civil liability’, 
Journal of Law and Economics, 1985, p. 587–609.  
Shavell, S., ‘The judgment proof problem’ International Review of Law and 
Economics, 1986, p. 43–58.  
Shavell, S., Economic analysis of accident law. Harvard University Press, 1987  
Shavell, S., ‘The optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent’, The 
American Economic Review, 1987, p. 584–592. 
Shavell, S., ‘Liability and the incentive to obtain information about risk’, The Journal 
of Legal Studies, 1992, p. 259–270.  
Sigman, H., ‘Liability fending and superfund clean-up remedies’, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 1998, p. 205–224.  
Smets, B., et al., ‘Dry gas vents Mazuku in Goma region (North-Kivu, Democratic 
Republic of Congo): Formation and risk assessment’, Journal of African Earth 
Sciences, 2010, p. 787–798.  
Smith, C. R., et al., ‘The near future of deep seafloor ecosystems’ in: Aquatic 
Ecosystems: Trends and global prospects, 2008, p. 334–351.  
Stigler, G. J., ‘The economics of information’, The Journal of Political Economy, 1961, 
p. 213-225. 
Sunstein, C. R., ‘Behavioral analysis of law’, University of Chicago Law University 
of Chicago Law Review, 1998, p. 1175–1195.  
Swanson, S. R., ‘OPA 90+ 10: The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 after ten years’, Journal 
Maritiime Law and Commerce., 2001, p. 135.  
429_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Appendix IV 
 399 
Tabuchi, H., ‘An energy coup for japan – ‘flammable ice’’, New York Times, 2013.  
Tedesco, D. et al., ‘January 2002 volcano-tectonic eruption of Nyiragongo volcano, 
Democratic Republic of Congo’, Journal of Geophysical Research, 2007  p. B09202.  
Teitelbaum, J. C., ‘A unilateral accident model under ambiguity’, Journal of Legal 
Studies, 2007, p. 431–477.  
Tetley, W., International maritime and admiralty law, Editions Yvon Blais, Thomson 
Company, 2002.  
Tietenberg, T. H., ‘Indivisible toxic torts: The economics of joint and several liability’, 
Land Economics, 1989, p. 305–319.  
Tietenberg, T. H., & Lewis, L., ‘Environmental and natural resource economics’, 
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2000. 
Trauberman, J., ‘Statutory reform of toxic torts: Relieving legal, scientific, and 
economic burdens on the chemical victim’, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 
1983, p. 177.  
Traufetter, G. ‘China and India exploit icy energy reserves: Warning signs on the 
ocean floor’, Der Speigel, 2007.  
Trebilcock, M. J., ‘The Social insurance-deterrence dilemma of modern North 
American tort law: A Canadian perspective on the liability insurance crisis’, San 
Diego Law Review, 1987, p. 929. 
Tribe, L.H., ‘Trial by mathematics: Precision and ritual in the legal process’, 
Harvard Law Review, 1971, p, 1329–1393.  
Van den Bergh, R. & Visscher, L. T.,  ‘Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law’ In: 
Mitigating risk in the context of safety and security. How relevant is a rational approach?, 
R.V. de Mulder, ed., Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam 2008, p. 29-62. 
Vanden Borre, T., ‘Contemporary Developments in Nuclear Energy Law: 
Harmonizing Legislation’, in: CEE/NIS, Chapter Channelling of Liability: A few Juridical 
and Economic Views on an Inadequate Legal Construction, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999, pages 13–39. 
Viscusi, W. K., & Hamilton, J. T., ‘Are Risk Regulators Rational? Evidence from 
Hazardous Waste Cleanup Decisions’, American Economic Review, 1999, p. 1010-
1021. 
Visscher, L. T, ‘Tort Damages’ In: Tort Law And Economics, Encyclopedia Of Law And 
Economics, Vol. 1, Second Edition, M.G. Faure, ed., p. 153-200, Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2009 
Wafula, D. M. et al., ‘Natural disasters and hazards in the Lake Kivu basin, western 
rift valley of Africa’, in: Report on the International Workshop on Natural and Human 
Induced Hazards and Disasters in Africa, 2007.  
430_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
References 
400 
Wagner, T. J., ‘The Oil pollution act of 1990: An analysis’, Journal of Marine Law 
and Commerce, 1990, p. 569 – 587. 
Walsh, M. R. et al., ‘Preliminary report on the commercial viability of gas production 
from natural gas hydrates’, Energy Economics, 2009, p. 815–823.  
Weinstein, N. D., ‘Optimistic biases about personal risks’, Science, 1989, p. 1232–
1233. 
Yabe, I. et al., ‘Environmental risk analysis of methane hydrate development’, in: 7th 
International Conference on Gas Hydrates (ICGH 2011), 2011.  
Yamamoto, A., Yamanaka, Y., & Tajika, E., ‘Modeling of methane bubbles released 
from large sea-floor area: Condition required for methane emission to the 
atmosphere’, Earth and Planetary Science Letters, 2009, p. 590–598.  
Zhang, Z. G. et al., ‘Marine gas hydrates: Future energy or environmental killer?’ 
Energy Procedia, 2012, p. 933–938.  
 
 
Institutional references and reports 
 
Japan’s methane hydrate research and development program: Phase I 
comprehensive report of research results, 2008.  
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents. United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, Helsinki, Finland, 2008.  
DOE national laboratory breakthrough could enhance use of domestic natural gas, 
methane hydrate resources. Technical report, Department of Energy of the United 
States, 2010.  
Realizing the energy potential of methane hydrate for the United States, 2010.  
Flow test from methane hydrate layers ends. Technical report, JOGMEC, March 
2013.  
  
431_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
  Appendix IV 
 401 
 
 
  
432_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
References 
402 
 
 
 
 
433_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix V 
 
 403 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Roy Andrew Partain was born near Atlanta, Georgia, in the United States on July 
14, 1970. He graduated from Myers Park High School in Charlotte, North Carolina 
in 1988. He received a Bachelor of Science in Economics from the Georgia Institute 
of Technology in 1991. After completing a thesis on mathematical models of 
altruism, he was awarded a Master of Science.  
He continued his studies in Economics at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. After completing a thesis on transaction costs and their role in the 
theory of the firm, he received a second Master of Science in 1995. He was the 
recipient of a U.S. Department of Education Fellowship for Foreign Language and 
Area Studies for the study of Mandarin Chinese in Taiwan.  
He returned from the Fellowship to Vanderbilt University Law School, where 
he joined the editorial staff of the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and 
Technology Law and served as a teaching assistant for the Legal Research and 
Writing program. He graduated with a Doctor of Jurisprudence in 2001. After 
graduation he passed the professional licensing examination of the State Bar of 
Texas in 2001. He remains in license to practice law.  
He first practiced law as in-house counsel to the Exxon Mobil Corporation in 
their Upstream Business Services division in Houston, Texas. His portfolio of 
responsibilities included oversight of ExxonMobil’s upstream activities, both on- 
and off-shore. He remained with ExxonMobil from 2001 until 2006. In 2006, he 
joined the Chevron Corporation at its headquarters in San Ramon, California. At 
Chevron, his portfolio of responsibility included Chevron’s global upstream 
activities.  
In 2010, he became an assistant professor of Economics at Keimyung 
University, in Daegu, South Korea. In the Spring semester of 2011, he served as 
interim Dean of Keimyung Adams College, within Keimyung University.  
Since September 2011, he has served as an assistant professor of Law at 
Soongsil University’s College of Law. His published research has primarily focused 
on environmental law, energy law, and the philosophy of law. He has taught a 
variety of classes: contract law, tort law, corporate law, private international law, 
American constitutional law, history of Western law, history of Anglo-American 
contract law, and legal research and writing.  
434_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
 
404 
  
435_Partain_Dissertation_stand.job
 
SAMENVATTING 
 
Offshore methaanhydraten vormen een potentiële overvloedige bron van energie en 
vers water en kunnen nieuwe wegen voor groene energie openen. Het ontwikkelen 
en produceren van offshore methaanhydraten kan echter gepaard gaan met 
onvoorspelbare risico’s en schade. Zowel rampzalige kleinere risico’s moeten 
worden geïntegreerd in de beleidsplanning aangaande het exploiteren van deze 
nieuwe energiebron. De regulering van deze offshore methaanhydraten staat 
centraal in dit onderzoek.  
 Het onderzoek bestaat uit vier delen. Het eerste deel van het onderzoek 
geeft een introductie op de wetenschappelijke, technische en commerciële 
kenmerken van offshore methaanhydraten projecten. Het geeft ook een overzicht 
van zowel de mogelijke voordelen als de potentiële gevaren van offshore 
methaanhydraten. 
 Het tweede deel van het onderzoek bespreekt de rechtseconomische 
inzichten aangaande het ongevallenrecht, toegepast op milieuschade. Het 
aansprakelijkheidsrecht wordt onderzocht teneinde te bepalen wanneer risico- of 
schuldaansprakelijkheid kunnen worden toegepast met het oog op risicobeheersing. 
Vervolgens wordt dezelfde analyse op publieke en private regulering toegepast. Uit 
de eigenschappen van offshore methaanhydraten volgt dat de optimale regelgeving 
een combinatie vormt van het aansprakelijkheidsrecht in aanvulling op de 
implementatie van publieke regulering. 
 Het derde deel van dit proefschrift onderzoekt bestaande wetgeving en 
verdragen om te bepalen welke van toepassing zouden kunnen zijn op offshore 
methaanhydraten. Tevens wordt onderzocht of deze risicobeheersing strategieën 
ook in overeenstemming zijn met de aanbevelingen in het tweede deel van dit 
onderzoek. Geconcludeerd kan worden dat het merendeel van de onderzochte 
wetgeving een strategie volgt, gebaseerd op aansprakelijkheid, in combinatie met 
publieke regelgeving, maar dat veel van de huidige wetgeving gericht op de 
regulering van offshore olie en gas activiteiten niet gekoppeld kan worden aan de 
specifieke omstandigheden van methaanhydraten. 
 In het vierde deel van het onderzoek wordt een samenvatting van de drie 
eerdere delen geboden en wordt een aantal aanbevelingen gedaan om de bestaande 
wetgeving aan te passen, zodat deze eveneens toepasbaar is op de ontwikkeling van 
de exploitatie en productie van offshore methaanhydraten.  
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